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Abstract
In the past years, the relevance of Thomas Aquinas’s theory of cognition for 
contemporary debates on epistemology has been widely discussed. That theory claims that 
mind and world aie formally identical and tliat this relationship overcomes various problems 
associated with scepticism concerning mental representation. The proposal, however, is 
grounded on the idea that die world can act on die mind through a relation of formal 
causation. This thesis attempts to develop a Thomistic theory of formal causation which may 
be suitable for a realist account of mental representation and wMch may meet die 
requirements prompted by current discussions.
The suggested view is grounded on Aquinas’s metaphysics, according to which die 
world is constituted of substances. The claim that change is possible since substances are 
hylomorpliically constituted (viz., metaphysically composed of fonn and matter) is 
defended. Aquinas’s claim that some substances have forms which may act independently of 
matter is also supported. The paradigmatic examples are human souls, i.e. die forms of 
human beings, whose higher cognitive capacity, i.e. thinking, can be m principle carried on 
widiout die need of any material organ. A Thomistic theory of causation is subsequently 
proposed. It is argued that hylomorphism explains the distinction among four” species of 
causes (material, formal, final and efficient). Aquinas’s attempt to explain causal relations 
conditionally is developed along die lines suggested by John Mackie’s INTS conditional 
analysis. Jaegwon Kim’s implementation of Mackie’s proposal through an object-based 
metaphysics of events is tiien adapted to the hylomorphical account of substances. On these 
grounds, a dieory of formal causation can be proposed and applied to Aquinas’s theory of 
mental representation. Tlie ensuing proposal is offered not in the spirit of historical exegesis 
but as a substantive philosophical account and it is Thomistic only in die broad sense that it is 
built on Aquinas’s metaphysics and is consistent witii his claims on causation.
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Introduction
In the last few decades, analytical philosophers have increasingly become 
interested in a broad variety of traditional philosophical issues and have relaxed if
not abandoned their original confinement to the analysis of logic and language. The 
refined and articulated arguments of analytical philosophers have consequently been 
focused also on ethics, political philosophy, the philosophy of mind, metaphysics and 
so on. This broadening of interests has induced a greater attention for history. Great 
philosophers of the past have come to be seen as the supporters of philosophical 
views which may still have some interest in contemporary debates; and the history of 
philosophy has began to appear as a storehouse of philosophical argumentation, 
which sometimes took entire centuries to be fully developed. The interest of these 
philosophical d ebates lies in the f act t hat t hey constitute s amples o f p hilosophical 
possibilities which open up when some of the assumptions normally shared in 
contemporary discussions are given up, or at least suspended.
Thomas Aquinas, the 13th Century master at the University of Paris, is one of 
the great figures of the past who has received most attention in the context of this 
novel interest for the history of philosophy. Following the seminal work of Peter 
Geach, who was the first analytical philosopher to focus on his thought, most areas 
of philosophy covered by Aquinas have been considered in the light of his work by 
contemporary thinkers writing in the English-speaking tradition. Just to recall the 
main examples, his philosophy of law and his philosophy of politics have been 
discussed by John Finnis (1998), his ethics by Alasdair MacIntyre, and his 
philosophy of mind by Anthony Kenny (1993). Several essays by analytical
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philosophers have also been published on his metaphysics, his theory oO cognition 
and his philosophy oO language. Such a wide interest has also given rise to the term 
'Analytical Thomism', which, since it w as Oirst used by John Haldane in the early 
1990s and later as the title oO an issue oO The Monist edited by him in 1997, came to 
reOer both to a new analytically oriented historiographical approach to Aquinas's 
texts and to a new trend in analytical philosophy.
The distinctive character oO Analytical Thomism was summarised by Haldane
in the preOatory note in the above mentioned issue oO The Monist'.
Analytical Thomism is not concerned to appropriate St. Thomas Oor the 
advancement oO any particular set oO doctrines. Equally, it is not a movement oO 
pious exegesis. Instead it seeks to deploy the methods and ideas oO twentieth- 
century philosophy - oO the sort dominant within the English-speaking world - 
in connection with the broad OOamework oO ideas introduced and developed by 
Aquinas. Form,, matter, existence, individuation, concepts, mental utterances, 
good, and evil all get some treatment by [analytical Thomists]. (Haldane, 
1997a, 486).
These remarks may help us to understand both the historiographical and 
philosophical aspects oO Analytical Thomism, Concerning historiography, the 
deployment oO "the methods and ideas" oO analytical philosophy may help to 
understand the coherence and the problems underlying Aquinas's views, and this, in 
turn, may help a charitable interpretation and thus a better understanding oO his 
philosophy. Concerning philosophy, some oO Aquinas's arguments may have a 
theoretical interest even within contemporary debates, and, consequently, one may 
try to elaborate and articulate them with the "methods and ideas" oO contemporary 
philosophy and to support them in current discussions, hi this sense, Analytical 
Thomism is not an attempt to oOOer a "pious exegesis", viz. to support the doctrines oO 
Aquinas to the point oO giving up philosophical credibility.
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The philosophical concern of Analytical Thomism represents a very welcome 
novelty. As it is well known, the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas was for a long time 
one of the main philosophical trends of Catholic thought, and, since 1879, when pope 
Leo XIII wrote the encyclical letter Aeterni Patris, it even came close to being the 
official philosophy of the Catholic Church for almost a century. Although this 
promoted the study of his works and the production of critical editions of his texts, it 
also induced the idea that his thought has an exclusively Catholic concern. 
Furthermore, the fundamentally apologetic, "pious" character of traditional 
Thomistic studies confined him almost wholly within restricted Catholic circles. By 
contrast, the approach of Analytical Thomism opens his arguments to rational 
scrutiny and broad philosophical discussion. This may help to rediscover the value of 
his work, which, at least in many writings, he certainly meant to be genuinely 
philosophically engaged.
The present thesis is an attempt to contribute to Analytical Thomism, in both 
respects, the historiographical and the philosophical. The first two chapters are an 
example of Analytical Thomistic historiography, since they try to reconstruct and to 
show the plausibility of Aquinas's hylomorphism (i.e., the view that material reality 
is made of substances composed of form and matter) and his conception of the 
human mind. Chapters three to five, instead, are mainly philosophical, since they 
attempt to offer an account of formal causation and mental representation which is 
grounded on Aquinas's metaphysics, but is also engaged with contemporary debates, 
in a way which requires the development of views which were not spelled out by 
Aquinas himself. Thus, whereas the first two chapters are on Aquinas, the last three 
are not on Aquinas, but are Thomistic, in the sense that they offer arguments which 
are grounded on Aquinas's positions, but were not explicitly proposed by him.
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The issue of formal causation and mental representation fits into one of the 
central areas of philosophy, i.e. epistemology, which is also one of the most lively 
topics discussed by Analytical Thomists. The contribution of Analytical Thomism to 
contemporary epistemology was first advanced by Taldane (1988, 1992b, and 
1993a) in connection with Hilary Putnam's discontent with metaphysical realism. As 
it is well known, Putnam (1981) argued that the versions of realism previously 
supported by himself faced some insurmountable difficulties, since there is no 
naturalistically acceptable account of how the mind hooks onto the world. Even 
causal theories of reference, which are the most widespread and promising solutions, 
cannot but fail: his permutation argument showed that there is no way to pick a 
unique or even dominant causal link which may secure the referent of each linguistic 
term. Haldane's contention was that the problems which arose from the permutation 
argument can be avoided if one accepts a Thomistic conception of thought, according 
to which thought and reality are formally identical, i.e. there is some ontological 
isomorphism between acts of thought and thought objects. The notion of formal 
identity can secure reference, though, only at the cost of giving up physicalism: 
intentionality must be taken as a primitive notion, irreducible to physical states of the 
brain, and involving a relation of formal causation between world and mind. 
Thomistic mental representation presupposes Aquinas's metaphysics.
Putnam (1993) agreed that Haldane's thesis has the suggested epistemological 
advantages, but he also pointed out two problems. First, he asked for an articulated 
explanation of the ideas that world and mind are fonnally identical and that the mind 
takes over the fonn of the world (Putnam 1993, 71). Second, he complained that one 
may think about a certain object even if one lacks the relevant concept, i.e., in 
Thomistic terms, has not taken over its form (Putnam 1993, 72-4). Subsequent
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articles by Haldane addressed these issues (1993b, 1996, 1998, et al), and Putnam
himselO came Oinally to accept the merits oO a broadly Aristotelian metaphysics in his
1994 Dewey Lectures (Putnam 1994), now part oO his book The Threefold Cord
(Putnam 1999). For example, he suggested that a purely causal relation between the
world and the mind cannot account Oor cognitive content, and consequently some
version oO Aristotelian direct realism needs to be developed:
It is the Oashion to hypothesise the existence oO "representations" in the cerebral 
computer [...] and to think that those "representations" are linked to objects in 
the organism’s environment only causally, and not cognitively. [...] This 
picture [...] is disastrous Oor just about every part oO metaphysics and 
epistemology. [...] The key assumption responsible Oor the disaster is the idea 
that there has to be an interOace between our cognitive powers and the external 
world. 1
A quite lively debate on Thomistic epistemology Oollowed these exchanges. 
Discussions Oocused both on the details oO Haldane's proposal (Boulter 1997 and 
1998 and De Amra 2000a) and on other epistemological advantages oO Aquinas's 
realism. Jonathan Jacobs and John Zeis (1997), Oor example, argued that Thomistic 
epistemology and metaphysics can meet the challenge oO Quine's thesis on 
ontological relativity - as well as other versions oO scepticism about semantic 
meaning such as those induced by Kripke's and Goodman's paradoxes. According to 
Jacobs and Zeis, the indeterminacy oO reOerence is the result oO the idea that sense 
experience underdetennines concept Oonnation, but this, in turn, is the result oO the 
presumption that one must be able to justify one's use oO concepts through his sense 
experiences. IO one gives up this internalist assumption and accounts Oor concept 
Oormation through the idea that there is a relation oO Oormal causation between 
experiences and concepts, scepticism on meaning can be overcome.
‘ Putnam 1994, 452-3 .
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In the past, I reconstructed and critically discussed these debates in a doctorial 
thesis presented to the University of Padua, Italy, in December 1999, for the degree 
of dottore di ricerca. A revised version of that thesis was subsequently published as a 
book (De Anna 2001). Since the topic of the present work emerged from problems 
which I pointed out there, I believe it is worthy to recapitulate my previous results. 
The Padua thesis was divided in three parts, each containing two chapters. The first 
part concerned the epistemological background of the Thomistic proposal, especially 
in connection with Putnam's antirealism. The second part was a critical 
reconstruction of the epistemological and metaphysical realism suggested by 
Analytical Thomists. In the third part I addressed the issue of formal identity in 
sensation, both in relation to an exegetical problem and to a philosophical one. (For a 
complete, brief summary of that thesis see the Appendix).
The first part attempted to account for the reasons which led Putnam to accept 
antirealism. The first chapter analysed the brands of metaphysical realism consistent 
with analytical naturalistic orthodoxy and the second the reasons for which Putnam 
abandoned realism. It was not a mere reconstruction, but the considerations
concerning realism and Putnam's objections to it aimed at supporting the following 
thesis, sketched by Haldane (1993a). The conjunction of metaphysical realism and 
naturalism implies semantic realism. Putnam had effectively shown that semantic 
realism is unacceptable, and, consequently, also the conjunction of metaphysical 
realism and naturalism is unacceptable. Putnam tried to solve the problem without 
renouncing naturalistic orthodoxy and so gave up metaphysical realism. This,
however, led him towards relativistic conclusions which he himself found
unacceptable. The trouble with relativism is that it fails to explain our experiential
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constraints, since it does not allow us to think about reality in terms of mind 
independent structures.
hi the second part, I expounded and defended proposals arising out of 
Analytical Thomism. Chapter three deals with reasons to g ive up naturalism, and, 
thus, w ith the p ossibility of a c onception o f i ntentionality s uch as A quinas's. T his 
involves the formal identity between mind and world. Chapter four dealt with the 
epistemological advantages of this form of intentionalism: one may give up the 
conjunction of metaphysical realism and naturalism by maintaining the former and 
giving up the latter. The resulting brand of semantic realism is not the extreme 
version described in chapter one and is not open to the problems of referential 
permutation highlighted by Putnam. I also defended against an objection due to 
Stephen Boulter the idea that Thomistic semantic realism differs from the 
problematic versions associated with naturalism. (This defence is also published in 
English: cf. De Anna 2000a).
The third part of the Padua thesis dealt with some problems of Aquinas's theory 
of cognition, which is the ground of the proposal under discussion in this thesis. As 
mentioned above, the work of Analytical Thomists must involve both the accurate 
reconstmction of Aquinas's thought and the advancement of some of his theses in 
contemporary debates. The third part attempted to be a contribution in both respects. 
Chapter five was mainly historical and focused on the first stages of the cognitive 
process described by Aquinas, i.e. the reception of sensible per se forms by the 
senses. Chapter six focused on the Thomistic idea that colours, odours, etc., are real 
properties of things. I did not mention Aquinas at all in this context, but I defended 
this idea in connection with the simple view of colours, recently suggested by Jolm 
Campbell.
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The conclusion oO my work was that the Thomistic proposal may be a 
respectable contender in contemporary debates, but it had one main urgent problem 
to solve; it needed to oOOer an articulated and satisOymg account oO Oormal causation 
and its metaphysical presuppositions. Indeed, the hopes oO Thomistic epistemology 
rest on Aquinas's account oO cognition which claims that, and explains how the mind 
becomes Oormally identical to the world. The cognitive process, in Aquinas's 
reconstruction, involves the recurrent use oO the notion oO Oormal causation, which is 
heavily entangled with Aquinas's hylomorphic metaphysics. Consequently, it 
appeared to me that three tasks were in urgent need oO attention. First, to clariOy the 
metaphysical presuppositions oO Oormal causation; second, to oOOer a satisOying 
analysis oO causation in general and Oormal causation in particular; and third, to 
veriOy whether and how the suggested analysis oO causation - and Oormal causation in 
particular - could serve the purposes oO the Thomistic account oO cognition, and, 
ultimately, oO mental representation.
The goal oO the present work is to address these tasks. Chapters one and two 
examine the metaphysical outlook which grounds Aquinas's theory oO cognition. 
Chapters three and Oour sketch a Thomistic theory oO causation, consistent with the 
metaphysical claims previously discussed. Chapter Oive shows that and how the 
proposed account oO causation Oits in a Thomistic theory oO cognition. As mentioned 
above, the Oirst two chapters are historical and closer to Aquinas's actual claims, the 
last three are Thomistic in the broader sense that they suggest a theory oO Oormal 
causation and mental representation which goes beyond Aquinas's thought, but 
which are consistent with it. It may be useOul to give a closer account oO what I will 
attempt to do in each chapter.
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The general outlines of Aquinas’s metaphysics are considered in chapter one. 
Both Aquinas’s theory of causation and his views on cognition are grounded on the 
premise that reality is composed of hylomorphically constituted substances. The 
idea, of course, is older than Aquinas and, in the form taken over by him, it dates as 
far back as Aristotle. Aristotle’s claims about the priority of substances, however, are 
quite tricky, and ancient and contemporary commentators have always struggled to 
formulate his arguments for substance priority in a way which renders them sound. I 
will offer an exegesis of Aquinas’s commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics which 
makes plausible the claim on substance priority. Since the general purpose is that of 
supporting some of Aquinas’s views on formal causation in contemporary debates, I 
will also need to deal with the hopes, in current discussions, of a metaphysics based 
on hylomophically constituted substances. This will lead me to deal with some 
objections to substance based metaphysics recently advanced by Peter Simons, and 
with some worries about hylomorphism raised by E. J. Lowe. In the rest of the 
chapter I will discuss Aquinas’s views on the distinction between substantial and 
accidental forms, and on the notion of matter as a principle of individuation.
Chapter two completes the analysis of the metaphysical presuppositions of 
Aquinas’s theory of mental representation with a focus on the human intellect. Since 
Aquinas takes cognition to be a causal relation between mind and world, and the 
grasping of universals to involve an immaterial faculty of the mind (i.e., the 
intellect), I will discuss Aquinas’s reasons to claim that in reality there are substances 
which have immaterial cognitive faculties. This will require an overview of the 
overall project carried out by Aristotle in his Physics and continued in his De anima. 
The Physics, indeed, analyses material reality and the De anima completes that 
analysis by studying living sensible material objects. Cognition emerges as a bundle
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of abilities which characterises some forms of life. Humans, furthermore, have 
special cognitive abilities (conceptual thought, or, in Thomistic terms, 'intellection') 
in addition to those shared by other animals. These special abilities, though, can only 
be exercised by something immaterial. The soundness of Aquinas’s reasoning 
concerning the immateriality of the intellect has recently been questioned by Robert 
Pasnau. I will defend Aquinas’s arguments against this challenge. I believe that the 
defence will ultimately be successful, and this is an important point besides the mere 
exegetical interest: much of Aquinas’s account of thought, as it will be clear in 
chapter five, depends on his assumption that the intellect is immaterial and that its 
contents (intelligible species) are universal since they are not individuated by matter.
The problems of causation will be addressed in chapter three, which will focus 
on causal relations. Aquinas does not say much about causal relations, besides 
repeating the Aristotelian fourfold distinction between efficient, material, formal, and 
final causes; and articulating it with various claims about the interrelations between 
different kinds of causes in causal chains and causal explanatory patterns. But he 
does make the very interesting claim that causal relations can be analysed as 
conditional relations (“the effect would not have occurred if the cause had not 
occurred”). This will allow me to develop a Thomistic theory of causation which will 
go beyond Aquinas. Indeed, I will suggest that a conditional analysis can be 
developed either in counterfactual terms (along the line suggested by Lewis), or 
along the lines of Mackie’s INUS conditional proposal (according to which a cause is 
an Insufficient Necessary conjunct of a Unnecessary Sufficient condition of the 
effect, viz. INTS condition). Since Aquinas’s metaphysics is incompatible with the 
ontology of possible worlds presupposed by counterfactual analyses, I will try to 
develop his views in the terms of an INUS conditional analysis of causation. The
14
challenge will be that oO showing that the OourOold distinction oO kinds oO causes, and 
the other distinctions suggested by Aquinas, are compatible with an INUS 
conditional analysis oO causal relations.
Chapter Oour also concerns causation, but it will Oocus on causal relata. 
Developing Aquinas's theory along the lines suggested by Mackie may be 
problematic, since Aquinas takes substances and their hylomorphic components to be 
causal relata, whereas according to Mackie only events may be causes and eOOects. 
Mackie's theory, however, was criticised precisely Oor its unsatisOactory treatment oO 
the individuation oO events. An implementation oO his proposal suggested by Kim 
overcame this diOOiculty, tlnough a substance-based theory oO the individuation oO 
events. This may reconcile Aquinas's views with Mackie's: I will claim that when 
we take events to be INUS conditionally related as causes and eOOect, and when 
events are identified by the substances involved in them, it makes sense to claim that 
substances and their hylomorophic components are INUS conditionally related, and, 
thus, can be causes and eOOects. The individuation oO events suggested by Kim will 
allow me also to oOOer an explanation oO why we need the OourOold distinction among 
kinds oO causes put Oorward by Aristotle and accepted by Aquinas. The hylomorphic 
composition oO substances discussed in chapter one will be the ground oO the 
suggested theory oO causation, which will prove able to accommodate also the 
possibility oO immaterial substances introduced in chapter two. The chapter will end 
with some considerations on Oormal causation and Oormal identity.
The OiOth and final chapter will be an attempt to apply the theory oO causation, 
especially Oormal causation, developed in chapters tlnee and Oour, to Aquinas's 
theory oO cognition, which is based on the metaphysical outlook considered in 
chapters one and two. I will oOOer a brieO summary oO the cognitive process described
15
by Aquinas and will try to highlight the key-points at which formal causation plays a 
crucial role. Subsequently, I will show how each of those key-points can be 
accounted for in the terms of the theory of causation proposed in the previous 
chapters. Finally, I will claim that the proposed view offers a satisfying explanation 
of the notion of formal identity between mind and world, and can explain some 
features of concept formation which may seem problematic within a Thomistic
outlook.
A final practical remark. All quotations make reference to authors and dates of 
publication, as recorded in bibliography. The only exceptions concern Aristotle and
Aquinas, whose works are referred to without mentioning the authors, through the 
titles which they are given in the bibliography.
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Chapter One
Aquinas on the Priority and Hylomorphic Composition of
Substances
1.1 Aquinas and Arissotle’s Metaphysics
Aquinas developed his metaphysical views in his commentaries on Aristotle's 
work, and this is why it is often believed that he was an Aristotelian. However, 
although the influence of Aristotle on him was certainly very strong, it is now 
commonly accepted that he was deeply influenced by Platonism as well. In 
discussing his m etaphysics, I will not try to s ettle the q uestion o f w ho i nfluenced 
each of his theses. I am only interested in his views. Thus, although I will mention 
Aristotle quite often and ignore Plato, I do not mean to undervalue the influence of 
Plato on Aquinas. The fact, however, is that Aquinas's (main) treatments of the 
problems I am interested in are in his commentaries on Aristotle.
In the next section, I will mention two of the problems with Aristotle’s theory 
of substances: the problem of priority, and the problem of the very nature of 
substances. This is necessary since Aquinas developed his own views by building on 
those of Aristotle. In section three, I will reconstruct Aquinas’s thesis of the priority 
of s ubstances. I will c laim that an argument for the priority of substances t hat h e 
offered is rather weak, but that he has the resources to make it stronger. In section 
four, I will defend his views on substance priority from a recent criticism due to 
Peter Simons, hi section five, I will mention Aquinas's reasons for maintaining
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hylomorphitm (the view according to which substances are composed oO Oorm and 
matter) and I will discuss Aquinas's conception oO substantial Oorm. I will address his 
surprising thesis according to which natural things are substances, but arteOacts are 
not. In the sixth and final section, I will discuss some problems concerning Aquinas's 
idea oO matter, in reOerence to recent criticisms due to E. J. Lowe and to Christopher 
Hughes.
The purpose oO the present chapter, as well as that oO the Oollowing one, is to 
reconstruct those aspects oO Aquinas's metaphysical outlook, which constitute the 
background oO his theory oO Oormal causation, which is recalled in the recent debates 
on mental representation considered in this work. Thus, the intent is not mainly that 
oO providing a historically accurate exegesis, but that oO considering the strength and 
the plausibility oO those views. In the light oO this consideration, Simon's, Lowe's and 
Hughes's criticisms oO Aquinas's theses on substances presented in this chapter need 
to be addressed, iO Aquinas's notion oO Oormal causation is to be proposed as a 
contender in contemporary debates.
1.2 of Aristotle’s theory of Substance
Aquinas Oollowed Aristotle in taking reality to be constituted ultimately oO 
substances. This view is actually a conjunction oO two claims, both oO which need 
support: thus one may expect both an explanation oO what substances are, and a 
justification oO the claim that they are the ultimate constituents oO reality. There are 
two main places where Aristotle attempts to do this, Oirst in the Categories, and then 
in Metaphysics Z. In the Categories, Aristotle writes:
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A substance [...] is that which is neither said of a subject nor in a subject, e.g. 
the individual man or the individual horse. The species in which the things 
primarily called substances are, are called secondary substances, as also the 
genera of these [e.g. man and animal]. [...] If something is said of a subject 
both its name and its definition are necessarily predicated of the subject. For 
example man is said of a subject, the individual man, and the name is of course 
predicated [...], and also the definition of man will be predicated of the 
individual man. [...] But as for things which are in a subject, in most cases, 
neither the name, nor the definition is predicated of the subject. In some cases 
there is nothing to prevent the name from being predicated of the subject, but it 
is impossible for the definition to be predicated. For example, white, which is 
in a subject (the body), is predicated of the subject; for a body is called white. 
But the definition of white will never be predicated of the body.?
From the example we are offered (i.e. an individual man), we can gather that, 
according to Aristotle, a substance in a strict sense (or a primary substance, as 
sometimes Aristotle says) is paradigmatically a concrete individual. He differentiates 
substances i n t his s trict sense, from se condary su bstances, i .e. u niversals ( such a s 
man or animal), which can be "said of' and whose names can be "predicated of' 
concrete individuals.* 2 *Universals of this sort are such that their definitions can also 
be predicated of the individuals of which their names can be predicated. If an 
individual m can be truly said to be a man, and 'rational animal' is the definition of 
'man', then m can be truly said to be a rational animal. Other things, i.e. properties, 
relations and states, have names which might or might not be predicated of concrete 
individuals, but whose definitions certainly cannot be predicated of those same 
individuals: such things are (or inhere) in those individuals? Let us assume that the
1 Categories, 2a 11-33
2 'Being said of and 'being predicated of are not equivalent: "The fact that A is said of B is not the 
fact that 'A' is predicable of B. The fact that A is said of B is not even the fact that both 'A' and the 
definition of A are predicable of B. This is fact about language that follows from that fact about the 
relation between things" (Ackrill 1963, 82).
2 Aristotle listed nine categories (i.e., kinds of predicates), other than substances. These are either 
properties (e.g., 'to be white'), relations (e.g., to be taller than') or states (e.g., 'to be running').
According to Aristotle, all these things are in substances, contrary to what we would say: in fact, we 
would claim that properties are in individuals, but that individuals are in relations or states. His 
reasons for claiming that, besides, probably, some characteristic of Greek, has to do with the fact that 
both relations and states individuals are in, depend on features intrinsic to those individuals.
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individual man m is white, and that white is a colour by definition: m can be tmly
said to be white, but not to be a colour. So white is in m.
In this way, Aristotle seems to give an account of what substances are. This 
account is based on some properties of predication which differentiate terms 
referring to concrete individuals from universals and from terms for properties, 
relations, and states. Thus it provides a criterion for substantiality which may be 
called the 'predicamental criterion' (hereafter PC). Then, he can go on to say in what 
sense they are the ultimate constituents of reality: they are metaphysically prior in 
respect to all other things.
All the other things are either said of the primary substances as subjects or in 
them as subjects. So if the primary substances did not exist it would be 
impossible for any of the other things to exist.4
Metaphysical priority therefore is to be taken in the sense that what is metaphysically 
prior needs necessarily to exist if what is posterior is also to exist. According to this 
criterion, primary substances would be prior both to the secondary substances which 
are said of them, and to the properties, relations, and states which are in them.
This treatment of substances, though, is problematic for at least three reasons. 
Aristotle himself, in later works, did not mention further the distinction between 
primary and secondary substances, although he probably maintained it/ and in the 
Metaphysics he tried to improve his account of substantiality through a different, 
although possibly partially compatible, theory, which will be considered below.
First, it is not clear what the metaphysical relation between primary and 
secondary substances is, although Aristotle's distinctions may be satisfying as far as 
grammar, or even logic, is concerned. Even assuming that it is true that a secondary 
substance exists only if some particular primary substance exists, do they have the
4 Categories, 2b 4-6.
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same kind oO existence? Primary substances, and even properties, can be objects oO 
sensible experience, but this is not the case oO secondary substances: do they exist in 
a realm separate Orom the material world? In any case, how can an individual be also 
man and animal? An answer to these questions must have been particularly pressing 
Oor Aristotle, given the Oact that his main aim in stating PC was to prepare the terrain 
to claim the metaphysical priority oO concrete individuals over universals, in order to 
give an account oO universals alternative to that oO Plato.
Second, concerning things which are in a subject, Aristotle Oails to distinguish 
between individual properties, relations and states and the corresponding universals. 
His view entails that when an individual man m can be truly said to be white, it Oalls 
under the universal concept white; but what is in m is a particular instance oO white, 
not the universal concept which can be predicated oO m. However, he Oailed to note
this distinction.
Third, the criterion Oor metaphysical priority is problematic. It is only possibly 
true what Aristotle says, i.e. that no secondary substance (e.g., the property oO being 
an animal) could exist iO no primary substance (e.g., some individual animal which 
instantiates the property oObeing an animal) exists, since one could maintain that 
there are uninstantraied universals. Unless Aristotle has some Ourther argument to 
reject this Platonic possibility, it would be question-begging to use the claim that 
substances are prior to support a view alternative to Plato. At the same time, 
Ourthermore, the reverse oO Arittotle't criterion seems to be true: no primary 
substance (e.g. an individual thing, like a stone) could exist iO it were not a thing oO a 
certain kind, i.e. iO some particular secondary substances (e.g., the property oO being a 
stone) did not exist. This means, though, that, according to this criterion secondary 
substances are metaphysically prior to primary substances.
5 Cf. Ackiill 1963,81 .
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In a similar manner, properties, relations and states could turn out to be prior to 
primary substances. In this case there are two possibilities. If we take properties as 
universals, we could claim that, since a stone must be some colour, if no colour 
property existed, no stone could have existed. Similarly, if we take properties as 
individuals, we could claim that a particular instance of a colour could exist even if 
the subject in which it inheres goes out of existence. For example, the whiteness of 
Socrates went on existing after Socrates died, and the whiteness of a statue may keep 
existing even if we break the statue in pieces.
Someone could suggest that there is also a fourth problem. From the examples 
offered by Aristotle, it seems clear that he takes substances to be concrete 
individuals, but PC could be mistakenly taken to apply to universals and properties 
just as well: animality, for example, can be said of humanity, and rationality is in it, 
thus one could believe that, according to PC, humanity should be as good a candidate 
for substantiality as any individual man. The same is true, the objector could say, of 
properties: things can be predicated of them both as being said of and as being in 
them, and, thus, they should also be substances? Although this objection is based on 
a misunderstanding of PC, it may be useful to discuss it, since this may help to 
explain the criterion. The misunderstanding is due to the fact that PC does not claim 
that a nything w hich h as t hings in it or said of it is a s ubstance, but t hat a nything 
which cannot be in or said of anything else is a substance. Although universals and 
properties have things in and said of them, they also are in or said of something else. 
Naturally this response rests on the assumption, shared by Aristotle? that the
2 Simons (1998, 237), for example, suggests that any things that could be ultimate subjects of 
predication would turn out to be substances: thus particulars as individual properties, relations and 
states would also be substances, and this jeopardises the attempt to ground the distinction between 
substances and things which are in substances of the predicamental criterion.
2 "Aristotle recognises that [...] 'generosity' and 'generous' do not serve to introduce two different 
things (we should say 'concepts'), but introduce the same thing in two different ways" (Ackrill 1963, 
82).
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semantic values of the concept white and of the noun 'white' are identical, i.e. that the 
colour white, and the property of being white are the same thing.
Maybe it is in order to overcome (at least some of) the three problems above
that Aristotle treated the theory of substance again in the Metaphysics, In book Z, in
fact, he wrote:
On the one hand [what is] signifies what a thing is and a this, and on the other 
of what quality or quantity or any of the other things thus predicated. But while 
what is is spoken of in these various ways, it is clear that the primary thing that 
is is what a thing is, which signifies [its?] substance. [...] what primarily is - 
not is something but is without qualification - will be substance. Now we speak 
of what is primary in many ways, but substance is primary in every way - in 
definition, in knowledge, and in time. For none of the other predicates is 
separable but this alone; and in definition too it is primary, since in the 
definition of everything there must occur the definition of a substance; and we 
think we know a thing most fully when we know what the man is, or the fire, 
rather than when we know its quality or quantity or place4
We can note that here Aristotle seems to have a more articulated theory of the 
priority of substances than in the Categories: he now lists three criteria according to 
which substances would be prior, instead of one. Concerning the nature of 
substances, he mentions something which may look like a new criterion for 
substantiality, possibly alternative to PC: a substance is a being (what is) which is 
not "something", but is "without qualification." Before discussing this criterion, let us 
consider that, as in the Categories' Aristotle maintains the distinction between items 
which are substances and items which are in other categories (quality, quantity, etc.). 
When speaking of substances, though, he does not distinguish between primary and 
secondary ones, and, actually, he seems to treat both together ('what a thing is', in 
fact, seems to refer to a secondary substance, and 'a this' [such and such] to a primary 
one).
8 Metaphysics, Z, 1, 1028 a 12 - 1028 b 2,
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According to D. Bostock, the issue oO whether Aristotle reOers to primary or 
secondary substances is "the main problem oO the interpretation oO Z, i" (Bostock 
1994, 54). Aquinas {ME, VII, lectures 1 and 2), on the other hand, seems to believe 
that Aristotle is purposely vague at this point, since his main concern would only be 
to support the idea that substances are prior; only in Z, 2, would Aristotle start 
dealing with the problem oO deciding what a substance is, and at that point he 
considers Oour options: a) "quiddity, essential structure, or nature", b) a universal, c) 
Oirst genus, i.e. unity and being, d) an individual. According to Aquinas, though, 
Aristotle's vagueness in Z, 1, does not depend on an indecision between primary (d) 
and secondary (b and/or c) substances. He takes 'what is' to reOer to quiddity, or 
essence; a sense oO ’substance' not yet introduced in Z, i, and ignored in the 
Categories. This would be a novel sense oO the term, introduced in the Metaphysics,
and Oundamental in order to understand the diOOerence and the relations between the
theory oO the Categories, and that oO the Metaphysics.
The division oO substance given here [Metaphysics] is almost the same as that 
given in the Categories, Oor by subject here is understood Oirst substance [d)]. 
And what he called the genus and the universal [b) and c)], which seem to 
pertain to genus and species, are contained under second substances. However, 
the essence, which is given here, is omitted in that work, because it belongs in 
the predicamental order only as a principle; Oor it is neither a genus nor a 
species nor an individual thing, but as the Oormal principle oO all these things.9
The Categories is a study oO predication, and as Oar as kinds oO predications are 
concerned, only genera, species, and individuals are relevant. This is precisely the 
result that Aristotle obtained when he Oormulated PC. Metaphysics, though, deals 
with reality and its principles (by 'principle', Aquinas means a cause or a condition 5 * * *
5 ME, VII, loc. 2, 1275; "Undo patot quid foio oadom ott dsvitir tubttantiao hio prtita, cum ilia quao
prnitui in piaodicamontis. Nam poi subioctum intolligs^tui hio substantia piima. Quid autom dixit
genus ot universale, quid vidotui ad gonus ot spocios poitinoro, orntinotui sub substantiis socundis.
Hro autom quod quid erat esse hio prnitui, sod ibi piaotoimsttitur, quia nrn oadit in
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initiating a certain process; thus, for example, the premises are the principles of the 
conclusion of an inference, the laws of nature are principles of natural happenings, 
and God is the (first) principle of reality); concerning predication, it looks for the 
realities and the principles in virtue of which our language works as it does. 
According to Aquinas, "essence" (or "nature", or "quiddity") is the principle which 
explains the relations between universals and individuals which present themselves 
in the study of predication. Thus, according to him, Aristotle does not mention 
primary and secondary substances because, although that distinction still holds on the 
"predicamental level", metaphysics looks for the principles because of which both 
primary and secondary substances are substances. The distinction, then, would 
neither be rejected, nor forgotten in Aristotle's Metaphysics, it would just be analysed 
and explained by looking for the reasons why PC holds.
In order to enquire whether the theory of substances developed in the 
Metaphysics can overcome (at least some of) the problems that we pointed out in the 
theory of the Categories, one should ask himself whether the new threefold account 
of priority offers a suitable criterion for the priority of substances, and whether the 
theory of essence can explain the relation between primary and secondary substances 
prompted by PC. In the following sections we will deal with these two problems, 
through an analysis of Aquinas's own developments of Aristotle's theses. *
praedicamentorum ordine nisi sicut principium. Neque enim est genus neque species neque 
individuum, sed horum omnium formale principium,."
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1.3 Aqqinas aadt he Priotiist o o S sUstaacce
Aquinas developed his more systematic discussion of the priority of substance 
in the first two lectures of his commentary on the seventh book of Aristotle's 
Metaphysics (ME,, 1, lectures 1 and 2). In his arguments, he seems to assume two 
main views. Firstly, he takes the task of Metaphysics as that of studying reality in the 
sense of what exists, i.e. "being" (ens) or, in the terms of Bostock's translation of 
Aristotle, "what is" (to on). Since whatever can be said to be, is something which can 
be predicated, in one way or another, the study of being will be grounded on the 
study of the kinds of predication. Secondly, he takes for granted the study of 
predication offered by Aristotle in the Categories, in particular the results of PC, 
which leads towards a distinction between the ten categories (or kinds of predication) 
into two groups: substantial predication, on the one hand, and accidental predication, 
on the other (divided into nine kinds, concerning properties, relations and sta^"t^s^.w 
(Let us note that the use of the term 'accident' does not correspond completely to 
contemporary usage, since accidents for Aristotle and Aquinas include properties, 
namely what belongs to the nature of a thing as such and is not merely contingent, as 
'accident' now implies). Given all this, he takes Aristotle to show, in Metaphysics Z, 
1, that "being in the primary sense is the whatness of a thing, i.e. the being which 
signifies subs^aices/'11 This is how he reconstructs Aristotle's argument (let us call it 
the 'Priority Argument, hereafter PZ):
That which exists of itself and is a being in an unqualified sense is prior to that 
which exists by reason of something else and is a being in a qualified sense. 10 11
10 In fact in ME. (paragraph 1274 of the first lecture of book 7) he assumes that "the term being is used 
in many senses (as has been stated in Book V, where [Aristotle] distinguished the different senses in 
which terms of this kind are used)." Commenting the referred passage, he notes that ’’being is divided 
into substance and accident. This is clear from the fact that [Aristotle] divides essential being into the 
ten predicaments, nine of which belong to the class of accident" (ME, 5, 885, p. 320).
11 ME, 7, lec. 1, 1247, p. 426: "inter omnia entia, primum est quod quid est, idest ens quod significat 
substantiam."
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But substance is a being in an unqualified sense and exists oO itselO, whereas all 
classes oO beings other than substance are beings in a qualiOied sense and exist 
by reason oO substance. ThereOore substance is the primary kind oO being.12 13
As it is clear Orom the context, Aquinas's distinction between being in a
qualiOied sense and being in an unqualified sense amounts to this: a being in an 
unqualified sense is something which may simply be said to exist (e.g., 'a chair is', 
i.e. 'there is a chair' or ’a chair exists'), whereas a being in a qualified sense is 
something which may be said to be one way or another (e.g., 'a chair is broken' or 'a 
chair is white'). OO course, this distinction is grounded on the Oact that the verb to 
be had two senses (existential and predicamental) both in Greek and in Latin, as it 
still does in some modern languages. The existential sense oO 'to be' is not so 
common in modern English: 'a chair is' is not a plainly con'ect way to say that a chair 
exists, as the Latin 'sella est' is. The existential use, nonetheless, may still be present 
in English expressions such as 'there is a chair' or 'there are chairs', said in answer to 
a question such as 'is there anything in the room?' Although Aquinas distinguishes 
the two senses oO this verb, he also recognises that it is not a case oO homonymy 
(which, according to Aristotle's definition oO the Categories., chapter one, amounts to 
the use oO one term to reOer to two completely different and unrelated reOerents): 
althrugh in ’this is a chaii' and 'this (icfciTod tr tho chaii) is whito' tho voib to be is 
used existentially and predicamentally respectively, in both cases something about 
the existence oO the chair is said; in the Oirst case, existence is simply stated, in the 
other case, it is said in what way the chair exists.
12 ME, 1, loc. 1, 1248, p. 426; "Qurd ost poi so ot simplicitei in unrqurquo gcssoio, ost piius or qurd 
ost poi aliud ot socundum quid. Sod substantia ost ons simplicitoi ot poi soipsam: rmnia autom alia 
gonoia a substantia sunt ontia socundum quid ot poi substantiam: oigr substantia ost piima intoi alia 
ontia."
13 Crnsidoi, fri oxamplo, this statomont: "whon a thing bogins tr bo whito wo dr nrt say that it bogins 
tr bo in an unqualifiod sonso, but that it bogins tr bo whito. [...] Honco it is rbvirus that boing a man 
signifios boing in an unqualifiod sonso, but that boing whito signifios boing with srmo qualificatirn" 
(Aquinas, ME, VII, 1, 1256). Hoio it sooms cloai that "begins tr bo in an unqualifiod sonso" moans 
"begins tr oxist."
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Before discussing the plausibility of the major premise of the PA ("that which
exists of itself and is a being in an unqualified sense is prior to that which exists by
reason of something else and is a being in a qualified sense"*14 *Aquinas suggests
that the minor ("substance is a being in an unqualified sense and exists of itself,
whereas all classes of beings other than substance are beings in a qualified sense and
exist by reason of substance") receives support from Aristotle when he claims that
when we say of what quality a thing is we say that it is good or bad, but not 
that it is three feet long or a man; but when we say what it is we do not say that 
that it is pale or hot or three feet long, but that it is a man or a god.1?
Thus, a thing (i.e., an individual) can be predicated in two different ways: we can say 
how it is, what properties, relations and states it has, or we can say "what it is", i.e. 
what kind of individual it is. This mirrors the distinction introduced by PC: an 
individual is a primary substance, which camiot be predicated of anything else, and 
the two kinds of predications correspond respectively to saying that properties, 
relations or states are in a subject (accidents), and to saying things of a subject (i.e., 
that they are things of certain kinds, that they are substances in the secondary sense).
The point of the last quotation from Aristotle, according to Aquinas, is to show 
that predications which say something of a subject (i.e., which say that primary 
substances are certain kinds of secondary substances) are predications which use the 
existential sense of ’being’ (i.e., "being in an unqualified sense"), whereas 
predications which say that something is in a subject (i.e., predications of accidents, 
in the sense of the nine categories other than substance) use the predicamental sense 
of 'being' (i.e., "being in a qualified sense"):
14 Although the argument is not a syllogism, at least not in one of the traditional Aristotelian forms, 
Aquinas refers to one of the two premises as "the minor premise", since, like in normal syllogisms, it 
contains the term which constitutes the subject of the conclusion.
^Metaphysics, Z, 1, 1028 a 15-18.
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terms signifying substance express what a thing is in an unqualified sense, 
whereas those signifying quality do not express what a thing is in an 
unqualified sense, but what sort16 17 18of thing it is. The same is true of quantity and 
the other genera. *4
The point seems to be that saying that some % is an F, where P is a predicate 
sematically related to a species or a genus-concept, is attributing to x being in an 
unqualified sense, i.e. existence. Why would that be so? A traditional interpretation 
of this identity is that in order to be able to say that some x exists we have be able to 
identify x, and this requires that we may decide (at least some of) the properties 
which necessarily belong to it among all those present in current circumstance. This, 
though, requires that we may be able to say that % is an F, i.e. an individual of some 
kind or other. Let us imagine that there is a dressed man in front of us: we can say 
that there is either one thing (the man plus his clothes) or, let us say, five things (the 
man, a pair of trousers, a shirt, two shoes) in front of us: it depends on what we take 
to constitute a thing, i.e. on what concept we apply to pick out the thing(s) which we 
claim to exist. So whenever we claim that there is a thing, we identify it as an 
individual belonging to some kind, as a thing falling some sortal concept, in the 
modem (Wiggins's) sense of the term. On the other hand, when we say that 
something has some property, is in some relation with something else, or is in a 
certain state we assume its existence as an object of some kind (the fact that it has
16 'Sort', here, has not to be taken in the now usual sense in which it appears in the expression 'sortal 
concept.' Especially after Wiggins 1980, 'sort' came to mean the species and the genus, i.e. the 
secondary substances, to which an individual belongs. John P. Rowan, though, the translator of 
Aquinas's ME, used it to signify categorical kinds within the category of quality.
17 ME, VII, 1, 1250: ’’ilia quae significant substantiam, dicunt quid est aliquid absolute. Quae autem 
praedicant qualitatem, non dicunt quid est illud de quo praedicatur absolute, sed quale quid. Et simile 
est in quantitate, et aliis generibus."
18 The modern sense of 'sortal' referred to here is opposed to the other sense specified in note 16 
above. The upshot of this argument is that there must be at least nominal essences of things, as shown 
by Peter Geach (1956). Metaphysically more robust essentialist conclusions are reached by Wiggins 
(1980 and 2001, ch. 4: "Individuative Essentialism").
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being in an unqualified sense), and we attribute some qualification to its existence, 
we specify some way in which it exists (its being in a qualified sense).
Another distinction follows, according to Aquinas, from this distinction
between qualified and unqualified senses of'being':
From this [discussion of unqualified and qualified senses of 'being’] it is clea* 
that substance itself is said to be a being of itself, because terms which simply 
signify substance designate what this thing is. But other classes of things are 
said to be beings [...] because "they belong to such a being", i.e. because they 
have some coimection with substance, which is a being of itseU^.19 20
Abstracting from the question whether the being of any thing is ultimately dependent 
on that which is existent per se (which is the basis of Aquinas's argument for God in 
EE), a primary substance exists of itself, i.e. independently fiom anything else, since 
being in an unqualified sense is predicated of it. Whereas things which are not 
substances are always predicated in a qualified sense, which means that they are 
predicated of something which exists simpliciter: when one utters ’this is a chair', one 
claims that there is an object of a certain kind, but when one utters 't^his is white' 
(referred to the chair) one claims that an object (already identified, which, then, must 
be of a certain kind) can be qualified as having a certain property, i.e. as being white. 
Objects, though, c an be c laimed to have properties, to be in certain relations with 
other things, or to be in certain states only in so far as they can be identified, and this 
is possible only if they are of some kind. Hence, properties, relations, and states, i.e. 
things which are not substances, do not exist of themselves, but only in "connection 
with substance, which is a being of itself."
19 The expression 'a being of itself is introduced by John P. Rowan, the English translator of ME, for 
the latin 'ens per se'
20 ME, VII, 1, 1251: "Et ex hoc patet quod ipsa substantia dicitur ens ratione suiipsius, quia absolute 
significantia substantiam significant quid est hoc. Alia vero dicuntur entia [...] quod sunt talis entis, 
idest eo quod habent aliquam habitudinem ad substantiam quae est per se ens."
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Someone may advance an objection about PC, which we have already 
considered: since the distinction between qualiOied and unqualified senses oO 'being' 
is a criterion Oor substantiality, properties, relations and states could satisOy it, and, 
thus, OalsiOy the criterion. In the case oO PC, the problem was excluded since noun­
terms Oor properties, relations, or states were taken to have concepts as their semantic 
values just as the corresponding adjectives signiOying properties, relations, or states; 
in this way, properties, relations, and states could always be predicated oO other 
things, unlike substances. Aquinas proposes a similar deOence Oor the new criterion 
Oor substantiality: property, relation, and state terms, he notes, may seem to be 
predicable in an unqualiOied sense (to be "beings"), but this happens only "in the 
abstract", namely aOter the intellect, which "is capable by nature oO separating things 
which are united in reality", has abstracted some relevant concepts Orom reality. For 
example, we may say that white is, in an unqualified sense, only iO we have come to 
master the concept white aOter being acquainted with or otherwise related to white 
things through some appropriate causal links. Yet,
accidents signified in the abstract seem to be non-beings, because no one oO 
them is fitted by nature to exist oO itselO. In Oact the being oO each oO them 
consists in their existing in something else, and no one oO them is capable oO 
existing apart Orom substance. ThereOore when they are signified in the abstract 
as though they were beings oO themselves and separate Orom substance, they 
seem to be non-beings?,
Thus accidents, which are non-essential properties, relations, and states can 
only be treated as substances, i.e. predicated in an unqualiOied sense, in the abstract; 
this, though, means that they do not exist oO themselves in reality, but only in the 
mind (intellect). Hence, the two occurrences oO 'white' in the two sentences 'white is
21 ME, VII, 1, 1254: "cum sit natus dividoio oa quao socundum natuiam crniuncta sunl;."
22 Ibid., 1253: "vidontui accidontia in abstractr significata osso nrn ontia, quia nihil ipsri'um ost aptum 
natum socundum so osso; immr cuiuslibot orium osso ost altoii inosso, ot nrn ost prssibilo aliquid
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a nice colour for this window' and 'this chair is white' do not refer to two different
things (e.g., a particular colour and a functional property): both the noun and the 
adjective are semantically related to the same thing, the accidental property of being 
white which cannot exist of itself, but only in a substance. The corresponding 
concept of white can exist apart from substances, but only in the intellect, not in 
reality. Naturally, the noun and the adjective may have semantic relations of two 
different kinds with the property of being white, and what these are depend on one's 
semantic theory. What is important is that abstract nouns for accidents (non-essential 
properties, relations, and states) "signify beings which inhere in something else, 
although they do not signify them as inhering."
In this way, Aquinas seems to give a satisfying support to the minor premise of 
PA, but the strength of the conclusion depends also on the possibility of supporting 
the major premise. Why, given the above explanation of these terms, should we 
accept the claim that things which have being in an unqualified sense and, therefore, 
are beings of themselves, are prior to those which have being in a qualified sense 
and, therefore, are not beings of themselves? The plausibility of this thesis will 
depend largely on our understanding of priority. In fact, in his interpretation of 
Aristotle, Aquinas suggests that the support for the major premise comes from 
Aristotle's threefold definition of priority. Earlier in the Metaphysics, Aristotle had 
distinguished several senses of'priority' (Metaphysics, 5, 11, 1018 b 9 - 1019 a 14), 
but now he says that three of those senses concern substances: substances are prior in 
knowledge, in definition and in time.
The priority in time would be "proven" by this argument:
eorum separari a substantia; et ideo quando significantur in abstracto quasi sint secundum se entia et a 
substantia separata, videtur quod sint non entia."
23 ME, VII, 1, 1254: ’’nomina abstracta accidentium significant entia quae quidem inhaerent, licet non 
significent ea per modum inhaerentium."
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none of the other c ategories is capable of existing apart from substance, b ut 
substance alone is capable of existing apart from others; for no accident is 
found without a substance, but some substance is found without an accident. 
Thus it is clear that an accident does not exist when ever a substance does, but 
the reverse is true; and for this reason substance is prior in time."*
Priority in time seems to be similar to the priority which, as we have seen, 
Aristotle had already defined in the Categories. In that case, though, priority was just 
defined, whereas it is now "proven", i.e. it is argued for with an argument. However, 
it is not clear what the argument for the temporal priority of substances is. In the first 
sentence of the passage above, the quantification seems to range over categories; we 
can rephrase it like this
i) for each category, if it is not the of substance, then it cannot
exist apart from the category of substance; but if it is the category of 
substance, it can exist apart from any other category.
On the other hand, the second sentence seems to range over individuals (individual 
accidents and substances); it can be thus rephrased:
ii) it is not the case tliat there is a hinrg which is an individual accident and 
which can be found without a substance, but there are things which are 
substances and can be found without any accidents.
(These claims open some puzzling questions: what does ’existing apart' mean? What 
does ’be found without' mean? Let us just assume that 'a exists apart from 6' is 
equivalent to 'a is found without b\ and that they both mean that a and b are not in a 
inherence relation).
24 Ibid., 1257: "nullum aliorum praedicamentorum est separabile a substantia, sola autem substantia 
est separabilis ab aliis: nullum enim accidens invenitur sine substantia, sed aliqua substantia invenitur
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The third sentence ("thus it is clear that an accident does not exist whenever a 
substance does, but the reverse is true") is meant to Oollow Orom the previous two, 
since it begins with the word 'thus.' A normal way oO interpreting it would be to see it 
as a conjunction oO two material implications; granting a charitable interpretation oO 
the negation contained in it, such as to rule out some clearly implausible literary 
readings, it can then be interpreted as Oollows; it is not the case that Oor each thing, iO 
it is a substance then there is an accident; but it is the case that Oor each thing, iO it is
an accident then there is a substance.
This reading has the merit oO showing that the sentence under discussion 
Oollows Orom (ii): it means, in Oact, that there are substances which exist without any 
accidents, and this is precisely what (ii) claims. However, this reading has also a 
problem, since it does not explain how the Oourth claim oO Aquinas's argument (i.e., 
the conclusion) is supposed to Oollow Orom it: the conclusion is that there is a 
temporal priority oO substances, but there is no reOerence to time in the "material 
conditional" reading oO Aquinas's third claim. Thus, it is reasonable to look Oor a 
diOOerent reading oO that claim which may involve a reOerence to a temporal order oO 
the relation between substance and accidents. A Ourther reason to do this is that 
Aquinas uses the expression 'whenever', which can be read as 'iO, but also as 'at any 
time t when.' A straightforward way oO rendering Aquinas's claim, then, would be 
this: it is not the case that Oor each time t, and Oor each x, iO x is a substance and x 
exists at t, then there isa? which is an accident and exists at t\ but Oor each time t, 
and each x, iO there is an x which is an accident and x exists at t, then necessarily 
there is ay such that y is a substance and y exists at t.
invonitui sino accidonto. Et sic patot, qurd nrn quandrcumquo ost substantia, ost accidons, sod o 
crntiarir: ot pirptoi hrc substantia ost piiri tomprio."
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However, this does not take us very far, since it involves a reference to time 
which does not add anything relevant to the simple double material conditional 
reading. In order to spell out Aquinas's reference to time, it might be suggested, we 
need to rephrase his statement as follows: "thus, it is clear that an accident does not 
already e xist w henever a s ubstance c omes i nto existence, b ut t he r everse i s t rue", 
namely:
iii) For each time t, it is not the case that for each x, if x is a substance at t, 
then, there is a y which is an accident of x at t' (where t > t'), but for 
each time t, and for each x, if x is an accident at t, then, there is ay such 
that y is a substance and x is in y and at t' (where t > t).
It seems clear that the conclusion that substances are prior in time follows from (iii); 
but, how is (hi) supported by (i) and (ii)? Since the sentence rephrased as (ii) begins 
with the word 'for' and follows immediately that rephrased as (i), Aquinas surely 
meant to infer (i) from (ii), and (iii) from (i). Since our aim is to discuss the 
plausibility of Aquinas's conclusion, we can work out the process backwards. 
Granted that the conclusion that substances are prior in time does follow from (iii), 
how does (iii) follow from (i)? A major difficult in understanding this has to do with 
the fact that (i) quantifies over categories, whereas (iii) quantifies over individual 
things: thus, (i) is about secondary substances (universals), but (iii) is about primary 
substances (concrete particulars). At least prima facie, no reason is given to suggest 
that what holds for universals, holds for the individuals which fall under them. It is, 
thus, rather natural to suspect that Aquinas does not distinguish (as Aristotle and he 
often do not) concepts from things falling under them. If so, in order to make the 
argument work, (i) should be changed:
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(i*) for each thing, if it does not fall under a substance concept, then it cannot
exist apart from a substance; but if it falls under a substance concept,
then it can exist apart from things falling under concepts belonging to 
any other categories.
This is not what Aquinas wrote, but it is what he should have written The reasons he 
did not do so could depend on his (plausible) sharing in Aristotle's failure, in the 
Categories, to distinguish between individual properties and property concepts. If 
this is so, Aquinas's first sentence in the passage under discussion would be 
ambiguous between the two readings, (i) and (i*): the latter, then, could be a sensible
alternative.
It is important to note the modality of (i*): substances are capable of existing a 
part from accidents, but not vice versa, i.e., things which are not substances 
necessarily are in a relation of inherence (do not exist apart) with things which are 
substances, whereas things which are substances may be in such a relation with 
things which are accidents, but they also may not. This is why (i*) can follow from 
(ii): according to the latter there are substances in an inherence relation with no 
accidents, but there are no accidents in an inhering relation with no substance. 
Therefore, if something is an accident, it must, of metaphysical necessity, be in an 
inherence relation with a substance, but a substance can, but does not need, of 
metaphysical possibility, be in a inherence relation with an accident.
To see how (iii) follows from (i*), we have to consider the distinction between 
the two kinds of being previously discussed: granted that distinction, (i*) means that 
if something has being in a qualified sense, then it necessarily has being in an 
unqualified sense, whereas if something has being in an unqualified sense, then it
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only possibly has being in a qualiOied sense. Thus when something comes to have 
some being in a qualified sense, necessarily it already has being in an unqualiOied 
sense and, thus, (iii) is true.
Although all this makes some sense oO Aquinas’s claims and makes them
plausible, the argument seems to have a problem. In Oact, (i*) is supported through 
the claim that there are some substances without accidents (God, angels, 
mathematical entities), but no accidents which do not inhere in any substances. This 
is why, as we s aw, the modality involved is metaphysical. In this way, though, it 
seems that the conclusion that substances are prior in time should hold only Oor some 
substances, i.e. those "Oound without an accident." Let us suppose that I am the only 
person in the world and that I think about God: iO we grant that the creation oO the 
world was a necessary act, we can conclude that, when I start to think oO him, God 
comes to have an accident, which is his only one, i.e. he comes to be in the relation 
’is thought by' with me. God, then, is temporally prior than all his accidents. 
Substances which cannot be "Oound without an accident", though, would not need to 
be temporally prior to their accidents. Thus, in order Oor the conclusion to hold Oor all 
kinds oO substances, i.e. those which can be "Oound without an accident" and those
which cannot, we need a stronger notion oO necessity in (i*).
Although Aquinas does not deal with this problem, he seems to have the
resources to do so. For example, he could have avoided supporting (i*) by means oO
25 Srmorno cruld rbjoct that relatirns rf this srit aio nrt 'real' accidonts rf tho things which are in 
thom. Indood, if rno accopts tho distinctirn botwoon 'intrinsic' and 'extrinsic' dcnfmsnatirn, rno cruld 
maintain that oxprestifns refoiiing tr such relatirns dr nrt pick any intoinal pirpoity rf tho rbi’ct 
which is in tho relovant relatim. Thus, thoy dr nrt refoi tr rno rf its 'real' accidonts. Ono way tr moot 
this rbjoctirn would bo tr rffoi a bottoi oxamplo, cloaily invflving a real accidont rf Grd. E.g., a 
providontial act rf Grd. Howm, it is crntontirus that thoio may bo acts rf Grd which aio accidontal 
in this sonso, i.o. which aio nrt nocossitatod by Divino infinito grrdnoss. Anrthoi way tr moot tho 
rbjoctirn, rno which dros nrt load trwaids tho tiicky issuos crncoming Grd's freo will, cruld bo tr 
insist that, nr mattoi what rno's viows abrut intrinsic and oxtiinsic donrmsnatifns aio, a iolatirn rf tho 
srit suggostod abrvo is a grrd onrugh oxamplo rf an accidont, sinco it cloaily invrlvos rno rf 
Aristrtlo's nrn-substantial catogrrios.
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(ii), by suggesting that it is simply a consequence of the distinction between the two 
kinds of being, as we have just seen: it is necessary that something which has being 
in a qualified sense has also being in an unqualified sense, since accidents can only 
be predicated of objects which have an identity, and, as we saw, an object has an 
identity only if it falls under some sortal concept, namely if it has being in an 
unqualified sense. Being red, for example, is necessarily a property of a being in an 
unqualified sense, 1 et's say a chair. In this case, the necessity does notdepend on 
metaphysical facts concerning the actual existence of substances having no accidents, 
but only on the nature of the distinction between the two kinds of being. Each 
instance of a property, relation or state, then, is the particular instance it is because of 
the fact that it inheres in the substance to which it actually does, whereas substances 
could have other properties, relations and states than they actually do. (i*), thus, has
to be read as:
(i*b) For each x, if it is not the case that x is a substance, then there is a y such 
that necessarily (y is a substance, x inheres in y, and y is unique); and, for 
each x, if x is a substance then for each y, ify is an accident and y inheres 
in x, then it is possible that y does not inhere in x.
Although (iii) does not follow from this, an accordingly modified (and compatible) 
interpretation of the claim of which it is a reading does:
(iii*) For each time t, for each x and for each y, if x is a substance starting to 
exist at time t and y is an accident inhering in x, then for each time ify 
started to exist at t\ then necessarily t < f. But for each time t, for each x, 
each y, if x is an accident inhering in y from time t and y is a substance, 
then for each t, ify started to exist at t', then it is possible that t > t.
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That is to say, since any accident is necessarily an accident of some particular 
substance, but no substance must have a particular accident, any of the accidents of a 
substance could start existing at any time when the substance exist, but not before, 
whereas any substance could start existing before any of its accidents. This is for any 
substance, no matter if having being in the unqualified sense only (as abstract object, 
God and angels can), or also in a qualified sense as well (as all material substances 
seem to). From (iii*), furthermore, one can conclude that substances are prior than
accidents in time.
One could put forward, however, an objection which we have already 
mentioned about Aristotle's formulation of priority in the Categories: could the 
whiteness of the statue endure longer than the statue, or the whiteness of Socrates 
persist after his death? If it is so, then accidents can exist independently of the 
substance in which they inhere. The whiteness of the statue, for example, could be 
the whiteness of some pieces of marble, or the whiteness of Socrates could become 
the whiteness of a coip. A reply to this objection could be that the whiteness of the 
statue and that of Socrates are not directly their properties, rather they are properties 
of the matter they a re made of, i.e. marble and flesh. Thus, the subjects in which 
those instances of whiteness exist do not stop existing when the statue is broken or
Socrates dies.
Aquinas follows Aristotle also in claiming that substances are prior in
definition:
in the definition of any accident it is necessary to include the definition of 
substance; for just as nose is given in the definition of snub, so too the proper 
subject of any accident is given in the definition of that accident.26
26 Ibid., 1258: "in definitione cuiuslibet accidentium oportet ponere definitionem substantiae. S icut 
enim in definitione simi pomtur nasus, ita in definitione cuiuslibet accidentis ponitur proprium eius 
subiectum."
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In defining any property, relation, or state, one needs to speciOy the kinds oO objects 
which have the property or are involved in the relation or the state. A complete 
definition, then, will require also a definition oO the relevant kinds oO objects. For 
example, in order to define the property oO being white, one needs to explain what 
sort oO things can have it, i.e. one needs to define what a corporeal or sensible object 
is. As in the previous case, the priority in question is grounded on the distinction 
between the two kinds oO being. What sort oO being in a qualified sense an object 
may have depends on what sort oO being in an unqualiOied sense it has. Thus, 
explaining (through a definition) its being in a qualiOied sense requires a reOerence to 
its being in an unqualiOied sense.
The last kind oO priority oO substances admitted by Aristotle and Aquinas is 
priority in knowledge:
that is Oirst in the order oO knowing which is better known and explains a thing 
better. Now a thing is better known when its substance is known rather than 
when its quality or quantity is known; Oor we think we know each thing best 
when we know what man is or what fire is, rather than when we know oO what 
sort it is or how much it is or when we know it according to any oO the other 
categories??
Knowledge oO substance is prior because it is by grasping what sort (in the modern 
sense) oO tiling something is that we can understand why it has certain properties. 
Again, this kind oO priority is a consequence oO the distinction between two kinds oO 
being: it is because oO being (in an unqualiOied sense) oO a certain kind, that 
something may be (in a qualiOied sense) in certain ways, and, thus, the Oormer thing 
explains the latter. The previous example may still be useOul: an object may have the
27 Ibid., 1259: "Illud onim ost piimum socundum crgnitirnom, qurd ost magis nrtum ot magis 
manifostat iom. Ros autom unaquaoquo magis nrscitui, quandr scitui oius substantia, quam quandr 
scitui oius quantitas aut qualitas. Tunc onim putamus nrs maximo scire singula, quandr nrscitui quid
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property of being coloured (e.g., white) because it is a corporeal substance of some 
sort; thus, its being coloured can be explained through its being corporeal. This is the 
kind of priority in knowledge which usually Aquinas, following Aristotle, calls 
priority in nature, and has to be distinguished from priority in knowledge for us: 
accidents are prior in knowledge for us, since it is by being previously acquainted 
with accidents that we can subsequently figure out what is the substance in which 
they inhere.
One way of p utting It his d istinctton m ighh b eint erms ofac ontrast b ttween 
explanatory (from substance to accident) and exploratory (from accident to 
substance) priorities, the former being priority in nature, the latter in knowledge. 
Both priorities are epistemological, since they concern - respectively - what counts 
as a good explanation for us, and how we can understand of what sort something is.
1.4 The PrioriSy oo Subsiancet: Some ObSettisols Conssdered
In the p revious s ection, we h ave s een t hat A quinas f ollowed an A ristotelian 
route to support the view that substances are metaphysically prior. That line of 
argument is grounded on assumptions concerning the ways in which particulars can 
be identified and predicated by us. One could object that any result it may reach 
concerns only our epistemic access to the world, not the world as it is. How can we 
be certain that our conceptual framework and the real structure of the world fit with 
each other? A defence of the fitting thesis, supporting both the Aristotelian direction 
of fitness (world-mind) and the Kantian opposite direction (mind-world), was
est homo aut ignis, magis quam quando cognoscimus quale est aut quantum, aut ubi, aut secundum 
aliquod aliud praedicamentum."
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famously suggested by Peter Strawson (1959) with his use of transcendental 
arguments: according to him, the existence of the basic particulars which we locate
in a spatio-temporal framework of thought is a necessary condition of our capacity to 
identify, re-identify and refer to things. Consequently, he supported descriptive 
metaphysics, which is based on "the actual structure of our thought about the world 
(Strawson 1959, 9), against revisionist metaphysics, which aims at a replacement of 
our ordinary thinking about the world in favour of a radically different (now usually 
physicalist) one.
Strawson's defence of his quasi-Aristotelian approach to metaphysics has 
received a number of resolute criticisms. A recent one, which is particularly 
interesting in this context, is due to Peter Simons (1998). Simons agrees with 
Strawson that our everyday thinking about the world cannot but be committed to the 
thought that Aristotelian primary substances, i.e. individuals, are the basic primary 
constituents of reality. A clear case which shows how our thinking cannot renounce 
the priority of substances is, according to Simons, the role of the latter in explaining 
change. Aristotle, in fact, gave an account of change as the result of some substance 
having different and incompatible attributes at different times. A common criticism 
which goes as far back as Broad (1933), Simons notes, holds the view that 
substances cannot really be used to explain change because they are continuants, i.e. 
three-dimensional objects lacking the dimension of time, and this makes it 
impossible to account for the fact that an individual is present as whole at any time at 
which it exists. As an alternative, Broad suggested that they should be replaced by 
occurrents, i.e. four-dimensional objects.
Simons distinguishes two brands of this revisionist metaphysics, that he calls
the replacement position and the reconstrual position. According to the fonner "talk
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about [continuants] should be replaced by talk about suitable occurrents" (1998,
239) , and, according to the latter, continuants "are in Oact already occurrents" (ibid.,
240) , and our language and thinking about the world should be reconstructed
accordingly. Simons complains that the reconstrual position is unsatisOying since
We should not wish the replacement ontology to be weaker in expressive 
power than the one it replaced, and the idea that either the same predicates that 
we already use or some trivial syntactic modiOication oO them will 
automatically serve up a rich enough vocabulary remains in [his] view an 
hypothesis completely untested in details as it should be iO it is to be made 
credible??
The reconstrual position, though, is in no better position, since it assumes that 
continuants are occurrents, but this is impossible since "the objects having the 
contrary properties, the temporal parts, do not survive the change. 1,29 Simons can thus
conclude that
attempts to shoulder aside the notion oO a continuant everyday substance 
perduring through time Oail. The notion is entrenched in our ordinary everyday 
way oO thinking and speaking and it would require a conceptual revolution oO 
unprecedented magnitude to remove or replace it. The motives oO those 
wishing to proclaim its demise are legitimate: they are those oO conceptual 
clarity and conOormity to scientiOic progress. The motives are honourable, but 
their target is misplaced.28 * 30
AOter deOending Strawson's point as Oar as the "everyday" notion oO substance is 
concerned, he can go on to attack the metaphysical bearing oO that notion. He 
advances a revisionary metaphysics, which leaves the everyday notion oO substance 
untouched, but aims at higher "conceptual clarity and conOormity to scientiOic 
progress." The ingredients are the denial that substances are metaphysically prior, 
and the claim that they are analysable as bundles oO tropes. In his view, priority has 
to be accorded to tropes and the Oormal relations which bind them together. Everyday
28 Simrns 1998, 240.
?>/Wd,241.
30 Ibid., 242.
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substances can still be claimed to have unity and relative independence, since a 
nucleus of tropes, each of which is necessary to all of the others, constitutes an 
individual essence while accidental characteristics are catered for by a peripheral 
halo of tropes which may be exchanged. The theory is flexible in allowing the
extreme cases of bundles without nuclei and also bundles without halos. " Unlike
other trope theorists, Simons does not take the binding relations between tropes as
mere spatial or spatiotemporal compresence, but as formal relations (i.e., not
themselves tropes) of existential dependence, which he defines in an Aristotelian
manner. Everyday substances are usually more than just a single trope bundle, but
are made of parts which are in turn material objects.
Only objects without parts in the common or garden sense are pure bundles of 
tropes and nothing else. Everything else is a whole of parts which are wholes 
of parts which are... etc. until we come to the parts which are as they are not 
because they have parts, but because they are bundles of tropes. How larger 
things are may or may not be determined by how their ultimate parts are and 
are related; the occurrence of holistic or Gestalt quality tropes dependent on the 
larger wholes is not ruled out, nor is the emergence of tropes unpredictable 
from the properties of their bearer's parts.31 2
This, according to Simons, leads him towards a kind of metaphysics which is 
consistent with Strawsonian descriptive metaphysics in maintaining the centrality of 
individuals and the epistemic priority of substances, but which is also revisionary 
since it claims that substances are not metaphysically prior, and attempts to "explain 
what everyday substances are and how they behave in terms of other more 
fundamental entities, which are far from first in the order of knowledge. "33 The 
advantage of such a view is that it can take into account everyday substances and the 
results of science, the entities of which cannot be accounted for by traditional
31 Ibid. 243.
32 Ibid., 244.
33 Ibid., 247.
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Aristotelian metaphysics, at the same time: this is a due aim, since "a metaphysics 
which does not aspire to universality does not deserve the name.?"*
Because of the results of science, descriptive metaphysics nowadays faces 
several problems, according to Simons: first of all, sub-atomic particles do not seem 
to meet the identification criteria that substances have within descriptive 
metaphysics. Secondly, it is not clear where the boundaries between different living 
species are. Thirdly, it is dubious whether some living organisms are individual 
entities or colonies of several entities (e.g., sponges). Lastly, living organisms (a 
mammal) or large size objects (the sun) lack perfectly clear boundaries, since there 
are parts of matter for which it cannot be determined if they belong to them or not: 
"if it is indeterminate what an object’s part are, it can be indeterminate which object it 
is, if any.”34 5
Simons concludes that "as a fmdamental metaphysical primitive, [substance] 
belongs, like horse and cart, to a bygone age. Neither the vehicle nor the concept will 
take us to the stars?'®
I would like to argue that Simons's points, although they have the merit of 
enlightening a number a central issues which descriptive metaphysics should address, 
do not succeed in establishing the need of revisionary metaphysics. The descriptive 
metaphysics of the enduring tradition which started with Aristotle, continued through 
the Middle Ages, and is pursued by Strawson, can meet Simons's challenges, at least 
as well as his proposed trope bundle theory.
First, Simons claims that descriptive metaphysics takes substances to be 
metaphysically prior and, thus, cannot but fail to settle in its fame the entities 
introduced by modem science. Thanks to the results of science and the enlargement
34 Ibid., 241.
35 Ibid., 249.
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oO our understanding oO matter, Simons says, now we know that substances are not 
metaphysically prior, but composed oO more Oundamental entities. I think it is highly 
disputable that traditional descriptive metaphysics cannot deal with this problem. As 
we will see in more detail in the next two sections, in order to explain the Oact that 
substances can be generated and destroyed, Aquinas, Oollowing Aristotle, argued that 
there must be a substratum persisting through generation and destruction: this is 
prime matter, which constitutes all material objects, but, since it lacks any 
characteristic, it cannot be known otherwise than as the component oO some material 
object. Thus, Aquinas and Aristotle even claim that in some sense matter must be 
prior to individual substances. They also supported the thesis that there is proximate 
matter, some things are not immediately composed oO prime matter, but oO objects in 
which prime matter has already received some Oorm. It seem, thereOore, that one 
cannot deny, at least prima facie, that Aquinas's theory has the resources which may 
allow him (or a contemporary Oollower oO his) to work out an account oO how the 
discoveries oO contemporary physics can be accommodated in his metaphysical 
Oramework. I am not expecting to show how this can be done successOully (oO course, 
this would require a project oO its own), nor aspire I to claim that the resources 
available to Aquinas constitute a sound theory (this will be discussed in the two 
Oollowing section). However, one cannot deny that this line may be as much as
Oollowed.
Second, the point oO Aquinas’s claim about the priority oO substances is that 
although substances are composed oO prime and/or proximate matter, they are prior 
because their properties, relations and states, both essential and accidental, (namely 
all the things which may be predicated oO them either in an unqualiOied sense or in a 
qualiOied sense, respectively) can only be predicated oO them, not oO the matter they
36 Ibid., 251.
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are made of. This is because accidents are not due only to the matter which constitute 
substances, but also to the form, which turns matter into a substance. Simons's 
"formal relation" holding among tropes or among the trope bundles which constitute 
middle sized substances, though, are prior in just the same way. As he s ays, such 
foimal relations and the higher level properties, relations and states they originate are 
unforeseeable at the substances' constituents' level: they are a result of those 
constituents being tied together in a fonnal relation, and can only be predicated of the 
resulting individual. The resulting individual, then, will be prior just as descriptive 
metaphysics claims.
Third, f rom the f act t hat the b oundaries of s ome s ubstances are m ore v ague 
than those of others, it does not follow that there are no substances at all. Aquinas, as 
we shall also see, admitted a variety of kinds of fonns, i.e. principles of organisation 
which turn some prime and/or proximate matter into an individual substance. Thus 
he admitted different criteria for speaking of unity and individuality. The same 
criteria and the same degree of precision which may allow one to state that certain 
things are or are not parts of a human being may not be the same which allow one to 
say that some things are or are not parts of the sun. All criteria, however, in some 
cases may fail: it may be indeterminate whether some things belong to a certain 
substance or not; but this is not enough to claim the indeterminacy goes all the way 
down to the metaphysical level and jeopardises the claim that there are substances. 
At least, so far as it is not disputable that some objects certainly are parts of a certain 
substance, we have no reason to claim that there is not substance because it is not 
determinate if other things are also parts of it. Similarly, the plurality of principles of 
organisation admitted by Aquinas, may allow one to explain the difference between 
the way in which sponges are individuals, and the way in which humans are
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individuals. What constitutes an unity may vary in different cases, and it is a question 
of empirical evidence, rather than decidable a priori through an universally
applicable criterion.
Fourth, it is true that the advancement of our knowledge of living things, 
particularly modern evolutionary theory, made us understand that there are no clear 
boundaries between species. Nonetheless, this does not necessarily count against the 
traditional Aristotelian grouping of biological entities in species. In fact, such 
grouping, based on morphological and functional characteristics of organisms, is still 
practised by taxonomists, who cannot renounce the concept of species. Although the 
concept of species they use may in some cases be quite far from the Aristotelian (or 
we should rather say Limaeus's) concept, it is still a subject of much debate which 
conception of species has to be accepted. However, so long as it is held that animals 
and plants fall within natural kind classes we have a relevant notion of species, 
although it may not be as metaphysically robust as that of Aristotle. Alternative 
conceptions, furthermore, do not seem to solve the problem of vagueness. Let us 
take, as an example, Ghiselin's (1974) theory, still a favourite among taxonomists, 
according to which species are individual objects, and individual organisms are not 
exemplifications, but parts of species. As in Aristotle's conception of species, also in 
this case there will be many organisms which will not be clearly parts of one species 
or another. Until a new conception of species, incompatible with Aristotle's, has 
solved this problem and has universally imposed itself, we cannot discharge 
Aristotle's based on the fact that it has to face the problem of unclear boundaries 
between species.
Fifth and finally, it is not clear why Simons's trope theory would be any better 
off than traditional descriptive metaphysics in addressing several of the objections he
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advanced. Let us take a large object, which is a bundle of bundles, of bundles... of 
tropes, for example the sun, and ask ourselves if some amount of incandescent matter 
at the edge of its surface belongs to it. Naturally, that amount of incandescent matter 
may be a bundle of bundles of bundles... of tropes as well. Now, it may be asked if 
such a bundle of bundles is a part of the bigger bundle of bundles that we call the 
sun. In many cases this may be indeterminate, just as it was for the substances of 
descriptive metaphysics. The fact that Simons claims that a bundle is not a prior 
entity is not really helpful: assuming that, contrary to what I have suggested above is 
the case, still the formal relation which holds among lower level bundles or among 
tropes is not an epistemic notion, in the sense that it is not up to us or to our cognitive 
faculties to determine which things it binds together. Thus, it should be determinate 
for each thing if it is bound within that formal relation or not. The case of the sun, 
though, shows that this does not happen. Similarly, since formal relations binding 
together large bundles are not epistemic notions, it cannot be argued that the 
boundaries between species are vague because of our lack of knowledge: although 
substances end up not being prior, he takes everyday substance talk to be determined 
by the (metaphysical, not epistemical) formal relations which bound bundles 
together; also in this case, thus, the vagueness in question is metaphysical. Finally, 
since Simons's tropes can be identified, reidentified, and referred to, it is not clear 
why his trope based metaphysics should be in a better position than traditional 
descriptive metaphysics in accounting for the bizarre entities of contemporary 
physics.
It may be concluded that, although it might be true that traditional descriptive 
metaphysics, as metaphysics of all brands, needs to deal with the problems raised by 
contemporary science in order to be universal in Simons's sense, it is also true that it
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cannot prima facie be excluded that it has the resources to do so. I will not try to 
develop such a project here, but in the next two sections I will discuss the plausibility 
and consistency oO such resources, which were already mentioned above: in next 
section I will discuss the notion oO substantial Oorm, and in the Oollowing the notion
oO matter.
1.5 CompofiSisn and Subssantial Forms
I have suggested a deOence oO' Aquinas’s thesis about the priority oO substances 
which is heavily based on the claim that substances are composed oO Oorm and 
matter. This thesis now needs to be discussed. The notion oO Oorm as a component oO 
a primary substance, Ourthermore, will allow us to consider a problem already 
mentioned above (section 1.2), that oO the relationship between primary and 
secondary substances.
Aquinas's main reason to introduce a distinction between matter and Oorm as 
the components oO each sensible being depends on some considerations concerning 
the possibility oO "motion" (i.e., change). In his Physics, Aristotle attempted to give 
an account oO motion, that he understood as change in a wide sense, including not 
only local change, but also qualitative and quantitative changes, changes oO states, 
etc. His analysis oO motion was based on the realisation that in any case oO change 
there is some substratum which undergoes the change. For example, in the event oO a 
green unripe apple turning red, there is one object, the apple, which has one property 
at one time and subsequently loses it and acquires a diOOerent, incompatible property
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of the same categorical kind. The apple is a substratum which undergoes the change, 
and has one property at one time and another incompatible one at another time.
This kind of change may only concern accidental being: the occurrence of an
event of change consists in the endurance of a being (in an unqualified sense), which
comes to be (in a qualified sense) in two different and incompatible ways at two
different times. Thus, it amounts to the succession of different and incompatible
accidents (properties, relations, and states) inhering in the same substance.
Consequently, it may be called accidental change. However, this cannot be the only
kind of change, since the coming into being and the ceasing to be (what Aristotle
calls generation and corruption) of substances cannot be accounted for in terns of a
substance having different and incompatible attributes at different times. On the
other hand, having defined change as the event of something being in incompatible
ways at successive times, Aristotle is forced to admit that also in the cases of
generation and conniption there must be a substratum which undergoes a relevant
modification. He calls ’matter' (or 'prime matter') such a substratum:
For my definition matter is just this- the primary substratum of each thing from 
which it comes to be without qualification, and which persists in the result?”
Thus, in cases of generation and comiption something (a substance) comes to be or 
goes out of existence in an unqualified sense, but since all changes are changes of 
something, according to Aristotle, there must be something which undergoes 
generation and corruption. Aquinas, which shares Aristotle’s view, is very clear about 
the structure of this argument:
[Aristotle] says that in sensible substances we must posit matter as substance 
and subject. For in every change between contraries, there must be a subject 
common to the tennini of the change. For example in change of place there is a 
common subject which is now here and afterwards somewhere else [...]. 
Hence, since there is substantial change, that is, generation and corruption.
37 Physics, 192 a 30-4.
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there must be a crmmrn subject which underlies ihe rpprsite changes oO 
generatim and coiTuption.38
Matter is what may become one substance or other, but it is not any particular 
kind oO stuOO, nor has it any characteristics per se. In Oact, matter is not in an 
unqualiOied sense, i.e. has not existence as such: when it comes to be in an 
unqualiOied sense it always exists as the matter oO a substance oO some kind or other, 
and, thereOore, when existing, it is not pure matter. 39 In generation and corruption, 
matter becomes some individual substance or ceases to be one, because it receives or 
loses a certain form. Form is a stmcturing principle which turns matter into an object 
oO some kind. Matter cannot exist without being structured by some Oonn: any 
existing thing is such in virtue oO being in an unqualiOied sense; since matter is the 
substratum which receives being in an unqualiOied sense when a substance is 
generated, and loses it when a substance is corrupted, it cannot have being unless it 
enters in the composition oO some substance or other. Even in cases oO cormption, 
matter does not simply enter in a state in which it is not structured by any Oonn,40 but 
it always receives a new Oorm structuring it, and in this way it contributes to the 
generation oO a new substance.
Matter is thus a metaphysical (as opposed to physical) notion: it is not any kind 
oO stuOO which may be the object oO empirical experience independently Orom the 
things which it contributes to constitute. Its nature and its existence, consequently,
38 ME, VIII, 1, 1688; "necesse esi in substantiis sensibilibus prnere maieriam quasi substantiam ei 
subiecium. In rrnni enim mutatirne rprrtet esse subiectum crmmune terminis mutatirnis in crntiariis 
mutatirnibus; sicut in mutatirne secundum lrcum est aliqurd crmmune subiectum, qurd nunc est hic, 
et iterum alibi. [...] Cum igitur sit quaedam mutatir secundum substantiam, scilicet generatir et 
criTuptir: rprrtet esse aliqurd crmmune subiectum, qurd subiiciatur crntrariis mutatifnibut 
secundum generationem et crrmptirnem.."
39 This seems equivalent tr the puzzling claim "whenever prime matter exists, it is nrt prime matter."
A solutirn to this apparent is suggested in Hughes 1998.
40 It is questtonable even that this cruld be called a 'state', since tomethlng may be in a state if it has 
srme structure and if it exists, but unformed matter is unstructured by definitirn rf 'form', and has nr 
existence.
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cannot be empirically accessed, but may only be arrived to through reasoning. In 
particular, it needs to be introduced in a metaphysical analysis of reality in order to 
explain change: things can be generated and corrupted, but some underling 
substratum of such processes has to be assumed to exist.
Like matter, forms of material things cammt exist in reality unless they are
informing some particular matter and, thus, contributing to the constitution of a
primary substance. Forms are not ethereal entities pervading a rough material
substratum, but they are the principles of organisation and the fonnal relations
between parts through which only matter can have existence. When matter loses its
structure and organisation, form is lost and the substance that they were constituting
together is coiTupted, although a new form will organise that matter and generate a
new substance. Thus, matter and fom?1 can never exist apart from an individual
concrete being which each of them contribute to constitute.
In one sense substance means matter, and in another form, and still in another 
the thing composed of these. For matter is called substance, not as though it 
were a being considered to have actual existence in itself, but as something 
capable of being actual (and this is said to be a particular thing). And form, 
which is also termed the intelligible structure because the intelligible structure 
of the species is derived from it, is called substance in as much as it is 
something actual, and in as much as it is separable from matter in thought but 
not in reality. And the thing composed of these is called substance in as much 
as it is something "separable in an absolute sense", i.e., capable of existing 
separately by itself in reality; and it alone is the subject to generation and 
comipiira.22 *
41 As we shall see in the following chapters, according to Aquinas, forms can exist either naturally of 
intentionally. This claim is only referred to the natural existence of forms; to forms which exist 
independently from a mind.
42 ME, VIII, 1, 1687; "Sed sciendum est, quod materia aliter dicitur substantia, et aliter forma, et aliter 
compositum. Materia enim dicitur substantia non quasi ens aliquid actu existens in se considerata, sed 
quasi in potentia, ut sit aliquid actu, haec dicitur esse hoc aliquid. Forma vero, quae et ratio nominatur, 
quia ex ipsa sumitur ratio speciei, dicitur substantia quasi ens aliquid actu, et quasi ens separabile 
secundum rationem a materia, licet non secundum rem. Compositum vero ex his dicitur esse 
substantia quasi separabile simpliciter, idest separatim per se existere potens in rerum natura; et eius 
solius est generatio et corruptio."
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Aquinas says that both matter and form can be called substances, as well as the 
individual thing, since they can only exist in reality as constituents of an individual 
thing, i.e. a substance in the proper sense. Matter has not actual existence, because, 
as we saw, it can only exist as a constituent of an individual thing; it has a disposition 
to become any individual thing (i.e., it is "capable of being actual"), but it camiot 
exist unless it is the matter of some individual thing. It is substance in the sense that 
it is what all material things are made of, but it is never anything apart from some 
material thing. Form may also be called substance, since it is what gives structure 
("is also termed the intelligible structure") to matter in constituting an actual 
individual material thing ("it is something actual"); furthermore, it may be called a 
substance, since it is its form that we think of when we think about any individual 
material substance ("as much as it is separable from matter in thought"); however, it 
exists separately in thought only, "not in reality", and, then, it is not a substance 
having being in an unqualified sense: it only exists when it is the form of some 
substance or the form of thought. An individual being, instead, is a substance in the 
strict sense: it exists "separately by itself in reality", i.e. in an unqualified sense, and 
it is an individual in this sense which may be generated or corrupted.
When, in virtue of having a certain form, a thing exists in an unqualified sense,
then that form is a substantial form. However, not all forms are of this sort:
sometimes a difference in the arrangement of some aspect of the matter of a
substance (i.e., some formal difference), may cause that substance to have a
difference in its way of existing, without ceasing to be that particular individual. In
other words, some forms do not make a thing to be in unqualified sense, but they
make it to be in a qualified sense. These are accidental forms.
we must consider that the substantial form differs from the accidental form in 
this, that the accidental form does not make a thing to be "simply," but to be
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"such," as heat does not make a thing to be simply, but only to be hot. 
ThereOore by the coming oO the accidental Oonn a thing is not said to be made 
or generated simply, but to be made such, or to be in some particular condition; 
and in like manner, when an accidental Oonn is removed, a thing is said to be 
corrupted, not simply, but relatively. Now the substantial Oorm gives being 
simply; thereOore by its coming a thing is said to be generated simply; and by 
its removal to be corrupted simply.00
What substantial Oorms organise and structure is not always prime matter; it 
may be the case, in Oact, that a thing is a thing oO a certain sort because some objects, 
which are objects oO certain sorts in their turn, are organised and structured in a 
certain way. A car, Oor example, is obtained through an arrangement oO parts 
Ounctionally organised with each other (an engine, a body, Oour wheels, etc.). Each oO 
those parts is itselO an object oO a certain kind, which is obtained through a 
structuring principle organising some matter. All those parts together, on the other 
hand, constitute the matter which can be organised by the Oorm oO the car and turned 
into a car: it is what Aquinas calls proximate matter. Proximate matter is whatever a 
thing which is in an unqualiOied sense is immediately made oO, and in turn it may or 
may not be made oO some determinate matter. IO it is not, besides being proximate 
matter, it is also prime matter.
Aristotle usually exemplifies the relation between substantial Oorm and matter 
with the case oO a statue. A statue is a being oO a certain kind, which satisfies the 
requirements Oor substantiality and can be thus predicated in an unqualiOied sense. On 
the other hand, it can be said to be a statue because it is made oO some matter, Oor 
example bronze, which is structured in a certain way by a certain Oorm (its shape). 
Aquinas, however, warns that such an example could be misleading:
43 ST, I, 76, 4, c.: "crnsiderandum est qurd frrma substantialis in hrc a fomia accidentali differt quia 
fri-ma accidentalis nrn dat esse simpliciter, sed esse tale, sicut cafor facit suum subiectum nm 
simpliciter esse, sed esse calidum. Et ider cum advenit frrma accidentalis, nm dicitur aliquid fieri vel 
generari simpliciter, sed fieri tale aut aliqur mrdr se habens, et similiter cum recedit forma 
accidentalis, nrn dicitur aliquid cm-rumpi simpliciter, sed secundum quid. Frrma autem substantialis
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this example must not be understood to express the situation as it really is, but 
only according to a proportional likeness; for figure and other forms produced 
by art are not substances but accidents. But since figure is related to bronze in 
the realm of artefacts as substantial form is to matter in the realm of natural 
bodies, he uses this example insofar as it explains what is unknown by means 
of what is evident.^
The "proportional likeness" to which Aquinas refers, is a kind of analogical 
reasoning often used by Aquina^5 if an object a is empirically accessible and an 
objects b is not empirically accessible, but we know that the relation between the two 
is sufficiently similar to the relation between two other objects, c and d, both 
empirically accessible, such that c is similar to a in respects relevant for the their role 
in the respective relations, then we can suppose that also b is similar to d, at least in 
respects relevant for the respective relations. In our case, we may have experience of 
both the shape of the statue and the bronze of which the statue is made. The statue 
exists in an unqualified sense, since the shape structures the bronze in a certain 
manner. Thus, the bronze and the shape both originate the statue (i.e., a being in an 
unqualified sense) by being in a certain relation one with the other, viz. the '... gives 
structure and organisation to...' relation. We may also have experience of a 
substance which exists in an unqualified sense and of its form, the cluster of 
characteristics because of which it falls under some sortal concept. From the 
argument for the existence of prime matter, we know that the form of the substance 
is in some relation with prime matter. It is in virtue of that relation that a being in an 
unqualified sense (a substance) is originated. This relation must be similar to the 
relation between the bronze and the shape of the statue (i.e., the relation ".. gives
dat esse simpliciter, et ideo per eius adventum dicitur aliquid simpliciter generari, et per eius recessum 
simpliciter corrumpi"
44 ME, VII, 2, 1277: "Quae quidem exemplificatio non est accipienda secundum veritatem, sed 
secundum similitudinem proportionis. Figura enim et aliae formae art^^^f^ciales non sunt substantiae, 
sed accidentia quaedam. Sed quia hoc modo se habet figura ad aes in artificialibus, sicut forma 
substantial ad materiam in naturalibus, pro tanto utitur hoc exemplo, ut demonstret ignotum per 
manifestum."
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structure and organisation to...'), since in both cases the relation involved gives 
origin to a being in an unqualified sense. Thus, matter must be similar to bronze, in a 
manner which is relevant for the relation with form: just as bronze has a disposition 
to be stmctured by shape, so matter must have a disposition to be structured by form. 
However, Aquinas warns us, we cannot take the analogy any further: for example, 
we cannot think of prime matter as some sort of stuff, since prime matter, by itself, is 
nothing, whereas bronze is some sort of thing even when it has no characterising 
shape at all, i.e. even when it is not the matter of some artefact. This is why, as 
Aquinas says, the shape it may acquire is not a substantial foim, but a mere accident: 
that object remains a piece of bronze, identified by the substantial foim of bronze, no 
matter how it is shaped.
Of course, the purported analogy does suffice to reach the conclusion that there 
is a distinction between proximate matter and prime matter. Only considerations 
regarding an explanation of substantial change may lead in that direction. All that the 
present analogy aims to, is to explain the relationship between prime matter and 
substantial form as similar to the relationship between proximate matter and 
accidental form, in order to offer an interpretation of Aristotle’s misleading example
of the statue.
Through the explanation of change and the analogical interpretation of 
Aristotle's example of the statue, Aquinas draws a distinction between prime matter 
and examples of matter which have substantial forms of their own; furthermore, he 
claims that only the former can receive substantial forms. Any further forms 
organising the latter would be accidental. Aquinas, in fact, clearly stated this thesis at 
several points. For example, he wrote:
45 Aquinas's uses of analogy have been studied in Ross 1981 and in Mclnemy 1996.
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Indeed, perhaps [...] neither these particular things [i.e., a house or a vessel] 
nor any or the others which are not produced by nature are substances.46
In his commentary on De Anima, he supported the same thesis:
Man and wood and stone are natural bodies, but a house or a saw is artificial. 
And oO these the natural bodies seem to be more properly called substances, 
since artificial bodies are made out oO them. .Art works upon materials 
Ournished by nature, giving these, moreover, a merely accidental Oorm, such as 
a new shape and so Oorth; so that it is only in virtue oO their matter, not their 
Oorm, that artificial bodies are substances at all; they are substances because 
natural bodies are such. Natural bodies thereOore are more properly called 
being such through their Oorm as well as through their matter*.47
The point seems to be that the reason why an arteOact exists in an unqualiOied sense, 
i.e. is a substance, is that it is made oO some (proximate) matter which has a
substantial Oorm and thus is a substance. In other words, a statue made oO bronze is a
substance in the sense that it is a piece oO bronze. IO this is so, properly speaking it is 
not a substance qua statue, but only qua piece oO bronze, i.e. since it is a piece oO 
bronze which has an accidental statue-shape.
One c ould o bj ect t hat t his v iew i s i nconsistent, s ince s tatues, c ars, h ammers 
and all sorts oO arteOacts seem to be obvious candidates Oor substantiality. For one 
thing, they seem to meet the predicamental criterion {PC). The individual statue can 
be predicated both the concept statue, and the definition oO that concept. IO we 
suppose that the definition oO statue is "a three dimensional carved piece oO art", we 
can say that the individual statue is a statue, but also that it is a three dimensional
46 ME, VIII, 3, 1719: "dicens, qurd frrmae artifieialium fortan nrn sunt substantiae, nee ipsae sunt 
aliquid per se, unde separari nrn prssunt. Et similiter nullum alirrum artificialium, quae nrn sunt 
secundum naturam."
47 CDA, II, 1, 218: "Homo enim et lignum et lapis sunt naturalia corpora, drmus et securis sunt 
artificialia. Magis autem videntur substantiae corpora naturalia quam artificiaHa, quia corpora 
naturalia sunt principia artificialium. Ars enim operatur ex materia quam natura ministrat; forma 
autem quae per artem inducitur, est forma accidentalis, sicut figura vel aliquid huiusmodi. Unde 
corpora ^^^if^^ialia non sunt in genere substantiae per suam formam, sed solum per suam materiam, 
quae est naturalis, Habent ergo a eorporlbus naturalibus quod sint substantiae. Unde corpora naturalia 
sunt magis substantiae quam corpora artificiaHa: sunt enim substantiae non solum ex parte materiae, 
sed etiam ex parte formae."
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carved piece of art. This means that, following PC, the semantic value of the concept 
statue is a secondary substance. On the other hand, though, we cannot say that the 
statue or not even "statuehood" is in something else. We can say, for example, that a 
dark shade of orange is in the bronze, or that a certain size is in the bronze, but we 
cannot say that the statue is in the bronze. Thus, a statue must be a substance, 
according to PC. If this is so, and if from the thesis of hylomorphism it really follows 
that a statue cannot be a substance, but is just a piece of bronze statue-shaped, then 
PC and hylomorphism are incompatible. Therefore, Aquinas's project to find a 
metaphysical basis for PC in hylomorphism fails.
A possible reply to this, one which Aquinas seems to suggest, is that things 
may be substances at different degrees, and natural substances are substances in a 
stricter sense than artefacts. In fact, in the above passage from CDA, he claims that 
"natural bodies seem to be more properly called substances" than artefacts. This 
seems to suggest that artefacts can also be called substances, although "less 
properly." These claims are not surprising within Aquinas's framework, since he 
shared Aristotle’s thesis according to which a single term may be used "polivocally", 
i.e. with meanings which are different but not completely confusing, and such that 
one of the meanings is central or focal, and all the others derive from it.48 Aquinas, 
thus, could be taking the meaning of 'substance' according to which the term refers to 
natural things as the focal meaning, and the other meanings as derived from it. Thus, 
a thing composed of proximate matter of one or more kinds {ml, m2, m3 ...) and of a 
form F, is a substance in the strict sense if and only if:
a) thanks to F, it meets PC, and
48 Cf. Aristotle's Categories, Ch. 1. The notion o f focal meaning was developedby Austin (1938, 
1940).
59
b) each kind of proximate matter m/, when it is organised and structured by F,
does not satisfy PC.
Let us consider some examples. A stone is a "natural body"; a particular stone meets 
PC\ things can be said of it ('it is a stone') and can be said in it ('it is grey'), but it 
cannot be said of nor in anything else; thus, it is a substance. Let us suppose that the 
proximate matter of the stone is a certain amount of minerals: the substantial forms 
of those minerals, i.e. the principles of organisation because of which a certain 
amount of proximate matter (for example, atoms) turn into those minerals, do not 
make those minerals satisfy condition a), when they contribute to the constitution of 
a stone. In fact, when they are constituents of a stone, they lose several of the 
(essential) properties and dispositions that they normally have in virtue of having 
those forms. Thus, the stone satisfies condition b), since, as all substances in the 
strict sense, it is not constituted of parts which actually have existence in the 
unqualified sense:
It is impossible that a substance should be composed of many substances 
actually present in it; for two actual things are never one actual thing, but two 
which are in potentiality are one actually. [...] One thing is distinguished from 
another by its proper fonn. Hence in order that many things may become one 
actual thing, it is necessary that all should be included under one form, and that 
each one should have its own form by which it would exist in act. Hence it is 
evident that if a particular substance is one, it will not be composed of 
substances actually present in it.49
On the other hand, a bronze statue satisfies condition a), but it fails to satisfy 
condition b): its proximate matter (a piece of bronze) has a form (the form organising 
silver and copper as bronze) because of which it satisfies a), also when it is the
49 ME, VII, 13, 1588: "Impossibile est enim aliquam substantiam esse ex pluribus substantiis, quae 
sunt in ea actu. Duo enim, quae sunt in actu, nunquam sunt unum actu; sed duo, quae sunt in potentia, 
sunt unum actu [...]. Unumquodque enim dividitur ab altero per propriam formam. Unde ad hoc quod 
aliqua fiant unum actu, oportet quod omnia concludantur sub una forma, et quod non habeant singula 
singulas formas, per quas sint actu. Quare patet, quod si substantia particularis est una, non erit ex 
substantiis in ea existentibus actu."
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proximate matter of the statue. Similarly, a car is a stmctured and organised whole 
which satisfies a), but does not satisfy b), since each of the parts it is made of (its 
proximate matter) satisfies PC.
This view is grounded on the Aristotelian idea that all the things constituting 
proximate matter can either be combined in a whole in which they lose their original 
substantial forms, although the form of the whole is a result of the contributions of 
their forms, or can be simply mixed together so that they maintain their original 
substantial forms. Even if this view requires some refinement and opens puzzles 
which need to be dealt with,50 it is not ultimately unintelligible: we can make sense 
of it if we think of the difference between combining different elements or molecules 
through a chemical process into a kind of stuff in which they do not have their 
original dispositions and properties, and mixing different kinds of stuff in a way such 
that small particles of the original kinds of stuff still exist with their original 
properties and dispositions. Sugar melt in water may be an example of the former 
way of combining things, and an emulsion of oil and water may be an example of the 
latter. Similarly, a stone can be an example of the former, and a piece of marble 
could be an example of the latter.
Someone could advance an objection grounded on the fact that Aquinas 
claimed that natural bodies are substances in a strict sense, but artefacts are not. The 
explanation I gave, in fact, entails both that marble, i.e. a "natural body", is not a 
substance, and that plastic, i.e. an artefact, is a substance, since the carbon and all the 
other elements constituting plastic have lost the properties and dispositions they have 
when they are not combined with each other, by contributing to the formation of the
50 The view is extensively discussed by Aquinas in DME. A recent discussion of Aristotle's theses on 
this topic is in Fine 1998.
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resulting composite stuff. Thus, the objector could claim, either my interpretation of 
Aquinas's views is wrong, or he is inconsistent.
However, I think that this objection can be answered. Aquinas's claim may be 
taken in a weaker sense, as asserting that natural things can be substances, whereas 
artefacts necessarily are not substances. On the one hand, this is consistent with the 
view that there are natural bodies which are substances, but there are also natural 
bodies which are not substances, and marble could be an example of the latter. On 
the other hand, although plastic is certainly a kind of stuff made by man, it could be 
i) taken not to be an artefact and ii) taken as being a natural body, i) An artefact is an 
object made of stuff(s) of some sor^s), and falls under an artefact-sortal concept 
because of a function which it may fulfil. Plastic, though, is a certain sort of stuff, 
and is not individuated functionally, ii) Although plastic does not occur 
spontaneously in nature, it can be artificially made because the laws of chemistiy 
make this possible: thus, the existence of plastic is made possible by the laws of 
nature, and, in this sense, plastic is a natural kind of stuff. Aquinas's claim may be 
imprecise, and why this may be so is comprehensible, since at his times artificial 
kinds of stuff like plastic were not known yet, but it does not seem to be 
incompatible with the views I am attributing him.
Another worry concerning the views I am attributing to Aquinas may have to 
do with another possible counterexample: living organic bodies. These seem to count 
as examples of "natural bodies", and are constantly presented by Aquinas as 
paradigmatic cases of substances.51 However, they are individuated by forms 
organising proximate matters, which are constituted of things having substantial 
forms of their own (hands, legs, and other organs; and, at a lower level, cells). If this
51 The claim that natural substances are the paradigm of substantiality is related to the further claim
that an animate substance has an intrinsic principle of life and hence is self-organising.
62
is true, organic bodies do not satisOy condition b), and thus they cannot be substances 
in the strict sense. I think, however, that this objection can also be met by Aquinas, 
since he shared Aristotle's idea according to which the Oorms oO organic wholes and 
those oO their p arts are Ounctional principles o O organisation: an organ ora cell is 
what it is because it OulOIls a certain Ounction within the organic whole. A part oO a 
living thing, when removed Orom an organic whole, acquires a diOOerent nature, stops 
being a (part oO a) living thing, and perishes. This view is not implausible, I believe, 
iO the Ounctionality it involves does not concern a wide teleological explanatory 
picture, but only the claim that living things can not be synchronically identified: a 
certain leap oO organs (or oO cells) is a living thing only iO it evolves through time in a 
certain way (e.g., it grows), and not in others (e.g., it does not decompose). A cell 
which is part oO a living body and a cell removed Orom a body are essentially 
diOOerent, since they have diOOerent diachronic properties and dispositions. IO this is 
so, the proximate matter oO a living thing (i.e., its cells), when contributing to the 
constitution oO that living thing, do not have the properties and dispositions they 
would have were they existing apart Orom the body. Thus, organic wholes satisOy also 
requirement b).
In conclusion, some natural bodies are substances in a strict sense because they 
satisOy both condition a) and condition b). Other things, although they satisOy 
condition a), Oail to satisOy condition b). They are cases oO objects which are 
identified by some principle structuring, organising, and giving unity to some matter, 
but the matter involved maintains its own substantial Oorm. The resulting object 
satisfies condition a) because it Oalls under a sortal concept, and meets the conditions 
oO PC. There are several ways in which such objects can be Oormed, and diverse 
criteria oO unity are oOOered by diOOerent types oO Oorms. Aquinas writes that:
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some things differ by reason of the different way in which their material parts 
are combined: in some things the material parts are combined by being mixed, 
as honey-water; in others, by being tied together by some bond, as the binding 
around a woman's head; in others by a nail, as occurs in a chest; and in others 
the parts are united in several of the aforesaid ways. On the other hand, some 
things differ from each others by their position, as a lintel and a threshold, 
which differ because they are placed in such and such a way- one being above 
and the other below. Again, some differ in point of time, as dinner, which is the 
late meal, from breakfast, which is the early morning meal [...].52
Thus, being a certain sort of thing may depend on different ways in which the stuff of 
which the thing is made may be organised. Following the previous passage, Aquinas
wrote:
Because these differences are constitutive of the things we have mentioned 
above, it is evident that the being of the aforesaid realities is diversified 
according to these differences; for a difference completes the definition, which 
signifies the being of the thing. Thus a threshold is this particular thing 
"because it is placed in such and such a position", and its being, i.e., its proper 
intelligible structure, consists in being placed in such and such a position. 
Similarly, being ice is being condensed in such and such a way. And by each of 
the differences mentioned the being of things of certain types is differentiated: 
some by being mixed; others by being combined; and others by other 
differences, as a hand and a foot and other parts of this kind which have 
peculiar differences of their own inasmuch as they are directed to certain 
definite operations.53
The definition of a thing, according to Aquinas, describes the form because of which 
that thing falls under a certain sortal concept. Thus, the way in which that form 
structures and organises matter and individuates that thing is part of the definition of
52 ME, VIII, 2, 1693; "Quaedam enim different secundum diversum modum compositionis partium 
materialium. In quibusdam enim partes materiae componuntur per modum mixtionis, sicut 
mellicratum: i n quibusdam v ero, quia ligantur a liquo vinculo, s icut e st 1 igatura c apitis mulieris: i n 
quibusdam etiam coniunguntur aliqua colla vel visco, sicut fit in libris: in quibusdam vero adunantur 
partes clavo, sicut fit in area: in quibusdam vero fit adunatio partium pluribus praedictorum modomm. 
Alia vero differunt abinvicem sicut positione, sicut liminare superius et liminare inferius; quae quidem 
differunt abinvicem, ex eo quod sic ponuntur, scilicet supra vel infra. Quaedam vero different 
tempore, ut coena, quae est comestio serotina, et prandium quod est comestio matutina."
53 Ibid., 1694: "quia praedictae differentiae sunt constitutivae renim de quibus supra dictum est, 
manifestum quod ipsum esse praedictarum rerum toties dicitur quot sunt differentiae. Differentia enim 
complet definitionem significantem esse rei. Limen enim est huiusmodi, quia ita ponitur. Et ipsum sic 
poni est esse ipsius, idest propria eius ratio. Et similiter esse crystalli, est ipsum taliter inspissari. Et ex 
omnibus praedictis differt esse quarumdam rerum: hoc quidem in eo quod commiscentur, alia quidem 
in eo quod complectuntur, et alia aliis differentiis utuntur, sicut manus et pes, et aliae huiusmodi 
partes, quae habent proprias differentias secundum quod ordimamtur ad determinatas operationes."
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the thing. Each form (F) can act as a structuring and individuating principle only iO it 
can organise some proximate matter {m) which, b ecause oO the substantial Oorm it 
already has (F% is apt to be thus stmctured and organised. IO such stmcturing and 
organising causes the loss oO essential properties and dispositions associated to the 
possession oO its own substantial Oorm {F1) to the proximate matter (m), then the 
incoming Oorm {F) is a substantial Oorm, and the resulting object is an object in the 
strict sense. IO proximate matter (m) can maintain the properties and dispositions it 
has in virtue oO having a certain substantial Oorm (F% even aOter being organised and 
structured by the incoming Oorm {F), then the resulting object will satisOy condition 
a), but Oail to sabOy condition b): it will be a substance, but not in the strict sense in 
which an object satisOying both conditions may be.
It seems to me that this way oO interpreting Aquinas's theory oO hylomorphism 
answers a woiTy advanced by Hughes (1998). In Oact, according to Hughes, Aquinas 
supports some claims which clash with each other. On the one hand i) Aquinas oOten 
claims that no substance can have more than one substantial Oorm, on the other ii) he 
thinks that an individual substance (s) is essentially composed oO matter (m) and 
Oorm (O) (cO. Hughes 282-4). Since Aquinas also admits that some substances may 
maintain their own identity even iO they exchange their matter with the environment 
(e.g., a living thing), the matter (m) concerned in ii) cannot be prime matter, but it 
must be proximate matter: its proximate matter is essential Oor a substance, but the 
prime matter it is ultimately made oO may change. IO this is so, the matter mentioned 
in ii), (m), has some substantial Oorm oO its own which
may or may not be the substantial Oorm O [oO the substance s]. Suppose it is.
Then m and O jointly wholly constitute the essence oO s iO and only iO m wholly 
constitutes the essence oO s. [...] So iO m has O as its Oormal part, [...] either m 
wholly constitutes the essence oO s, in which case [s is not composed oO m and 
some Oorm, as hylomorphism requires], or m only partially constitutes the 
essence oO s, in which case [a composition oO m and O is not enough Oor
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constituting s, as hylomorphism requires]. The only way that the thick matter"/ 
m and the form f can jointly wholly constitute the essence of s, even though 
neither m nor f (taken individually) wholly constitutes the essence of s, is if the 
substantial form f is distinct from the substantial form that partially constitutes 
m - in which case the unicity of substantial foim goes by the board.54 5 56
I think that one can reply that in cases of substances in the loose sense, e.g. statues, 
the f is the substantial form of m, e.g. bronze. A statue satisfies condition a) in virtue 
of an accidental fonn of its matter (the statue-shape of the bronze), but fails to satisfy 
condition b). In cases of substances in the strict sense, instead, the substantial foim of 
m is not f, without any risk of inconsistency with the thesis that the substantial form 
of f is unique. In fact, when m (which is not prime matter, as we saw) enters, as a 
component, in the constitution of s, it loses some of its essential properties and 
dispositions, and cannot be identified as the kind of stuff it used to be before 
becoming the matter of m. The resulting object, then is composed by an only 
substantial form, f. Of course, the substantial form that m had, somehow contributes 
to the structured now given by f to s, but does not survive the coming of f.
The point of claiming that there are different degrees at which something may 
be a substance is that in different cases the structuring principle may have a different 
metaphysical bearing on the identification of objects. In cases satisfying also 
condition b), the structuring principle inteiwenes on the very organisation and 
structuring of proximate matter, and it is this which gives unity and identity to the 
resulting substance; in other cases, our way of utilising and (consequently) 
conceptualising things m ay have a relevant r ole in individuating them/r although.
54 Hughes uses the expressions 'thin matter' and 'thick matter' to refer - roughly - to prime matter and 
proximate matter respectively. In the next section, the issues of his uses of the two expressions will be 
discussed in greater detail.
55 Hughes 1998, 284.
56 Haldane 1996 discusses how, from Aquinas's point of view, our conceptual capacities may interact 
in different ways with different kinds of structures existing in reality in the identification of diverse 
types of substances.
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the substantial form (and, thus, the identity) of the proximate matter composing them 
is left untouched: thus, condition a) is satisfied, but condition b) is not.
The upshot of the admission of this diversity of ways in which an object may 
be identified by the form in virtue of which a thing falls under a sortal concept, is 
that each form needs a particular kind of matter in order to be able to organise and
structure it:
There are different actualities of forms for different matters. For in some things 
the actuality consists in being combined; in others in being mixed, or in some 
of the aforesaid differences.57
Even though there is a matter common to all things [i.e., prime matter], 
nevertheless the proper matters of different things are different. [...] For not 
anything at all is naturally disposed to come into being from any matter, as saw 
does not come from wood.58
Proper matter, then, is the potentiality which is required in order for a particular form 
to be able to actualise a substance of a certain kind. The proper matter of a certain 
form may be prime matter, if that form can organise prime matter directly: this may 
be the form of one of the four elements (air, water, fire and earth), if we accept 
medieval physics. But we can make sense of this notion also in modern terms: prime 
matter may be constituted by elementary particles, although, as we have seen in the 
previous section, cannot be identified as stuff of some sort, and, thus, fails to meet 
the requirements for substantiality. Lower level forms, in this context, could be the 
forms of subatomic particles which can be identified (electrons, protons and 
neutrons). At higher levels of complexity, proper matter is always stuff of some kind, 
and when it is organised by some form, it may maintain or lose the properties and 
dispositions associated with the form that it already has, being a stuff of some sort. In
57 ME, VIII, 2, 1699: "diversarum materiarum diversi sunt actus et formae. In quibusdam enim est 
actus compositio, in quibusdam commixtio, aut aliquid dictorum.'’
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the Oirst case, the resulting object is a substance in the proper sense; in the second 
case, iOthei ncoming O orm i s r esponsible Oor the O act t hat t he r esulting thing O alls 
under a sortal concept, the resulting object is a substance in a looser sense.
The Oact that each Oorm can only organise proper matter is the ground Oor 
Aquinas's claim that there is a distinction between potency and act. Again, Aquinas 
takes this distinction Orom Aristotle, and develops it in his commentary oO the ninth 
book oO Metaphysics. This distinction corresponds to the matter-Oorm distinction, 
since "Oorm is actuality and matter is potentiality alone."58 9
As we have seen, the proper matter oO a certain Oorm is the matter which, in
virtue oO the its characteristics, is apt to be organised and stmctured by that Oorm.
Thus, that proper matter is potentially the thing which it may become when it is
organised by that Oorm. Proper matter is the proximate matter oO a certain thing, since
matter which is not proximate cannot be immediately turned into that thing, and thus
does not have the potentiality to be that thing:
Matter is potentially a house when none oO the things present in the matter 
prevent the house Oiom being brought into being immediately by a single 
action, and when there is nothing that should be added or taken away or 
changed beOore the matter is Oormed into a house, as clay must be changed 
beOore bricks are made Orom it; and as something must be taken away Orom 
trees by hewing them and something added by j oining them so that a house 
may be brought into being. Clay and trees, then, are not potentially houses, but 
bricks and wood already prepared are.60
Clay is not the proximate and proper matter oO the house and it lacks the 
potentiality oO being turned into a house. In order Oor this to be possible, it must Oirst
58 Ibid., 4, 1735: "Quia verr, licet materia prima sit communis omnibus, tamen materiae propriae sunt 
diversae diversorum [...]. Nrn enim quodlibet natum est fieri ex qualibet materia; sicut serra nrn fit ex 
ligno."
59 ST, I, 76, 1, resp.: "Cum enim frrma sit actus, materia vero sit ens in potentia tantum."
60 ME, IX, 6, 1836: ’"materia est in potentia drmus, quandr nihil eoimm quae sunt in materia, prohibet 
domum fieri statim una actione, nec est aliquid qurd oporteat addi, vel auferri, vel mutari, antequam 
materia formetur in domum. Sicut lutum oportet transmutari, antequam ex eo fiant lateres: ex 
arboribus autem oportet aliquid auferri per dolationem, et a ddi per compaginationem, ad hrc quod
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be turned into bricks, i.e., it has to receive a further fonn in order to acquire new 
characteristics, which grant it the potentiality of being a house. The reception of that 
form, however, turns them into something different, i.e. bricks. Thus, bricks, not 
clay, have the potentiality of being a house, and they are the proximate and proper 
matter of the house. Clay is still present in the house, but not as proximate and proper
matter*.
Form, on the other hand, is the organising and stmcturing principle which turns 
proper matter into a certain thing: in this way it actualises a potentiality which proper 
matter has: "matter has actual existence through substantial fom.’’"1 Foim, then, is 
the act (or actuality) of the resulting substance, and "form's coming to matter makes 
matter actually to exist.”61 2
Aquinas distinguished also first potentiality and first actuality from second
potentiality and second actuality respectively. This distinction can be illustrated with 
an example. Let us imagine that there is a man who does not have the skills for 
building a house. This man is not a builder in actuality, but, assuming that he has no 
relevant disabilities, is a builder in potentiality, since, as any other man, he may 
acquire the relevant skills. Let us imagine, now, that that man has acquired the 
relevant skill after a period of training, and that now he is a builder, although, at the 
moment he is not building. In a sense, that person is now a builder in actuality (first 
actuality), since he has actualised a potentiality (first potentiality) he had, by 
acquiring the relevant skills. However, he is not actually building, and so, in another 
sense, he is not a builder in actuality (second actuality), although, having all the
componatur domus. Unde lutum et arbores non sunt potentia domus, sed lateres et ligna iam 
praeparata."
61 ST, I, 76, 6, resp.: "[Materia] Esse autem in actu habet per formam substantialem."
62 DSC, 1, resp.: "forma enim adveniens materiae facit ipsam esse actu."
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relevant skills, he can build and, thus, he is a builder in potentiality (second
potentiality).
Another distinction pointed out by Aquinas is that between active and passive 
potentiality?3 Something may be potentially something else, since because of its 
fonn (i.e., the stmcture and organisation it has) it may receive a different fomi (i.e., 
stmctme and organisation); such a thing is potentially organised and structured 
according to the new form: this potentiality is called passive potentiality, since it is a 
potentiality towards the reception of a new form. On the other hand, something may 
be potentially an agent acting on other things in certain ways, since, because of its 
form (i.e., the way in which it is stmctured and organised), it has the power to do so, 
although it is not doing it at the moment: this potentiality is called active potentiality, 
since it is the potentiality to act in certain ways.
1.6 Matter, Individuality, and Universals
Since form and matter are correlate constituents of hylomorphic substances, 
they have been so far discussed together. However, it may be worthy to recapitulate
Aquinas's views on matter in a more systematic way, since it is by using the notion 
of matter that Aquinas proposes a principle of individuation of substances.
Elsewhere (De Anna 2000b, p. 55-6), I have argued that we can recognise three 
main related notions of matter, in Aquinas's writings. Firstly, Aquinas takes matter in 
the sense of pure or prime matter, i.e. an uncharacterised substratum which has the 
potentiality of becoming all material things,", but which lacks any characteristic by 63 *
63 cf. ME, IX, 1.
m5T, I, 48, 3; ibid., 10, 6; ibid., 23, 5; ibid., 7, 2; ibid., 84, 3; ibid., 16, 8.
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itself. Were it to be attributed some characterisation, it should have some essential 
properties, i.e. a form. Yet, prime matter has no form.65 66 67Prime matter does not exist 
as such, i.e. there is no thing or quantity existing antecedent to substance or inliering 
quasi-substantially in it. Let us call matter in this sense, 'matter. Secondly, Aquinas 
takes 'matter' in the sense of one of the two hylomorphic components of any 
corporeal thing: it has a disposition to receive a certain form, and it may be that case 
that is has that disposition in virtue of a form which it already poseesses.® This is the 
notion of matter which was called 'proper' above (since it is what is proper for each 
form to structure and organise), and which sometimes is also called 'proximate' 
(since it is the closest to each form: it is what each form immediately structures and 
organises). In this sense, some atoms may be said to be the matter of a molecule, or a 
certain amount of paper may be the matter of a book, because it has the disposition to 
receive the form of a book, and it has that disposition because of its characteristics, 
i.e. because of its form. This may be called 'matter2I Finally, matter may be spatial-
temporally located stuff of some general sort, characterised by certain properties, and 
disposed to be structured and combined in certain ways. 'Matters', as we may call
this sense of 'matter', is the ultimate constituent of physical reality: it can be further 
analysed in terms of matter and fonn, but its matter is not composed of matter and
fonn, since it is matter j. It is matter. which is the object of study of physics. On a 
philosophical level, acknowledgement of matter, is quite independent from the 
acceptance of one physical theory rather than another, and it is probably compatible 
with the endorsement of (potentially) any physical theory. It is matter in this sense 
that Aquinas probably considered in discussing the doctrine of the elements.6,
65SCG, IV, 63.
66ST, I, 66, 1: "Was created matter formless at any time prior to its diversification?"
67 Cf., for example, SCM, 3, and DME.
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It is important to note that there are potential overlaps in the extensions oO these 
three senses oO the term 'matter', although the overlaps are not complete, and, thus, 
the notions can be dMmay be the mattei2 oOsomething, i.e. it 
may enter the hylomorphic constitution oO some substances, i.e. oO mattery, but
matter2 may or may not be matteq: the paper oO a book is mattery, but it is not
matter}. Similarly,
matter and mattery are distinct notions. IO something is mattery it must be also 
mattery, but something could be matter without being mattery. For something 
may be mattei'2 even iO it is not spatially and temporally located (the potential 
intellect, Oor example) and/or even iO, when analyzed in terms oO matter and 
Oorm, its matter has a Oorm (Oor example paper may be the matter oO a book, 
but in its own turn it is composed oO matter and Oorm).66
As we shall see in chapter 4, Aquinas's views on hylomorphism play a central 
role in the account oO Oormal causation, especially in the developed Thomistic 
version oO it which I will propose there. In the light oO this, we need to consider a 
similar, but incompatible, threeOold distinction oO the senses oO 'matter' in a (widely) 
Aristotelian metaphysical Oramework, which was recently proposed by E.J. Lowe 
(1998). Lowe's proposal is particularly interesting in this context, not only because oO 
the philosophical incompatibility oO the suggested alternative with the theses I 
attributed to Aquinas, but also because L owe himselO explicitly argues against the 
Thomistic proposal. Lowe distinguishes:
Mattera proximate matter, i.e. "the concept oO what a thing is immediately 
made oO."66 It is a relative notion, since x may be made oO >, which, in turn, may be 
made oO z, but, although x is thus made oO z, it is not immediately made oO z.
68 De Anna 2002b, 56.
69 Lowe 1998,215.
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Consequently, y is the matter„ of x, and z is the matter„ ofy, but z is not the matter,, of
X.
Mattery it "is the notion of a kind of stuff, that is, a kind of space-filling 
material which has separable parts capable of filling different parts of space."',
Matterc\ "is the notion of material substratum. This is the notion of an item
which provides ontological support for a thing's properties - the notion of that in 
which a thing's properties 'inhere'"’71 Since it is that in which properties inhere, it 
must be featureless: if it had any property, that property would not inhere in anything 
else, and, thus, we should be committed to the possibility of ungrounded properties, 
otherwise an infinite regress would ensue; but if we accept that possibility, we would 
have no reason to introduce the idea of a substratum grounding properties in the first 
place: the reasons which are normally put forward to introduce matteic are that we 
have empirical evidence of the existence of properties, and that properties must be 
grounded in something else. An alternative, one which Lowe certainly favours,72 
would be to claim that it is the thing itself which grounds its properties, but then it 
would be questionable that it is a kind of matter which constitutes the substratum of 
properties. Not surprisingly, therefore, Lowe concludes that things are "fomis
without matter."
It is not immediately clear how this threefold distinction can be mapped on the 
distinction I have suggested above. It seems quite clear that matter, corresponds to 
matter. On the other hand, matter, seems to be matter^ but, at a closer sight, they are
rather different: matters is a certain kind of stuff, like mattery, but it is a fundamental 
constituent of reality, whereas no restriction of this kind is attributed to matteiy. The 
most interesting question in a discussion of hylomorphism, however, concerns prime
™lbid................ .....................
71 Ibid, 216.
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matter (mattei'!). One might suppose that prime matter is matter^ since it is matters 
which sustains properties and is Oeatureless. Unexpectedly, though, Lowe claims that 
he does not consider prime matter separately, since "it is clearly a special case oO the 
concept oO matter as stuOO oO a certain kind" {ibid., 219), i.e. matteiy. This is certainly 
Oalse, at least as Oar as prime matter is taken in Aquinas's sense, i.e. as matter,. In Oact, 
iO it were s^OO oO a certain kind it should have some Oeatures characterising it as a 
certain kind oO stuOO, and diOOerentiating it Orom stuOOs oO other kinds. In other words, 
it should Oall under some sortal concept, and, thus, it should be structured and 
organised by some Oorm. Yet, as we saw, matter, is Oeaiurelest; it can only be deOined 
as the pure potentiality to receive some Oorm, and no Oorm can be granted to it as 
existing independently Orom any Oorm (as not combined in an hylomorphic 
constitution). Actually, matter, cannot exist apart Orom some Oorm, it is always the 
matter oO some substance, whereas a stuOO oO a certain kind can.
The possibility that prime matter is a kind oO matterc, however, is subsequently 
considered by Lowe, who seems to be thinking about Aquinas (whom he mentions 
explicitly, as we shall see) when he recognises that "some philosophers have been 
inclined to identiOy the notion oO prime matter with that oO material substratum. "cf 73 
However, Lowe thinks that the possibility that prime matter is matterc has to be 
disregarded, Oor two reasons. Firstly, he takes himselO to have already rejected the 
claim that matterc may be Oeatureless. Secondly, he thinks that the attempt to support 
the view that prime matter is Oeatureless through the idea that it "has only ’potential', 
as opposed to 'actual', existence" is "too dark" Oor him, and thus he decides to 
consider it "no Ourther."74
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cf. ibid., 217.
Ibid.
ibid., 219.
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It seems to me that neither of these reasons is very strong as a defeat of the 
view which I attributed to Aquinas. About Lowe's first alleged argument, it can be 
said that he never actually put it forward. When he introduces matterc, he does say 
that "it may be objected that material substrata would have themselves to be quite 
featureless"75 and then goes on to explain, as we have already seen, that this must be 
so, otherwise one should either accept an infinite regress of inhering properties, or to 
introduce groundless properties of material substrata, which undermine the main 
reason for which material substrata were introduced in the first place. What is 
important, though, is that he does not seem to offer any explanation of why 
featureless substrata would be problematic. He just introduces an alternative way of 
understanding substrata, i.e., as the individual thing in which properties inhere.
The argument he does not mention could be the usual and obvious one 
according to which the idea of something which is nothing is an empty one. A reply 
to this, on the other hand, could be that prime matter is not a "something", otherwise 
it would be a thing of some sort, i.e. it would have a form, and this is not the case by 
the definition of prime matter. Prime matter is the pure potentiality that forms may 
actualise things. It is a substratum in the sense that all substantial changes presuppose 
such potentiality, but not in the sense that it is a stuff of a special sort, i.e. featureless.
It is worth noting that the intuition according to which properties inhere in 
individual things, rather than in featureless material substrata, is not incompatible 
with Aquinas's treatment of prime matter. As we have seen, prime matter is 
introduced to explain substantial change, and the essential properties of a thing 
certainly inhere in prime matter. The accidental properties of a thing, though, do not 
inhere in prime matter but in the thing itself: accidental properties have being in a 
qualified sense, and they depend on something having being in an unqualified sense.
75 ibid., 216.
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Only individual things, though, have being in an unqualified sense, since the prime 
matter actualised in them has no being at all by itself.
Lowe's second argument against the identity between prime matter and matteic, 
does not seem any more convincing, if he does not explain in what sense he finds 
talk about actuality and potentiality of matter obscure. A natural guess would be that 
nothing can be said of featureless prime matter besides that it is pure potentiality; in 
this way, though, no positive characterisation of that notion can be offered, and it 
remains somehow undefined. Prime matter ends up sharing a dubious halo of 
mystery which is often found in metaphysics, for example in talk about noumenal 
reality. Although this may be a legitimate worry, it could that metaphysical analyses 
carnot but lead us to the need of introducing concepts which we cannot have a 
complete grasp of, but which are nevertheless required by the procedure of our 
inquiiy. Yet, unless there are direct reasons to reject the notion of prime matter, like 
issues of consistency or metaphysical economy, there is no need to abandon it.
On the other hand, at the beginning of section five above, we have considered 
the reasons which induced Aristotle to introduce the notion of prime matter. The 
notion of prime matter is introduced via the issue of change and permanence. In 
substantial change one thing ceases to be and another comes to be "in the same 
matter." Since there may be a total chemical change involved we need to say what is 
that was first this, and is now that the only answer seems to be 'matter', and in 
particular 'prime matter.' However, this is just to say that all stuffs have the 
potentiality to receive different material forms. The fact that nothing more can be 
said about this potentiality, and that the expression 'prime matter' seems to suggest 
that it is a stuff of some kind, induce the halo of mystery. However, when it is
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understood in these terms, the notion oO prime matter seems to originate Orom a 
genuine metaphysical demand and to play an acceptable explanatory role.
OO course, new metaphysical approaches should still be attempted, but they do 
not count as definitive substitutes as Oar as they have not proven themselves at least 
just as explanatory and conceptually clearer. It is not sure, at least so Oar, that Lowe's 
proposal based on the existence oO Oorms without matter can satisOy these conditions. 
Thus, although it may be a legitimate possibility to investigate, it does not count as a 
rejection oO more traditional approaches based on Oeatureless prime matter, like 
Aquinas's, which have to be understood in the way just expounded. This may, in Oact, 
be Lowe's intent, since he does not seem to presume that he has deOeated the 
traditional view, but only that he is searching Oor a new, and hopeOully clearer, 
metaphysical Oramework.
This explanation and this deOence oO Aquinas's threeOold conception oO matter
were needed since matter plays an essential role in one oO the keystones oO his
outlook: the principle oO individuation. According to Aquinas, it is the Oact oO being
constituted oO matter which makes a thing the particular thing it is, and which
diOOerentiates it Orom other individuals belonging to the same species:
Things which are specifically the same, but numerically diOOerent, have 
diOOerent matter. For the diOOerence which comes Orom Oorm results in specific 
diOOerence, while the diOOerence which comes Orom matter results in numerical 
diOOerence.76
Christopher Hughes (1996, 2) noted that Aquinas's claim according to which 
two diOOerent things oO the same species must have diOOerent matter may be read in 
two diOOerent ways, i.e. as:
76 SCG, II, 93: "Quaecumque sunt idem specie differentia autem numero, habent materiam: differentia 
enim quae ex forma procedit, inducit diversitatem speciei; quae autem ex materia, inducit diversitatem 
secundum numemm."
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(A) ’’For any time t, and any distinct individuals i and V, if i and V are members 
of the same species at t, then the matter of i at t is distinct from the matter
of V at tn',
or as:
(B) "For any times t and t', and any distinct individuals i and V if i is a member
of a species at t, and i' is a member of that same species at tf, then the 
matter of i at t is distinct from the matter of V at Z'".77 78 *
Hughes goes on offering various arguments in favour of the idea that Aquinas 
really meant (B). His main and most convincing consideration is that, at several 
points, Aquinas claims that immaterial substances (i.e., angels) do not differ 
numerically one from the other, but are subsisting species differing specifically from 
each other; moreover, he seems to suggest that there cannot be more than one 
individual in each individual angelic species, not even existing at different timesJ 
Aquinas's argument for this conclusion is grounded on the premise that immaterial 
substances cannot differ numerically, since it is materially different things which 
differ numerically (SCG, II, 93); given that the conclusion is meant to hold 
diachronically, also the premise must be diachronically tensed: it must be that things 
which differ materially at the same time or at different times, differ numerically at 
the same time or at different times. Consequently, it is (B) which Aquinas must hold.
The view to which Aquinas seems committed, Hughes notes, is quite too 
strong, since "if being this substance of this kind is being a substance of this kind 
with this matter, then no substance can change its matter over time";80 and this is
77 Hughes 1996, 2.
78 cf. SCG, II, 92 and 93.
™ cf. ST, I, 47, 2, resp.
80 Hughes 1996, 7.
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certainly false, since several kinds of things may change the matter they are made of 
during their history. Furthermore, Aquinas himself seems to recognise that this is the
case:
In the body of a man, while he lives, it is not with respect to the matter that he
always has the same parts, but only with respect to the species. As far as the 
matter is concerned, the parts come and go.81 82
It seems, thus, that in holding (B) Aquinas both accepts an implausible view and 
commits himself to an inconsistency.
However, Hughes highlights some other passages by Aquinas, which, in his 
view, solve the inconsistency, and, in my view, also make (B) plausible. Aquinas, for
example, wrote that
Form and common matter belong to a thing's true nature considered in general; 
signate matter and the form individuated by matter belong to the true nature 
considered as in this individual. Just as the human soul and body belong to the 
true human nature in general, this soul and this body belong to the true human 
nature in Peter or Martin.
Here Aquinas seems to suggest that the matter which is the principle of
individuation is matter,, i.e. the body in the case of a human being, in his example. If
this is so, Hughes notes, it may be the case that the matter! of an individual is not
required to remain unchanged throughout the history of that individual, i.e. is not
expected to meet the requirement of (B). That this is what Aquinas meant can be
supported by other examples; at another point of ST, Aquinas wiites:
In natural things the matter is part of the species - not single signate matter, 
which is the principle of individuation, but common matter. Just as it belongs 
to the nature of this man to be made of this soul, and this flesh, and these
81 SCG, IV, 81: "In corpore autem hominis, quandiu vivit, non semper sunt eaedem parties secundum 
materiam, sed solum secundum speciem; secundum vero materiam partes fluunt et refluunt."
82 ST, I, 119, 1, resp: "naturae alicuius in communi consideratae, pertinet forma et materia eius in 
communi accepta, ad veritatem autem naturae in hoc particulari consideratae, pertinet materia 
individualis signata, et forma per huiusmodi materiam individuata. Sicut de veritate humanae naturae 
in communi, est anima humana et corpus, sed de veritate humanae naturae in Petro et Martino, est 
haec anima et hoc corpus. "
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bones, so it belongs to the nature of man to be made of soul, and flesh and 
bones.83
The impression that according to Aquinas it is matter2 which is meant to offer a 
principle of individuation is most clearly stated in his commentary on Aristotle's 
Metaphysics'.
Matter is the principle of individuation, not only in singular things but also in 
mathematical objects; for there are two kinds of matter - sensible and 
intelligible. By sensible matter is meant such things as bronze and wood, or 
many changeable matters, such as fire and water, and all things of this sort; and 
singular sensible things are individuated by such matter.84
Here, Aquinas affirms explicitly that it is matter2 which constitutes the principle of
individuation.
If things stand in these terms, the inconsistency disappears: material substances 
are individuated by their matter2, and thus satisfy (B), but their matter! may change, 
and this justifies Aquinas's claims to that effect. Although it is consistent, Hughes 
suggests that this view is implausible, since there are substances the matter2 of which 
may change without compromising their identity. To begin with, Hughes considers 
the example of a statue: a bronze statue of St. Ambrose may be melted and reshaped 
as a statue of Julius Caesar; its matter2 remains the same, and thus the two statues 
should be really one, but this result is quite counterintuitive. Similarly, if the wood of 
which a statue is made petrifies, it undergoes a substantial change, i.e. matter2 of the 
statue changes: this entails that the statue should not remain the same statue; this, 
again, is counterintuitive.
83 ST, I, 75, 4, resp.: "materia est pars speciei in rebus naturalibus, non quidem materia signata, quae 
est principium individuationis; sed materia communis. Sicut enim de ratione huius hominis est quod 
sit ex hac anima et his carnibus et his ossibus; ita de ratione hominis est quod sit ex anima et carnibus 
et ossibus."
84 ME, VII, 10, 1496: "Materia autem non solum est principium individuationis in singularibus 
sensibilibus, sed etiam in mathematicis. Materia enim alia est sensibilis, alia intelligibilis. Sensibilis 
quidem ut aes et lignum, vel etiam quaelibet materia mobilis, ut ignis et aqua, et huiusmodi omnia; et 
a tali materia individuantur singularia sensibilia."
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Hughes recognises that these counterexamples may be answered by Aquinas.
In the commentary on the Sentences {CSE), Aquinas considers the case of a statue
which is destroyed and then reconstructed; he notes that if we consider it as a
substance, we are forced to say that the newly remade statue and the melted one are
the same statue, since they are made of the same matter2 and the same form (the form
of statuehood). But if we consider the statue as an artificial thing, then we can say
that the two statues are numerically different: once the first statue is destroyed its
(accidental) form is lost, and when it is reconstructed a (numerically different) new
accidental form is given to the same substance, e.g. bronze. Although Aquinas does
not consider the other counterexample, a parallel reply is available, according to
Hughes. In fact, if the statue is considered as an artefact:
when [it] undergoes petrification, no substance changes its thick matter,55 
because the (only) substance undergoing petrification (the bit of wood) does 
not survive the loss of its thick matter. On Aquinas's account, not even the 
shape of the statue would survive its petrification: the shape of the petrified 
thing would be idem specie, but not numero, with the shape of the wooden 
statue, inasmuch as accidents in different substances cannot be numerically 
identical. 55
According to Hughes, these are good replies from the Thomistic side, and they are 
grounded on the fact that there are "two senses"55 of the word 'statue', one according 
to which 'being a substance' is part of its meaning, but 'being an artefact' is not, and 
one according to which the reverse is the case. I think that a better diagnosis of the 
reason why Aquinas's replies are cogent may depend on the fact that, according to 
my interpretation of Aquinas's' views, a statue is not a substance in a strict sense (cf. * * *
85 Hughes uses the expressions 'thin matter' and 'thick matter' to refer (almost precisely) to my matter; 
and matter2 respectively (cf. note 53 above). The clause 'almost precisely' is due to the fact that his 
thick matter is not exactly my matter2: matter2 is something which is disposed to receive a form and 
this enter the constitution of a new substance, and it may or may not have a form already (i.e., it may 
or may not be matteri as well as matter2), whereas it seems impossible that thick matter may be 
matter;,
86 Hughes 1996, p. 11.
87 Ibid.
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§ 1.5). Let us recall that a statue satisfies condition a), but it fails to satisfy condition 
b), since its matter, e.g. the wood or the bronze, satisfies PC.88 89This divergence in the 
interpretation of the motives lying behind Aquinas's reply is not trivial: indeed, 
Hughes points out other possible counterexamples to (B) which cannot be met in his 
interpretation, but, I would like to suggest, that they can find a reply in mine.
Once more, Hughes finds useful counterexamples in Aquinas's writings, and
thus rises both a question of consistency and a question of cogency at the same time:
The river Seine is not this river because of this floating water, but because of 
this source and this river-bed. Hence it is always called the same river, even if 
the water flowing down is different. 8’
Thus, one and the same substances may change its matter2, and still remain the same
individual of the same kind. Aquinas makes even claims of the converse:
Things that are corrupted in their substances do not come back in the course of 
nature, although in the same species do: the cloud which is generated from 
rainwater is not numerically identical to the ctc^iui generated again from the 
water which rains down and then evaporates.90 91
hi genenr ternm, two thinns bdonging to the same specces may have the same 
matter2 and still be two difffreen tnnividuars.
The strength of these new counterexamples, according to Hughes, is due to the 
fact that they mention cases of naturalia, and thus is "possible for the same naturale 
to be successively constituted by different bits of the same kind of stuff."’' The
88 Let us recall that PC is the predicamental criterion, according to which a substance is "that which is 
neither said of a subject, nor in a subject" (cf. 1.1). Furthermore, a) and b) are the two conditions 
which an object needs jointly to satisfy if it is to be a substance in the strict sense; i.e. an object made 
of the form F and the matter {ml, m2, m3, ...) is a substance in the strict sense if and only if; a) thanks 
to F it meets PC and b) each kind of proximate matter mb when it is organised and structured by F, 
does not satisfy PC (cf. 1.5).
89 DSC, 9, ad 10: "fluvius Sequana non est hic fluvius propter hanc aquam fluentem, sed propter hanc 
originem et hunc alveum, unde semper dicitur idem fluvius, licet sit alia aqua detluens."
90 CT, I, 154: "Ea vero quae secundum substantiam corrumpuntur, non reiterantur eadem numero 
secundum operationem naturae, sed solum secundum speciem: non enim eadem numero nubes est ex 
qua pluvia generatur, et quae iterum ex pluente aqua et rursus evaporante generatur"
91 Hughes 1996, 12.
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importance of stressing the fact that they concern naturalia, seems to be that now
Aquinas cannot use the same manoeuvre he used in the case of the statue: being 
naturalia, a river and the clouds cannot be taken in a second non-substantial sense as 
artefacts. Furthermore, they must be cases of substances, according to Hughes: first, 
nowhere Aquinas seems to suggest otherwise; second, the example of the cloud is 
introduced by Aquinas to make the point that "things that are cormpted secundum 
substratum - i.e. substances which go out of existence - don't come back”; thus, he 
cannot have picked an example concerning non-substantial things.
I do not find these two reasons very strong. Concerning the first, we can 
recognise that although Aquinas does not directly deny that clouds and rivers are 
substances, it may be the case that he did not have any need to do that, even if that 
was his opinion, as I think it was. About the second point, we need to remember that 
it is possible that clouds are not substances in the strict sense (i.e. do not satisfy b)), 
but are still substances in a weaker sense (i.e., they satisfy a)). If this is so, they could 
qualify as suitable (although potentially confusing) examples of substances which 
can be destroyed. Let us remember, that Aquinas often follows Aristotle in using a 
statue as an example of hylomorphic composition, even if statues are not substances 
in the strict sense, because of their analogy with real substances (cf. above § 1.4). A 
parallel analogical use of clouds cannot be surprising, although unlike statues they 
are naturally constituted.
I would like to suggest that a river is not a substance. In fact, it may well 
satisfy condition a), but its matter; maintains the substantial form it had before 
entering the constitution of the river: the water has still the form of water, and the 
stones which make up the spring and the bed keep their original forms.
Consequently, the matter; of a river does not receive a new structure through the
92 ibid, 13.
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Oorm oO the river, and thus the river does not satisOy condition b). IO this is so, a river 
cannot count as a counterexample oO the claim that it is the matter2 oO a substance
which individuates it.
The upshot oO this approach is that arteOacts are not the only cases oO quasi­
substantial objects, i.e. objects satisOying a) while Oailing to satisOy b). Consequently, 
it may be the case that also some natural objects are individuated by quasi-substantial 
Oorms, and thus Oall under sortal concepts, although they are not substances in a strict 
sense. This may be so since their proper matter is organised by some Oorm giving it 
unity - turning it into an object Oalling under a certain sortal concept - while leaving 
its original substantial Oorm unaltered.
Drawing on Aquinas's analysis put Oorward at the begimiing oO his Being and 
Essence (EE), we could say that things Oall under sortal concepts and thus satisOy a) 
when they have a certain unity granted by their structure or Oorm. The Oorm in 
question, though, could be material or immaterial, i.e. it could structure matter or not. 
(Immaterial substances will be discussed in next chapter). Material Oorms, may be 
composed oO matter (i.e., all concrete particular) or not (e.g., Oorce-Oileds). Composite 
objects, can be the result oO aggregation (i.e., when they are made up oO several 
smaller amounts) or concretion (i.e., when the bits oO matter which make them up are 
cemented together). Aggregates may be either natural (e.g., a heap oO leaves blown 
by the wind) or artificial (e.g., a heap oO leaves bmshed together by a sweeper). 
Concretions may also be either natural or artificial (e.g. a chipboard). Natural 
concretions may be inOormed by an intrinsic principle oO organisation (e.g., proper 
substances, like trees, animals, and persons) or an extrinsic principle oO organisation 
(e.g., marble, in which bits oO diOOerent kinds oO stuOO are cemented together by an
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external pressure). It seems that only intrinsically structured natural concretions 
satisfy b), and thus are substances in a strict sense.
It seems, then, that a river can be a quasi-substance although it belongs to the 
class of naturalia, as Hughes points out. In fact, it can be seen as a case of natural 
aggregation. The case of clouds is more complicated, since Aquinas seems to have 
two options to choose between. On the one hand, granted that Hughes's worries have 
been answered, A quinas c ould d eny t hat c louds a re s ubstances and t hus t he s ame 
reply to the river case would be available. The form of clouds could be seen as a 
mere accidental form which water may receive. Alternatively, Aquinas could accept 
that clouds are substances; in this case, water would be the constituent of (the matter; 
of) clouds, by being turned in a particular kind of stuff (the matter; of clouds, let us 
say, cloud-stuff, i.e. water at gaseous state, within a certain range of pressure) when 
it enters the composition of a cloud. Since the form of the cloud and the form of the 
cloud-stuff are one and the same, we could say that cloud-stuff does not satisfy PC 
independently from having the substantial form of the cloud, and thus clouds satisfy 
b). Consequently, when it rains, the cloud-stuff loses its substantial form and is 
transformed into water; when water evaporates in the right atmospheric conditions, it 
receives a new form of cloud-stuff, and enters the constitution of new clouds; the
new cloud-stuff it constitutes, however, is numerically different from the cloud-stuff 
it constituted before it rained. If this is so, two clouds existing at different times and 
made with the same water, are not made of the same the matter;, and thus, according 
to (B), they are numerically different just as Aquinas said.
It is interesting to note that Hughes's discussion of Aquinas's theory of matter 
as a principle of individuation can offer a straightforward defence of it against a 
recent attack due to E.J. Lowe. According to Lowe,
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[Aquinas's] idea is that what makes for the numerical distinctness or diversity
(non-identity) of two different tigers, say, is the numerical distinctness of the 
matter composing them. But this idea can certainly be challenged, on the 
simple grounds that individual concrete things like tigers can and do change 
their component matter.’’
This objection can be easily met: if it is matter2 which individuates substances, then 
we can say that the flesh, bones and skin of a tiger are its matter2, and they do not 
change while the tiger exists. It is prime matter which changes, but Aquinas does not 
claim that prime matter can be the principle of individuation, as we have seen.
Truly, Lowe's objection is not as simple as it may seem. Aquinas's answer 
cannot satisfy Lowe, since he does not accept the notion of a featureless prime matter 
in the first place, as we have seen above. So, if a substance changes the matter which 
it is made of, then that matter cannot be featureless prime matter, but must be some 
kind of stuff, having some characteristics, i.e. matter2. Thus, for him, matter cannot 
be the individuating principle, and, in fact, he argues in favour of the view according 
to which it is the form a thing which individuates that thing. By form he means the 
cluster of all the property-tropes which constitute an individual thing."’ It is in virtue 
of having a certain fom in this sense that a thing has certain parts and occupies a 
certain space. It is in virtue of having a certain form in this sense that a tiger has 
certain particular bones, flesh and skin. It seems to follow that from this standpoint 
the idea that matter2 individuates things is a nonsense: if by matter we mean what is 
opposed to form, matter cannot have a form; matter;, though, is supposed to have 
some form or other, unless it is also matter;, and thus it is part of the form of the 
thing, it is not its matter.
On this issue, however, Aquinas's views seem to be incompatible with Lowe's,
but not inconsistent in themselves. According to Aquinas it is a nonsense to claim
” Lowe 1998, 226.
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that a definition oO a thing can pick out its individual Oonn: the individual Oorm is
certainly an individuating principle, but it is so since it contains reOerencet to the bits
oO matter2 which the individual Oorm organises and structures. Forms, at least
material Oorms, with which we are here dealing, are principles organising and
structuring matter, as we saw, and they can only exist when they do so; thus, they can
only exist in matter. When they are thought oO, they are not in matter, but they also
Oail to be individuals. It is true that Aquinas reOers to individual Oorms, but he does so
only by pointing to them, i.e. by mentioning them as 'this man' or 'this statue' (as, Oor
example, in the above quoted passage Orom ST, I, 75, 4). In this way he is consistent
in treating individual Oorms as existing only in matter, namely either as concrete
individuals (and then they have "natural" existence), or as current perceptions oO
concrete individuals (and then they have "intentional" existence):
Oor some Oorms oO things are not Oorms without matter, but are "a this in this", 
i.e. a Oorm in matter, in such a way that what results Orom the Oorm existing in 
matter is the species.
When Oorms oO this kind are thought oO they are not individuals. According to
Aquinas, then, an individual (material) Oorm cannot but exist in matter, and when it is
abstracted Orom matter, like in thought, it Oails to be individual, and is universal. In
Oact, he seems to agree with Aristotle, whom he takes to prove
that animal in general or man in general is not a substance in reality, but that 
the Oorm animal or man takes on this generality insoOar as it exists in the mind, 
which understands one Oorm as common to many inasmuch as it abstracts it 
Orom all individuating principles.94 95 6
94 cf. ibid., 222.
95 ME, VII, 11, 1517: "Quia quaedam species rerum non sunt formae sine materia; sed sunt hoc in hoc 
forsan, idest formae in materia: ita quod id quod resultat ex forma in materia existente species est."
96 Ibid, 13, 1571: "animal commune vel homo communis non est aliqua substantia in rerum natura. 
Sed hanc communitatem habet forma animalis vel hominis secundum quod est in intellectu, qui unam 
formam accipit ut multis communem, inquantum abstrahit eam ab omnibus individuantibus."
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This thesis about universals allows Aquinas to answer the problem concerning the 
relationship between primary and secondary substances, which, as mentioned above 
(§ 1.2), were distinguished by Aristotle in the Categories, but not in the Metaphysics. 
The distinction between primary and secondary substances holds on the level of 
logic, for the reason seen above (cf. § 1.2), but it does not hold on the metaphysical 
level, since the existing thing is one and the same, although it is considered as an 
independently existing thing in one case (primary substance), and as an object of 
thought, i.e. as existing in an intellect, or a mind, in another case (secondary 
substance):
A logician considers things insofar as they exist in the mind, and therefore he 
considers substances insofar as they take on the character of universality from 
the way in which the intellect understands them. Hence in reference to 
predicating, which is an act of reason, he says that substance is predicated "of a 
subject", i.e., of a substance subsisting outside the mind. But the first 
philosopher considers things insofar as they are beings, and therefore in his 
view of the matter there is no difference between existing in a subject and 
being predicated of a subject. For he takes something to be predicated of a 
subject which is something in itself and belongs to some actually existing 
subject. And it is impossible that this be a substance, for then it would have to 
exist in a subject. But this is contrary to the notion of substance, as also stated 
in Categories, 2?
This argument leads towards the conclusion that universals are not substances. 
In making that point, Aquinas explains what the relation between primary and 
secondary substances are: the former are things existing independently in reality, the 
latter are those very things thought of, i.e., existing universally in some mind.
97 Ibid., 1576: "Logicus autem considerat res secundum quod sunt in ratione; et ideo considerat 
substantias prout secundum acceptionem intellectus subsunt intentioni universalitatis. Et ideo quantum 
ad praedicationem, quae est actus rationis, dicit quod praedicatur de subiecto, idest de substantia 
subsistente extra animam. Sed philosophus primus considerat de rebus secundum quod sunt entia; et 
ideo apud eius considerationem non differt esse in subiecto et de subiecto. Hic enim accipit dici de 
subiecto, quod est in se aliqua res et inest alicui subiecto existenti in actu. Et hoc impossibile est esse 
substantiam. Sic enim haberet esse in subiecto. Quod est contra rationem substantiae: quod etiam in 
praedicamentis est habitum."
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Chapter Two
Hylomorphism and the Immateriality of the Human Soul
2.1 The Soul as the Form of a Living Tiling.
In chapter one, the discussion of Aquinas's theory of substances was focused 
on material, or, as he sometimes says, 'corporeal' substances, which, in his view, are 
things which can be perceived through the senses, i.e. sensible things. A justification 
for this limitation is that Aquinas's account of ontology follows Aristotle's by starting 
with an analysis of the material things of which men may have experience: Physics is 
a study of change, in the widest sense, of sensible things, and, as we have seen, it is 
for the sake of explaining accidental and substantial change within the material world 
that hylomorphism was developed in books VI to VIII of Metaphysics. The 
Aristotelian approach, however, is not a version of empiricism, since the possibility 
that non-sensible or even non-material things exist and can be known is not ruled out. 
In books XI and XII of Metaphysics, in fact, Aristotle suggests that in order to 
account for the existence and the character of material reality, one needs to admit that 
there are non-material substances, primarily a first uncaused immaterial cause, which 
play a causal role in relation to material things.
The decision to start from material reality is due mainly to epistemic reasons, 
i.e. to Aristotle's conviction (numerously expressed by him and subscribed to by 
Aquinas) that knowledge can be arrived at by starting from an analysis of what is 
more evident to us, through a search for its (ideally first) causes, which are less
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evident to us, but which are nevertheless more explanatory than what is immediately 
apparent. This search Oor non-evident Oirst causes leads Aristotle and Aquinas
towards the conclusion that there must be immaterial substances:
[There is a] distinction between corporeal and incorporeal substances. Now the 
Oormer are the most evident to us: Oor, whatever the latter may be in 
themselves, they do not impinge on our senses, but are only discoverable by an 
exercise oO reason.1
According to Aquinas, the human soul, considered by Aristotle in the De 
anima, is the Oirst immaterial substance which has to be admitted, Oor it is halO way 
between materiality and immateriality. (Whether Aristotle himselO shared this view 
has been a subject oO controversy since late antiquity). It is the Oorm oO a human 
body, and, as such, it belongs to the material realm, but it is also capable oO activities 
which are immaterial, as we shall see.
The De anima, according to Aquinas, is still a part oO the project which started 
with the Physics, namely the attempt to analyse and account Oor changes occurring in 
material substances through hylomorphic explanations. The material substances 
studied in the Physics, in Oact, can be divided into natural bodies and artificial bodies, 
as we have seen in chapter one. OO natural bodies, Aristotle notes in the De anima, 
"some have liOe and some do not", the Oormer being those which are capable oO "selO- 
nourishment, growth and decay."-1 2 3 About this claim, however, Aquinas suggests that
it
is said by way oO example rather than definition. For, besides growth and 
decay, living things may exhibit sensation and intellectual knowledge and other 
vital activities. Immaterial substances, as is proved in the Metaphysics, book 
XI, have the liOe oO intellect and volition, though they camiot grow and do not
1 CDA., II, 1, 217: "substantiamm quaedam sunt corpora, quaedam non sunt corpora. Inter quas 
substantias maxime sunt manifestae corporales substantiae. Nam substantiae incorporeae, 
quaecumque sint, immanifestae sunt, eo quod sunt a sensibus remotae et sola ratione investigabiles."
2 Franks 1995 dwells with the longstanding problem whether Aristotle's theory of the soul has to be 
located within Physics or Metaphysics. Her conclusion is that, in Aristotle's framework, "the soul is in 
a real sense the meeting place of the physical and the metaphysical" (255).
2 Aristotle, De anima, II, 1, 412 a 13-4.
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take food. But because, in the sphere of things that are born and die, the plant- 
soul (the principle of nutrition and growth) marks the point where life begins, 
this soul is here taken as the type of all living things.4 5
Thus, according to Aquinas, growth and decay are just some of the possible 
cases of vital activities: Aristotle's proposals would have to be taken as mere 
examples, and he could have listed many more cases than he did. Not only are 
growth and decay not the only cases of vital activities, but they are not even the 
activities that a living thing necessarily must have, since they are not part of the 
"definition" of living things, i.e. they are not essential marks of life. In fact, 
immaterial substances (like God or angels) are alive, but they do not grow or decay. 
This choice of examples, however, would have a rationale laying behind it: Aquinas's 
point seems to be that, although growth and decay are not the mark of life 
simpliciter, they are a mark of a break existing among material objects, i.e. between 
those material things which have life, and thus "are bom and die", and those which 
do not, like stones and mixtures. Aquinas's mention of birth and death, it seems to 
me, is a sign of his intention to refer to the material world as a domain within which 
Aristotle's examples of life would constitute a criterion for life. In fact, birth and 
death are the ways in which living corporeal things are generated and cormpted. 
Generation and cormption, furthermore, are events which are possible within the 
material realm only.’ The relevance of this mark seems to make sense in the context
4 CDA, II, 1, 219: "haec explanatio magis est per modum exempli, quam per modum definitionis. Non 
enim ex hoc solo quod aliquid habet augmentum et decrementum, vivit, sed etiam ex hoc quod sentit 
et intelligit, et alia opera vitae exercere potest. Unde in substantiis separatis est vita ex hoc quod 
habent intellectum et voluntatem, ut patet in undecimo metaphysicae, licet non sit in eis augmentum et 
alimentum. Sed quia in istis generabilibus et corruptibilibus anima, quae est in plantis, ad quam 
pertinent alimentum et augmentum, ut in fine primi dictum est, principium est vitae, ideo hic quasi 
exemplariter exposuit habens vitam, id quod habet alimentum et augmentum."
5 A distinction needs to be made between generation and corruption, and creation and annihilation as 
modes of coming and ceasing to be. The former concern possibilia, the latter necessaria (e.g. forms 
and angles). The distinction between the two modes is due to the fact that necessaria cannot be 
generated or corrupted, since they do not have material parts or organisation. On the distinction 
between the two modes, see for example ST, I, 45, 1 and 2. On the creation of angels (and immaterial 
forms in general), see 6T, I, 61, 1.
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of De anima: Aquinas probably takes Aristotle as analysing the material things 
which compose the physical world, and looking for distinctions and differences
which need to be accounted for.
Aquinas goes on, noting that, in more general terms, i.e. in the scope a wider
range of reality than material reality, a different criterion of life is available:
life is essentially that by which anything has power to move itself, taking 
movement in the its wide sense so as to include the 'movement' or activity of 
the intellect. For we call those things inanimate which are moved only from 
outside.6 7
Thus, a necessary condition for something to be alive is that the principle of its 
motion is internal to it, rather than external. 'Movement', Aquinas warns us, has to be 
taken in a wide sense, so as to include all sorts of change: growth, decay, and 
movements in space, but also changes in the content of thoughts (i.e., "activity of the 
intellect"). According to this criterion, plants, animals, but also immaterial 
substances, like God and angles, would count as alive, and could be differentiated 
from all other material things, like stones and mixtures.
This proposal, however, is quite unsatisfactory unless one can explain what it is 
for a movement to originate from "outside" or from "within." There are, of course, 
some paradigmatic examples, which may well have grounded Aquinas's intuition: a 
stone, namely a non-living material object, can move in space, but it needs 
something outside it (i.e., something which is not that stone or a part of it) to push or
6 CDA, II, 1 219: "Pi^^opria autem ratio vitae est ex hoc, quod aliquid est natum movere seipsum, large 
accipiendo motum, prout etiam intellectualis operatio motus quidam dicitur. Ea enim sine vita esse 
dicimus, quae ab exteriori tantum principio moveri possunt."
7 There is a problem about the application of this criterion in relation to God. Given the claim that God 
is impassible, He does not undergo change. Aquinas's solution is quite complex, but it might be worth 
noting that it involves the idea that God's standpoint is outside time, viz. an eternal presence of each 
instinct. From that standpoint, God cannot undergo change, but can think simultaneously about each 
state of a 11 p rocesses of c hange which e ver o ccmred or w ill o ccur i n t he universe. T hus, a lthough 
change cannot be attributed to God, His thinking involves the cognition of change, and the criterion of 
life ~ in His case - can be extended accordingly. On God's immutability, also in relation to His vital
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attract it; a living material object (Oor example a dog), instead, can move in space by 
itselO. There are other cases which are less clear, though.
Let us take the example oO a plant: we can say that it grows and that growth is a 
kind oO movement; Ourthermore we can grant that the origin oO that movement is
/
within the p lant, in the sense t hat t here i s n oting p ushing or p ulling it to m ake i t. A
larger. However, Oollowing the same line oO reasoning, we could also say that a dry
cloth mying in the rain grows when it get soaked with water, even though there is
. ...noting pushing or pulling it. IO this is so, it seems that the criterion oO liOe has a 
counter-example, and it is plausible to think that many more can be Oound.
A possible reply could be that there is, aOter all, something which is responsible 
Oor the growth o O the cloth, and that it is s omething external, s omething w hich i s 
neither the cloth nor a part oO it: the water drenching it. In other words, we could say 
that the cloth is not a living thing, since its growth has a cause which is external to 
the cloth. However, this is a bad reply, and, what is more important in this context, it 
isnota r eply t hat A quinas w ould O avour. C onsidering why t hat s hould be s o c an 
teach us something about Aquinas's proposal.
First oO all, it is a bad reply, since iO we introduce a general notion oO cause8 to 
account Oor the origin oO motion, all sorts oO moving things will result as having 
several sets oO causes, both external and internal, no matter iO they are living or non­
living things. In our example, we could say that also the plant has external causes 
which play a role similar to that oO the water in the case oO the cloth. For example, all 
the nourishing material that the plant absorbs through its roots. Furthermore, the 
cloth would itselO be moved from within, since it is its physical structure which
activities, see ST, I, 9, 1. On God's epistemic standpoint, see ST, I, 14, 7. On God's life, involving both 
His intellectual operations and His immutability, see ST, I, 18, 3.
® An analysis of this notion, both in Aquinas and in contemporary terms, will be discussed in chapter 
3.
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makes it liable to grow when soaked with water, and thus the cloth itself would be a 
cause of its growing when drenched, and it would have, consequently, an internal
cause.
Secondly, Aquinas would probably reject this reply, since, in his commentary
on Aristotle's Physics, he explicitly claims that "that from which a motion originates
is a principle of motion, not a cause. "9 The reason for drawing a distinction between
principles of motion and causes has to do with the fact that speaking of a principle
introduces the notion of an order of a process, and consequently
by 'principles' we seem to mean moving and acting causes, in which some 
ordered process can be most clearly found; by 'cause', on the other hand, we 
seem to mean formal and final causes, from which things mostly depend for 
their being and the way they are made.'”
A discussion of the different kinds of causes introduced by Aquinas will be presented 
in the next chapter. At this point, however, Aquinas's claims should seem puzzling. 
First he seems to say that there are things (i.e. those things from which "a motion 
originates") which are principles, but not causes; then he seems to say that all 
principles are causes of some sort, i.e. active causes, rather than final or formal ones. 
It may be suggested that the second claim is what Aquinas has in his mind.. His first 
claim, in fact, although literally inconsistent with the second, can be charitably 
interpreted in a way which makes it consistent; but the other way around does not 
present, at least prima facie, a similar possibility. The charitable interpretation takes 
the first claim to affirm that no principle is a cause simpliciter, meaning that 
principles can only be causes of some particular kind. The second claim, then, would 
be more specific in pointing out what sort of causes principles are. They are active * 10
” PE, I, 1,5: "Id unde incipit motus est principium motus, non tamen causa."
10 Ibid.'. "Per principia videturintelligere causas moventes et agentes, in quibus maxime attenditur 
ordo processus cuiusdam; per causas autem videtur intelligere causas fomales et finales, a quibus 
maxime dependent res secundum suum esse et fieri."
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causes, rather than final or formal ones. In the same part of PE, Aquinas makes the
same point also about material causes, which are not principles, nor causes
simpliciter, but elements."
If this is correct, when Aquinas says that a thing is alive if the origin of its 
motion is internal, he must be thinking about a principle, i.e. an active cause, not a 
formal or final cause, nor the matter which constitutes that thing. Of course this is not 
to say that causes and principles are opposed to each other like causes and non­
causes, but simply that "principles' refers to a subset of all causes.
This allows some restrictions on suitable candidates as counter-examples of 
Aquinas's definition of life: the stmcture of the cloth may be taken as a cause of the 
cloth, but it would be a formal cause; thus, it cannot count as a principle of its 
motion, and the claim that there is an external origin of motion loses its support. 
Similarly, then ourishing s ubstances a bsorbed by the p lant, a re not p rinciples, b ut 
elements or matter of it. They are not external origins of its motion. Of course, this 
does not mean that suitable counter-examples camiot be found, but it does show that 
Aquinas's intuition has some plausibility, and that it is not, prima facie, an untenable
definition of life.
Aquinas goes on considering the material world, and searches for what the 
principle of motion of living things may be. He notes that corporeal things which are 
alive are natural bodies, just as non-living things are. Thus, they also are substances, 
and since they are physical substances, like all physical substances, they must be 
compound, i.e. made of form and matter.* At this point, he can speculate about what 
the principle of life of a living thing is:
because tosay 'living b ody' i s to i mply two t hings., t he b ody i tself andt hat 
modification of the body by which it is alive, it cannot be said that the element
"ibid.
12 CDA., II, 1, 220.
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in the composition reOerred to by the term body is itselO the principle oO liOe or 
the 'soul.' By 'soul’ we understand that by which a living thing is alive; it is 
understood thereOore as existing in a subject, taking ’subject’ in a broad sense to 
include not only those actual things which are subjects oO their accidental 
modifications [i.e., substances], but also bare matter or potential being. On the 
other hand the body which receives liOe is more like a subject and a matter than 
a modification existing in a subject*.
In other words, when some being is a living body, it is a body which has the property 
oO being alive. Thus, the property oO being alive inheres in that body as in a subject. 
Inherence is a relation oO a property with a subject, i.e. a substratum. It may be a 
relation between a substance and one oO its accidental properties, or between an 
essential property and the matter oO the substance oO which it is an essential property. 
In the case oO a living body, liOe inheres in that body, which is the substratum: thus 
the body is either a substance or the matter oO a substance. In neither case may it be 
the principle oO liOe, i.e. the soul. (Let us note that in the passage above Aquinas 
seems to stipulate that the soul is the principle oO liOe).
The soul cannot be the compound thing either, i.e. the living thing: the latter is 
precisely that whose principle oO liOe we are looking Oor. And nothing can be the 
principle oO its own motion, according to Aquinas, who Oollows Aristotle in this 
respect. Book VIII oO Physics, and the parallel commentary by Aquinas, in Oact, are 
mainly devoted to showing that no physical substance can move itselO, unless there is 
one "part" moving another. Here 'part’ should be taken in a wide sense, so as to 
include sections which occupy diOOerent spatio-temporal locations, elements oO 
mixtures, and hylomorphic components. Thus, the compound living substance cannot 
move itselO, save in the sense that one oO its parts moves other parts. Consequently,
13 Ibid. : "Quia vero, cum dico, corpus habens vitam, duo dico, scilicet quod est corpus et quod est 
huiusmodi corpus, scilicet habens vitam, non potest dici quod ilia pars corporis habentis vitam, quae 
dicitur corpus, sit anima. Per animam enim intelligimus id, quo habens vitam vivit: unde oportet quod 
intelligatur sicut aliquid in subiecto existens; ut accipiatur hie large subiectum, non solum prout 
subiectum dicitur aliquid ens actu, per quem modum accidens dicitur esse in subiecto; sed etiam
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the soul camiot be the whole living thing, but one of its parts. But the part in question
cannot be a spatio-temporal section (for example an limb or an organ of the body),
nor an element mixed in the body, otheiwise the above arguments against the idea
that matter or compound substances can be principles of life can be restated
recursively. Aquinas can then conclude that:
we have no choice but to say that the soul is a substance in the mamer of a 
fonn that determines or characttrists a particular sort of body, i.e., a physical 
body potentially alive.*
The soul of a living thing, then, is the form which stmctures the body, by 
organising matter into a living thing. The structure and organisation of a body is due 
to the fact that it is the body of a certain living being, and has grown up accordingly. 
So the shape of the body is an actuality of the matter which composes that body, and 
is the result of the living activities which led to the formation of that body; that is, it 
is a manifestation of the form which is the soul of the living being whose body it is.
A different argument for the same conclusion is suggested elsewhere, by 
Aquinas. In Summa theologiae, for example, he argues that the soul, namely the first 
principle of life, must be numerically identical to the substantial form of the existing 
thing, since they both perform the same function, hi fact, the substantial form is the 
principle of o rganisation w hich m akes a t hing bethe k ind oft hing it is, and it is 
because of being the kind of thing it is that something acts the way it does. On the 
other hand, it is because of its first principle of life that a living thing acts the way it 
does. Thus, both the substantial foim and the first principle of life perform the 
function of making a living thing act the way it doss.1* This argument, however.
secundum quod materia prima, quae est ens in potentia, elicitin' subiectum. Corpus autem, quod recipit 
vitam, magis est sicut subiectum et materia quam sicut aliquid in subiecto existens. "
14 Ibid., 221: "relinquttm, per locum a divisione, quod anima sit substantia, sicut forma vel species 
talis corporis, scilicet corporis physici habentis in potentia vitam."
25 Cf. ST, I, 76, 1.
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seems quite problematic, since it rests on the assumption that things which perform 
the same function must be the numerically identical, and this is dubious. It is 
conceivable, in fact, that there are several things performing the same function, either 
as necessary but insufficient concurrent conditions, or as sufficient but unnecessary 
competing conditions of the performed function®
Although this latter argument is intended to directly support the identity 
between soul and substantial form, the previous one does not reach the conclusion 
that the form which is the soul is a substantial one. In CDA, Aquinas puts forward 
another argument for this conclusion. A living being which loses its soul ceases to 
exist. What remains, a corpse, is not the living thing which used to exist, nor its 
matter; rather, it is a new substance, possibly in the weak sense introduced in chapter 
one, i.e. one whose unity is only constituted by the spatial proximity of the particles 
which compose it. Furthermore, "s ince e very form has the matter proper to it, the 
soul must actualise just this special sort of body";16 7 not any body can be the body of a 
certain soul, not even any body of the same species: each form can only actualise its 
own body, namely the body that it structured through the activities implicit in the 
process of growth which it originated.
Given the general metaphysical point, discussed in chapter one, according to 
which no substance can have more than one substantial form, Aquinas concludes that 
each living thing has an only soul:
there cannot be more than one substantial form in any one thing; the first 
makes the thing an actual being; and if others are added, they confer only
16 It may be that case that the articulated defence of this argument which Aquinas proposes could have 
the resources to make it stronger. However, this argument is not essential for the line of discussion 
which we are following, and thus we do not need to press it further.
17 CDA., II, 1, 223; "^'^lia omnis forma est in determinata materia, sequitur quod sit forma talis 
coiporis."
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accidental modifications, since they presuppose the subject already in act o O 
being®
IO a Ourther Oorm is added to a substance and the modifications it causes are not
merely accidental, then it is a new substantial Oorm, and its action causes the 
corruption oO the substance in which it was brought in, and the generation oO a new 
substance (i.e., it gives being in an unqualiOied sense, according to the jargon 
explained in chapter one). Other Oonns can be super-added to a living being in a way 
such that it remains the same individual, but they need to be accidental (i.e. to give it 
being in a qualiOied sense). At this point, Aristotle's definition oO the soul, namely oO 
the principle oO liOe, can be put Oorward by Aquinas:
The soul is the primary actuality [i.e., Oorm] oO a physical body organism.
Aristotle does not need t o add 'having liOe potentially', Oor this is implied in
'orgamsm.'18 9
From the Oact that in an individual there can only be one soul, an important 
consequence Oollows. All vital activities oO a living being are movements originating 
Orom its soul. Following Aristotle, Aquinas notes that there are Oive kinds oO vital 
activities, namely oO types oO change which have an origin within the substance 
which performs them: intellection, sensation, volition, spatial motion, growth and 
decay. These activities give origin to a series oO Oour kinds oO living beings: 
intelligent animals (humans); animals capable oO moving in space; animals which 
cannot move in space, but have sensation and volition; plants, which grow and decay 
only?0 The reOerence to a series is due to the assumption that a hierarchy exists 
among the diOOerent kinds. Although Aquinas does not explicitly justiOy that
18 Ibid., 224: "impossibile est unius rei esse plures formas substantiates; quia prima faceret eus actu 
simpliciter, et omnes aliae advenirent subiecto iam existenti in actu, unde accidentaliter advenirent 
subiecto iam existenti in actu."
19 Ibid., 233; "anima est actus primus corporis physici organici. Non autem oportet addere, potentia 
vitam habentis."
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assumption, it is easy to see what his reasons for holding it could be. Firstly, he could 
recall the claim, that he makes elsewhere/1 according to which the four kinds of vital 
activities have different degrees of nobility or perfection; this, however, would not be 
very helpful, since it would just move foiward the problem of explaining the reason 
why we think that there is a hierarchy, and prompt the need to explain why there are 
degrees of nobility. Secondly, he could suggest that the hierarchy is due to the fact 
that each organism which can perform the activities of some level, can also perform 
the activities of lower levels, but the opposite is not true. For example, a plant, which 
is at the first level, cannot think or feel, but a human, who can think and feel, can 
also grow and decay. This seems an acceptable explanation, and one which Aquinas 
could give.
Now let us turn to the interesting consequence of the idea that there can only be 
one substantial fonn in a substance. The consequence is that the soul of a living thing 
is the origin of change of all the vital activities which that thing can perform. For 
example, the human soul is the principle of motion thanks to which a man can think 
(and thus it is called 'rational soul'), feel, desire, move, nourish himself, and so on. It 
is the same form which actualises prime matter as a human body: "the rational soul 
itself is the form whereby the body is a body.’'27
The thesis that the soul is the form of the body and that it is also the source of 
all living activities, including thought, makes it possible to overcome, according to 
Aquinas, the problem of the relationship between mind and body, which was already 
an old problem at Aristotle's time. Before Aristotle, in fact, "there had been much 
uncertainty about the way the soul and the body are conjoined [...] [and] some * * *
20 Cf. ibid, 3, 255.
21 Of. ST, 111, 4, c.
22 DS, 3, s .c. 5 : " ipsa a nima r ationalis e st forma in homine, q iia c orpus este orpus. " T his r elation 
between prime matter and the form of an animal has already been discussed in chapter 1.
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supposed a sort of medium connecting the two together by a sort of bond. ”23 Aquinas
believes, however, that thanks to Aristotle's theory
there is no more reason to ask whether soul and body together make a unity, 
than to ask the same about wax and the impression sealed on it, or about any 
other matter and its form. [...] [Furthermore,] just as the body gets its being 
from the soul, as from its fonn, so too it makes a unity with this soul to which 
it is immediately related.24
In this way, given the metaphysical assumptions concerning the hylonolphlc 
constitution of all material substances, and the identity between soul (or principle of 
life) and substantial form, Aristotle and Aquinas attempt to overcome Platonic 
dualism. Like Plato, they take the soul to be responsible for all vital activities, but 
they claim that its existence and the exercise of its powers are not independent from 
the body. Even intellectual human thought, which, as we shall see in next section, 
can become independent from the body, needs the body and the perceptions received 
by it in order to abstract its universal contents. In DSC, Aquinas wrote that "the soul 
and the body [...] are related to each other as matter is to form, and their union is 
immeditee."25 The soul is the form of the living thing, and the body potentially alive 
is its matter, but any activity of the body is an activity of the compound, the actual 
living thing. Although the converse is not true, since, as just mentioned, intellectual 
human thought may be independent from the body, also several activities of the soul 
are activities of the compound. Thus, all activities of the body and several activities 
of the soul are activities of both soul and matter. As a result, the problem of
23 CDA, II, 1, 234: "Fuit enim a multis dubitatum, quomodo ex anima et coipore fieret unum. Et 
quidam ponebant aliqua media esse, quibus anima coipori uniretur, et quodammodo colligarehir."
24 Ibid.: "non oportet quaerere si ex anima et coipore fit unum, sicut nec dubitatur circa ceram et 
figuram, neque omnino circa aliquam materiam et formam, cuius est materia. [...] Et ideo sicut corpus 
habet esse per animam, sicut per foimam, ita et unitur animae immediate, inquantum anima est forma 
corporis."
25 DSC, 3, ad 10: "Anima autem et corpus [...] comparantur ad invicem ut materia ad formam, quamm 
unio est immediata."
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explaining how an action or a movement oO the body can aOOect the soul, or vice
versa, does not even arise, and no connecting medium is needed.
2.2 Tlie Iimmd t^i^ialitty of the
The claim that the soul is tied to the body as its Oorm does not entail that 
humans are just material beings. As we have seen, the analysis oO natural (i.e., 
physical) reality, carried on by Aristotle in his Physics, leads him to the conviction 
that some physical beings are alive, and that among living things some are capable oO
more and more elevated vital activities than the other. Humans turn out to be the
highest examples oO natural living things, since they are capable oO all vital activities, 
including thinking. Like other living natural things, humans can nourish themselves, 
grow, decay, have sensations and desires, and move in space. But thinking is 
something peculiar to them, among material beings.
According to Aquinas, Ourthermore, thinking is a vital activity, which is unlike 
all the others. In a sense to be specified, thinking is independent Orom the body, and, 
thus, it is incorporeal, i.e. immaterial. In this way, humans turn out to be very special 
physical entities; they are physical - in the Aristotelian sense discussed in the 
previous section -, but not merely physical, since they are capable oO activities which 
transcend physicality. It is not plainly clear that, in drawing these conclusions, 
Aquinas was an Aristotelian, although he probably thought that Aristotle would have 
agreed with him. In Oact, Aristotle certainly believed that the physical world does not 
exhaust the whole oO reality, since in Metaphysics XII, he explicitly admitted the 
existence oO a transcendent Oirst cause, capable oO thinking, which is a pure act, i.e.
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not composed of matter. What is unclear, as is well known, is at what point of the 
philosophical search he thought that non-physical entities had to be introduced. In 
Aquinas's view, human beings are a borderline case, since they are still part of 
physical reality, but are also non-physical since they are capable of thought and self­
reflection. It is contentious that this was Aristotle's position in his De anima. Since 
antiquity, in fact, several commentators claimed otheiwise. In Aquinas's own times, 
in particular, the views of Arab commentators clearly incompatible with Aquinas's 
interpretation were quite widespread. At the University of Paris, for example, during 
Aquinas's period of teaching there, the views of Averroes were strongly defended by 
Siger of Brabant. According to Aven'oes, the actual thinkmg is not a vital activity of 
the single individual, but an activity of the active intellect, a single non-physical 
transcendent entity, shared by all individual men. It is against such views that 
Aquinas wrote De unitate intellectus contra Averroistas.
The problem now arises of understanding how it is possible that a material 
form, i.e. a form of something material, as explained and analysed in chapter one, 
can be credited with activities which are independent from a body. In particular, 
Aquinas seems to need to do at least two things: to show that thinking must be an 
activity of something immaterial, and to show that the individual human soul can be 
the soul of a living man and a subsistent being, i.e. a substance, at the same time. We 
will deal with these problems in turn.
Before entering into Aquinas's arguments for the immateriality of the intellect, 
however, three preliminaries concerning his conception of the intellect are needed.
First of all, following Aristotle, Aquinas believed that all sentient beings are 
aware of the environment around them because they are in contact with the world 
outside them and end up "containing" it in themselves. Thus, "the soul is in a way all
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existing things."26 However, there are different ways in which the world can be 
"contained" in a soul, and among all of them a major distinction has to be considered. 
On the one hand, a soul can be acquainted with a particular individual, tluough 
perception (e.g., when one sees a table), through memory (e.g., when one recalls 
perceiving a particular table, after closing her eyes while standing in front of it, by 
picturing in herself an experience as close as possible to the one she was undergoing 
when her eyes were open), or through imagination (when one pictures in himself a 
particular table, although he has never actually experienced it). On the other hand, a 
soul may entertain thoughts which do not concern any particular individual, but 
classes of things; for example one may think that tables are a great invention, or that
tables are more useful than statues.
One might suppose that such a distinction makes the explanation of singular 
thoughts difficult (e.g., the thought that the only table in my bedroom is useful): 
thoughts of that sort refer to singular individuals, but they employ concepts which 
are universal, and thus carnot secure a one-to-one con'espondence with the relevant 
referents. However, Aquinas has the resources to answer this worry: a singular 
thought can be about a particular individual, because it represents it through the 
exercise of relevant conceptual abilities (e.g., the abilities to master the concepts 
bedroom, my, table, only, useful, etc.), which ground the capacity to manage the 
focus of attention on imagined possible experiences or memories of actual past 
experiences; these, on the other hand, are individuals and can be in appropriate one- 
to-one relationships with the referents. In this way, an individual object may be 
represented non-pictorially, by sorting it out with an individuating list of 
characteristics, which require the mastering of conceptual abilities (i.e., universals)
26 De anima, 431 b 22.
104
and the reOerence to the conditions in which the subject had or could have relevant 
experiences.27
The second preliminary concerns Aquinas's distinction between two diOOerent 
operations oO the intellect, the capacity to comprehend universal Oonns (intelligentia
indivisibilium), e.g. to master the concepts under which things Oall, and the capacity
to Oorm propositions, both aOOinnative (compositio) and negative (negatio).
the intellect, by one oO its activities, understands things simply; understanding, 
Oor instance, man or ox, or any such thing, simply in itselO. And this operation 
involves no Oalsehood, both because objects considered simply in themselves 
are neither true nor Oalse, and also because, as we shall see later on, the mind is 
inOallible with respect to what things are in themselves. On the other hand, 
where truth and Oalsehood are Oound in the intelligible objects themselves, there 
must have been already a certain composition oO objects, i.e., oO things 
understood, joining several such objects togethe?.28
These remarks may seem very odd to a modem reader, but I hope that they can 
be made to seem more plausible. The main diOOerence between the two operations 
seems to be that the Oormer cannot go wrong, where the latter can. The latter is the 
capacity oO judgements and it is easy to see why it can go wrong: iO one judges that a 
certain object has a certain property, Oor example, the judgement will be tme iO that 
object really has that property, and it will be Oalse otherwise. It seems harder to see 
why the apprehension oO essences, i.e. universal Oonns, cannot go wrong. A reason 
could be that truth and Oalsehood "consist in a certain adequation oO or comparison oO 
one thing to another, as when the mind combines or distinguishes; but not in the
27 For an analysis of Aquinas's theory of singular thoughts, see Haldane 1989, 17-26. Aquinas deals 
with the problem in ST, 86, 1.
28 CDA, III, 11, 746-7: "una operationum intellectus est, secundum quod intelligit indivisibilia, puta 
cum int^nigit hominem aut bovem, aut aliquid huiusmodi incomplexorum. Et haec intolligontia est in 
his circa quae non est falsum: tum quia incomptexa non sunt vera neque falsa, tum quia intellectus 
non decipitur in eo quod quid est, ut infra dicetur. Sed in illis intelligibilibus, in quibus est vemm et 
falsum, est iam quaedam compositio intellectuum, idest rerum intellectarum: sicut quando ex multis 
fit aliquid unum."
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intelligible object taken in its^^JT.’^-'-' Although the idea that concept formation cannot 
go wrong may seem puzzling (an explanation of it will have to wait till chapter five), 
the distinction between the two faculties seems acceptable.* 30 * *
The third and last preliminary is about Aquinas's idea that thinking consists in
the intellect becoming formally identical to the thought object, i.e., in his words, in
receiving the intelligible form of the object, that is the fonn of the object abstracted
from matter, and thus made universal, in the way mentioned at the end of chapter
one. John Haldane has pointed out in several essays3' that the claim that the intellect
becomes fonnally identical to the object, does not entail that Aquinas thinks of
mental representations as internal objects; rather, mental representations are acts of a
mind, which acts according to its stmcture, and is structured according to the reality
which it cognises and can think of. Possessing a concept is having a certain habit
{habitus) of thought, i.e. being used to forming thoughts in a certain way. In
Aquinas's own words, with Haldane's interpolations:
It is because the intelligible species [the concept F] which is the form of the 
intellect and the principle of thought is the foimal likeness of the external 
object [the property Fness] that the intellect, consequently, forms the intentio 
[namely a thought] of the object: since as a certain thing is, such is the effect of 
its operation. And since thought is like a particular thing, it follows that the 
intellect thinks about that thing by foiming that thought.®
Although this may suffice for what follows, these views will be discussed in chapter
five.
Ibid., 760: "Veritas enim etfalsitas consistit in quadam adaequatione vel comparatione unius ad 
alteram, quae quidem est in compositione vel divisione intellectus. Non autem in intelligibili 
incomplexo."
30 The distinction is explained in Kenny 1993, 47-9; a criticism of the idea that the intellect camiot go 
wrong is in Jenkins 1991.1 have discussed the issue in De Anna 2001, Ch. 4. On the capacities of the 
intellect see also Haldane 1992a.
o' Cf., for example, Haldane 1989a, Haldane 1992b and Haldane 1993b.
oo SCG, I, 53: "Per hoc enim quod species intelligibilis quae est forma intellectus et intelligendi 
principium, est similitudo rei exterioris, sequitur quod intellectus intentionem formet illi rei similem: 
quia quale est unumquodque, talia operatur. Et ex hoc quod intentio hitellecta est similis alicui rei, 
sequitur quod intellectus, formando huiusmodi intentionem, rem illam intelligat."
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Now let us go back to Aquinas's arguments for the thesis that thinking must be 
an activity of an immaterial subject. Some are taken from Aristotle, and some are not 
found in Aristotle, although they rest on Aristotelian premises. David Foster (1991a
and 1991b) grouped all these arguments in five types, and offered an assessment for
each of these.
Arguments of type one, are akin to the following. "The intellect is in potency to 
become all corporeal things. To be in potency, the intellect must not be that to which 
it is potential. Therefore, the intellect must be free of all coiporeal thmgs."33 34The first 
premise rests on the assumption of the theory of mental representation according to 
which thinking is becoming identical to the object of thought, which was mentioned 
few paragraphs above. In other words, thinking is an act of the intellect, which it can 
perform in virtue of having previously being structured by the foims of things which 
it abstracted from individuals existing in reality. The second premise depends on the 
notions of potentiality and actuality which were introduced in chapter one. 
Arguments of this sort, Foster notes, are very common in Aquinas's writings, 
especially at the beginning and at the end of his career, i.e. in the Commentary on the 
Sentences, the Questiones disputatae de anima, and in the Summa theologiaeP
According to Foster, arguments of this sort are open to at least four 
obj*ec1noils.35 It seems to me, however, that only one, the first, is truly significant. 
This first objection is that the argument equivocates different senses of 'potentiality.' 
As we have seen in chapter one, according Aquinas all material things are the result 
of the avalisation of some potentialities contained in a substratum (matter), 
according to a certain principle of organisation (form). The intellect, on the other 
hand, is taken to receive potentially the natures of all material things - in the sense
33 Foster, 1991b, 236-7.
34 CSE, II, 19, 1, 1; ST, I, 75, 2; QDA, 2; CT, I, 7.
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that it can receive the Oonns which stmcture material things through a process oO 
abstraction -, but it is not potentially such in the same sense in which matter is 
potentially all things. When the intellect receives the Oonn oO a thing, it does not 
literally become that thing, but it contains the Oorm oO that thing in a special manner, 
i.e. intentionally. But there is no reason, at least prima facie, to deny that some 
material thing which has some substantial Oorm naturally can have the Oorms oO all 
material things intentionally. Thus, Aquinas's argument equivocates the two senses 
oO ’potentially', i.e. the natural and the intentional. This objection seems quite
eOOective.
The second objectim35 6 is that while it is tme that the intellect can cognise all 
material things, this cannot provide a case Oor its immateriality, since the internal 
sense (i.e., the Oaculty which, according to Aquinas, collects and unifies the data 
arriving Orom the diOOerent sense modalities) can also cognise all material things, 
although it is a Oaculty oO a material organ. Indeed, Aquinas thinks that all types oO 
sensory cognition - including perception, imagination and memory - consist in the 
reception oO the Oorms oO things in sense organs. Also the internal sense, which 
receives all sensible Oomrs through all sense modalities, is the act oO a sense organ, 
apt to receive all types oO Oonns. Foster's claim, then, is that the internal sense can 
receive the sensible Oorms oO all material things and, thus, it is a counter-example oO 
Aquinas’s contention that only immaterial things have that capacity. To this, 
however, Aquinas could reply that it is not tme that the internal sense can cognise all 
material things. In Oact, it camiot perceive itselO, although it is a material body, 
whereas the intellect can cognise it (the internal sense) by inOemng its existence Orom 
considerations concerning the Ounctioning oO the diOOerent sense modalities. The
35 Cf. Foster 1991a, 426-38.
® Foster 1991a, 431-4.
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point, here, is not that the internal sense lacks reflexive cognition, whereas the 
intellect has it, but that F oster's a ssumption that the internal sense c an c ognise all 
material things is false (in fact, it cannot cognise itself, although, it is material), and, 
thus, the capacity of cognising all material things could be rightly taken as the mark 
of immateriality, as Aquinas does take it.
According to the third obj^cio^rit7 the findings of recent neurophysiology, such 
as discoveries about what cognitive functions different parts of the brain perform, 
would be consistent with the view that there is an internal sense working as Aquinas 
supposes; t hus, t he d octrine of the i ntemal s ense w ould b e w ell s upported and i ts 
clash with arguments of type one would be even stronger than the second objection 
supposes. However, given the failure of the second objection, the third does not 
stand: no matter how closely the findings of neurophysiology resemble the working 
of the internal sense, intellect and internal sense have different capacities (i.e., the 
former can cognise the internal sense, the latter cannot), contrary to what the second 
and the third objections suppose.
The fourth objection® says that an argument of type one severs Aquinas's unity 
of soul and body, since it "minimizes the role of the interior senses" (437). It is not 
clear, though, why this argument would minimise "the role of the interior senses." 
Perhaps, the reason is that it would overlook the thesis that also the interior senses 
can cognise all things, as Foster suggests in raising the second objection. If this is the 
reason, the objection fails, since, aswes aw, it iffalse that the intemal sense can 
cognise all things; the internal sense cannot perceive itself.
Let us now turn to arguments of type two. These claim that "whatever is 
received is received according to the mode of the receiver. The intellect receives * 38
07 Foster 1991a, 434-6.
38 Foster 1991a, 436-7.
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what it knows in an absohitely33 * * * * * 9 * 41immaterial mode. Therefore, the mode of being of 
the intellect is rmnraterial.’yo The first premise is a general point about the reception 
of forms: we have seen that a form ("whatever is received") is a principle stmcturing 
a suitably disposed matter ("the receiver"). There are different ways in which things 
may be suited to receive the same form, but that fonn will give different organising 
results depending on what sort of matter receives it. The second premise is justifiable 
tluough the assumption of the above mentioned theory according to which thinking 
consists in grasping universals. Foster notes that, although arguments of type one are 
present in the most prominent locations, arguments of type two are the most 
pervasive in Aquinas's writings,4' and are still the most considered by twentieth 
century Thomists. Foster (both 1991a and b) takes this argument to be cogent and 
indeed it seems quite strong. Aquinas's success in supporting the immateriality of the 
soul will ultimately r est on its fortune. Nonetheless, it has recently received some 
deep and precise criticisms. Before turning to these, however, let us look at the rest 
of Aquinas's arguments listed by Foster, which, I will claim, are not cogent.
Type three arguments can hardly be said to constitute a kind, but there are a
number of cases which have a structure similar to that of the following:
no body can receive the substantial form of another body, unless by connptinn 
it loses its own foim. But the intellect is not corrupted; rather it is perfected by 
receiving the forms of all bodies; for it is perfected by understanding, and it 
understands by having in itself the fomis of the things understood. Hence, no 
intellectual substance is in a body.42
33 Foster's reference to an absolute mode of immateriality has to do with Aquinas's claim that
materiality and immateriality are matter of degrees. De Anna (2000b) offers a discussion of this thesis
by Aquinas, which can be thus recapitulated: "Aquinas speaks about a hierarchy of forms with respect
to the complexity of the functions that things having those forms may display. [...] for a form f the
more complex fss, the more complex the mattery [secondary matter] which is apt to receive fis, but
tlie more complex matter2 is, the further away f is from prime matter. In other words, the more
im^nate^era^l/is." A form is "absolutely immaterial", then, if it can exist without structuring matter.
'* Foster 1991b, 238.
41 ST, I, 75, 5; QDA, 14; CT, I, 7.
4® SCG, II, 49, 3: '"Nullum corpus potest alterius corporis formam substantialem recipere nisi per 
coiTupttonem suam formam amittat. Intellectus autem non cormmpitur, sed magis perficitur per hoc 
quod recipit formas omnium coi-porum: perfidur- enim in ir^te^llligendo; intelligit autem secundum
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A common Oeature oO these arguments is that they rest on Aristotle’s principle
according to w hich t he intellect c an b ecome all n atural t hings, a nd s how t hat t his
clashes with some physical principle, so that the intellect cannot belong to the realm
oO physics. Although all the premises are Aristotelian, Aristotle himselO did not
advance arguments oO this sort Strangely, these arguments are Oound extensively and
exclusively in the Summa contra Gentiles, where no other type is present; this is a
peculiar detail, which is thus explained by Forster:
type 3 [...] can be multiplied by varying the minor premise. The Summa contra 
Gentiles is characterised by multiple arguments Oor each point hence, the 
attraction oO using a type oO argument which lends itselO to variatiOTS.43
Arguments oO this sort, Foster notes, are very weak nowadays, since each oO them 
rests on a premise taken Orom physics, i.e. old "bygone physics." This criticism is 
true only on the assumption that we take the principles oO Aristotle's Physics to be 
scientiOic principles in the modern sense. IO, instead, we Oollow the line taken above, 
in chapter one, and hold that they are metaphysical preconditions Oor the existence oO 
a physical world, whatever the latter may be made oO, it may be the case that 
arguments oO this sort have still something to say. However, the argument seems to 
have another, Oatal problem. As was mentioned in chapter one, and will be discussed 
in detail in chapter Oive, Aquinas maintained that the Oorm existing as the structuring 
principle oO an actual being has natural existence, whereas when perceived or thought 
oO, it has a diOOerent kind oO existence, i.e. intentional existence. Unless Ourther 
qualifications are added to type three arguments, and it is hard to see what these may 
be, it could be objected that the claim that the intellect could not receive substantial
quod habet in se formas intellector'am. Nulla igitur substantia intellectualis est corpus." Translation 
quoted from Foster (1991b, 238).
'5 Foster 1991b, 240.
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forms of other things without losing its own nature, i.e. without being corrupted, 
would only be true if it were supposed to receive those substantial forms naturally. 
We have no reason to think that this has to hold also for the reception of substantial
forms iotdotionullf.
Arguments of type four concern self-consciousness, i.e. the capacity of the
intellect of knowing itself, a capacity that, it is claimed, no material thing could have:
The action of no body is self-reflective. For it is proved in the Physics that no 
body is moved by itself expect with respect to a part, so that one part of it is the 
mover and the other the moved. But in acting the intellect reflects on itself, not 
only as to a part, but as the whole of itself. Therefore, it is not a body.44 *
The "acting" ofthei ntellect is the m anner of r epresentation u sed bythei intellect, 
which was mentioned in the third preliminary above. The conclusion cannot be 
extended to sense modalities, since the senses cannot perceive themselves directly, 
whereas the intellect can. An eye, for example, cannot see itself directly, but only in 
a minor, whereas the intellect can think about itself. This argument - which is of neo- 
Platonist origin - appears only in the writings of the early and middle periods of 
Aquinas's production, namely in the Commentary on the sentences, and in Summa 
contra Gentiles. It is similar to the third type, in assuming a premise from physics, 
but it relies on the capacity of self-knowledge, rather than on the capacity of knowing 
everything else. The argument uses Aristotelian premises, but is only found in 
Plotinus, in Avicenna, and in Albert the Great, before Aqumas®
Foster believes that this argument is one of the strongest, but it can be objected 
that the premise according to which the intellect "reflects on itself, not only as to a
44 SCG, II, 49, 8; "Nullius corporis actio reflectitur super agentem: ostensum est enim in physicis quod 
nullum corpus a seipso movetur nisi secundum partem, ita scilicet quod ima pars eius sit movens et 
alia mota. Intellectus autem supra seipsum agendo reflectitur: intelligit enim seipsum non solum 
secundum partem, sed secundum totum. Non est igitur corpus." Translation quoted from Foster 1991b, 
240.
4o Cf. Foster 1991b, 241.
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part, but as the whole oO itself' is unwarranted. In Oact, it could be the case that in 
selO-reOlection there is a part oO the intellect which thinks about the other parts oO the 
intellect, but which cannot be thought oO by other parts. Such a part would be our 
highest cognitive Oaculty, and thus it would be out oO the reach oO our cognitive 
powers, and it w ould n ecessarily p ass u nnoiiced.46 G iven t he p remises a bout s elO- 
motion taken Orom physics, selO-reOlection ends up being a reason to introduce such 
an unnoticeable part oO the intellect, unless a previous reason Oor thinking that the 
intellect is immaterial, and thus can violate a law oO physics, is granted. Yet, gr anting 
such a reason would make arguments oO type 4 question-begging.47
Type Oive is a group oO arguments starting Orom the Oact that the intellect can
contain contraries:
the Oorms oO contraries as they exist in matter, are contrary; hence, they exclude 
one another. But as they exist in the intellect the Oorms oO contraries are not 
contrary; rather, one contrary is the intelligible ground oO another, since one is 
understood through another. They have, then, no material being in the intellect. 
ThereOore, the intellect is not composed oO matter and Oom.®
This argument also uses premises Orom Aristotle, but was not developed by him. 
Aquinas, however, does not seem to have been the Oirst to use it, and its history can 
be probably traced back to Alexander oO Aptlcodislase
'5 This objection could be overcome if a follower of Aquinas is keen to claim that a distinction 
between self-reflexivity and other directed second order thought has to be made. If self-knowledge is 
subject-reflective, it camiot be accounted for in terms of cognition of an object - be it an internal or an 
external one. This line of defence, though, is available only if one can argue that self-knowledge needs 
to be accounted for in terms of reflexivity. Although this is an open possibility, and thus there could 
be more to Aquinas's argument than I allow, I do not intend to peruse this line of defence here, since it 
would requhe an extended and articulated analysis of self-knowledge.
47 Haldane (2003b) notes that there are versions of this argument which are better than Aquinas's, in 
that they preclude the possibility of dealing with reflexivity as second order consciousness. For 
example, Haldane quotes Plotinus {Enneads, IV, 7, 1-3), who denies that the soul may be made of 
parts, and thus one cannot claim that one part could know the rest.
5 SCG, II, 50, 7: "Formae contiariorum, secundum esse quod habent in materia, sunt conti'ariae: mide 
et se invicem expellunt. Secundum autem quod sunt in intellectu, non sunt cfntrariao: sed unum 
contrarii^ium est ratio intelligibilis alterius, quia unum per aliud cognoscitur. Non igitur habent esse 
materiale in intellect!!. Ergo intellectus non est compositus ex materia et forma." Translation from 
Foster 1991b.
4® Cf. Rahman 1952, 6, mentioned in Foster 1991b, 241.
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It seems to me that this kind of argument is open to two strong objections, at 
least. Firstly, it is vulnerable to the same objection put forward against type three. 
Although we grant that "forms of contraries as they exist in matter are contrary", it 
carnot he prima facie excluded that they are contrary when existing intentionally as 
intelligible forms. Secondly, it is disputable that contrary forms can c oexist in the 
intellect, for one cannot entertain at the same time two "contrary" thoughts. Indeed, 
someone could claim that even a typical example, such as the thought 'x is hot and 
cold', does not show the simultaneous deployment of contrary concepts, since its 
entertarnnent is an event extended throughout a certain lap of time. The instant at 
which the concept hot is entertained, thus, could be different from the instants at 
which the concept cold is entertained. Of course, at a certain instant, one may master 
concepts suitable to produce "contrary" thoughts, but in this sense the intelligible 
fonns (the concepts) would exist in the intellect only as dispositions, or capacities, or 
habits (habiti), and the intellect would only be actualised by some consistent set of
them at each time.
One could reply that the point of Aquinas's argument concerns the content of a 
thought, whereas the second objection insists on the articulation of a thought as it is 
entertained or expressed. However, it seems to me that, given Aquinas's account of 
the content of thought as an act of the intellect informed by an intelligible species, 
the distinction between the content of a thought and its articulation cannot be 
relevant. From Aquinas's perspective, the content of a thought is certainly 
determined by the actualisation of the intellect by a certain form. On the other hand, 
it seems to me that, prima facie, there is no other way of explaining the articulation 
of an act of thinking, other than recalling the succession of forms which actualise the 
intellect throughout. If that is the case, the content of a thought and its articulation
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when it is entertained are determined by the same event: a certain succession of 
forms uctuuiisiog the intellect. Since Aquinas's argument concerns the content of 
thought in that it involves the avalisation of certain forms in the intellect, what he 
says concerns the articulation of that thought just as well.50 * * *
If all this is right, we can conclude that the only chances for Aquinas to sustain 
the thesis that the intellect is immaterial rest on the second argument, which, as I 
have mentioned above, has recently been the subject of strong criticism. I now turn
to this.
The criticism consists in the claim that arguments of the second type are 
fallacious. According to this view, Aquinas commits what Robert Pasnau (1998) has 
termed the 'content fallacy', a criticism previously presented, as Pasnau recognises, 
hy Joseph Novak (1987). Pasnau notes that the fallacy is well-known and quite 
widespread in the philosophy of mind® It is the "mistake in reasoning that comes 
from conflating two kinds of facts: facts about the contents of our thoughts, and facts 
about what shape or form our thoughts take in our mmd.”” An argument fallacious in 
this sense "falsely supposes a correspondence between what someone is thinking 
about and the intrinsic, noo-iotentiooal qualities of that thouhh"”® For example one 
may conclude that Bob's thought is red, since Bob is thinking about a red sports car. 
Pasnau notes that the fallacy may appear as an inference "from the intrinsic, non 
intentional qualities of our thoughts to their intentional qualities" or the other way 
around. "An argument in either direction may be an instance of the content fallacy."54
oo Aquinas’s argument could be defended if one denies that thinking involves the entertainment of 
concepts through time. Haldane (2003), for example, suggests that only sensations and imagery are 
temporally extended, and that thinking does not always require them. The issue was also discussed by 
Peter Geacli (1969). By contrast, the claim that thinking is necessarily extended in time was supported 
by Claudio Costa (2001).
o* He mentions the analysis of the fallacy due to Zenon Pylyshyn (1981).
oo Pasnau 1998,293.
oo Ibid.
o Ibid., 294.
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Thus, one can fallaciously claim that Bob's thought was red since he was thinking 
about a red sports car, and that the sports car he was thinking abnut was represented 
as being fast because the thought about it which he entertained was quick.
Although it is hard to believe that anyone would be likely to make these 
inferences, the fallacy may take extremely subtle foims, as it happens, according to 
Pasnau, in an astonishing number of places in Aquinas's writings. Indeed, Pasnau 
suggests that Aquinas very often falls victim of the content fallacy. A common case 
would be the following
intellectual thought is immaterial
intellectual thought is of tilings that are immaterial, 
which Aquinas would tacitly accept in all the several occasions in which he attempts 
to show that universals are immaterial. The cases considered hy Pasnau proceed in 
the opposite direction to the arguments for the immateriality of the intellect. The 
former assume the immateriality of the intellect to show that universals are 
immaterial, while the latter start from the immateriality of universals to conclude that 
the intellect is immaterial. The presence of hoth kinds of arguments in Aquinas does 
not prima facie entail that he was trapped in a vicious circle. The distinction between 
what is prior for us and what is prior in nature may be useful again in this context. 
The fact that there are universals and the fact that universals cannot he material, are 
prior for us (i.e., they are tmths about the content of cognition and about 
metaphysics, respectively); by assuming statements about those facts, furtheimore, 
we can reach the conclusion that the intellect is immaterial, which is not a prior truth 
for us. This is precisely what type two arguments do. On the other hand, the fact that 
the intellect is immaterial, which is prior in nature, i.e. more explanatory, is what
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explains the Oact that universals are immaterial. Aristotle's distinction between 
dialectic, the kind oO knowledge described in the Topics, and science, as presented in 
Posterior Analytics, is at work here. In both cases, however, inOerences can he 
constructed, even iO the epistemic status oO the premises is diOOerent in the two cases. 
I will argue below that, even iO the cases considered by Pasnau concern the naturally 
prior version oO the inOerence, his point may be extended also to the opposite case, 
consistently with his claim about the dual character or direction oO the Oallacy.
Pasnau Oinds a clear example oO the content Oallacy in Aquinas's commentary
on the De anima:
While the tense-Oacu1ty is always the Ounction oO a bodily organ, intellect is an 
immaterial power-it is not the actuality oO any bodily organ. Now everything 
received is received in the mode oO the recipient. IO then all knowledge implies 
that the thing known is somehow present in the knower (present hy its 
similitude), the knower's actuality as such being the actuality oO the thing 
known, it Oollows that the sense Oaculty receives a similitude oO the thing 
sensed in a bodily and material way, whilst the intellect receives a similitude oO 
the thing understood in an immaterial and incorporeal way. Now in material 
and corporeal beings the common nature derives its individuation Orom matter 
existing within speciOied dimensions, whereas the universal comes into heing 
by abstraction Orom such matter and all the individuating material conditions. 
Clearly, then, a thing’s similitude as received in sensation represents the thing 
as an individual; as received, however, by the intellect it represents the thing in 
terms oO an universal nature. That is why individuals are known hy the sense, 
and universals (oO which are the sciences) hy the inteUece.55
This passage would hide, in Pasnau's view, an instance oO the content Oallacy, 
as it would he clear Orom the Oact that its premises are about non-intentional, or
55 CDA, II, 12, 377: "sensus est virtus in organo coiporali; intellectus vero est virtus immaterialis, 
quae non est actus alicuius organi corporalis. Unumquodque autem recipitur in aliquo per modum sui. 
Cognitio autem omnis fit per hoc, quod cognitum est aliquo modo in cognoscente, scilicet secundum 
similitudinem. Nam cognoscens in actu, est ipsum cognitum in actu. Oportet igitur quod sensus 
cOTporaliter et materialiter recipiat simtlitudinem rei quae sentitur. Inteltectus autem recipit 
simrlitudinem eius quod intelligitur, mcfrporaitter et immaterialiter. Individuatio autem naturae 
communis in rebus coipor'aMbus et materialibus, est ex materia coiporali, sub determinatis 
dimensionibus contenta: universale autem est per abstractionem ab huiusmodi materia, et materialibus 
conditionibus individuantibus. Manifestum est igitur, quod simriitudf rei recepta in sensu repraesentat 
rem secundum quod est singularis; recepta autem in intellect!, repraesentat rem secundum rationem 
universalis naturae: et inde est, quod sensus cognoscit singularia, intellectus vero univeisalta, et 
horum sunt scientiae."
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intrinsic, in Pasnau's terminology, qualities of our cognitive faculties ( a "sense- 
faculty is always the function of a bodily organ", and an "intellect is an immaterial 
power"), but its conclusion concerns the intentional or representational features of 
our perceptions and thouhhtn® Pasnau offers a detailed analysis of the argument (let 
us call it the 'A-argument'), and claims that it is plausible, but only up to a certain 
point:
Al. the senses are powers of corporeal organs (premise)
A2. the intellect is immaterial (premise)
A3, everything received in something corporeal is received corporeally and 
everything received in something incorporeal is received incorporeally
(premise)
A4, cognition is the reception of the form (likeness) of the cognised object
(premise)
A5. the senses must receive a likeness corporeally (from Al, A3, A4).
A6. the intellect must receive a likeness iocorpordully (from A2, A3, A4).
A7. "in material and corporeal beings the common nature derives its
individuation from matter existing within specified dimensions"
(premise).
A8. "the universal comes into being by abstraction from [...] matter and all the 
individuating material conditions" (premise).
At this point, two conclusions are expected to follow by Aquinas:
A9 a thing's similitude (likeness) as received in sensation represents the thing
as an individual (from A5 and A7)
56 Pasnau 1998, 295.
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A10 a thing's similitude (likeness) as received by the intellect represents the 
thing in terms of an universal nature (from A6 and A8)
From A9 and A10 the conclusion that "individuals are known by the senses, and 
universals by the intellect" certainly follows, but according to Pasnau, the inferences 
to A9 and A10 are problematic.
In Pasnau's view, Aquinas would suppose A9 to follow from A5 and A7, and 
A10 to follow from A6 and A8. This, though, would be wrong. What follows from
A5 and A7 is
A9*. a thing's likeness, as received in sensation, is individual ("singular")
A9 concerns the intentional features of the received likeness, whereas A9* is about 
its intrinsic character. Since all the premises regarded the intrinsic character, the 
inference of A9 is fallacious and only A9* really follows. But, "why couldn't a 
physical likeness represent a universal?"57
Conclusion A10 is in no better position. It is meant to follow from A6 and A8, 
but A8 is problematic. A7 seems to contrast with A8, but they are more compatible 
that it could seem. A7 states that being in matter is a sufficient condition for being 
individual, although it is not necessary (angels and God, who are immaterial, are 
individual nonetheless). A8, on the other hand, refers to a mental operation 
(abstraction) through which some of the aspects of a thing are considered "while 
bracketing the rest."58 Thus, A8 concerns an intentional feature of the likeness which 
it mentions, and is indifferent to the aspect touched upon by A7, i.e. materiality and 
individuality. Consequently, A10 does not follow, since, as far as A8 is concerned,
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"it seems perfectly possible that something material might, through the act of 
abstraction, understand universals."59 Again, the problem with the inference has to do 
with the content fallacy: A8 is about intentional content but it is then used to reach 
conclusions about the intrinsic nature of representations.
Pasnau considers a possible reply. One could suspect that A3 and A5 could be 
given an intentional reading and be interpreted like
A5#. the senses must receive a likeness representing the thing being sensed 
as corporeal (from Al, A3, A4).
A6#. intellect receives a likeness representing what it understands as 
incorporeal and immaterial (from A2, A3, A4).
Now, it seems that A10 follows from A6# and A8, and A9 from A5# ad A7.
Unfortunately, Pasnau notes, the problem now is just moved up to the inferences to 
A5# and A6#. These seem to be plausible only at the cost of reinterpreting A3 as
A3#. every representation received in a material cognitive power represents 
the world as material; every representation received in an immaterial 
cognitive power represents the world as immaterial
The trouble here is that A3 was a quite harmless metaphysical claim, whereas A3# 
seems unsupported and question begging.60
An alternative way out for Aquinas would be to offer a bridge between the 
intrinsic and the intentional, i.e. an explanation of the relation between intrinsic and 
intentional features of representations, to the effect that A5# and A6# can be derived 
from A5 and A6. Unfortunately again, Pasnau notes, Aquinas is hostile to such 
bridges, since he holds the view that the likeness existing in the cognisant is similar
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid., 300-1.
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to the thing cognised, but not literally so®’ He Oamously claimed, Oor example, that 
the eye receives the Oorm oO the object without becoming coloured.62 Why should a 
representation oO something physical (i.e., a particular), then, become literally 
physical, or the representation oO something immaterial (i.e., a universal) become 
literally immaterial®63 Pasnau concludes that the argument does not stand as it is and 
it could only Oollow iO some Ourtber suitable premise is added. However, Pasnau's 
point does not undermine the general character oO Aquinas's possible move, Oor some 
other suitable kind oO bridge could be proposed nonetheless.
Another way oO bridging the gap was indeed suggested hy Aquinas, according
to Pasnau, by arguing in Oavour oO a claim which could become a suitable premise to
vindicate the argument. In Questiones de veritate, he wrote:
Species received by the senses are similar to objects only in respect to the 
object’s being able to act - that is, in respect to Oorm. Hence singulars cannot be 
cognized through them, unless perhaps insoOar as they are received in another 
power that uses a corporeal organ, in which they are received in a way as 
material, and so as particular’.
In intellect, however, which is altogether devoid oO matter, [a species] can be a 
source only oO universal cognition, unless perhaps through a kind oO reflection 
to phantomne.64
Here a capacity oO an object to act is taken to be a dispositional property that it 
has in virtue oO its Oorm. Such is the case also Oor perceptual properties: they are 
capacities to act on the senses. On the other bare, the experiences oO objects having 
the same Oorm may be indistinguishable. Consequently, Aquinas claims, singulars, as 
such, cannot be known (cognised) through their Oorms (species) received in the * 5
61 Cf. gDK2, 3,ad 9.
55 Cf., for example, ST, 1, 78, 3 c.
53 Pasnau 1998, 301.
M QDV, 19, 2 c: "Species autem quae sunt acceptae a sensibus, sunt similes rebus secundum hoc 
tantum quod res agere possunt; hoc est secundum formam. Et ideo per eas non possunt singularia 
cognosci, nisi forte in quantum recipiuntur in aliqua potentia utente organo coiporali, in qua 
quodammodo materialiter et sic particulariter recipiuntur. In intellectu vero, qui est omnino a materia 
immunis, non possunt esse principium nisi universalis cognitionis, nisi forte per quamdam 
reflexionem ad phantasmata, a quibus intelligibiles species abstrahuntur."
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senses, i.e. through the content of experience, unless there is some way in which a 
species received in a sense organ is an individual item which may track down the 
object which caused it. In order for this to be the case, the species must be received 
in a sense organ, so that it can he individuated by the matter of that organ. In other 
words, it is the spatio-temporal conditions of the experience, not its content, which 
make it the experience of a certain individual. Since the intellect is immaterial, on the 
other hand, species cannot exist in it as individuals, i.e. they are not spatio­
temporally individuated by matter, and thus particular objects cannot be cognised - as 
individuals - by the intellect.
In Pasnau's inteipretation, this distinction due to Aquinas amounts to the 
following. Since any action is due to the form of the actor, not to its matter, fonns 
can convey some information about matter when they are received in a corporeal 
organ, but cannot do that when they are received in something immaterial. This 
would avoid the content fallacy, in Pasnau's view, since the argument would he the 
following:
a) Intellect is immaterial
b) What is immaterial cannot receive infonnation about matter
c) Intellect cannot have cognition of anything material 
In this case h) bridges the gap between intrinsic and intentional features of 
representations. If we evaluate Aquinas's reasons to support b), though, we get in 
trouble again. Those reasons are not put forward in Questiones de veritate, but are 
found by Pasnau in the Summa contra Gentiles, where Aquinas explains that the
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form of something material cannot act on something immaterial, whereas a form of 
an immaterial thing can act on something mateiaal?5 In Pasnan's rephrasing,
"Cl*. A form in a material state cannot, by acting, convey its likeness to
something immaterial
C2*. A form in an immaterial state could, by acting, convey its likeness to 
something material."65 6
These claims explain why material objects can act on the senses, through their fonn, 
but not on the intellect. They are also a reason why Aquinas has to introduce a 
special part of the intellect, the active intellect, capable of stripping phantasms of 
their material conditions and impressing them on the potential intellect: the intellect 
cannot cognise particulars directly, since it cannot be acted upon by them. The 
problem is that now the content fallacy appears again. Cl* is open to two readings,
an intrinsic one and an intentional one:
Cl*a A fonn that is intrinsically material cannot, by acting, convey its likeness 
to something intrinsically immaterial
Cl*b A form that is representative of matter (i.e., intentionally material) 
cannot, by acting, convey its likeness to something intrinsically
immaterial
The former is what is needed to explain why material objects cannot act on the 
intellect, but the latter is what would justify b). Thus there are two functions which 
the active intellect should perfomi: "a) to alter the intrinsic properties of phantasms, 
by making material likeness immaterial; b) to alter the intentional properties of 
phantasms, by turning representations of material particulars into representations of
65 SCG, 1, 65, 537.
66 Pasnau 1998, 311.
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universals."6' According to Pasnau, Aquinas seems worryingly to fail to distinguish 
the two functions, and does not give any reason to believe that the active intellect 
should perform them both. "And so once again we have the content fallacy at work. 
Facts about what our cognitive faculties are like are being invalidly used to infer
facts about what those faculties can know.”67 8
I have already pointed out that the argument discussed by Pasnau is not the 
argument for the immateriality of the soul, but its reverse. However, one needs just to 
substitute A1 and A2 with the two corresponding conjuncts of the conclusion and, 
after readapting consequently the rest of the premises, one obtains the argument for 
the immateriality of the intellect (let us say ’B-argument').
B1 the senses have cognition of singular things (premise)
B2 the intellect has cognition of universals
B3 cognition is ^f^e reception of th^e form of the <^og>n;^^e?d obj^^c^t
(premise)
B4 a lung's hkeness , as eecei ved in sensation , rs^prr<ss<^itts hait thing as tt is
individual ("singular") (from B1 and B3)
B5 a iikeness ns the ^tellec, , ns contras, , rcpresents thas hung m
terms of a universal nature (fiom B2 and B3)
B6 "ns material and corporeal beings the common nature derives Is 
individuation from matter existing within specified dimensions" 
(premise).
B7 "the un^essas comes mto bemg by absfraction from [..J matter ^nd 
all the individuating material conditions" (premise)
67 Ibid., 313.
68/ZWW.,314.
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B8 the senses must receive a likeness corporeally (Orom B4, B6)
B9 the intellect must receive a likeness incorporeally (Orom B5, B7)
When a last premise is added
BIO everything received corporeally is received in something corporeal 
and everything received incorporeally is received in something 
incorporeal (premise),
then, Orom B8 and B9 the conclusion that the senses are powers oO corporeal organs
and the intellect is immaterial Oollows.
Pasnau's objection can be extended to this argument. B4 and B5 correspond to 
A9 and AlO, and once more they are the problem. In order Oor B8 and B9 to Oollow 
from them, they should be given an intrinsic reading, but it is only in their intentional 
sense that they Oollow from Bl, B2 and B3. Pasnau's consequent discussion can then 
be repeated, with the due variations. In this way, his objections count also against the 
argument Oor the immateriality oO the intellect. The criticism which I am about to 
advance against his objection, then, will be a deOence also oO the argument Oor the 
immateriality oO the intellect.
My main point is that, notwithstanding a detailed and sophisticated analysis, 
Pasnau overlooks an important thesis assumed by Aquinas: according to the latter, 
the likeness oO the external things existing in the senses and in the intellect, are not 
what is cognised {quod), but the means {quo) oO cogmtion.n As we have already 
mentioned, he does not take representations (likenesses) to be the internal objects oO 
which a cogniser is aware, but the acts oO the sense or the intellect through which 
external reality is cognised, although they may become the objects oO cognition in
acts oO second intention.
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The root of Pasnau's mistake seems to be the twofold distinction between
intrinsic and extrinsic features of representation which he uses to describe the content 
fallacy. A threefold distinction, indeed, would be more suitable: thoughts may be i) 
mental acts, i.e. psychological occurrences; ii) content carrying vehicles; iii) 
contents. Pasnau's account of the fallacy is ambiguous between the charge that iii) is 
confused with i) and that it is confused with ii). Were i) and ii) identical, the 
ambiguity would dissolve, but from Aquinas's point of view they are not identical. 
His claims to the effect that thoughts are acts of the intellect as opposed to internal 
content carrying objects makes all the difference.
As a consequence of the failure to appreciate the bearing of the distinction 
between i) and ii), Pasnau's interpretation of Aquinas's claim that the intellect 
receives universals is probably wrong. In fact, he takes this to mean that the intellect 
turns "representations of material particulars into representations of universals."7" 
Similarly, he could be wrong in interpreting Aquinas's awkward claim the intellect 
"represents [a] thing in tenns of a universal nature" as meaning that "things are 
represented in the intellect as universal."69 70 71 Universals are not the intentional content 
of representations, and this suggests that there may be room to close the gap causing 
the fallacy. To see how this may be done in more detail, one should focus on 
premises A8 and A9, and on the problem of the individuation of a "likeness."
Let us recall that Aquinas's claims about matter being a principle of identity (as 
we have seen in chapter one) refer to secondary, not prime matter. A man is the man 
he is because he is made of those bones and that flesh, but this means that his 
secondary matter remains unchanged, even if the prime matter which his form
69 ST, I, 85, 2, c
70 Pasnau 1998, 313.
71 Ibid., 300.
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actualises at each time changes. A way oO interpreting this, developed by Strawson” 
in an Aristotelian framework and extended to Aquinas by Haldane,72 3 is to claim that 
identity is due to spatin-tempnra1 continuity. A man is the man he is and diOOerent 
Orom other men, because the matter structured by his Oorm at each time is not the 
matter structured by the Oorms oO ntber substances at that time. Furthermore, 
continuity through time is secured by the Oact that, even iO the prime matter actualised 
by the Oorm oO a thing may change, its secondary matter remains unchanged, at least 
at a high degree which allows criteria oO re-ideniiOicatinn oO that object to be 
speciOied. For example, the Oorm oO a man may structure diOOerent prime matter at 
elOOerent times, but its secondary matter will remain grossly unchanged: his bones 
and his Olesh will always be those bones and Olesh, at least as Oar as that man will be 
re-identifiable in spacetime.74
It seems to me that all this applies to the case oO cognition. As we saw, Aquinas 
takes cognition to involve the cognitive power to become Oormally identical to the 
cognised object. In the case oO perception, the sensations occurring in the senses 
consist in the senses becoming Oormally identical to some oO the properties oO the 
external object; the internal sense, in its turn, becomes identical to the external object 
and the phantasm in it is a likeness oO that object, i.e. the Omm oO the object existing 
intentionally. Now, since the internal sense is material, the Oonn received by it 
structures something material. As a result, the resulting item, i.e. the phantasm or 
image in the internal sense, is a particular identifiable in space-time. What makes an 
image i the likeness oO the object o is the Oact that i originated in the senses through
72 Strawson 1959.
73 While discussing Aquinas, Haldane notes that "prime matter is best understood [...as] space-time, 
conceived of not as a pure receptacle but as the counterpart to structuring natures, and as restricted to 
the instantiation of these" (2002, 96).
74 Naturally, tliis does not imply that prime matter is some sort of stuff: prime matter is not another 
kind of matter to secondary matter in the same sense in which gold is another kind of matter to gold. 
These issues were discussed in Chapter One.
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the form of o (that very numerically identical foim) actualising the senses at a certain 
space-time. Being a material particular, i can be identified through its spatio­
temporal history, and thus it is numerically different from other likeness caused by o 
or by other objects at different times and/or spaces. Its being a likeness of o and thus 
its tracking the object o depends on its being a particular structured by the form of o 
at a certain time in which o was perceived. On the other hand, an intelligible fonn 
existing in the intellect is not a material particular, and thus cannot be identified in 
the way that material particulars can. At time tl, the object ol may cause the intellect 
to entertain the form Ol, and at a time t2, the object o2, foimally identical to but 
numerically different from ol, may cause the intellect to cause the fonn 02. Being 
ol fonnally identical to o2, the forms Ol and 02 entertained by the intellect will also 
be fonnally identical. Being O1 and 02 immaterial, though, they cannot be 
numerically different, and thus they would be the same form, O. Thus, the fonn O 
may track all objects oi foimally identical to ol and o2. This is what Aquinas means 
by claiming that forms in the intellect, since they are immaterial, are universal; they 
can track all the individuals of a certain kind. This is also why the universal is not the 
content of the representation {quod intelligetur), but is the representation itself {quo 
intelligetur): the content of the representation is the set of all the individuals that the 
universal tracks. Consequently, b* and c*, revised versions of b and c respectively, 
can be proposed as suitable candidates to bridge the gap of the content fallacy:
a) the meehed ss inmlaterial
b*) what ss inmlaterial camod a material particular likeness
c*) the intellect camiot have cognition of particulars
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In this way, the claim that a likeness of the intellect is universal, is identical to the 
claim that its representational content is universal, in the sense that it tracks all the 
individuals of a certain type, but it is not identical to the claim that its 
representational content is a universal (apart from cases of second intentions, when 
the intellect reflects on its own operations). Thus, the content of an intellectual 
representation of something material7? - in a first intention - is always constituted by 
material things, and this explains the consistency between these theses and Aquinas's 
idea that the intellect can know material things as such, since the matter is part of
their definition:
Physical objects [...], though they are intellectually discerned in abstraction 
from matter, cannot be completely abstracted from sensible matter; for man is 
understood as including flesh and bones; though in abstraction from this flesh 
and those bones. But the singular individual is not directly known by the 
intellect, but by the senses or imagination.'"
Pasnau's womes concerning the asymmetry between colour and materiality in 
Aquinas's treatment of intentional existence, which were mentioned above, can now 
be dissolved. It is not the content of intellectual representation which needs to be 
immaterial, since the intellect is immaterial, but is the act of representing which 
needs to be immaterial in order to represent in the way it does, i.e. without being a 
spatio-temporally individuated item.
As we saw, according Pasnau's interpretation of the passage by Aquinas which 
led to a)-c),” the reason why the intellect cannot cognise individuals is that the 
likeness received in it cannot convey infonnation about matter since it is immaterial.
75 Of course, this is not the case of angels, God, and other immaterial realities (maybe including also 
numbers); in such cases the intelligible species is not received through the senses, and it does not track 
material particulars.
CDA, III, 8, 716: vero intelliguntur per abstractionem a materia individual^ non autem
per abstractionem a materia sensibili totaliter. Intelligitur enim homo, ut compositus ex camibus et 
ossibus, per abstractionem tamen ab his camibus et his ossibus. Et inde est, quod intellectus non 
cognoscit directe singularia, sed sensus vel imaginatio?'
” QDV, 19, 2 c.
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IO that reading were correct, Aquinas's passage would be inconsistent with that just 
quoted, where it is clearly stated that matter is part oO the definition oO a filing which 
is grasped by the intellect. The point made by Aquinas in the Oormer, passage, 
however, can now be reinterpreted: since the species received in the senses are the 
result oO the action due to the Oorm oO things, things oO file same type would cause the 
same species in the sense, and, thus, they could not be distinguished one from the 
niher. Since the senses are powers oO corporeal organs, though, the species are 
received in matter (although intentionally, non naturally), and thus they are tpatio- 
temporally determined, i.e. they are particular's. In Aquinas words: "they are received 
in a way as material, and so as particular." In the intellect, on the other hand, the 
species "can be a source only oO universal cognition”, since the intellect "is altogether 
devoid oO matter.” Note that, consistently with my interpretation, and contrary to 
Pasnau's, the claim here is that the species in the intellect can be sources oO universal 
cognition, not that they are the (universal) objects oO cognition. Finally, the intellect 
can know individuals through a "kind oO reflection to phantasms”, Oor as we have 
seen above - thoughts about individuals are possible through the deployment oO 
universal concepts and their role in Oocusing the attention on possible oO past 
experiences, as stated at the beginning oO this section.
The consistency between the immateriality oO intellectual cognition and the 
idea that the intellect can be acquainted with matter can now be explained: a species 
existing in the intellect tracks all objects oO a certain type, independently Orom their 
material spatio-temporal conditions, but it is a characteristic oO all those objects that 
they act on the senses in a certain way and produce a certain range oO experiences. 
These are powers that they have in virtue oO being material, and thus their matter is 
represented in the intellect by the intellectual Oorm as a common Oeature oO all objects
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of that type. This is secondary, matter, however, and thus it is represented in virtue of 
the form which makes it suitable to receive the form received by the intellect.
Let us now see how the substitution of b) and c) by b*) and c*) offers a 
suitable bridge to overcome the alleged fallacy pointed out by Pasnau. As we have 
seen, according to Pasnau, a), b) and c) were meant as the links needed to make an
inference from
A5. the senses must receive a likeness corporeally
A6. the intellect must receive a likeness incorporeally)
to
A5#. The senses must receive a likeness representing the thing being sensed as
corporeal.
A6#. Intellect receives a likeness representing what it understands as 
incorporeal and immaterial.
(naturally, the argument a) - b) - c) is meant to bridge A6 and A6#: a parallel 
argument should be proposed for A5 and A5#).
Given the above criticism to Pasnau's understanding of the way in which the 
species exist in the senses and in the intellect, A5# and A6# are unacceptable. In fact, 
as we have seen above, contrary to what A5# claims, also the intellect - as well as the 
senses - must receive a likeness representing a corporeal thing being thought of as 
corporeal (since it is part of the definition of corporeal things that they are made of 
some kind of secondary matter). For the same reason A6# must be wrong, according 
to Aquinas: the species existing in the intellect does not represent what it understand 
as being incorporeal or immaterial, since - as we saw - its content is universal (it 
understands all things of a certain type), not an universal (an immaterial common 
feature of all things).
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a) - b*) - c*), and a parallel argument for the sense, suggest that the senses, 
since they are material cognitive powers that receives a form in matter, i.e. in 
determined spatio-temporal conditions, must have cognition of particulars, whereas 
the intellect, which is immaterial and cannot receive material particular likenesses, 
cannot have cognition of particulars. As explained above, this means that the sense 
can only have cognition of individuals as individuals, whereas the intellect can only 
have cognition of individuals as members of a class of things of a certain types. In 
other words, A5# and A6# can be substituted by
A5#. The senses must receive a likeness representing the thing being sensed as
individual.
A6#. Intellect receives a likeness representing all the members of the class of 
things to which what it understands belongs.
These follow from Al, A3, A4 and A2, A3, A4 respectively, and the conclusion that 
"individuals are known by the senses, and universals by the intellect" follow from
them.
In conclusion, I believe that Aquinas's arguments for the immateriality of the 
intellect, at least versions of the second type, can resist the accusation of committing 
the content fallacy. This shows them harder to defeat than it might seem at first and 
supports their strength, even if it does not prove their ultimate cogency.
2.3 The Soul as a Substance
Aquinas's thesis that the intellect is a faculty of the individual soul, i.e. that
each individual soul has its own intellect, was not a universally accepted
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interpretation of Aristotle, and Aquinas had to defend it against the contrary view
suggested by Arab commentators and endorsed by some of his contemporaries. As I
have already mentioned, this was the main purpose of his De unitate intellectu
adversos Avveroistas, written against Sign of Brabant. Aquinas's main complaint
against the Arab interpretation, is that it would be "an implicit denial of the existence
of thinking in the human individual",'® which is an undeniable truth of our
experience. The fact that each individual human soul has an activity, thinking, which
is intrinsically independent from the body, leads Aquinas to conclude that each
human soul is a substance, since it can exist independently from the body:
The intellective soul acts though itself, inasmuch as its proper activity occurs 
without the body sharing in it. And since a thing acts in so far as it is in act, it 
follows that the intellective soul has existence through itself, independently. Its 
existence does not depend on the body.'®
By saying that something "acts through itself', Aquinas means that its action is 
possible in virtue of itself only, independently from other things. "A thing acts in so 
far as it is in act" because its act is its form, the stmcturing principle through which it 
is that particular thing, and what actions a thing can perform depends on what it is, 
i.e. on its structure and in the way it is organised. Furthermore, by structuring it, a 
form makes a thing actually be, and thus gives it its act of being. Consequently, the 
fact that the intellect can act independently from the body entails that its act of being 
is independent from that of the body, and, thus, "its existence does not depend on the 
body." Since the intellect is one of the faculties of the soul, this entails that the 
existence of the soul does not depend on the body. This means that the soul has its 
own being in an unqualified sense in the sense defined in chapter one, and thus it
78 CDA, III, 7, 695: "ad positionem hanc sequitur, quod hic homo non intelligit."
79 QDA, 1, c: "Et sic oportet quod anima intellectiva per se agat, utpote propriam operationem habens 
absque corporis communione. Et quia unumquodque agit secundum quod est actu, oportet quod anima 
intellectiva habeat esse per se absolutum non dependens a corpore;."
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subsists, it is a subsaanee.8” In this way, Aquinas is led to claim that the human soul is 
the Oorm oO the body, but is also a subsistent, per se entity, a substance on its own. 
This conclusion will constitute a ground Oor Aquinas's most Oamous argument Oor the 
immortality oO the souk8’
Aquinas himselO is aware that his conclusion may be problematic and 
- - underlines a possible worry. As we have seen in chapter one, a substance is a thing oO 
a certain sort, i.e. it Oalls under a certain soiOal concept, because oO its structure and 
organisation, which, in turn, depends on the Oorm giving it being in an unqualiOied 
sense. Falling under a sorlal concept, it has a certain nature, or, in Aquinas words, it 
is "complete in some species and genus oO substance."8' In other words, when a thing 
is a substance it has a being in an unqualiOied sense such that it Oalls under a certain 
sortal concept, and it possesses all the essential properties which characterise things 
Oalling under that concept. Aquinas's worry originates Orom the Oact that a 
disembodied soul is not "complete in its tpeciet7: a human being, i.e. a rational 
animal, is the composition oO soul and body, not a soul alone.®3 On the other hand, 
the disembodied soul cannot be simply a Oorm, since Oorms only exist when 
structuring matter, but it cannot Oall under a diOOerent sortal concept either, otherwise 
its identity would be lost; in other words, disembodiment would end up being a sort 
oO corruption oO the soul, and the eisembodlne soul would not be the same thing as 
the Oorm which structured the body OnOorn being disembodied. This is implausible, 80
80 Cf. ST, I, 75, 2, c.; QDA, 1 and 14.; DSC, 1, 1, ad 6, and ibid.. 1, 2, c.; SCG, II, 68, 7; CDA, III, 7, 
680-88.
o' His point is that a subsistent form, being all forms actualities, is necessarily in act, and thus camiot 
lose its existence (in cases of non-substantial forms, the corruption of the form amounts to the loss of 
the matter which it organises). Cf. ST, 75, 6, c. On Aquinas and the immortality of the soul see Treolar 
1990, Cross 1997, St. Hilaire 1960 and Kelly 1967. On the consequences of Aquinas's views on the 
character of the existence of a soul after death see Owens 1 974. According to Owens, Aquinas is 
forced to admit that, after disembodiment, it is possible that the soul keeps existing, but it cannot act. 
o' QDA, 1, c.: "completum in aliqua specie et genere substantiae"; see also CDA, II, 1, 213 and 215; 
and 57,1, 75, 2, ad 1.
oo ST, I, 75, 4.
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since it undeimines one of Aquinas's most important claims concerning the human 
soul, namely that it exists through itself and it is at 1 east possihle that it survives 
disembodiment. Furtheimore, this would be inconsistent also with the lengthily 
supported conclusion that the human soul is identical to the form of the body. 
Aquinas's only way out seems to giant the fact that the human soul is an anomalous 
kind of substance. He distinguishes two senses of 'substance'; something is a 
substancel if it is subsistent, and something is a substance2 if it is complete in a 
species. He can then claim that
since the human soul is a part of a human nature, it can be called "a definite 
this" inthe first sense, as subsistent, but not in the second sense. It is the 
composite of soul and body which is "a definite this" in the second sens..8"
Thus, a soul can be called a substance only in the first sense of 'substance'; the soul-
body composite, instead, is a substance2. This does not entail that the soul and the
composite in which it enters have different acts of being in an unqualified sense. As
we have seen in chapter one, a thing receives an act of being in an unqualified sense
when it begins to exist as a thing of the sort which it happens to exemplify, and that
is the case when some suitable matter is organised by a certain principle of
organisation, a form. Thus, had body and soul different acts of being, they should
have different forms. In that way, though, the identity between the form of the living
body and the disembodied soul would be jeopardised. Consequently, the body-soul
composite must have the same very act of being (in an unqualified sense) of the soul:
the soul communicates that existence in which it subsists to the corporeal 
matter. Out of this matter and the intellective soul there results one being, so 
that the existence of the whole composite is also the existence of the sou..8"
84 "Definite this" is an Aristotelian expression refeming to substance as a something of a certain sort. 
This issue was mentioned in chapter one.
8" ST, I, 75, 2, ad 1: "cum anima humana sit pars speciei humanae, potest dici hoc aliquid primo modo, 
quasi subsistens, sed non secundo modo, sic enim compositum ex anima et corpore dicitur hoc 
aliquid." See also CDA, II, 1 215, and DSC, 2 and 16.
ST, I, 76, 1, ad 5: "anima illud esse in quo ipsa subsistit, communicat materiae coiporali, ex qua et 
anima intellectiva fit unum, ita quod illud esse quod est totius compositi, est etiam ipsius animae."
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This is possible since the soul (among other immaterial powers, such as intellection 
and volition) has the capacity to structure and organise appropriate matter into a 
living body; it is also the foim of the body.
In this way, though, Aquinas seems to be led to a view which is problematic in 
many ways. Donald Abel (1995), for example, complained that, since the intellect 
needs phantasms to perform its own natural acts (i.e., thinking), and since phantasms 
are bodily items, the intellect can only perform its own natural acts in this life, when 
embodied. In this way, although
it may be true that the human soul's dependence on phantasms is "extrinsic" 
rather than "intrinsic", there is nonetheless a dependence. It is odd for a 
substance, which by definition exists through itself, to be unable to perform its 
fundamental natural activity without relying on something external to it®'
Abel's worry, however, seems to rest on a misleading interpretation of "exists 
through itself, and on a confused notion of reliance. Saying that something exists 
through itself, in fact, cannot amount to the view that it does not rely on anything 
else, not even as far as its "natural", essential activities are concerned. A living thing, 
e.g. a plant, exists through itself, and growing is one of its natural activities. 
Nonetheless, its process of growth relies on something external, e.g. the availability 
of suitable nourishing substances in the environment. It seems to me that parallel 
examples of reliance and dependence can be indefinitely repeated for all substances 
and for several of their essential properties. If they constitute a problem, the human 
soul is not an isolated case, but the very notion of a substance is endangered. Let us 
recall that the idea that a substance exists through itself alone taken in the radical 
sense indicated by Abel is what led some philosophers, e.g. Spinoza, to conclude that 
there is only one substance, i.e. "God or nature." However, Aquinas's, and Aristotle's,
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notion oO substance is Oar both Orom Spinozian substance-monism and Orom its 
presupposition, i.e. the view that substances are radically independent Oiom anything 
else. Aquinas's only commitment is with the view oO independence presented in 
chapter one, which does not entail the thesis that substances do not depend on 
anything else.
One could make Abel's point stronger, by pointing out something peculiar 
about human souls as substances: the intellect dnnt not only rely on phantasms to 
carry on its natural activity (thinking), but it also needs them in order to exist in Oull 
actuality. In Oact, the potential intellect camiot receive any actuality OnOnre universals 
are abstracted Oenm phantasms and "inscribed” in it by the active intellect. The 
problem could then be that the soul depends on the body Oor its very act oO existence, 
not only in order to perform its natural activities. All this, though, does not need to 
worry Aquinas, Oor two reasons. First, the act oO the active intellect does not depend 
on the body at all, and this could be enough to claim that the soul whose intellect it is 
exists independently frnm the body. Second, even iO the objector insists that Onih 
active and passive intellects need to have some actuality iO a soul is to exist, Aquinas 
could reply that once the passive intellect has received some universals, it exists, 
even iO it stops receiving them because phantasms are no longer available to the 
active intellect aOter eitembndlment. In this way, phantasms (and thus the body) 
would be needed Oor the passive intellect (and thus the human soul) to come into 
existence as an active power or agent, but they would not be required Oor its 
endurance. In other words, although it is true that the soul needs the phantasms 
received Orom the body to perform some oO its activities, this is the case only Oor its 
initial aciuahsatinn, not Oor its continuing activity. That is, the soul could outlive the 
body, even in the case that it could not pre-nxitt it. In conclusion, souls are
87 Abel 1995, 232.
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dependent on the body, as Abel claims, but theirs is a contingent dependence which 
may be transcended.
According to Alee®8® human souls would be anomalous substances also in the 
sense that they would conflict with a full bodied Aristotelian hylomorphism. 
Assuming that Aquinas's interpretation of Aristotle is wrong (but we will not deal 
with this exegetical question), this may indeed be the case. However, Aristotle 
himself certainly admitted the possibility of foims existing without matter. It may be 
contentious that this is the case of his human intellect (active only, as in Avicenna's 
interpretation, or both active and passive, as in Aquinas's), or the case of the celestial 
souls moving the heavens. But this is certainly the case of his first cause, which is 
"pure act" and the supreme end, moving all things thiough deiire.®9 Thus, Aquinas 
did not revolutionise Aristotle's views on hylomorphism, but, in the worst case, 
moved his borderline separating the realm of em^ttered forms from that of 
immaterial (or pure) forms. Consequently, the mere fact that Aquinas does not 
assume a full bodied Aristotelian hylomorphism, while accepting his general 
metaphysical outlook, does not prima facie suggest that there is an inconsistency in 
his views. If an inconsistency really exists, it needs to be spelled out, and Abel does 
not do this. His point is historically inaccurate and theoretically inconclusive.
A more preoccupying wony about Aquinas's thesis that the human soul is both 
a substance and the form of the body, which was put forward by Gregory Conker,9"
has to do the fact that it leads him to the conclusion that the disembodied soul and the
actual living human being whose soul it is have one and the same act of being. 
According to Coulter, this view is open to two objections.
® 7&zW
8® Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics, XII.
90 Cf. Coulter 1990. Abel also mentions this wony, although he does not really explain what the 
problem is (Abel 1995, 233).
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Coulter's first objection is grounded on Aquinas's thesis, which we have
already d isci'issed, according to which something w hich is in an unqualified sense
can only receive being in a qualified trnsr, unless it gets corrupted. Coulter lrliet on
Aquinas's argument against the possibility that there are more souls in one man. This
view is unacceptable, in Aquinas's opinion, since, were it the case, then the union
between the intellective soul and the body would be merely accidental, for
everything which is received in something which already has complete existence is
received accidentally®1 Coulter complains that
a thing complete in existence can only unite accidentally to something else, 
precisely because having a complete existence entails having a complete 
essence. According to this ontological requirement, if the mens subsists, it 
could not be a substantial form - it could only unite accidentally to the body®'
The problem is, in Coulter's view, that on many occa^on®91 * 3 Aquinas clearly states 
that none of the hylomorphic components, i.e. matter and fonn, can have complete 
existence, since only the resulting compound is in an unqualified tensr. However, it 
is also true that, at many other points, Aquinas asserts that there are immaterial 
forms, namely forms which exist without structuring any matter, like angels and 
God. Leaving theological considerations on the side, such a possibility rests on 
Aquinas's theses on the immateriality of the intellect, according to which 
understanding is an activity of immaterial things, which consists in them becoming 
formed and structured in certain ways®4 Once this possibility has being granted, there 
is nothing inconsistent in the idea that some immaterial form, capable of 
understanding, may also strncture and organise matter. Such a thing can be a 
substancel, since it exists through itself, but may fail to be a substance?, if
91 Cf. SCG, II, 58, 6.
®7 Coulter 1990, 168.
9® Coulter points to EE, 6; ibid., 2; SCG, II, 54, 4 and 6; ST, I, 65, 4, c.; ME, VII, 7, 1419 and 1423.
On this see Sullivan and Pannier 1995.
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structuring matter is essential Oor it. It seems then, that Aquinas has fim resources to 
meet Coulter's Oirst objection.
Aquinas's possible reply, however, is problematic in the light oO Coulter's 
second objection. This consists in the complaint that saying that tomntbing is a 
substancel, but Oails to be a substance2, is inconsistent. In other ternis, one thing 
cannot be "complete in existence", but have an incomplete nature. In Oact, Aquinas 
claims, as mentioned above, that all things are in an unqualified sense through their 
Oorms, but also that it is in virtue oO their Oorms that they have certain natures. How 
can a Oorm oO a thing make it be in an unqualified sense, while leaving it with an 
incomplete naturee9” The soul, however, is supposed to do precisely this. Coulter 
notes that Aquinas was aware oO the problem , and that his ultimate attempt to solve 
it was the Oollowing:
the Oact that the intellectual substance is united to the body as Oorm does not 
prevent one saying, as the Philosopher did, that the intellect exists separately 
from the body. For one can think oO the O'orm in terms oO its ntsnnce {ipsius 
essentiam) and its power (potentia eius). Now according to its essence, it gives 
existence to such body; but according to its power, it causes the proper 
operations. Thus, iO an operation oO the soul is completed through a physical 
organ, it is necessary that the power oO the soul which is the principle oO that 
operation be an act oO that part oO the body through which its operation is 
completed; just as sight is the act oO the eye. IO, however, its operation is not 
completed through a physical organ, its power will not be an act oO any body. 
And so the intellect is said to be separated, nor does this prevent the substance 
oO the soul whose power is the intellect or the intellective soul, Orom being the 
act oO the body as a Oonn giving existence to a body.®”
o" I think that this is a fair summary of Coulter's main point (cf. Coulter 1990, 170-3).
96 SCG, II, 69, 5: "Nee tamen per hoc quod substantia intellectualis unitur corpori ut forma, removet^ir 
quod a philosophis dicitur, intellectum esse a corpore separatum. Est enim in anima considerare et 
ipsius essentiam, et potentiam eius. Secundum essentiam quidem suam dat esse tali corpori: secundum 
potentiam vero operationes proprias offrcit. Si igitur operatio animae per organum corporate 
completur, oportet quod potentia animae quae est illius operationis principium, sit actus illius partis 
corporis per quam operatio eius completer; sicut visus est actus oculi. Si autem oper-atio eius non 
compleatur per organum corporate, potentia eius non erit actus alicuius corporis. Et per hoc dicitir 
intellectus esse separatus: non quin substantia animae cuius est potentia intellectus, sive anima 
inteltectiva, sit corporis actus ut forma dans tali coipori esse."
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This would avoid the problem, in Coulter's view, since it would introduce a 
distinction between the intellective power of the soul (i.e. the mens, capable of 
separate existence, and, thus, subsistent) and the soul as substantial form (i.e., the 
soul which only exists as an act of a body). If these are separate items, the former 
may be a substance2, although the latter is not a substancel, without the risk of any 
inconsistency. However, this solution is unacceptable, according to Coulter, since 
"this distinction of reference between soul and the mens has profound difficulties": 
either it leads to the claim that the mens is subsistent, but separate from human 
nature, or it has to be taken as a mere facon de parler, and mens and soul have to be 
subsequently identified, with the result that the contradiction is reintroduced.97 
Aquinas would then use equivocally the term 'mens', taking its referent as a 
subsistent separate item and as a power inhering in a soul at different times.
It seems to me that Coulter's interpretation of the last passage is dubious, since, 
when claiming that "one can think" about the term "form" in two ways, Aquinas does 
not intend to introduce two referents of the ternr, but two senses; one through which 
the human form can be thought to be subsistent (a substancel), i.e. an incorporeal 
entity, the other through which it can be conceived as incomplete in nature (failing to 
be a substance2), i.e. a substantial form, which, by its nature, structures a body. In 
other words, in that passage Aquinas simply states the usual solution grounded on the 
distinction between 'substancel' and 'substance2'. The soul may have different 
aspects, which are the ground for the possibility to think of it in different ways, but it 
may be one entity nonetheless.
At this point I would like to suggest that this distinction is not as problematic 
as Coulter takes it to be. There is no inconsistency in the claim that something may 
be a substancel, but fail to be a substance2. Let us imagine that a substance s has the
®7 Coulter 1990, 176-8.
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essential properties pi, p2, p3.., pn. In virtue of these properties s can act in 
determinate manners and manifests a certain nature (i.e. is a substancel, and falls 
under a sortal concept S). If s loses the essential property pm, belonging to the set 
(pi, p2, p3.., pn), it stops being that particular substance, and goes out of existence, 
i.e. gets corrupted. Eventually it becomes an individual of another sort (e.g., falling 
under the sortal concept 7). Therefore, it stops being that particular substance (5), and 
becomes a different substance (5% Let us imagine that the loss of property pm by s is 
peculiar in these ways: i) (at least a great part of) the essential propertirt of s', in 
virtue of which it falls under the sortal T, are a subset (pl, p2, p3..., pi] - pm) of the 
essential properties ofs, in virtue of which s fall under the sortal S (pi, p2, p3.., pn); 
ii) the essential properties in virtue of which s' falls under the sortal concept T ([pi, 
p2, p3.., pn] - pm) are such that a thing which possesses them has a disposition and a 
propensity to acquire the property pm. It seems plausible to claim that, in this case, 
although s and s' are two different individuals falling under different sortal concepts, 
the form of s' is part (in a wide srosr which should be specified) of the foim of s, and 
thus it canbe claimed that ithasnn n^0x^1611 nature, i n respect tos. Similarly, 
being in virtue of its form that a thing receives its act of being, since the foim of s' is 
a part of the form of s, the act of being of 5' is the act of being of s. In respect to the 
sortal concept S, then, s' is a substancel, but fails to be a substance2. In other words, 
it has the act of being of an S (i.e., s), but it is not a complete S, it does not have a 
whole nature of an S, although it has a disposition to have such a complete nature, 
and nothing inconsistent with it.
What has just been sketched is a coherent and conceivable scenario, although it 
may be difficult to find examples satisfying all these conditions. The human soul
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seems to be such a case, and it may well be the only possible one."" In this context, 
John Haldane has spoken of "residual substances", i.e. things "to which are 
transferred certain powers hitherto possessed and exercised by a more extensive and 
more potent subBln^"."99 As an example, he introduces the compound A/B, which is 
a perfect mix, in the sense that its constituents (A and B) are not independently 
identifiable, and exist only virtually within the compound but are nonetheless such 
that one of the two (say A) can survive the destruction of and maintain some of the 
properties of the compound. He offers a red pigment, which may result from the 
destruction of some brown pigment as an example.
It might be useful to consider another example, which is a mere analogy, since 
it involves an object which is not a strict substance, but an artefact, according to the 
criteria set in chapter one: a cracked glass. Let us suppose that the glass
under consideration is cracked in a way such that it does not break into different 
pieces, but it cannot be used for its usual function since it leaks. Since the properties 
needed to be used for a certain function are essential for an arteeact,100 this object 
cannot be said to be complete in its nature, i.e. properly speaking it caimot be said to 
be a glass anymore. However, it maintains almost all the properties which it had 
before being cracked and which were essential for its function. For example, it has an 
appropriate shape and it is made of some impermeable material. hi a sense, we may 
even s ay that, i n v irtue of these features, i t m aiytaiys a d isposi0ioy t o acquire the 
capacity to contain liquids: if the two edges of the crack are perfectly congruent, one 
just needs to seal it. In this case, we can say that the principle of organisation which
0 Aquinas suggests precisely that in ST, 1,76, 1, ad 5. In fact, after claiming that the human soul is 
subsistent, he adds that the same does not happen for other fonns. Because of that fact, the soul 
maintains its act of being after the destruction of the body, whereas other forms do not ("Quod non 
accidit in aliis formis, quae non sunt subsistentes. Et propter hoc anima humana remanet in suo esse, 
destmcto corpore, non autem aliae formae").
oo Haldane 2000, 254, and Haldane 2002, 105.
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gives structure and unity to the object is one and the same both beOnre and aOter the 
crack occurred. IO an analogy between proper substances and arteOacts were allowed, 
we could say that the glass is a substance2, but it Oails to be a substance 1.
Let us now consider the case oO human beings, who, as mentlnnee, may well be 
the only case oO proper substances, which can be substances2 but Oail to be 
substances 1. A human being (5) and his eisembndine soul (s') Oall under diOOerent 
sortal concepts (5 and T respectively). However, most oO the essential properties oO s' 
were essential properties oO s: Oor example, having an intellective power, and being 
capable oO Oree choices. (It may well be that s \ by losing some oO the properties oO 5, 
has acquired some new property which s did not have. For example, by losing a body 
it may have acquired the capacity to act in more spaces at one time). Being the 
intellective power and the Oree will oO s' the same very power and will oO s, it may be 
claimed that the act oO being oO 5’ is the very act oO being oO s. In respect to 5, s' has 
lost some essential property, i.e. having a body. Nonetheless, s’ has maintained a 
disposition to structure and organise matter into a living human body, and thus it can 
be said to be the Oorm oO that particular human body, i.e. the human body oO the 
human person whose act oO being is now the act oO being oO s', i.e. j."' In this way, s' 
can be said to be a part oO s (in the wide sense mentioned above), and this is a ground 
to claim that s' is akin to s in nature, although it ennt not possess that nature 
completely. In other words, a disembodied human soul, is a human being (has the 
being in an unqualified sense oO the human person oO whom it is a soul), although it 
does not have a complete human nature, in that it lacks control oO matter actua1isee
100 In the week sense in which an artefact - as such - may be said to have essential properties, i.e. to be 
a substance. Cf. 1.5 above.
101 The tied relation between a soul and its body is a ground for Aquinas's rejection of the possibility 
of reincarnation. See George 1996.
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as u living body, and, consequently, it cannot exercise all the human capacities and 
powers (including cognitive ones) which require a body and would be natural for it.
Although this may make teosr in Aquinas's terms, some worries may still 
remain. Since, on Aquinas's view, it is matter which individuates subttancrt, how 
can we say that a disembodied human soul is an individual, let alone the same 
individual existing as a human being complete in nature before disembodiment? 
Forms are individuated by matter, thus a soul, form of the living body, s hould be 
individuated by the living body; once separated from it, one could claim, it is not an 
individual anymore; it is numerically indistinguishable from all other disembodied 
human souls. In the case of angels, given their immateriality, Aquinas claimed that 
they can only be distinguished because of their different levels of intelligence, and 
each angel is like a whole species.10' Why isn't this the case of disembodied human 
souls, with all the fatal Avvercoist consequences regarding the oneness of human
intellect? A solution could be that each human individual has an intellect, which is
individualised by the particular structure of her passive intellect, which in turn is the
result ofthep eculiar character of her experience inher p reviously embodied 1 ife.
Strawson made this very point when he suggested that
in order to retain his idea of himself as an individual, he [a disembodied ego 
which has turvived to the death of the body] must always thinHc of himself as 
dzsembodied, as a former person. That is to say, he must contrive still to have 
the idea of himself as a member of a class or type of rotrtirs with whom, 
however, he is now debarred from entering into any of those transactions the 
past fact of which was the condition of his having an idea of himself at all. 
Since then he has, as it were, no personal life of his own to lead, he must live 
much in the memories of the personal life he did lead (...). Disembodied 
survival, on such terms as these, may well seem unattractive. No doubt it is for 
this reason that the orthodox have wisely insisted on the resurrection of the 
body?® 102
102 Cf., e.g.. ST, I, 50, 4. 
'"’Strawson 1959, 116
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One could insist that according to Aquinas memory is a corporeal faculty, and 
that, no matter how finely personal experience is specified, it may be the case that 
two passive intellects may be identical in structure, since they only contain 
universals. However, the point here is not that of defining how singular thoughts are 
possible within a conception of the mind according to which thought is essentially 
universal. Rather it is that of securing the possibility of individual consciousness of 
disembodied souls. Strawson's point was developed towards this end by Gaixeth 
Evans, according to whom
A subject may be amnesiac and anaesthetized, and his senses may be prevented 
from functioning; yet he may still be able to think about himself, wondering, 
for example, why he is not receiving information in the usual ways. [...]It is 
essential, if a subject is to be thinking about himself self-consciously, that he 
be disposed to have such thinking controlled by information which may 
become available to him in each of the relevant ways.1"4
Although one has no body, no phantasms in the imaginative power or in memory to 
which turn one's intellectual capacity, still one can be capable of thinking about 
himself as an individual, and this is enough to secure that his consciousness is 
individuated. Being disposed to have one's thinking controlled by infoi-madon 
coming from the senses, on the other hand, seems to be a characteristic which a 
disembodied soul maintains, also from a Thomistic perspective. A disembodied soul, 
in fact, has a disposition to organise matter, i.e. its living body, and this includes 
controlling the senses. Furtheimore, Aquinas takes singular thoughts as exercises of 
conceptual capacities, in which attention is directed towards mental images, which 
are corporeal items, in ways controlled by the habits which constitute the relevant 
conceptual abilities:
our intellect cannot know the singular in material things directly and primarily.
The reason of this is that the principle of singularity in material things is 
individual matter, whereas our intellect, as I have said above, understands by
'"“Evans 1982,215 and216.
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abstracting the intelligible species from such matter. Now what is abstracted 
Orom individual matter is the universal. Hence our intellect knows directly the 
universal only. But indirectly, and as it were by a kind oO reO1nctinr, it can 
know the singular, because, as we have said above, even aOter abstracting the 
intelligible species, the intellect, in order to understand, needs to turn to the 
phantasms in which it understands the species (...). ThereOnre it understands 
the universal directly through the intelligible species, and indirectly the 
singular represented by the phantasms. And thus it Oorms the proposition 
“Socrates is aman”.’”"
The structure oO the passive intellect, then, has not to be taken merely as the storage 
oO universals, but as the habit to direct attention to mental images in ways controlled 
by one's conceptual capacities. Although mental images may become unavailable, 
e.g. since one’s loses (control over the relevant parts oO) one's body, still one may 
preserve the disposition oO one's intellect to manage a conceptually stlnciuree control 
oO mental images, that is to maintain a disposition to receive inOormation Orom the 
senses. This may be enough to satisOy Evan's condition, and to justiOy Strawson's 
reOerence to memory in his account oO the relation oO a eisemOneind soul to the body, 
which it lost. The dispositions oO a soul towards the organisation oO its own body and 
ihn actualisation oO the powers oO the body secure its individuation and its identity
aOter its disembodiment.106
'05 I, 86, 1, c: "singulare in rebus materialibus intellectus noster directe et primo cognoscere non 
potest. Cuius ratio est, quia principium singularitatis in rebus materialibus est materia individualis, 
intellectus autem noster, sicut supra dictum est, intelligit abst^-ahendo speciem intelligibiiom ab 
huiusmodi materia. Quod autem a materia individuali abstrahitur, est universale. Unde intellectes 
noster directe non est cognoscitivus nisi universalium. Indirecte autem, et quasi per quandam 
reflexionem, potest cognoscere singulare, quia, sicut supra dictum est, etiam postquam species 
intelligibiles abstraxit, non potest secundum eas actu intelligere nisi convertendo se ad phantasmata, in 
quibus species intelligibiles intelligit, ut dicitur in III de anima. Sic igitur ipsum universale per 
speciem intelligibilem directe intelligit; indirecte autem singularia, quorum sunt phantasmata. Et hoc 
modo format hanc propositionem, Socrates est homo."
1106 This may answer a worry of Gerald Kreyche, according to whom Aquinas's views on 
disembodiment would lead him to abandon hylomorpliism and to accept a form of Platonism. (Cf. 
Kreyche 1972, especially pp. 482-4). It may also challenge Etzwiler's thesis according to which 
Aquinas's view would lead to a conception of man as an embodied angel, and to a original synthesis of 
Aristotelianism and Platonism (cf. Etzwiler 1980). A view to the effect of the former two was 
suggested also by Kenny 1973, 79-80. Finally, these remarks may explain Aquinas's claim (which is 
obscure according to Cross 1997) that its body is essential to a soul, since it maintains an inclination 
and aptitude towards it after disembodiment (cf. ST, I, 76, 1, ad 6).
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It seems to me that, once one grants Aquinas the possibility of forms existing 
immaterially and the plausibility of one of his arguments for the immateriality of the 
intellect, one can accept his views on the human person, conceived as a borderline 
case between material reality and a transcendent immaterial realm, necessarily 
existing in a body, but, once his passive intellect has been at least partly infomed, 
able to live separately from it.
2.4 From the Metaphysics of Mind to a Theory of Cognition
A short recapitulation at this point may be needed. The Aristotelian route to 
metaphysics followed by Aquinas moves from an analysis of what is most evident to 
us, i.e. to human experience, in order to reach the causes of reality which are 
empirically unattainable. In chapter one, we have seen how this leads Aquinas to 
conceive of reality as being the actualisation of an unchanging substratum (prime 
matter) due to forms, i.e. structuring and organising principles. When a form is such 
that the acquisition of it purports the generation of one thing and the corruption of 
another, it is a substantial fonn, and the thing which it originates is a substance. 
Prime matter and material foms (i.e. forms of empirically accessible things) can 
never exist independently one from another, but they only exist as the potentiality 
and the actuality of some substance or other.
In this chapter, we have noted that the analysis of experience leads Aquinas to 
follow Aristotle also in admitting that, among all substances, some have an internal 
principle of growth and decay. They are living substances. Life, however, does not 
include only growth and decay, but other kinds of activities, such as motion, desire,
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sensation, cognition, and understanding. Some of these activities, notably 
understanding, are independent of any corporeal organ and, thus, can be performed
by immaterial substances.
Aquinas has several reasons to admit the existence of immaterial substances,
the main of which is the need to introduce a transcendent first cause prompted by his 
five ways to demonstrate the existence of God. Concerning material reality, however, 
he suggests that some material substances, i.e. human beings, are capable of
intellectual activities which are immaterial. This leads to the conclusion that human
beings are hylomoiphically constituted like all material substances, but their foims 
have activities independent from matter and thus may survive the destruction of the 
bodies which they infoim.
A form, on the other hand, is the principle of organisation because of which a 
substance has its essential properties, and life is the essential feature of a living thing. 
Since a soul is the principle of life, the form of a living thing is its soul. The 
substantial form of a human, consequently, is a human soul. This brings Aquinas to 
the conclusion that a human person is a material being infoi'med by a human soul 
which is capable both of material and immaterial activities and which may survive 
the destruction of the body.
Although these views are at odds with contemporary naturalism, we have seen 
that several of the arguments which lead to some of them are in fact more 
philosophically plausible that they may seem at a first sight to a modem thinker. The 
metaphysical outlook which they prompt, as far as the present work is concerned, is 
the idea that reality is hylomorphically composed, and that some material things 
(humans) are capable of receiving immaterially the forms of other things, and thus 
are able to cognise reality. It is within this outlook that Aquinas develops his theses
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on formal causation, and the subsequent views of metal rrrrrseotatioo which will be
discussed in the following chartrrt.
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Chapter Three
Aquinas on Causal Relations
3.1 Vertical Causation, Horizontal Causation and Realism
This chapter deals with Aquinas's theory oO causation, and is centred on ibntn 
aspects oO causation which are relevant Oor an account oO Oonnal causation, and thus 
may be involved in a theory oO mental representation. This will lead us to pay our 
attention to the Aristotelian aspects oO Aquinas's theory, and to overlook some 
P1atorisi elements which are nonnihn1ess present. In orenr to explain and justiOy this, 
however, some remarks on tbn general Oeaiuret oO Aquinas's theory oO causation are
rnndnd.
Aquinas is Oamous Oor being a commentator oO Aristotle, and it is commonly 
believed that he Oo11owne Aristotle on almost all metaphysical issues, almost without 
oOOering any personal contribution, besides the persistent attempt to chrltilanisn his 
positions. This view is certainly supported by the Oact that Aquinas wrote 
commentaries on all major works by Aristotle. As Oar as causality is concerned, then, 
Aquinas's views would be expressed in his commentaries on those passages oO 
Aristotle which deal with the problem oO causation, most Oamously the sncnre book 
oO the Physics, and some parts oO the OiOth book oO the Metaphysics.
Some scholars, however, have suggested ibat Aquinas is not strictly 
Aristotelian,’ but had strong influences Orom other sources, especially Plato and late
1 Cf. Owens 1993.
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Platonism, as it is evident in his commentary on the Liber de causis. According to 
Geiger (1942), for example, Aquinas borrowed from Plato the aytl-Aiis0otellun 
concept of participation, and made it the keystone of his own metaphysical view. 
Fabro (1939 and especially 1960), proposed a similar interpretation, but he also 
claimed that Aquinas really attempted to merge together both Platonic and 
Aristotelian elements, and, as a result, he ended up with a new and original 
metaphysical synthesis.
The relevance of these remarks, in the present context, is due to the fact that, 
according to Fabro, it is precisely on the matter of causation that Aquinas attempts to 
synthesise Platonism and Aristotelianism. Fabro distinguishes two concepts of 
causation, in Aquinas: a Platonic one and an Aristotelian one. According to the 
former, a separately existing form is the cause of all the individuals of which it can 
be predicated: those individuals participate or partake of that form. A form and the 
individuals which partake of it exist on different levels of reality, and, thus, Fabro 
calls this concept of causation vertical or transcendental. According to the second, 
Aristotelian, concept of causation, an individual is caused to exist by that fact that a 
form actualises some matter which is previously disposed to be thus organised; and 
an agent which actually possesses the capacity to actualise matter in the due manner 
is required. This is an instance of the general thesis that the change from potentiality 
to actuality requires some logically and metaphysically prior actuality. In this case, 
forms are nothing else than the structuring principles which make things be what 
they are, and exist in the same level of reality as the things of which they are foims, 
i.e. in the natural realm. Fabro calls this kind of causation horizontal, but also
predicamental. In Fabro's words:
Aristotelian causality is exclusively horizontal, while Platonic causality is 
exclusively vertical. According to Plato, intelligibles and first substances alone
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are causes, so that the physical world is purely receptive. According to 
Aristotle, by contrast, physical reality or "nature" has in itself the principles of 
its own changes. Furthermore, according to Aristotle, causality is precisely the 
link of the continuous but differentiated transfoi'mation of reality.2 3
About Aquinas, Fabro writes:
[His] deep criticism of the Platonic conception of reality and of the consequent 
vertical stmcture of causation highlighted [...] some principles and theoretical 
suggestions taken from neo-Platonism. These were accepted and merged in the 
Aristotrlian~Thomistic synthesis and represent a keystone at crucial points of 
Thomistic metaphysics?
Fabro explains the "principles and theoretical suggestions" which, in his view, 
allow Aquinas to criticise P latonism and to endorse neo-Platonism at once.4 First, 
there is what he calls "mrtarhytical participation", namely the idea that all beings 
which do not exist necessarily, participate in the existence of a being which exists 
necessarily. Second, there is the idea of "mrtarbysical" causation: "metaphysical 
participation" is a kind of causation, but, unlike Platonic participation, an individual 
does not partake of a transcendent reality as far as its form or stmcture is concerned. 
On thee ontrary, it is its act of b eing ( actus e ssendi), n amely i ts e xittrncr, w hich 
results from a vertical, transcendental causation. Third, being is an ''intensive" 
notion, i.e. it comes in degrees. Being, in this sense, is not a mere act of an intellect, 
namely the act through which an intellect apprehends the thing which is said to be. In 
Thom^hc terms, this means that the being of a thing is independent from and 
precedes any cognition of that thing. Being in this trosr is not a real act of existence 
according to the different categories either*. In other words, it does not correspond to 
the identity, nor to the r^rdicational sense of 'to be.' In the sense which Aquinas 
points towards, being is "the act of every act, namely the supreme perfection in
2 Fabro 1960, 323. The tr anslations of quotations from Fabro 1960 are mine.
3/WW.,316
4 Cf. ibid, 316 ff.
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respect oO which all Oorms and perfections have to be considered as partaking."5 
'Being’, in this sense, is equivalent to 'existence.’ Something has being, in this sense, 
iO it exists. It is the "supreme perfection", since all essential properties ("perfections") 
oO things can exist only so Oar as the things oO which they are properties have 
existence in the Oirst place. Essential properties are called perfections, Oor the higher 
is the degree to which essential properties are exempliOied in an object, the more that 
object participates in being, i.e. the more intensely it exists. Being is the perfection oO 
all perfections in two ways: a) being is the act or actuality oO all Oorms and 
perfections, which are thereOnre potencies in respect oO it; and b) being is 
exiensinna11y equivalent to the set oO all really existing Oorms and perfections, which, 
in this way, partake oO it. This seems to mean that each Oor^m may be realised, i.e. 
actualised, to diOOerent degrees and, consequently, each thing may be what it is (i.e., a 
thing oO a certain kind, Oalling under a certain sortal concept) to diOOerent degrees. A 
radio which does not work properly, is still a radio: it has the right structure, and in 
Oact it does Oall under the concept radio. But it is less oO a radio than a second one 
which works properly. The latter is better stmciurne; namely the Oorm oO radiohood 
is better actualised in its case; in Fabro's words, it has more being. Finally, being, in 
the sense oO act oO being {actus essendi), is the most common eOOect oO the First 
Cause. (Indeed, this is the basis oO one oO Aquinas's argument Om God as existence 
per se).
Aquinas's synthesis oO Plato and Aristotle, according to Fabro, is due to the Oact 
that while he manages to maintain the Aristotelian conception oO causation, which 
rejects the existence oO separate Onems as exemplars in which things partake 
(Aristotelian Ooms, as we have seen, are structuring principles existing in reality), he 
also accepts the Platonic idea oO participation and applies it to being and acts oO
57Zu</.,317.
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existence. This is particularly interesting as far as forms are concerned. These are 
principles existing in reality, as Aristotle claimed, but they may also be realised to 
different degrees, as Plato required. This is possible thanks to the intensive use of 
'being', i.e. to the fact that the acts of being which give forms their actualities come in 
degrees. In conclusion, Aquinas's synthesis highlights a link between vertical and 
horizontal causation: the vertical p ertains to existence the horizontal to forms and
natures.
It is contentious whether these claims are intelligible, at least as they have been 
sketched here. Furthermore, they would require much support in order even to look 
plausible. However, we do not need to explain and justify them. Here, we are looking 
for an account of Aquinas's theory of foimal causation which may help to explain his 
views on mental representation. The latter were mainly developed in his commentary 
on Aristotle's De anima. Thus, it is an Aristotelian Aquinas we are dealing with, and 
what he has to say about Aristotelian causation should serve our purposes. 
Furthermore, from Fabro's thesis it is clear that Aquinas's use of Platonic causal 
notions such as participation is relevant mainly in his demonstration of the existence 
of the first cause, i.e. a part of metaphysics outside the scope of this work. In 
conclusion, it seems that, for present purposes, we can focus on what Aquinas has to 
say about horizontal, Aristotelian causation. However, in analysing Aquinas's views,
we also have to bear in mind the fact that he believed also in the existence of vertical
causation (participation), and in a link between the two.
Before leaving it aside, though, the relationship between vertical and horizontal 
causation may be useful in discussing Aquinas's causal realism. It seems beyond 
dispute that, according to Aquinas, causal connections are metaphysically robust. 
The links between causes and effects have real existence, independently from our
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minds and our thinking about the world. This follows clearly from the ontological 
and epistemological role of causal links in Aquinas's metaphysics, especially in his
demonstrations of God's existence and in his discussions of the causal relations
between God and created things. Indeed, all famous five "ways" to demonstrate 
God's existenre? rest on the assumption that the objects of the universe have causes 
and tach "way" considers the need of a particular kind of cause. (Tht distinction 
between different kinds of causes in Aquinas is discussed below in this chapter). hr 
tach "way", God is introduced as a metaphysically or logically prior cause of all 
things. Tht metaphysical bearing of this conclusion, though, depends on the 
metaphysical strength of the causal link involved in the rest of the argument. Since 
Aquinas takes the conclusion to show that God really exists mind-independently, he 
is committed to the view that (at least some) causal linlcs art metaphysically robust. 
Each of thrse arguments, furthermore, involves either vertical causation or horizontal 
causation, or both. Tht cosmological argument (which is the second "way"), for 
example, seems to require horizontal causation only. It contends that, in order to 
prevent an infinite regress of horizontal causation, a first uncaused cause nerds to be 
introduced. The third "way", instead, seems to require vertical causation: it claims 
that a contingent universe can exist only if a necessary being exists, the latter bring 
God. In this case, tht causal relation between tht universe and God is a cast of 
participation in the act of being, i.t. an instance of vertical causation.
An exemplar passage where Aquinas manifests his realism on both vertical and 
horizontal causation at onct, while suggesting that God is the cause of all things, can 
be found in the first part of the Summa theologiae:
it has been shown above when treating of tht divine simplicity that God is tht 
essentially self-subsisting Being; and also it was shown that subsisting bring
6 ST, I, 2,3.
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must be one; as, if whiteness were self-subsisting, it would be one, since 
whiteness is multiplied by its recipients. Therefore all beings apart from God 
are not their own being, but are beings by participation. Therefore it must be 
that all things which are diversified by the diverse participations of being, so as 
to be more or less perfect, are caused by one First Being, Who possesses being 
most perfectly. Hence Plato said (Parmen. xxvi) that unity must come before 
multitude; and Aristotle said (Metaph. II) that whatever is greatest in being and 
greatest in truth, is the cause of every being and of every truth; just as whatever
-J
is the greatest in heat is the cause of all heat.
God is the "subsistent being which exists by itself', in the sense that he does 
not receive his act of being from anything else. All other things, though, are caused, 
and thus receive their being from "outside." Strictly speaking, therefore, they are not 
beings (entici), but they partake of being. They receive an act of being because they 
receive a form (i.e. a structuring principle) from an agent on the natural level, but 
they remain in existence because they partake of the subsistent being, which is,
, o t
therefore, another cause of theirs. Beings may be "more or less perfect", namely 
each thing may realise more or less of the possibilities characterising the form (i.e. 
the structure) by which i t is individuated. The more a thing actualises a form, the 
more perfect it is, i.e. the more it partakes of being. Let us consider an example, and 
imagine that, following the classical definition, each man is essentially a rational 
animal, so that rationality and animality are characteristics which he posses in virtue 
of having the substantial form he has. In this case, the more he acts for reasons, the 
more he actualises his substantial form, and, consequently, the more he partakes of
7 ST, I, 44, 1, c: "Ostensum est autem supra, cum de divina simplicitate ageretur, quod Deus est ipsum 
esse per se subsistens. Et iterum ostensum est quod esse subsistens non potest esse nisi unum, sicut si 
albedo esset subsistens, non posset esse nisi una, cum albedines multiplicentur secundum recipientia. 
Relinquitur ergo quod omnia alia a Deo non sint suum esse, sed participant esse. Necesse est igitur 
omnia quae diversificantur secundum diversam participationem essendi, ut sint perfectius vel minus 
perfecte, causari ab uno primo ente, quod perfectissime est. Unde et Plato dixit quod necesse est ante 
omnem multitudinem ponere unitatem. Et Aristoteles dicit, in II Metaphys., quod id quod est maxime 
ens et maxime verum, est causa omnis entis et omnis veri, sicut id quod maxime calidum est, est causa 
omnis caliditalis."
8 It follows that there are at least two causes of each being: the agent which made it be on a natural 
level, and the first cause to which it partakes in order to receive its act of being. One may wonder
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being. Contingent beings like humans do not possess their acts of being in virtue of 
their fomis, and, thus, must receive them from outside. They must be caused,
therefore, by a yon-con0ingeyt being, i.e. by God.
One may wonder whether this argument shows the causal dependence from
God of all things, or whether it overlooks the possibility that non-contingent tmths, 
like mathematics, may be causally independent from God.* 9 At any rate, what matters 
for our purposes is the fact that this passage shows that Aquinas takes causal links to 
exist in extra-mental reality. It is the claim that a causal link really exists that allows 
him to infer the thesis that all things which participate in being are caused by God (a 
creator, a subsistent being) from the premise that there is a world of things which do 
not "derive" existence from themselves (the creation, which is contingent). If causal 
links were not real, the conclusion that all things which do not "receive" being from
themselves are caused by God would not follow.
One could wonder whether all Aquinas is committed to for the sake of this
argument is the real existence of vertical causal links. Indeed, the only kind of causal 
dependence mentioned in the above passage is participation in being, and this is 
precisely vertical causation. However, we can contend that, in order for the argument 
to follow, the reality of horizontal causation has also to be assumed. When things 
come into existence they receive an act of being and, consequently, start partaking of 
the subsistent being (God) on a transcendental level: in other words, they become
effects of a vertical causal relation with God. At the same time, however, all
contingent things (i.e. all things which do not receive being from themselves) in the
whether there is a problem of overdetermination of causation; this problem, though, will be discussed 
below,
9 However, Aquinas would dismiss this objection since, according to him, both all possibilities and all 
necessities are rooted in actualities and thereby in that which is act per se and unconditionally, i.e. 
God, Furthermore, although n ecmraria are not generated and do not perish, according to Aquinas, 
their existence is not self-explanatory and they can be annihilated, since they are caused to be by God 
ex nihilo. Cf., e.g., ST, I, 46, 1.
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natural order (i.e. in the material world we have experience of) come into existence 
when they receive a form from an agent which has the capacity to act on matter in an 
appropriate manner'. 10 This reception of forms makes them effects of a horizontal 
causal relation. For example, a man exists since he has an act of being which he 
receives from the subtistent being. However, he came to have that act of being 
through the process of generation which was earned out by his parents, who also 
received their acts of being from the subsistent being (Fig. 1).
Fig. l
When, in the passage under discussion, Aquinas claims that all things are 
effects of vertical causal relations with a transcendental cause (God, the subsistent 
being), he is committed to the reality of vertical causal links, but also to the claim 
that all things other than God are not themselves tubsistent and, thus, contingent. In
10 The restriction to the material world is due to the fact tliat the passage by Aquinas under discussion 
concerns both generation and comiption (that is the coming and ceasing to be of material substances) 
and creation ex nihilo and annihilation (that is the coming and ceasing to be of necessaria, i.e. non 
material things such as angels). Whereas the former concern the material world and all horizontal 
causation, the latter are within the capacities of God only, and do not involve all horizontal causes, 
since they do not concern material things. This restriction in the interpretation of the passage is
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the natural order, i.e. in the world we have experience of, on the other hand, things 
are contingent since they come into existence when they receive a folly from other 
contingent things, and, thus, are effects of horizontal causal links. Thus, Aquinas is 
committed to the real existence of horizontal causal links as well. If this is true, in his
argument, Aquinas needs to assume the real existence of both vertical and horizontal
causation.
One could ask oneself what it means to say that causal links are metaphysically 
robust, i.e. that they exist in reality independently from our minds. This claim may be 
taken in at least two eiafeien0 sense. First, causal links could be particular kinds of 
entities, which have to be distinguished from causes and effects and taken into 
account in a complete description of the kinds of objects of our ontology. A 
supporter of this view has to deal with the difficult task to explain how those entities 
can be known, or, at least, under what conditions they may be taken to exist. Second, 
it could be the case that causal links do not constitute a separate class of entities, but 
are just relations between really existing entities, namely causes and effects, hi this 
case, one needs to be ontologically commi00ee to the two relata only, and has to give 
existence conditions for them alone. A causal connection would be nothing more 
than a cluster of conditions which necessarily links the two relata, because of some 
of their intrinsic characteristics. An explanation of causality would be wholly 
provided by the determination of those conditions.
The second view is certainly less demanding from an ontological point of view: 
it is the most economical as far as the class of entities required are concerned.
Whoever endorses the first view is committed to the other, but the reverse is not true, 
at least prima facie. If causal links are real entities, so too must be the causes and
justified by the fact that here we are only interested in the relationship between horizontal and vertical 
causation.
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effects that they link; but causal links could be relations between causes and effects, 
without constituting a further class of entities. It is not clear whether Aquinas was a 
realist in the first stnst, 1 1 but he certainly was a realist in the second sense (the same 
is probably true of Aristotle): according to him, as wt saw, the existence of real 
causal links warrants the fact that there must exist entities, such as a creator, which 
can only bt known tlnough their effects.
As wt saw, a realist about causation of the second type must be able at lrast to 
specify the conditions under which there is a necessary connection between causes 
and effects. Aquinas makes some attempts of this kind, especially in his 
commentaries of Aristotle’s Physics and Metaphysics, but also elsewhere in his 
writings. In the next section we will consider Aquinas's theory of causal explanation, 
and we will discuss its suitability for the realist requirements that hr nttds to meet.
3,2 Causal Explanations and the CondiOoiial Analysis of Causation
As it is well known, Aristotle distinguished four kinds of causis, or better, four 
mtanings of the term "cause", but he hardly ever said anything to explain what is 
common among all of them, namely why they all art kinds of causes, and they are 
not merely different things. An answer to this problem may only come from tht
1 ' The reason for this doubt depends on the complexity of the discussions on relations in the Middle 
Ages. The setting of those discussions was dictated by Aristotle's treatment of relations as a separate 
class of accidental categories. In this context, relations are taken to be accidental, in the sense that they 
are not substantial, and, as such, do not constitute a separate class of entities, if 'entities' is taken to 
refer to per se objects, viz. substances. Although Aquinas was a non-reductive realist about relations, 
his realism was due to the fact that, following his master Albert the Great, he took each relation to be 
grounded on the existence of a sui generis accidental property in each substance involved in it; the 
accidental property would be sui generis since it would be irreducible to accidents belonging to other 
non-substantial categories, The claim of the real presence of such sui generis accidents in relations, 
however, does not entail the existence of relations as mind independent substances or accidents: non­
reductive realism is realism about the relational sui generis accident existing in each substance
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consideration oO Aristotelian discussions oO ntber topics. In a passage Orom Physics,
Oor example, Aristotle gives us a hint: "we think we have knowledge oO a thing only
when we can answer the question about it 'on account oO what?' and that is to grasp
the primary cause. 1,12 In his commentary, Aquinas repeats the Aristotelian deOinition,
with the only diOOerence that he explains the sense oO "primary cause";
we do not think that we know anything, unless we grasp the "why”, which is to 
grasp the cause. Hence it is clear that we must observe generation and 
cneeuptinn and every natural change in such a way that we know the causes and 
that we reduce to its proximate cause each thing concerning which we seek the 
”why.”* 12 13
Aquinas interprets Aristotle as meaning that, at least in the physical domain, 
we have to look Oor the "proximate causes" oO the things to be explained, i.e. Oor the 
last link oO the relevant causal chain beOnre the effect which we want to explain. 
Besides that, he just repeats Aristotle: anything which may count as a satisOying 
answer to a why-question is a cause.
Aristotle goes on listing Oour "groups” (or species, as Aquinas writes in his 
commentary) oO causes, which are, as it is well known, efficient, material, Oormal and 
Oinal causes. The diOOerence among them is explained by Aristotle with the notorious 
example oO a statue. 14 IO we want to explain why the statue exists we can give Oour 
kinds oO answers, i.e. it exists because: a) there is some marble, which was sculpted 
(material cause); b) some sculptor made it (e001cleni cause); c) the marble, as a 
consequence oO the sculpting, has a certain Oorm (OOTmal cause); c) a sculptor 
intended to increase the beauty oO his town (Oinal cause).
involved, it does not need to be realism about the relation itself. The debates on relations in the 
Middle Ages were studied by Henninger 1989.
12 Physics, 11,3, 194b 19-20.
13 PE, II, 5, 176: "Sed nos non opinamur nos scire unumquodque, nisi cum accipimus propter quid, 
quod est accipere causam: unde manifestum est quod hoc observandum est nobis circa generationem 
et corruptionem et omnem naturalem mutationem, ut cognoscamus causas, et reducamus 
unumquodque de quo quaeritur propter quid, in proximam causam."
14 Cf. Metaphysics, V, 2, 1013b 5-8.
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The reference to final causes is highly problematic for a contemporary reader. 
It raises two main worries. First, causes are normally taken to precede temporally 
their effects; on the other hand, the end or purpose for which a certain causal action 
is performed (e.g., the increase of beauty in the town) is subsequent to the occuiTence 
of the effect (the statue) of that action (the act of sculpting). A ss uch, the end or 
purpose cannot be one of the causes. Second, end and purpose (e.g., the increase of 
beauty in the town) presuppose the lntentlonali0y of causal processes (the will of the 
sculptor). Therefore, either the scope of final causation is restricted to human (and 
possibly animal) actions, or one needs to endorse the idea that nature and the whole 
of material reality are teleologically organised; this claim, however, is normally 
taken to entail that they are the result of a divine design. Since both Aristotle and 
Aquinas conceive of final causes as means of explanation which do not need to be 
restricted to the domain of human action, they must accept the idea of a divine 
design. This i dea, h owever, i s i incompatible w ith t he c laim t hat n atural e vents are 
fully determined by their physical causes; even biological objects, which traditionally 
seemed to offer the best examples of final causes independent from human intention, 
can be explained tlnough the concourse of physical causes, natural selection, and
fitness to the environment.
The first problem may be overcome if we try to be more precise about what 
Aristotle takes final causes to be. It is not clear whether, according to him, a final 
cause i s t he i ntentional state of an a gent ( the d esire o f t he s culptor t o produce a n 
increase of beauty in the town), or the final result o f a causal process (the actual 
increase of beauty). Sometimes he seems to think about the former possibility, e.g. iy 
examples along the lines of that just presented, but at other times he has certainly the 
latter in his mind. Evey if Aristotle does not mention it, though, there is u possibility
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according to which the two views may coexist: iO we take an intentional state to have 
a prepositional content, we can claim that one ensires that p because ibern is a 
possible state oO aOOairs which "p" enscriOes, even iO that state oO aOOairs is not a Oact 
yet, and possibly it will never be. The possible state oO aOOairs (the actual increase oO 
beauty), thus, could be taken to be a cause oO the intentional state (the desire oO ibn 
sculptor to produce an increase oO beauty), and, consequently, an indirect cause oO 
the resulting action. ThernOore, the Oinal cause (tim content in the sculptor's mind) 
precedes the action causing the eOOnct, although it is not an eOOicinrt cause oO it (the 
act oO sculpting).
The second problem may be overcome either by supporting directly the view 
that actually there is a Designer oO the universe, or tlnough attnmpit aimed at 
showing that (at least some sorts oO) objects may have purposes and ends 
independently oO their alleged origin Orom a Designer. The latter possibility, which is 
more acceptable Oor contemporary naturalists, may lead one to claim that, just as 
arteOacts could be said to have ends and purposes Oor which they were constructed, 
natural living objects could be said to have purposes and ends set by their normal 
patterns oO growth and development. Those patterns may result from design or 
evolution indiOOerently. (The teleology oO living organisms was already discusss/in 
section 1.5 above. More on Oinal causes and intentional action will be said below, in
section 3.4).
The OourOold description oO causes may raise the problem oO tee 
overdetermination oO c autation, which Alistnt1e did not see, but was d'scussed by 
Aquinas. In Oact, iO there are several causes oO an effect, it may be the case that any oO 
them could have Oai1ne to exist, and the eOfect came into existence anyway; yet, it is 
problematic to claim that something is a cause even iO its absence, oihnr things being
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equal, would have made no difference. Aquinas’s solution is interesting because it
helps explain Aristotle's fourfold distinction:
That there are several proper causes of one thing becomes evident from the fact 
that causes are spoken of in various ways. For the maker of a statue is a proper 
cause and not an accidental cause of a statue, and so is the bronze, but not in 
the same way. For it is impossible that there should be many proper causes of 
the same thing which are in the same genus and in the same order, although 
there could be may causes providing that one is proximate and the other 
remote; or that neither of them is of itself a sufficient cause, but both together. 
An example would be many men rowing a boat. Now in the case in point these 
two things are causes of a statue in different ways: the bronze as matter, and 
the artist a efficient.15
The distinctions accidental/proper causes and proximate/remote causes will be 
introduced in next section. The sense of the passage is clear, though: 
overdetermination would be a problem (there could not be more causes of one effect, 
unless "neither of them is of itself a sufficient cause"), but only when there are at 
least two candidates which are proper causes, are at the same proximity from effect, 
and belong to the same one of the four groups of causes. Two causes belonging to 
two different groups are not tach sufficient for the effect which they cause when 
joined together, and, thus, can coexist.
The four causes are not really causes as such, but groups or species of causes, 
because each kind of cause may be exemplified by a rather heterogeneous range of 
instances. Let us consider, for example, the formal cause. Aristotle says that "the 
whole, the composition and the fom""16 may all be formal causes. Aquinas's 
commentary is very helpful in making this assertion clear:
15 ME, V, 2, 773: "quod causae per se sint multae unius, hoc fit manifestum ex hoc, quod causae 
multipliciter dicuntur. Statuae enim causa per se et non per accidens est factor statuae, et aes; sed non 
eodem modo. Hoc enim est impossibile quod eiusdem secundum idem genus, sint multae causae per 
se eodem ordine; licet possint esse plures causae hoc modo, quod una sit proxima, alia remota: vel ita, 
quod neutrum sit causa sufficie^, sed utrumque efniunetim; sicut patet in multis, qui trahunt navem. 
Sed in proposito diversis modis ista duo sunt causa statuae: aes quidem ut materia, artifex vero ut 
effieiens."
^Metaphysics, V, 2, 1013b 16.
165
it must be borne in mind that sometimes one thing is the matter of something 
else in an unqualified sense (for example, silver of a goblet) and then the form 
corresponding to such a matter can be called the species. But sometimes many 
things taken together constitute the matter of a thing; and this may occur in 
three ways. For sometimes things are united merely by their arrangement, as 
the men in an army or the houses in a city; and then the whole has the role of a 
form which is designated by the term army or city. And sometimes things are 
united not just by arrangement alone but by contact and bond, as is evident in 
the parts of a house; and then their composition has the role of a form. And 
sometimes the alteration of the component pails if added to the above, as 
occurs in the case of a compound; and then the compound state itself is the 
form, and this is still a kind of composition.17
Aquinas's explanation makes it clear in what sense there may be different kinds of 
foims which determine the identity of a being, within each group. A similar point can 
be made for all other groups of causes.
At this point, though, a contemporary reader could raise some objections, 
starting from a modern conception of causality. The modern conception and its 
relationship to Aristotelian causation were effectively described by Thomas Kuhn 
(Kuhn 1971), who distinguished a wide and a narrow sense of "cause." In a wide
sense, "cause" refers to the Aristotelian doctrine of causation and indicates an 
explanation of an event; a cause is whatever may answer a why-question about a
certain event:
according to Aristotle, every change, including coming into being, had four 
causes: material, efficient, foimal and final. These four exhausted the types of 
answers that could be given to a request for an explanation of a change.18
The narrow sense, according to Kuhn, corresponds to the concept of cause 
which became prevalent in the physics of the 17th and 18th centuries. In this sense, a
17 ME, V, 3, 779: "Sciendum est enim, quod quandoque una res simpliciter est alicuius materia, sicut 
argentum phialae; et tunc forma correspondens tali materiae potest dici species. Quandoque autem 
plures adinvicem adunatae sunt materia alicuius rei. Quod quidem contingit tripliciter. Quandoque 
enim adunantur secundum ordinem tantum, sicut homines in exercitu, vel domus in civitate; et sic pro 
forma respondet totum, quod designatur nomine exercitus vel civitatis. Quandoque autem non solum 
adunantur ordine, sed contactu et colligatione, sicut apparet in partibus domus; et tunc respondet pro 
forma compositio. Quandoque autem super hoc additur alteratio componentium, quod contingit in 
mixtione; et tunc forma est ipsa mixtio, quae tamen est quaedam compositionis species."
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cause can only be "an active agent, one that pushes or pulls, exerts a Onrcn or 
mariOesis a power."'9 Roughly, it corrnspondt to Aristotelian eOOicient causation. All 
oihnr groups oO Aristotelian causation must be reduced to eOOicinnt causation, 
otherwise they may be consieernd as explanations, but not causal explanations. In his 
essay, Kuhn notes that in the 19th Century even physicists returned to the use oO a 
wider notion oO causation, i .e. by employing Oormal c auses or telno1ogica1 cabuses. 
Among philosophers, however, the idea that only nOOlcient causation is real causation 
is still prevalent. Other (Ar^^tc^^^1ian) causes, many would still say, must either be
reduced to eOOicient causes or mled out as causes and contldernd as mere Oorms oO
explanation.
The direction oO this objection against the Arittoie1ian-Tbomltilc view oO
causation can also be supporind by considerations concerning the very deOinition oO
"cause" oOOnree by Aristotle and taken over by Aquinas. According to them, anything
which may be a satisOying answer to a why-questinn is a cause. An answer to a why-
question, is precisely what, nowadays, Oollowing Hempd's notorious distinction, we
would call explanation, in a wide, not strictly causal sense, as opposed to a proper
causal explanation.18 19 20 Charlton, Oor example, writes in his commentary on
Physics, while discussing the definition just mentioned:
Aition is traditionally translated 'cauise', and I On11ow that practice, but we 
sbou1d be careOul not to be misled by it. We talk oO causes operating, and 
producing eOOncis. Aristotle had no such expression [...]. The Greek word 
aition (cornncine to the verb 'to blame' 'to hold accounia01n') is used 
cnrsidnra01y more widely than tim English 'cauise'. [...] This being so, we 
sbou1d not expect Orom Aristotle's discussion oO 'causet' light on ibntn 
problems about causal nOOicinrcy and causal connection which were 
bnqueathnd by the British Empirictstc.21
18 Kuhn 1971, 24.
19 Kuhn 19*71 22.
20 Cf. Hempel 1965.
21 Charlton 1983, 98.
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(This is not the right place to discuss tht tmth of these claims, but we will see 
btlow how they may bt questioned, at least in respect to Aquinas's understanding of 
Aristotle, which seems to lead to an analysis of causation simUar - in some respects - 
to that of the Empiricists).
Furthermore, tht objection of a contemporary critic could be supported by 
other arguments, hr tht case of causal connections, causes and effects may bt taken 
as being objectively related. Tht cause which pushes or pulls exerts a power on 
something else, which is consequently pushed or pulled: the existence of both pulling 
and been pulled is required in order for the causal link to exist. In the case of non­
causal explanations, though, the existence of a real link between distinct existents is 
not warranted: tht acceptability of an answer to a why-question relits on the 
interests, the Imowltdge and the prejudices of the person who has to accept it. One 
does not need to offer as an answer conditions which link necessarily the two relata 
in reality, as it is the case in causal explanations. Aquinas's examples of fonnal 
causes which we have mentioned above would suggest precisely this view: if we 
wire asked why a group of men march together in tht same direction wt could offer 
a satisfying answer by saying that they art an army. But our interlocutor could be 
unsatisfied by this answer, for example because hr lacks the concept army, or we 
could have some interest in concealing from him the fact that they are an army and 
satisfy his curiosity by tilling him that they nerd to reach a common target. In 
conclusion, very different things could count as satisfying answers, depending on our 
knowledge and our interests. On tht other hand, in the case of "real causation", what 
counts as a coin ect answer to a why-question is an objective matter, even if wt could 
bt satisfied by a wrong answer, due to our epistrmic limits: the rial answers depend 
on what, in Kuhn's words, pushes or puns. In contemporary terms, the problem is
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that statements of causality are extensional, whereas statements of causal explanation
are intensional.
If this objection is right, the Aristotelian-Thomistic theory of causation faces a 
problem: how could what it regards as causal explanation be both real causation and 
explanation in a wide sense at the same time? Aquinas needs causation of all soils to 
be metaphysically robust: formal, final and material causation are fundamental 
notions of his metaphysics, in discussing God's existence as well as in explaining 
cognition. How can they fulfil this task if they fail to be real causal links and are 
mere patterns of explanation depending on our concepts, interests, and epistemic 
standpoints?
Strangely, a solution to this problem may come from the consideration of some
of Hume's arguments, which, as is well blown, are traditionally considered
destructive of any metaphysically robust interpretation of causation. His critical
points started from the fact that, according to orthodox empiricist epistemology, there
cannot be any ideas in the mind which were not derived from sense impressions or
from reflection on sense impressions. Thus, according to Hume, if we look at any
pair of objects which may be considered cause and effect, we
must not search for [an impression which produces an idea of causation] in any 
of the particular qualities of the objects; since, which-ever of these qualities I 
pitch on, I find some object, that is not possest of it, and yet falls under the 
denomination of cause or effect. And indeed there is nothing existent, either 
externally or internally, which is not to be consider'd either as a cause or an 
effect; 'tho 'tis plain there is no one quality, which universally belongs to all 
beings, and gives them a title to that denomination.22
Since the idea of causation cannot be produced by sense impressions, 
according to Hume it has no ontological reality and it can be nothing else than the
22 Hume 1739, 75.
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result of habits of our minds, which are used to noticing the contiguity and 
succession of certain objects.
Similar objects are always conjoined with similar. Of this we have experience.
Suitably to this experience, therefore, we may define a cause to be an object, 
followed by another, and where all the objects similar to the first are followed 
by objects similar to the second. Or in other words where, if the first object had 
not been, the second never had existed?2.
Here Hume seems to make a mistake and to take as logically equivalent two 
different proposals which are not. When he states that a cause is an object of a type 
followed by an object of another type, under the condition that all objects of the first 
type are always followed by objects of the second type, he claims that a causal 
relation is a conditional relation, which exemplifies an universal law and where the 
cause is a sufficient condition of the effect. Subsequently, he tries to rephrase the 
same point "in other words" by claiming that if the cause had not existed, the effect 
never had existed. This, however, is equivalent to the claim that a cause is a 
necessary condition of its effect. David Lewis (1973) noted that Hume's first 
formulation gave rise to regularity analyses of causation, which attempt to explain 
causal relations as instantiations of laws of nature, whereas Hume's second proposal 
was developed into counterfactual analyses, such as his own. As we shall see, 
however, a third possibility may be suggested, which accommodates both of Hume's 
intuitions about the conditional dependence between cause and effect. At this stage, 
however, we do not need deal with the content of Hume's proposal, but only with the 
general aim of his attempt.
Although from an. Empiricist standpoint causality has no real existence, Hume 
explains the importance of causation in our thinking by suggesting that what we 
designate as causes and their respective effects are related by a conditional relation,
23 Hume 1748, 76.
170
which may not be the result oO the laws oO nature, but which imposes ltsnlO to our 
minds through habit. Hume's view may be summarised as On11nws: a) as a 
consequence oO the empiricist assumptions, we cannot claim to have knowledge oO 
real causal links; b) the idea oO causation is the result oO the recurrence oO the 
succession oO two objects, which may be described in cnneltlnna1 terms (the cause 
appears as the necessary and/or soOOicient condition oO the eOOect).
This criticism oO the reality oO causal links concerns all groups oO Aristotelian 
causes, including the eOOicient causes, whose reality was accepted by modern post­
Aristotelian physics. In a way, thus, besides suggesting that causation can be 
analysed in conditional terms, Hume nulliOies the distinction oO ontological value 
among the Oour Aristotelian causes, which was introduced by the distinction between 
causation and explanation. (OO course, this is not to claim that he questioned 
Hempel's views; but the Oirst traces oO the distinction supported by Hempel in the 20* 
century be Oound at least as Oar back as Galileo).
At this point, though, a On11ower oO Aristotle and Aquinas could reject the 
empiricist assumptions on which Hume grounds his antirea1iti conclusions. Indeed, 
the plausibility oO arguments to the best explanation casts several doubts on the 
empiricist assumption that all ideas oO real things must derive, directly or tbenugb 
ref1ectinn, Orom the tensts."4 The existence oO some entities could be warranted, even 
iO they do not leave any impressions on the senses, and can only be known as 
conditions Oor the possibility oO experience. Arguments oO this snei, OUeihermnre, are 
not unusual in Ar^^tc^i^^n^'t framework. It is through an argument oO this kind that he 
concludes that there are substances, which cannot be directly perceived, unlike the
24 This line of objection to Hume's empiricism was openly advanced by Thomas Reid, for example in 
his essay "Of Power" (1792). Here, Reid claims that the idea of a necessary comiection between 
causes and effects must be a first principle, required by our understanding of what is a power, which 
cannot be obtained from experience.
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accidental qualities which inhere in them. A similar argument could be advanced 
with regard to the case of causal links: a casual link could be claimed to exist under 
certain conditions, even if it cannot be directly experienced. The obtaining of the 
conditions which are specified in an analysis of causation along Hume's lines, thus, 
could be best explained by the admission of an unperceived causal link underneath.
The same realist conclusions could be arrived to through a different, neo­
Aristotelian route. Elisabeth Anscorabe (1971), while famously contending that 
singular causal relations are not instantiations of universal causal laws, suggested 
that causal realism does not need to be supported tlrnough indirect approaches such as 
arguments to the best explanation. In her view, one can simply observe that an effect 
"comes from" its cause.25 She challenges Hume's antirealism by pointing out that 
who denies that causal relations are directly perceivable on the grounds that cause 
and effect can be conceived as existing independently from each other, should 
consistently deny that motion can be perceived. Indeed, one could conceive any 
temporal stage of a moving objects as existing without the preceding or subsequent 
stages. No sensible theory of perception, however, would make a claim of this sort, 
nor Hume intends to deny the reality of local motion. Furthermore, several of our 
concepts, which are instantiated by objects of experience, such as to cut, to push, are 
cases of causal concepts. Also our concept of cause, therefore, must be instantiated 
by objects of experience. When the direct acquaintance with causation has been 
granted, however, Anscombe believes that a conditional analysis of causal facts can 
be developed nonetheless.
The follower of Aristotle and Aquinas who supports causal realism is not 
committed to a queer metaphysics, e.g. by introducing the existence of peculiar 
entities. Let us recall the distinction (mentioned above) between two ways in which a
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causal connection could be real. Tht second, ontologically less demanding ont, 
which is anyway sufficient for Aquinas's purposes, requires only that ont can
establish some conditions which link the real existence of a cause to that of an effect.
Again, a satisfying attempt along the lints of Hume's failed effort to specify 
sufficient and/or necessary conditions of causation could do. Furthermore, if one can 
show that some suggested analyses apply equally will to efficient, material, formal 
and final causes, the ontological equality within tht Aristotelian theory of causation
would be assured.
Consequently, a neo-Aristotelian, or a nro-Thomist, may either endorse 
Antcombe's direct realism on causation, or, alternatively, may accept Hume's thisis 
that there is not any object of experience that is a causal relation. In either cast, 
equality among Aristotelian causes, including efficient ones, would bt granted. Evin 
one who rejects direct causal realism, however, could reject antirealist consequences 
about causation, by suggesting the existence of mind-independent causal connections 
can bt indirectly infenred from the occun'ence of certain types of conditional 
dependrnct in our experience. If relevant kinds of conditional deptndrncr exist 
between agents and ratitntt, forms, rnds and matter, then ont could claim that all the 
groups of causes indicated by Aristotle art genuine kinds of causes. Tht antecedent 
of this conditional is in a plural form in order to account for the possibility that there 
may be more than ont type of conditional relations, i.t. one for tach group of causes, 
as far as they all wan'arnt the same dtgrer of oectttity, in order to ^^1^1 the 
ontological equality among the four groups of causes allowed by the argument to the 
best explanation.
The strength of this lint of argument rests on the possibility (for a 
contemporary supporter of Aquinas's views) to propose an analysis of tht required
25 Anscombe 1971, 92.
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connections along the line oO Hume's conditional analysis. One might wonder 
whether this would take him Oar Orom the actual Aristotelian-Thomistic theory oO 
causation, and lead him to end up as a Oo11ownr oO Hume. Let us recall, in this 
connection, Charlton's thesis mentioned above according to which in Aristoi1n there 
is nothing along tin 1innt oO Hume's analysis oO causation in terms oO nncntsary 
and/or tuOOicient conditions. Although this claim may be true about Aiistotin, it is 
certainly Oalse in the case oO Aquinas, who characterised causation as a relation in 
which "the nOOnct would not exist, iO the cause did not.".. This is precisely Hume’s 
second Oonnulation oO his Oailed attempt to oOOer a conditional analysis oO causation.
BeOorn looking more into Aquinas's theory oO causation, we should say 
something about the problems oO conditional analyses, and discuss some rncnrt 
enOatns. The intent is not that oO comparing or contrasting Aquinas's views with 
contemporary ibnorint, but to consider whether a satisOying conditional analysis oO 
causation, i.e. an analysis oO causation oO the tori which Aquinas and Hume seem to 
be aOter, can be oOOel•nd. IO this can be done, and iO Aquinas's theory oO causation has 
to be presented as an option in contemporary debates, we will need to consider 
whether Aquinas's proposals are compatible with tim requirements oO a sailtOaciory 
contemporary view. Roughly, Aquinas and Hume mean this:
(1) 'u- >-'3
where c stands Oor a cause and e Oor an eOfect. (1) needs to be reOined, since it is 
certainly inadequatn as it stands: it may be tiie case that e could have nccorrnd, even 
iO c had not, Oor instance because it could have been caused by an a1ierrailvn cause 
c*. For example, let us imagine that a house is burning because oO the breaking oO a
26 ST, I, 44, 1, ad 2: "quia effectus non esset, si causa non esset."
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stove. Even if the stove had not broken, nevertheless the house might have ended up 
on fire because a candle fell on the floor. Let us imagine that the candle could have 
fallen exactly on the spot where some fire was in fact spread fiom the stove, so that 
the resulting burnings are identical in the two cases: from the moment of ignition on, 
they are the same burning.27 The best attempt to offer a conditional analysis of 
causation which deals also with counterexamples of this sort, is probably John 
Mackie's (1965).28
Mackie noted that, even if a cause may not be a necessary condition of an 
effect (in fact, that effect could have been caused by some other cause), it must be a 
necessary part of a conjunction of conditions which are, as a whole, sufficient for it. 
In the above example, the burning of the stove is necessary, together with the 
presence of oxygen in air, with the availability of combustible material in the 
surroundings, and so on. All these conditions are jointly sufficient for the effect, 
although they may not be jointly necessary. Indeed, some other conjunction of 
necessary conditions could have been sufficient for the same effect (for example the 
falling of a candle, together with the presence of oxygen, the availability of 
combustible material, and so on). The conjunctions of conditions which are sufficient 
for the effect are not composed of positive conditions only, as in the above examples, 
but they also contain negative conditions. For example, a negative condition could be 
that there are no water sprinklers which could prevent the spreading of the fire. It is 
also necessary that other possibly concurring causes (like the falling of the candle,
27 Of course, this presupposes a theory of the identity of objects which does not take its origin as an 
essential feature of an individual, contrary to Kripke's point of view (1980).
28 The problem of preemption, as the above mentioned issue is widely known after Lewis (1973), is 
normally considered a case to abandon the conditional analysis of causation in favour of other 
accounts. Yablo (2002), for example, suggests that his theory of the de facto dependence (according to 
which an effect depends de facto on its cause, in the sense that the obtaining "natural" conditions 
make the effect in need of the cause) offers the best available solution to the problem of the 
preemption. Nonetheless, we will consider the solutions available to a supporter of a conditional
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whin the stove is the cause of the fire) have no causal role, otherwise there would bt 
a problem of overdetrrmination of causation. Conditions which are redundant or 
make no difference should not be part of a conjunction of conditions which is 
sufficient for the effect either. Whin all these requirements art satisfied, tin 
conjunction of conditions which is sufficient for the effect can bt called a minimal 
sufficient condition?®
As mentioned, a minimal sufficient condition may not be nicitsaly for the 
occurrence of tht effect. For each occuiring event there could a (possibly infinite) sit 
of minimal sufficient conditions, each of which is a conjunction of (possibly infinite) 
necessary conjuncts; the disjunction of all thesr minimal sufficient conditions would 
be necessary for the effect:
(2) {cl & c2 & ...-^3 & c4 &...~'c7r...) v (c7* & c2* & ...-^3 & c4
v ... e
According to Mackie each of the conditions cn may be a cause. A cause, therefore, 
may be an insufficient but necessary part of a condition which is unnecessary but 
sufficient, or, in other words, a cause may bt an INUS condition. He uses the 
following notation. Let A bt the cause of P, and X a conjunction of conditions such 
that thr conjunction AX is a minimal sufficient condition of P [e.g. {cl 8c c2 Sc .. ~cc> 
8c c4 &...-^c/r...) in (2)]. Lit also Y bt the disjunction of all thr other minimal 
conditions, other than AX, which are sufficient for P. It may be thr cast that AX is thr
analysis, since Aquinas seems keen to endorse an analysis of that kind and our aim is to consider the 
plausibility of Aquinas's views on which rests his theory of formal causation.
29 Mackie deals with the problem of overdetermination by appealing to what he considers a common 
sense intuition, i.e. the idea that no individual cause can be considered sufficient for the effect, when it 
concurs to produce it jointly with other causes (cf. Mackie 1965, 44),
30 Mackie 1965,36.
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only minimal sufficient condition oO P, or even that A lisnlO is the only minimal 
soOOiclent condition. In the Oormer case, A would be a necessary condition, and in the 
latter a necessary and sufficient condition oO P. This is why, Mackie claims that a 
cause is at least an INUS condition oO the eOOect: it could be a necessary condition 
(when there are no nthnr alternative causes oO the eOOect) or a necessary and suOOiclnni 
condition (when there are no other alternative causes and it causes the eOOeci without 
the need that other conditions obtain), but, even iO there are other possible causes and 
other Oavnurab1e conditions are needed, it is an INUS condition. ThnreOore, "A caused
P" means at least, or also. that
(i) A is at least an INUS condition oO P - that is, there is a necessary and 
suOOicient condition oO P which has one oO these Oorms: {AX or Y), {A or T),
AX, A.
(ii) A was present in the occasion in question.
(iii) The Oactors represented by the 'X, iO any, in the Oormula Oor the necessary and 
suOOicient condition were present on the occasion in question.
(iv) Every disjunct in T which does not contain W ' as a conjunct was absent on
T9the occasion in question.
Mackie adds a refinement What makes A a cause, and diOOnrentiates it from all 
the nthnr conditions included in X, i.e. the other conjuncts oO the minimal tuOOicieni 
condition oO which A is also a part? His answer involves the notion oO a causal field
31 This limitation is due to the fact that this is not supposed to be a reductive definition of "A caused 
P"\ there may be more to tlie meaning of that expression than what is specified here.
32 (i)-(iv) are taken literally from Mackie (1965, 37). He thus justifies (iv): "Ass a rule, this [(iv)] 
means that whatever T represents was absent in this occasion. If T represents a single conjunction of 
factors, then it was absent if at least one of its conjuncts was absent; if it represents a disjunction, then 
it was absent if each of its disjuncts was absent. But we do not wish to exclude the possibility that T 
should be, or contain as a disjunct, a conjunction one of whose conjuncts is A or require that this 
conjunct should have been absent" (Mackie 1965, 37). The reason for not wanting this is that A could
177
(1965, 39-40). He does not define this, but elucidates it through some examples. One 
of these concerns the question "what caused this man's skin cancer?", which may 
mean at least two different things. It may mean "why did this man develop skin 
cancer now when he did not develop it before?" or "why did this man develop skin 
cancer, whereas other men who were also exposed to radiation did not?" In the first 
case the causal field is "the career of this man: it is within this that we are seeking a 
difference between the time when the skin cancer developed and times when it did 
not."* 33 In the second case, "the causal field is the class of men thus exposed to 
radiation and what is the cause in relation to one field, may not be the cause in 
relation to the other."34 It seems that which reading one intends, and consequently 
what is the cause, depends on the context. The causal field, therefore, seems to be the 
region of reality, which the context detennines as causal (i.e., as valuable options to 
replace A), as opposed as merely (at least INUS) conditional. Mackie suggests a
consequent readjustment of (i):
(ia) A is at least an INUS condition of P in the field F - that is, there is a condition 
which, given the presence of whatever features characterise F throughout, is 
necessary and sufficient for P, and which is one of the forms: or Y), (A or
Y), AX, A. (1965, 41).
Because of the role of the causal field in (ia), causation is an epistemic notion, 
i.e. it concerns the way in which our knowledge is built and obtained, and it entails 
the idea, already discussed above, that it is a sort of (or somehow dependent on) 
explanation. The interesting thing about Mackie's proposal is that it offers a
cause P jointly either with X or with a Z, such that AZ belongs to Y. In some cases, it could be possible 
thatV7 and Z obtain at the same time. When this is the case, and A causes P, both AX and AZ obtain.
33 Mackie, 1965,40.
34 k...
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conditional analysis of what bapplos at the metaphysical ltvel, through the idta that 
any rffect is sufficiently and olcessarily dependent on a disjunction of sufficient 
conjunctions of INUS condition, but then it leaves it open to our epistemic standpoint 
and to the context (i.e., to our interests, dltiret, and nerds) to decidt which of thr
INUS conditions within r ach minimal sufficient c ondition are causes. Tht kind of
causation advocated by modern physics is no less of an epistemic notion than 
traditional Aristotelian explanatory causes. Conversely, if traditional Aristotelian 
causes can be shown to satisfy the requirements for being INUS conditions (and wt 
shall sir that they can), they are no lrss metaphysically robust and objrctivr than the 
causes used by physics.
A problem with Mackie's proposal, however, is that no matter how precisely 
wt specify the causal field, there is always the possibility that there art INUS 
conditions which cannot qualify as causes. For example, there could bt an entity 
(fact, event, property or whatever) ol which necessarily coexists with another entity 
(fact, event, property or whatever) o2, for example because ol supervents on o2, if 
o2 satisfies (2) as ont of thr c«'s, so dots ol, sinct they necessarily coexist. Thus, 
they are both INUS conditions of thr rffrct. But it may be thr cast that ol fails to 
have any causal role, whatever thr causal field may be. This is the reason why, whilt 
introducing (in)-(iv), it was said that those conditions specify what an INUS 
condition at least (or also) is: they explain only part of the meaning of 'A caustd P, 
sinct there is more to causation than what they mrntion.
Note that this entails that there are two at /io.s'Lrestrictions on INUS conditions
which art causes. First, a caust is at least an INUS condition in the sense that it may 
even bt a necessary, or necessary and sufficient condition of the rffrct. Second, a 
cause is at least a condition which is at least INUS, sinct the meaning of 'A caused B'
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is only partially captured by (ia)-(iv). In other words, being a cause is being a 
condition which is at least INUS plus something else. For brevity, we can say that a
cauise is also an at least INUS condition., where ’also' OulOils the role oO the second at
least restrichon, and 'at least' OulOils hie role oO the first at least restriction. In other 
words, we can say that a cause is at least an INUS condition, since it could be a 
nncntsary or necessary and suOOicient coreiilor, and hut it is also at least an INUS 
condition, since it is something more than that, given hie Oact that there may be
conditions which are at least INUS but Oail to be causes, whatever iO the causal field.
In conclusion, it seems that a satisOying conditional analysis oO causation must 
be consistent with the idea that causes are at least INUS conditions, and possibly
should have the resources to mark the diOOernrce between causes and ohier non­
causal at least INUS conditions, i.e. to explain what a cause is also, besides being at 
least an /A/L/>condition. S ince Aquinas seems to Oavour a conditional analysis o O 
causation, when he suggests a reading oO causal relations like (1), and since Mackie's 
analysis oOOers a deep and detailed account oO cauisation in conditional terms, 
Aquinas's theory is plausible and acceptable to the extent that it is capable oO 
tatisOying Mackie's requirements and, possibly, to oOOer a criterion to diOOernntiate 
causes Orom other non-causal at least INUS conditions. In what Oohows, a key oO 
interpretation oO Aquinas's views will be suggested that highlights how it could meet 
hiese requisiiet. BeOore entering into toe dnial1t oO Aquinas's theory, however, a 
possible objection to this approach has to be considered.
One could contend that hie Oact that Aquinas supports (1) does not commit him 
necessarily to a conditional analysis oO causation along the 1innt suggested by 
Mackie, since ( 1) is also cnmpati01n with a counterOactual analysis such as David 
Lewis's (1973). Two replies can be oOOnred to this. First, Lewis's proposal is so
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highly contentious that it can hardly be seen as dictating requirements that any 
conditional approach along the lines of (1) should satisfy. Second, Lewis's theory is 
grounded on metaphysical assumptions extremely distant from Aquinas's; desiderata 
resulting from his theory, therefore, are set in a framework which Aquinas could not 
accept it the first place. Before considering each of these points more closely, let us 
remember that, according to Lewis, 'A causes B' is implied by the counterfactual 
dependence of B from A, which is thus analysed: if A were ti*ue, then B would be time 
if and only if there is a possible world in which A and B are true that is more similar 
to the actual world than any possible world in which A is true and B is false. 
Furthermore, the similarity between different possible words depends on the degree 
to which they share the same laws of nature and factual truths.
Concerning the first reply, one need to consider that Lewis's proposal had to 
face several objections, and, consequently, it is now highly dubious and problematic. 
Let us consider just a few examples. Jaegwon Kim pointed out that there are 
counterexamples of Lewis's theory, i.e. counterfactuals which clearly do not involve 
a causal relation, such as, for example, 'if George had not been born in 1950, he 
would not have reached the age of 21 in 1971' (Kim 1973, 206). Furthermore, Kim 
notes that Lewis fails to explain how changes of laws of nature and factual diversities 
across possible worlds determine similarity and diversity among possible worlds. 
Paul Horwich (1987), added other objections to the two by Kim. Lewis's theory, 
according to Horwich, would have to face the problems of over-determination and 
pre-emption, and would fail to explain the direction of causation. Jonathan Bennett 
(1987) also criticised all attempts to explain causation through counterfactuals, since 
they rest on the assumption that some counterfactuals hold true in all possible worlds 
close to ours. In order to secure the constancy of truth values of counterfactuals in
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clost possible worlds, on thr other hand, we must bt able to rr-identify in different 
possible worlds the rvrnts which are related in them. Some counterexamples, 
however, show that the re-identification of events rrlatrd in some counterfactuals in
worlds in which those c omiterfactual must maintain the samt tmth values, can bt
tamed out only at thr cost of accepting views on thr essence of evto.tt which do not 
squart with our conceptual framework. For example, the statement 'if that hand-wavi 
had not occurred, the auctioneer wouldn't have thought you were bidding' is true both
in worlds where thr hand-wave referred to was a right-hand-wave and in worlds 
where it was a left-hand-wave and this rises thr question whether "my right-handed 
wave was essentially right-handed."35 36Burnett's contention is that it was, given the 
way in which wt identify events. In conclusion, it stums that the counterfactual 
analysis is too problematic to bt taken as highlighting features of causation which 
any conditional explanation of causation should account for. This is not to say that 
Mackie's proposal is indisputable (indeed, it nerds to bt refined, and wt will 
consider some improvements in next chapter), but it dots offer a starting point which 
has proven to bt hrlpful and acceptable for further developments.55
Thr second reply has to do with the fact that Aquinas's views are incompatible 
with some tsttotial assumption of the counterfactual theory of causation. As we have 
sttn, in Lewis's vitw, counterfactual dtptodtoct has to be explained in thr terms of 
similarity between the actual world and other existing possible worlds. This is 
incompatible with Aquinas's views for two reasons. First, Lewis's metaphysics 
requires a distinction bttwteo actuality and existence: all possiblt worlds exist, but 
only our world is actual. As wt have seen, on the other hand, in Aquinas's 
metaphysics, actuality is existence. This purports that no distinction can bt drawn
35 Bennett 1987, 219.
36 Cf., for example, Cartwright (1989) and Pearl (2000, 313 and ff).
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between the actuial world and other possible ones. Second, according to Aquinas all 
possibilities are rooted in actualities, i.e. in ways the world is. Hence, the thought that 
there are worlds which are possible but independent from the actual one would be 
incoherent. In both cases, however, Aquinas's view does not entail that 
counterfactual thoughts are impossible, but only that the range of variations from 
actuality depends strictly on actual laws and features of the world. Whatever 
requirements on causation the counterfactual view entails, then, they camiot be 
expected to constrain an analysis carried on along Aquinas's lines.
In conclusion, Aquinas seems to think that causes can be analysed in 
conditional terms. From contemporary analyses, such as Mackie's, we know what an 
acceptable conditional analysis of causation requires: causes must at least satisfy 
Mackie's description, i.e. they must also be either necessary and sufficient, or 
necessary, or INUS conditions (or, in other words, they must also be at least INUS 
conditions), which are present in the occasion together with whatever other
conditions constitute a minimal sufficient condition, and under the condition that no
other minimal sufficient condition produced the effect. F urthemiore, w hat suitable 
condition constitutes a cause depends on the causal field. If Aquinas's theory has to 
be acceptable, one needs to show that the causes advocated by him can be at least 
INUS conditions, and that he has the resources to explain the constrains of the causal 
field. (When a theory can satisfy these requirements, it can trivially satisfy the other 
as well, i.e. the actual presence of the causal condition in events of causation, the 
availability of the other relevant necessary conditions, and the absence of causal 
competitors.) Let us now turn to some of the details of the theory.
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3.3 The Modes of Causation
Right after defining the four groups (or species) of causes, Aristotle goes on to 
say more about the ways (or modes) in which something may be a cause, and 
Aquinas develops those claims in his own ways.
According to a first distinction, "among causes of the same species, some are 
prior and some are posterior."37 8 A modern reader would easily understand this as a 
distinction depending on the order in causal chains. Aristotle's examples, though, are 
disappointing: health has a doctor as a proximate cause, and a man of skill, the 
concept of which is the genus of the concept doctor, as a remote cause. According to 
a second example, the double is a proximate cause of an octave, and number is a 
remote one, since the concept number is the genus of the concept double.
Aquinas's commentary is reassuring: between ME and PE he offers four 
readings of the prior/posterior distinction. The first two readings are suggested in PE,
where he notes that Aristotle's distinction can be taken either in the sense that there is
a share of predication {communitatem predicationis) between prior and posterior 
cause, or in the sense that there is a share of causal power {communitatem 
causalitatis) between them.39 Aristotle's example fits in the first case, whereas the 
second case accommodates Aquinas's views on the hierarchical stmcture of the 
world. Let us begin from the latter. According to Aquinas, forms are hierarchically
37 Physics, II, 3, 195a 29 - b 30; Metaphysics, V, 2, 1013 b 29 - 1014 a 25. The difference between a 
distinction of causes into species and one into modes is explained by Aquinas: "Causes are 
distinguished in to [species] and into modes. For the distinction into species is based on different 
formal aspects of causality, and is equivalently a division based on essential differences, which 
constitute species. But the division of causes into modes is based on the different relationships 
between causes and things caused, and therefore pertains to those causes which have the same formal 
aspect of causality" {ME, V, 3, 783, the translation was revised: "Est autem distinctio causae per 
species et per modos. Nam distinctio per species est penes diversas rationes causandi; et ideo est quasi 
divisio per differentias essentiales species constituentes. Divisio autem per modos est penes diversas 
habitudines causae ad causatum. Et ideo est in his quae habent eamdem rationem causandi").
38 Physics, II, 3, 195 a 30.
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structured a ccording to thr dtgrte of their iodtpendtoce from matter, but thr lrss 
constrained by matter something is, thr more effectively it can act on different things 
of different sorts, and, thus, thr prior it is in thr causal outer?0 This latter distinction, 
seems to bt related to the problem of vertical causation, since it involves a 
hierarchical outlook or reality, and so it can bt ignored for our purposes. 
Furthermore, it is hard to set what Aquinas means by it, and how it could bt 
supported. Tht foinntr interpretation of thr distinction, however, may interest us, but 
is quite problematic, and oeees to be discussed.
Lit us suppose that Jot healed Bill. Jot is a doctor and, thus, a professional 
man. Thus, according to Aquinas, both a doctor and a professional man are causes of 
Bill's recovery. The concept professional man is a higher-level concept 'Iiuo thr 
concept doctor. All doctors are professional men, but not all professional men art 
doctors, sinct there are lawyers, accountants, etc. Whin Aquinas says that a doctor is
a cause of a recovery, with 'doctor' hr may refer to ont of tluei tbiogs: a) to an 
individual who falls under the concept doctor, b) to thr individual essencr (or foinn) 
of an accident, i.e. an instantiation of a quality, which btlongs to a particular 
individual who falls under a relevant concept: in this cast it would be thr doctorness 
of Jot (just as one might think of thr individualised case of whiteness which is thr 
whiteness of this page); c) to the concept doctor. It is improbable that Aquinas means 
a), smcr according to a) there would bt an only caust, i.t. the individual falling 
under both concepts, but Aquinas says that there art two causes, a prior one and a 
posterior one?1 A similar problem arists in thr cast of b): the form of an accident is *
39 PE, II, 6 189.
40 The problem of the intelligibility of claims about a hierarchy of forms in Aquinas is discussed in De 
Amia 2000b.
41 About this point, it must be noted that Aquinas is inconsistent. This claim is quite explicit in PE 
("one cause is said to be prior to another"; PE, II, 6, 188: "dicitur una causa prior altera"), but it is 
denied in ME: " [the distinction applies] when the cause is one, but is considered according to the 
sequence which reason sets up between the universal and the particular; for the universal is naturally
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the principle of organisation because of which an individual has a quality which 
makes it fall under a certain concept; the structuring principle because of which an 
individual m ay b e s aid t o b e a d octor, t hough, isthes ame oneduetow hich t hat 
individual may fall under both concepts doctor and professional man; again, the 
cause would be one (the structuring principle), but Aquinas is referring to two 
different causes, c) is the only option left. How concepts may be prior to each other, 
when a theory of the hierarchy of concepts on the line of Aristotle's views on species 
and genera is in place, may not be a problem. A natural path to follow for a 
contemporary analysis of such a relation could start from the consideration that F is 
prior to G if:
(3) Vx -> IF) & 3x (Fx & -,Gx)
Note that (3) is a necessary condition, but it is not sufficient, since there are cases in 
which F and G fail to have the right speclee-gensss relation., even if they satisfy (3). 
For example it is true that all cats are hairy and that there are hairy things which are 
not cats, but hairy is not a genus of cat. However, this is not the path followed by 
Aquinas. Probably we can grant him the canonical definition of the species-genus 
relation: a definition of a species is constituted by the definition of the higher-level 
genus plus a term referring to a differentiating characteristic. Then, Aquinas needs 
only to show that a concept can figure as one of the causes in the first member of (2), 
i.e. that it may be an (at least) INUS condition, and c) offers a plausible reading of
the distinction.
prior and the particular subsequent" {ME, V, 3, 785: "in una et eadem causa numero secundum 
ordinem rationis qui est inter universale et particulare. Nam universale naturaliter est prius, particulare 
posterius"). The reference to universals confirms the correctness of option c).
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The third and the Oourib readings oO Aristotle's distinction between prior and 
posterior causes are presented in ME. The third one is a variant oO the Oirst: as a 
higher-level universal is a cause prior to a lower-level one, any universal is a cause 
prior to an individual which instantiates it.
In the last reading oO tiie distinction, Aquinas interprets Aristotle exactly in the
way which a modern reader would Oind more natural:
causes are prior or subsequent [...] when there are many distinct duises which 
are related to each other, one oO which is primary and remote, and the arntber 
secondary and proximate (as in the case oO nOflcient causes man generates man 
as a proximate and subsequent cause, but the sun as a prior and remote 
cause).42
Here, Aquinas is clearly thinking about a causal chain and claims that cl is prior to 
c2 iO and only iO c2 is closer than cl to tin eOOnct in the causal procnst.
One may wonder why, in commenting on Aelstot1n't deOinition oO 'cauise' (see 
above 3.1), Aquinas interpreted 'primary cause' as reOerring to the proximate cause, 
and now takes a prior cause to be tim more remote. This Oact is easily explained by 
the notorious distinction between epistemic and orio1ngica1 priority that he Oorrowee 
Orom Aristotle. Things which are prior Oor us, i.e. on an npisiemic level, are posterior 
in nature, i.e. on an ontological level; assuming that we have direct knowledge oO an 
eOOeci and inOerential lmowtedge oO its causes, the element oO the causal chain which 
immediately caused the eOOeci is priori Oor us, although it is last in natere, i.e. in the 
causal chain. Vice versa, things which are prior in nature, i.e. in the order oO causal 
series, a re p osterior Oor us. A gain a ssuming t hat we h ave d irect k lrow1negn oOthn 
nOOnci and inOerential Imnw1ndge oO its duises, the nar1lntt an element oO a causal 
chain comes, the Ourther it is in our inOerential inquiry. Consistently with this
42 ME, V, 3, 785; "Dicitur enim una prior, et altera posterior. [...] in causis diversis numero adinvicem 
ordinatis, quarum una est prima et remota, et alia secunda et propinqua; sicut in causis efficientibus 
homo general hominem ut causa propinqua et posterior, sol autism ut causa prior et remota."
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distinction, while discussing what causal explanations are, Aquinas was thinking 
about epistemic priority. Now he is analysing the metaphysics of causation and so he 
refers to metaphysical priority.
The second distinction between modes of causation introduced by Aristotle is
between proper {per se) and accidental causes {per accidens):
Polycletus is an accidental cause of a statue, while the sculptor is a per se 
cause. For Polycletus is a cause of statue insofar as he happens to be a 
sculptor.43
It is important to note that this distinction does not correspond to the distinction 
between substances and accidents; in the example, 'Polycletus' is a better candidate 
than 'sculptor' to refer to the substance, i.e. the individual man. Being a sculptor, after 
all, is just an accident, not an essential characteristic, for a man. The reason because 
of which a cause is accidental is due to its role in the cautsal process; the existence of 
a statue depends essentially on the existence of an individual who sculpted it, but it is 
not essential who that individual was. Even if Polycletus had not existed, the statue 
coutld have nonetheless existed, since somebody else could have scutlpted i.,44 45
The prior/posterior distinction applies also to accidental causes; Aquinas gives 
an example which fits in the first and third readings of that distinction: The species 
and the genera to which an accidental cause belongs are also accidental causes. For 
example, since Polycletus is an accidental cause of the statue, and he is a human and 
an animal, humanity and animality will also be accidental causes of the stauue*5 It 
can be suggested, though, that accidental causes can be prior and posterior also in the 
fourth sense: if Polycletus is an accidental cause of the statue, so is his father; the
43 PE, II, 6, 190: "sicut causa statuae per accidens quidem est Polycletus, per se autem causa statuae 
est faciens statuam: Polycletus enim est causa statuae inquantum accidit ei esse statuam facientem."
44 This claim is true under the assumption that, contrary to Kripke's contention (1980), its origin is not 
an identifying feature of a thing. Cf. note 62 below.
45 Cf., Ibidem.
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father, though, is a prior accidental caust becaust he is further away from the effect
in the causal chain.
Aquinas introduces a further distinction bttwtto accidental causes: "somt [...]
art proximate and some rem©^'!. Hr refers back to a parallelism with proximity
and remoteness of proper causes, but it is not cltar what he is thinking about. A
possibility would be that he has in his mind the prior/posterior distinction io the order
of causal series, i.e. thr point which has just brio made at the eoe of thr previous
paragi'aph. In that case, though, it is not clear why he introduces this distinction right
after eitcutsing the prior/postrrior eittinctioo. Furthrmiore, the intelligibility of this
distinction is complicated by the fact that hr explains it quite differently in ME uoe in
PE. In ME, he stems to say that accidental causes which are substances art more
proximate that accidental causes which are accidents:
Polyclitus is a more proximate cause of a statue than what is white or what is 
musical [, them all being accidental causes]. For an accidental mode of 
predication is more remote when an accident is predicated of an 10^1X0' than 
when an accident is predicated of a subject. For one accident is predicated of 
another only becaust both are predicated of a subject. Hence something 
pertaining to an accident is prteicattd of another, as something pertaining to a 
builder is predicated to a musician, this mode of predication is more remote 
than ont in which something is prteicatte of the subject of an accident, us 
whin something pertaining to a builder is predicated of Polyclitus.46 7
A parallel criterion, suggested in PE, seems to be quite different, sinct it concerns 
thr mutual relation between accidental causes which happm to be accidents, rather
than thrir inherence in an accidental caust which is a substance:
if it happens that the person who sculpted a statur is white and musical, the 
musical is a more proximate caust, sloct musicallty and thr skill to sculpt are
46 ME, V, 3, 788: "causarum per se quaedam sunt propinquae, quaedam remotae."
47 Ibidem.'. "Polycletus est causa statuae magis propinqua quam album et musicum. Magis enim 
remotus modus praedicationis per accidens est, cum accidens praedicatur de accidente, quam cum 
accidens praedicatur de subiecto. Accidens enim non praedicatur de accidente, nisi quia ambo 
praedicantur de subiecto. Unde magis remotum est ut attribuatur uni accidenti quod est alterius, sicut 
musico quod est aedificatoris, quam quod attribuatur subiecto quod est accidentis, sicut Polycleto 
quod est aedificatoris."
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in the same subject and because oO the same thing, namely the soul; whiteness,
xo
instead, is because oO the body.
In conclusion, it is hard to see what this distinction amounts to and how it is different 
Orom more Oamiliar cases oO prloriiy-dlOOnrerce among accidental causes.
About accidental causes, Aquinas also notes ibai there are two ways in which a 
cause may be said to be accidental, i.e. Orom the view point oO the cause and Oram
that oO ibn nOOnci:
Orom the view-point oO the cause, because whatever is accidental to a cauise is 
hselO called an accidental cause, Oor example when we say that something 
white is the cause oO the house. In another way Orom the view-point oO the 
nOOnct, i.e., inasmuch as a thing is said to be an accidental cause oO something 
else because it is accidental to hie proper eOfect.49
In the first case, the accidental cause is just a characteristic oO whatever the proper 
cause is; a Onaiure which the proper cause happens to have, but which has no direct 
causal role. For example, the white man may be tin cause oO the house, but rni qua 
white, only qua 0ui1dnl•. Whiteness as such is not directly responsible Oor the nOOnci, 
even though it is a condition oO it, since the builder needs to be coloured in tomn 
way, and, thus, without any colour there could not be any buiiMer. Calling ibesn 
causes indirect may be justified by the Oact that timy are causes oO the caotnt oO ibn
eOOnci.
From the view-point oO the nOOnct, instead, there are causes which are not 
essential, i.e. are accidental, but still have some direct role to play in the production 
oO the nOOect. They do not contribute by causing one oO the causes oO the eOOnct (as in 
the previous case) but they are required in order to set the conditions which make the 48
48 PE, II, 6, 190, (my translation): "si statuam facienti accidat esse album et musicum, musicum 
propinquius est, quia est in eodem subiecto et secundum idem, scilicet secundum animam, in qua est 
musica et ars statuae factiva; album autem inest secundum coipus."
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actual causing possible. According to Aquinas causes can be accidental from the 
view-point of the effect in thi'ee different ways: a) "the thing has a necessary
connection with the effect. Thus that which removes an obstacle is said to be a mover
accidentally"; Aquinas seems to refer to an INUS condition of the effect, which lacks 
some characteristic to be a proper cause; for example, the absence of water sprinklers 
in the example of the fire mentioned in the previous section would be accidental in 
this sense, b) "Something is accidental to the proper effect when the accident is 
connected with the effect neither necessarily nor in the majority of cases but seldom. 
[...] It is in this way that fortune and chance are said to be accidental causes;" e.g., 
the fact that I go to the market may be the cause of my meeting a friend who I did not 
expect to be there; neither all trips to the market nor the majority of them may have 
such unexpected results, but in that circumstance it happened. This is the sense in 
which we may say that an event was caused, but totally accidentally, i.e. non- 
intentionally. c) "In a third way things are accidental to the effect when they have no 
connection except perhaps in the mind, as when someone says that he is the cause of 
an earthquake because an earthquake took place when he entered the house;"49 50 in this 
case the relation between alleged cause and effect can only be post quern, due to 
someone's mistakenly taking the truth of both the sentences describing the cause and 
that describing the effect as a mark of the two events being causally related.
49 ME, V, 3, 789: "ex parte causae; quia scilicet illud quod accidit causae, dicitur causa per accidens, 
sicut si album dicatur causa domus. Alio modo ex parte effectus; ut scilicet aliquid dicatur causa per 
accidens alicuius, quod accidit ei quod est effectus per se."
50 All these three quotations are from ibidem'. "Quod quidem potest esse tripliciter. Uno modo, quia 
habet ordinem necessarium ad effectum, sicut remotio impedimenti habet ordinem necessarium ad 
effectum. Unde removens prohibens dicitur movens per accidens; sive illud accidens sit contrarium, 
sicut cholera prohibet frigiditatem, unde scamonaea dicitur infrigidare per accidens, non quia causet 
frigiditatem sed quia tollit impedimentum frigiditatis, quod est ei contrarium, scilicet choleram: sive 
etiam si non sit contrarium, sicut columna impedit motum lapidis, unde removens columnam dicitur 
per accidens movere lapidem superpositum alio modo, quando accidens habet ordinem ad effectum, 
non tamen necessarium, nec ut in pluribus, sed ut in paucioribus, sicut inventio thesauri ad fossionem 
in terra. Et hoc modo fortuna el casus dicuntur causae per accidens, Tertio, quando nullum ordinem 
habent, nisi forte secundum existimationem; sicut si aliquis dicat se esse causam terraemotus, quia eo 
intrante domurn accidit terraemotus."
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c) seems just to mean that in a stnst 'accidrotal cause' may be ustd to rtfer to
events which are claimed to havr a causal roll but which , in fact, do oot. Oo the
other hand, prima facie, b) may seem obscure; however, it could bt reduced to a), as 
it will bt clear after the discussion of necessity in next suction. Chanct, according to 
Aquinas and Aristotle, is oot metaphysically robust, but it is just the production of an 
rffect which was not intended by an agrnt, btcause of the interference of some 
unexpected or unconsidtred factor, or which did not result according to thr normal 
development of natural things. In reality, fortune is not a cause at all. a), finally, 
stems to be the real explanation of what accidental causes from thr view-point of the 
rffrct are: they have a direct and active role in producing the effect, but they lack a 
kind of essentiality which belongs to a proper cause. What this is will bt eiscutsee io 
next chapter, but it cao be allticipatte that proper causes are those which give the 
rffrct its foim, its matter, its eod, aod which act efficiently in producing it.
The third distinction of modus of causation suggested by Aristotle is between
simple and composite causes. Aquinas explains:
a cause is said to be simple when, for example, in the case of a statue, the 
proper caust alont is considered, as a sculptor, o r when ao a ccidrntal caust 
alone in considered, as Polycletus. But a caust is composite when both are 
taken together, for example, when wt say that the cause of a statue is thr 
sculptor Polyclitus?'
This can be understood as the claim that different degrtet of completeness are 
possible, according to the number of INUS conditions constituting a minimal 
sufficient condition which are specified. Aquinas warns us not to confuse this 
Aristotelian distinction between complete and simple causes with aoothtl oot, that 
between partial aod complete causts: *
51 ME, V, 3, 792: "simplex causa dicatur secundum quod accipitur causa statuae per se totum ut 
statuae factor, sive per accidens tantum, scilicet Polyclet^is. Composita autem secundum quod 
utrumque simul accipitur, ut dicatur causa statuae Polycletus statuae factor."
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there is moreover another way in which causes are said to be composite, i.e., 
when several causes act together to produce one effect, for example, when 
many men act together in order to row a boat, or when many stones combine in 
order to constitute the matter of a house. But [Aristotle] omits the latter way 
because no one of these things taken in itself is the cause, but a part of a 
cause.52
It must be noted that Aquinas is imprecise, since he first speaks of "several causes 
acting together", and then denies that they are causes, since each of them is just "a 
part of cause." This detail aside, though, this passage is important for two reasons. 
First, Aquinas appears to be aware of the distinction between partial and complete 
causes, which is something missing from Aristotle. Second, he gives a plausible 
interpretation of Aristotle, according to which his discussion of modes concerns only 
complete causes.
The fourth and last distinction between modes of causation introduced by 
Aristotle is between potential and actual causes and effects. A builder, for example, 
is an actual cause of a house only as far as he is actually building one, otherwise he is 
just a potential cause. A builder who is not building but potentially may, though, is 
not just a non-builder, since potency, as Aquinas says, "designates his habit or 
office", i.e. his skill.53 In other words, a builder who is not building is not just like a 
man who does not have the skill to build: he has the actuality of that skill, even 
though its utilisation is only potential. These two modes of causality, potentiality and 
actuality, apply to all the other three p airs: prior and posterior causes, proper and 
accidental causes, simple and composite causes can all be either potential or actual.
A last remark about the modes of causation due to Aristotle is that they hold
both for causes and for their effects. Aquinas comments:
52 Idem, 793: "Est autem alius modus quo causae possunt dici compositae, secundum quod plures 
causae concurrunt ad unius rei constitutionem; sicut plures homines ad trahendum navem, vel plures 
lapides, ut sint materia domus. Sed hoc praetermisit, quia nullum illorum est causa, sed pars causae."
53 Idem, 790: "Hoc enim sonat habitum vel officium."
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for effects, whether particular or universal, can be divided into prior or 
subsequent, as a sculptor may be called the cause of this statue, which is 
subsequent; or of statue which is more universal and prior; or of an image, 
which is still more universal. And similarly, something is the causal form of 
this particular bronze; or of bronze, which is more universal; or of matter 
which is still more universal. The same thing may be said of accidental effects, 
i.e., of things produced by accident. For a sculptor who is the cause of the 
statue is also the cause of the heaviness, whiteness or redness which are in it as 
accidents from the matter and are not caused by this agent.54
The claims about universals being effects may seem implausible. One can reasonably 
accept that they may be causes, for example because they may figure as conditions of 
a specified kind for the existence of objects. But it may be hard to see how a 
universal can be brought into existence. Maybe because an instance of it comes into 
existence? If so, how can the universal be such? Perhaps Aquinas would answer 
positively to the first question and, in order to meet the second one, would bring into 
the picture his thesis of universalia post res, discussed above in chapter one. 
According to Aquinas, universals are structuring principles, or patterns of 
organisation which only exist, qua universals, in the mind consequent upon being
abstracted from the things which they structure. Different instances of one and the 
same pattern may exist in different things, and thus that pattern is universal, but it 
can exist separately as a universal only in a mind which abstracted it. Given this 
view, Aquinas can plausibly hold that if an object is an effect, also the universal of
which its structure is an instance is an effect, for two reasons. First, the instantiation
of that universal structuring a certain object is caused with the object. Second, the 
presence of that universal in a mind is caused by the abstractive process and,
54 Idem, 791: "Potest enim dividi causatum per prius et posterius sive particulare et universale; sicut si 
dicamus, quod statuae factor est causa huius statuae, quod est posterius, aut statuae, quod est 
universalius et prius, aut imaginis, quod est adhuc universalius. Et similiter aliquid est causa formalis 
huius aeris, aut aeris, quod est universalius, aut materiae, quod est adhuc universalius. Et similiter 
potest dici in accidentalibus, scilicet in effectibus per accidens. Nam statuae factor qui est causa 
statuae, est etiam causa gravis vel albi vel rubei quae accidunt ex parte materiae, et non sunt ab hoc 
agente causata."
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ultimately, by the objects from which it is abstracted, (cfr. fig. 2 for a recapitulation 
of the modes of causation).
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Fig. 2; the modes of causation
I would like to suggest that Aquinas's distinction among several modes of 
causation offers the possibility to systemise the featmes of causation for which 
Mackie introduced the notion of causal field. In fact, the context and the question 
which one wants to answer determine what kind of cause something is (i.e. in what 
modality it is a cause).
In order to be divided as prior or posterior, in the first place, causes have to be 
distinguished from other background conditions, and this depends also on the 
explanatory context. When I ask ‘who made that statue?’, for example, I am already 
constraining my inquiry on the conditions which made the creation of that statue 
possible in general, to the person who sculpted it. The causal field is thus limited to a 
sculptor (prior cause), and to things which caused him (his humanity, his parents, and 
so on: posterior causes); whereas several other conditions which had to obtain in 
order for the statue to be created (for example some man had to quarry a piece of
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marble, and some other to cany it to the art studio) become just part oO the 
explanatory background.
What counts as accidental cause and what counts as a per se cause, also 
depends on the explanatory context; the event oO a statue having been created, Oor 
example, may raise the issue concerning why it was a statue qua statue which was 
created (and not a table), and thus the creator being a sculptor (and not a carpenter) is 
a per se cause; the Oact that the sculptor was a man, in that case, is merely accidental. 
On the other hand, had the question concerned the Oact that the statue was a work oO 
art, not the carving produced by sand carried by the wind, then the Oact that it was 
created by a man, i.e. an intentional agent, would have been a per se cause, and the
Oact that that man was white accidental.
Similarly, whether a cause is composite or simple depends on what answer one 
expects to one's question. When one asks ‘who made this statue?’, one may be 
satisfied to know that a sculptor did, and thus a sculptor would be a simple cause. 
The answer ‘the sculptor Pn1yc1etus made it’ would add some accidental cause as a 
OUeiher specification, and thus it would be a composite cause. (The circumstances in 
which the answer ‘a sculptor made it’ could be acceptable do not need to be 
particularly queer. One may wander, at an exhibition, whether some piece oO art is 
the result oO the work oO an intentional agent, or whether it is stone carved by the 
wind and placed on a platform). Alternatively, iO the question is asked by the 
headmaster oO a Oine arts school, who wants to know Orom the sculpting teacher the 
name and area oO specialisation oO a student, ‘the sculptor Pn1yc1eius made it’ could 
oOfer a simple cause as an answer, whereas ‘the sculptor Pn1yc1ntus Orom Athens’ 
would add some accidental specification and would thus mention a composite cause.
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Also what counts as a complete cause, as opposed to incomplete, depends on 
the explanatory context. "Why is that boat proceeding at that speed?" may be asked 
by the manager of a rowing team, the boat of which is placing second at a race, while 
looking at the winner. A complete answer, i.e. an answer which may help his team to 
win next time, should probably involve considerations of hydrodynamics, naval 
architecture, strength of the crew, and so on. The strength of the crew would then be 
an incomplete cause, which would make an unsatisfying answer to him. On the other 
hand, if the question is raised by the coach of a rowing team, while compering 
different crews available to him, the crew can be a complete cause, since the shape of 
the boat and the features of the stream of water are constant and become background
conditions.
Finally, also what is potentially or actually a cause is context-dependent. A 
statue which is about to be sculpted can actually come into existence only if several 
potentialities are available. For example, there needs to be a person who knows how 
to sculpt, and a person who knows how to quarry marble, and another who can drive 
the piece of marble to the studio. However, what will be properly a cause, as opposed 
to mere background conditions, depends on the context. In the next chapter we will 
see how Aquinas's metaphysics allows him to constrain what may count as a genuine 
cause, as opposed to a background condition. Before getting into that, however, we 
need to consider whether his views on causal relations are plausible.
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3.4 Causal Relations
As we have seen, Aquinas suggests that causal relations should be analysed 
conditionally when he claimed that they have the Oorm
(1) --c-^e
On the other hand, we have seen that a saiisOylng conditional analysis oO causation 
should take the Ooim oO (2):
(2) {cl & c2 & ...'-c3 & c4 v (c7* & c2* & ...-r3 & c4
8l...-'c1) v g
and should subsequently be developed along the lines suggested by Mackie. We 
should now consider whether Aquinas says anything that suggests, or is at least 
consistent, with a conditional analysis taiisOying modem standards.
As we have seen, (2) takes causes to be at least necessary members oO 
conjunctions oO conditions which are minimally suOOicient One the occurence oO an 
eOOect For each eOOect, such members may be infinite in number, since there may be 
infinite possible events, which, iO actual, would be INUS conditions oO the resulting 
eOOect, and a suOOicient condition is needed in order to account Oor the possibility oO 
the existence (or non-existence) oO each oO ibnm. There is a crucial passage in 
Aristotle's Physics, which Aquinas endorses (adding some examples, and a OOetber 
distinction not important Oor our purposes). Aristotle starts his discussion oO luck (or 
Oortum) and chance (i.e., "the automatic", in Charlton's translation) as On11nws:
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since we see some things always, and other for the most part, coming to be in 
the same way, it is p lain that 1 uck or its outcome isnot called the cause o f 
either of these-of that which is of necessity and always, or that which is for the 
most part. But since there are other things which come to be besides these, and 
all men say that they are the outcome of luck, plainly there is such thing as luck 
or the automatic, [i.e. by chance].55
Here, Aristotle distinguishes between three kinds of causal connection: i) the initial 
conditions necessitate the effect: that "things come always to be in the same way" 
means that whenever certain conditions obtain some particular consequence will 
necessarily follow, i.e. the initial conditions are sufficient for the effect; ii) that 
things come to in the same way for the most part means that the obtaining of some 
initial condition makes the occurrence of a certain result probable, but not certain; iii) 
some things come to be in ways which are made neither necessary nor probable by
the initial conditions, i.e. they happen by chance.
This distinction is problematic for the following reason. From i), we can
conclude that Aristotle must have been aware that there are complete conditions, i.e. 
conjunctions of all causes, that are fully sufficient for an effect, i.e. that at least a 
simplified version of (2), for example one having an only disjunct as first member, 
must be true. This is a comforting result, since it suggests that an analysis of 
causation like (2) is on the lines of what Aristotle and Aquinas tried to do. But, then, 
what s hould wet hink of ii) and i ii)? If A ristotle t akes t he i nitial c onditions tobe 
completely specified also in those cases, then his claim is that, on a metaphysical
level, there are three fonns of causal relations, and that in the case of two of them,
i.e. ii) and iii), there is underdetermination of causation. The possibility that
causation is undetermined, when all the concurrent causes are taken into account,
leaves no room for the possibility of a conditional analysis of causation.
55 Physics, II, 5, 196b 10-5.
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There is a way out, though. We can take Aristotle's claims as introducing an 
epistemic diOference: in case i) all fee causes would be cortienree, and so the 
resulting conjunct is a suOOicient condition oO the effect; cases ii) and iii), at the 
contrary, would originate Orom the Oact that only some oO fee causes are taken into 
account, ii) couild be the claim that an nOOnct is recntsiiated by some causes, other 
things being equal, but in the Oew cases in which other things are not equal, i.e. some 
causally interfering unlaiown and unusual events occur, the eOOnci could be deviant 
Orom normal cases, a1tbougb Oully eninrmined; iii) could just be a radical version oO 
ii): other things being equal., a certain eOOeci would not be made probable, nor 
improbable by some initial conditions, but it could happen nonetheless. In either 
case, though, Oull knowledge oO all causes would show the necessity oO the nOOeci. In 
all cases, then, Aristotle's theory would be consistent with a conditional analysis oO
causation.
That this is the right interpretation oO the passage may become clear iO we 
consider it in the context oO Aristotle's explanation oO Oortum and chance. For our 
purposes, it will be interesting to see how Aquinas developed a similar interpretation 
oO this point.
In this part oO the sncone book oO Physics, Aristotle is trying to square common
tnrsn talk about Oortune and chance, with the intuitions oO many philosophers
according to whom all happenings are necessarily determined by their causes:
necessarily, then, the causes Orom which an outcome oO luck might come to be 
are indeterminate. That is why luck is thought to be an indeierminatn tnrt oO 
thing and intcmiab1n to man, and at the same time there is a way in which it 
might be thought that nothing comes to be as the outcome oO luck. For all feese 
things are rightly said, as might be expected. There is a way in which things 
come to be as the outcome oO luck: they come to be by virtue oO accident, and
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luck is a accidental cause. But simply, it is the cause of nothing. And in the 
case of a house the cause is a builder, but by accident a flute-player [.. .].56 57
Aristotle agrees with both sides of the dispute ("for all these things are rightly said"), 
but, of course, he needs to show that the inconsistency is only apparent. He giants 
that in a sense nothing happens by chance ("nothing comes to be as the outcome of 
luck"), and that chance is not really a cause ("is cause of nothing"). We say that it is 
by chance that the cause of the house is a flute-player, because the builder, who is the 
proper cause, happened to be a flute-player as well, and so the flute-player is an 
accidental cause of the house. Now, since the accidental causes of an event are 
"indeterminate",66 and thus may be "inscrutable to man", there may be cases in 
which, when the other things are not equal, we do not know some accidental cause 
which made other things unequal, and is essential in determining the effect. Thus, 
even though the effect is fully determined by the conjunction of all the initial 
conditions, our knowledge may be inadequate in determining the proper causes of the 
thing to be explained. On a metaphysical level, the causation is determined. On an 
epistemological level, it may not be.
These claims are highly problematic. Every effect has infinite causes, some 
proper and some accidental, and so we can never have a full knowledge of all of 
them. How can we speak of fortune, i.e. note our epistemic limits, only in some 
cases? The answer suggested in the previous paragraph is that this happens only if 
the "other things being equal" condition does not hold true. This, however, needs to 
be explained. Aristotle's solution is grounded on teleology: some things, although not
56 Idem, 197a 8-15.1 have revised Charlton's tr^^^^lation ofsumbebekos with "concurrent" by the more 
traditional ’"accidental" My reason for doing this has to do with the importance of the traditional term 
"accident" in all medieval commentaries of Aristotle and particularly in Aquinas.
57 "Infinite", according to the Latin translation of Aristotle's Metaphysics by William of Moerbeke, 
which was commented by Aquinas. That version suggests an interesting point, which was developed 
by Aquinas; since there are infinite accidental causes, nobody can know all the accidental causes of an 
event.
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all, are for some end, i.e. have final causes. There are two classes of things of this 
kind: things made by humans with some intention, and natural beings, whose end is 
the full realisation of their form through growth. When things of this sort are in 
question (the intention of the agent in one case, and the principle of growth and 
organisation in another), a process of change is directed toward the fulfilment of 
some end. When things are nomial, i.e. other things being equal, the end can be 
reached: the proper causes (material, efficient, fonnal, and final) give a satisfying 
account of the reasons due to which that thing exists and changes. In some cases, 
though, the reaching of an end may be made impossible by something else. It is 
important to note that its final cause has already b een determined, when the thing 
was created with an intention, or informed by a principle of organisation having a 
built-in teleology. In these cases the "other things being equal" condition does not 
hold anymore, and the four usual causes are not enough to explain what happened. 
Sometimes, in these cases, we do not Imow what the interfering cause was, and then 
we say that the effect was the result of chance.58
An e xample m ay b e u seful, and A quinas o ffers an i nteresting o ne, w hich i s 
open to a modern interpretation.59 Let us imagine that a normal baby was born. In 
this case, we could say that the parents were the efficient cause, the biological 
materials received from the mother were the material cause, the genetical structure 
received by both parents the formal cause. Because of this genetical structure, the 
baby has a particular form, and is disposed to grow in certain ways: the fully realised 
fonn, i.e. the grown individual, is the final cause. Let us now imagine another baby, 
who was born with six fingers in one of his hands. He was caused exactly like the 
previous baby, under all the relevant respects; for example he had a normal genetical
58 Aristotle explains the relation between chance and final causes in Physics, II, 5 and 6.
59 Cf. PE, II, 8, 208.
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structure. Consequently, he also had the same end. He was bound by his genes to 
grow in certain ways, in particular with Oive Oingers in both his hands. Yet, in his 
case, something went wrong, i.e. some things were not equal: Oor example, some 
hormonal dysOOncilnn caused an exaggerated cellular reproduction at a crucial point 
oO his Ooetal development. This is a non-proper, accidental cause and it has to be 
adverted to, iO we wish to explain why things were diOOerent in this case. When we do 
not manage to do this, we appeal to "chance."
In conclusion, Aristotle and Aquinas believed that any eOOect results Orom a 
conjunction oO conditions which is as a whole suOOicient Oor it. They believed that, on 
a metaphysical level, causes are always determined, and so their view was consistent 
with a conditional analysis oO causation.
Even iO Aquinas believed that each eOOect is determined by a set oO conditions 
which is suOOicieni Oor it, his views would not be consistent with 2) unless he also 
believed that it is possible that none oO those sets is necessary Oor the obtaining oO the
eOOect A mark oO the Oact that he could have held this view can be Oound in his
discussion oO the infinity oO accidental causes: he claimed that there are infinite 
accidental causes oO any eOOect, since "an infinity oO things may happen to one and 
the same."60 This may be interpreted at least in two ways: a) as claiming that any one 
thing may undergo an infinite number oO changes; b) as claiming that any one thing 
may have the accidents it has (i.e. be part oO the events in which it is involved), 
through an infinite number oO causes.
The latter interpretation would be cnntlsient with 2): it claims that each oO the 
sets oO cnnditlnnt suOOicient Oor an eOOect may be unnecessary. A confirmation oO the 
correctness oO this interpretation can come Orom an example given by Aquinas:
60 PE, II, 8, 214; (translation modified by me): "infinita uni possunt accidere."
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per accidens causes are infinite, because it is possible for a man to go to a place 
because of an infinity of reasons; e.g., if he goes to visit someone, or to pursue 
an enemy, or to escape from a pursuer, or to see a show of some sort.69
Here Aquinas is still discussing fortune and chance. What really matters, though, is 
that he seems to be admitting that for each effect there is a set of conditions which is 
sufficient for it, but it does not need to be necessaiy. There may be other (possibly an 
infinite number of) sets of conditions each of which could have been sufficient, but 
was not actual. In his example, the man could have gone to that place for any of a 
(possibly infinite) series of reasons, under the assumption that all the other necessary 
requirements were satisfied.
We can now recapitulate Aquinas's views on causal relations. He believed that 
a cause is in some relation of necessary and sufficient conditional dependence with 
an effect, and so he accepted a conditional analysis of causation. However, he was
also aware of other truths about causation which could have led him towaids a more
sophisticated analysis, such as 2). These truths are the following. First, he was aware 
that an effect is sufficiently conditioned by a conjunction of many, possibly infinite, 
causes. This is indicated by his discussion of the overdetermination of causation, by 
his distinction between complete and incomplete causes, and also by his admission of 
an infinite number of accidental and posterior causes. Second, his discussion of 
chance shows that he believed that each effect, on the metaphysical level, is 
sufficiently determined by a (infinite) set of causes, which is, then, a sufficient 
condition of the effect. Third and last, he was aware of the possibility that an effect 
may be produced by one of many alternative sets of complete causes, each one of 
which, then, is sufficient but not necessary for the occurrence of the effect. We can 61
61 PE, II, lectio ix, 2I8; (translation changed by me): "Sed haec causa per accidens infinita est: quia 
mfinitis aliis de causis potest homo ire ad locum ilium; puta si vadat causa visitandi aliquem, vel 
causa persequendi hostem, vel causa fugiendi persequentem, vel causa videndi aliqua spectabil^^a."
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now draw some conclusions. Of course, he never proposed a sophisticated analysis 
like (2), but this is unsurprising, given the philosophical style of his period. At the 
same time, however, Aquinas was aware of all the reasons which may lead one to 
refine an analysis of causation like (1) (which he did mention) along the lines of (2). 
Thus, we can conclude that what he thought about causes camiot be inconsistent with 
them being also at least INUS conditions of their effects, even if he never used this 
term, nor any equivalent one.
Let us now consider whether Aristotelian-Thomistic causes can really be INUS 
conditions of their effects. We can consider the traditional example of a statue, which 
is convenient since it allows us to easily identify the four proper causes belonging to 
each of the four groups: the material cause of a statue is, for example the marble it is 
made of, the efficient cause is the sculptor, the formal cause is the mental image 
which was in the sculptor's mind, and the final cause is his desire to increase the 
artistic beauty of his town..
If a certain sculptor, for example Michelangelo, had not sculpted a certain 
statue, someone else could have sculpted exactly that statue, even though 
Michelangelo's presence was necessary under the conditions which actually obtained 
and which were sufficient to cause the existence of that statue. Michelangelo is an 
INUS condition of that statue.62
62 This claim is contrary to Kripke's thesis on origin and de re necessity. According to Kripke (1980), 
the origin of an object is necessary to its identity across the possible worlds in which that very object 
exists. He appeals to the intuition according to which a man would not be tlie individual he is, had he 
sprang from a different sperm and/or egg. This could seem to clash with the views supported by me, 
since the efficient, material, formal and final causes seem to be part of the origin of an object. Kripke's 
point, however, rests on intuitions about a few somewhat dramatic examples and he does not consider, 
for examples, cases of slow and systematic replacement of matter, which impinge on us intuitions in 
the opposite direction. Wiggins (2001, 133 ff.) criticises Kripke on these grounds, and suggests the 
possibility that material causes need not to be essential for the objects they cause. Wiggins rejects 
Kripke's view on the grounds of his spatio-temporal criterion of identity: an object (he discusses 
artefacts) may be the same object it is in all possible words in which it maintains its essential 
properties throughout its spatio-temporal history, no matter what material it is made of. Naturally, in 
all the possible words in which it is that same objects it is, it needs to be made of a right kind of
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IO the block oO marble with which the statue was made had not been available, 
that statue could still have been made with other marble, but the Oact that that block 
oO marble was there was a necessary (given all the other obtaining conditions) and 
soOO1cieni (jointly with all the other obtaining conditions) condition Oor the existence 
oO the statue. That block oO marble, then, is an INUS condition oO the statue.
IO Michelangelo had not had exactly that mental image in his mind when he 
sculpted the statue, but a suOOicinni1y similar one, he would have still sculpted that 
very statue; but the Oact that he had exactly that Oom in his mind is a necessary 
(given the other circumstances) and suOOicient (jointly with the other circumstances) 
condition Oor the existence oO the statue, i.e. it is one oO its INUS conditions.
IO Michelangelo had not desired to increase the beauty oO his town, he could 
still have sculpted that statue, Oor example because he wanted some money Orom a 
patron; but his desire to increase his town’s beauty, given all the other circumstances, 
was a necessary part oO a jointure oO conditions which was suOOicieni Oor the 
production oO the statue. Michelangelo's intentions, thus, were an INUS condition Oor
the existence oO the statue.
In conclusion, it can be suggested that a conditional analysis like 2) can 
coherently Oit in the Arlstnte1lan-Thnmlistlc theory oO causation. Furthermore, with a 
conditional analysis oO causation in place, as we have seen above, an argument to the 
best explanation may grant the second (and ontn1ngica11y less committing) kind oO 
realism about causation which was mentioned at the beginning oO this chapter, and 
which is required by Aquinas's views.
Two fOeiber problems shed some doubts about this conclusion. Both have 
something in common: their solution may come Orom considerations concerning the
material, suitable to sustain all the properties which it needs to have throughout its spatio-temporal 
history. The same defence can be extended to the other three kinds of causes.
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fact that the relata of causal comiections, according to Aquinas, are the hylomorphic 
components of substances. First, as we saw above, Mackie's conditional analysis tells 
us what a necessary condition for something being a cause is: a cause is also at least 
an INUS condition. There are things which are not causes, though, and still satisfy 
(2); for example, they are properties supervening on actual causes, or are conditions 
which one would not consider as causes in a given causal field. No matter how 
interesting Mackie's analysis may be, then, it seems that it cannot be used as a mark 
of the ontological class of causes. One needs a narrative to explain what causes are, 
besides being at least INUS conditions. Second, if it is true that what Aquinas says 
about causal comiections suggests an analysis (at least) similar to (2), and if it is true 
that this can be best explained by proposing the real existence of causation, should he 
not conclude that there is one and only one class of things which may be called 
causes, rather than four? In other words, granted that we can know that c ausation 
exists for the proposed reason, why should we believe that there are four groups of 
causes? Metaphysical economy should lead him to claim that, since there is an only 
conditional analysis of causation, there must be an only group of causes.
An answer to the first problem could be that according to Aquinas anything 
which is an INUS condition may be considered a cause, i.e. that he does not share the 
common (at least nowadays) intuition according to which there are things which are 
INUS conditions but fail to have any causal relevance. Let us recall, in fact, that even 
the whiteness of a builder, according to him, can be considered a cause of a house, 
i.e. an accidental cause. This example is interesting because it concerns a typical 
counterexample of (2), in contemporary discussions: the property being coloured is 
supervenient in things which may be causes, a lot of people would say, and so it is an 
INUS condition when it supervenies on something which is such. If a golf club is
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involved in an event which is an INUS condition of the hitting of a ball, so is the 
property being coloured, since the club needs to be some colour. Even the property 
of being white may be involved in an event which is an INUS condition, assuming 
that that club is white: the club could have been coloured otherwise, but given the 
actual conditions (among which there are the following: the club is not brown, the 
club is not black, etc. etc.), its being white is necessary. In other words, differences in 
the colour of the club may generate different minimal sufficient conditions, but given 
a certain minimal sufficient condition, the colour of the club is an INUS condition. 
The property of being white, though, has no relevant causal role in the hitting of the 
ball, we would say, and then we would have the problem to explain what a relevant 
causal role is. Aquinas, instead, would grant that whiteness is a cause, but an 
accidental one, as opposed to a proper one. This seems a simple syntactic difference: 
he calls ‘cause’ any INUS condition, and ‘proper cause’ what we would call simply 
‘cause’; his accidental causes would be INUS conditions which have no causal role. 
Then we could reformulate our contemporary problem: what is special about proper 
causes and differentiates them from accidental ones? In introducing the accidental- 
proper distinction in 3.2, a hint was suggested, but a full explanation postponed: 
proper causes are those which are directly responsible for the hylomorphic 
composition of the resulting effect. A complete explanation of this response, though, 
requires considerations concerning what the relata of causal connections may be, 
which will be developed in next chapter.
A solution to the second problem may come from the fact that Aquinas uses the 
term "species" to refer to the four Aristotelian groups of causes. This suggests that he 
takes the concept cause to refer to a common genus, shared by the four groups. As it 
is well known, different species belonging to the same genus, share the same
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definition oO the genus, but in tie case oO each oO them a specific characterising 
difference h as t o b e a dded. S o 6 eing also an at I east INUS c ondition n ayOni he 
common definition, and each species oO cause will then be specified by Ourtiier 
characteristics. These may depend on what objects are in an at least ZVYrelation 
with each other: Oor example, iO some matter can be said to be at least the INUS- 
condition oO the matter oO some substance, we can say that it is its material caotn. 
Tie availability oO this solution, though, depends, on an hemieneutic level, on what 
snri o O t hings A quinas t ook toOelnc ausal r elation w ith e ach o ther ( e.g., o Ojncis, 
properties, events, states, etc.), and, on a philosophical level, on the plausibility oO his 
views. What tori oO things are related in causal connections will be discussed in next
chapter.
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Chapter Four
Causes, Effects, and Formal Causation
4.I Causal Relata, Events and Substances
In chapter three, we considered Aquinas's views on causal relations, and saw 
that they are compatible with a conditional analysis of causation along the lines 
suggested by Mackie. In this chapter, our attention will be focused on Aquinas’s 
conception of causal relata, i.e. of things which may count as causes and effects 
when properly embedded in a causal relation. We will keep enquiring whether 
Aquinas's theory can cope with the demands, prompted by contemporary analyses, 
which any philosophically respectable theory of causation needs to satisfy. This will 
require a refinement of the metaphysical presuppositions of Mackie's proposal, 
which will be earned out in this section. Subsequently, in the next section, we will 
consider how a Thomistic view can meet the requirements on causal relata prompted 
within contemporary debates. The proposal which will be expounded, strictly 
speaking, does not belong to Aquinas, but it is Thomistic, in the sense that it is one of 
the possible theories which follow fiom the assumption of his metaphysics. The 
resulting proposal will allow us to explain two points which were left open in chapter 
three: 1) why Aquinas's theory requires only one kind of causal relation and yet 
embraces four species of causes; 2) why real (proper) causes must be distinguished 
from other at least INUS conditions (accidental causes). In the final section, formal 
causation will be paid a special attention.
2I0
Someone could object that Aquinas's analysis of causal relations presented in 
the previous chapter is dubious since it involves substances and their hylomorphic 
components as causal relata, but only events seem to be suitable candidates as causes 
and effects. Hilary Putnam, for example, has famously contended that an Aristotelian 
theory of formal causation could be accepted, were it not for the fact that nowadays 
we all Imow that causal relata must be events, and camiot be objects.' hideed, 
Mackie himself seems to think about events when he carries out his conditional
analysis of c ausation. These are some of the c auses and effects he r efers to while 
discussing the example of the burning which we looked at in the previous chapter:
'a fire broke out in a certain house'
'the house's catching fire at this time'
'the overturning of a lighted oil stove'
'the presence of inflammable material'
'the absence of a suitably placed sprinkler'
All these are either sentences or nominalised sentences which refer to individual
events.
While offering examples of this sort, however, Mackie does not discuss the 
nature of causal relata, nor does he seem to be aware of some serious problems that 
his proposal has to face when one tries to develop this aspect of it. Donald Davidson 
(1967) famously pointed out some of those problems and ended up rejecting the 
possibility of explaining causation conditionally. Unless some other way out can be 
found, Mackie's proposal is in no better position than Lewis's and this would be fatal 
for Aquinas's conception of causation described in the previous chapter. However,
1 Putnam 1993, 65: '"we now think of events rather than objects as causes. At one time it would have 
sounded perfectly all right to say that the parents are the cause of the child, but today we would say 
that the event of procreation (or something of that kind) is the cause of the event of the child's being 
born."
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Kim (1971) proposed a theory oO events which lets Mackie's theory meet Davidson's 
objections, and which can be developed so that Thnmlsiic hy1nmnrphic components 
oO substances can turn out to be causally related. BeOnre getting into that, though, we 
shall consider Davidson’s objections.
Davidson notes that the thought that causation is a conditional relation among 
events is incoherent, since the tpeclOicaiion oO the conditions which should obtain in 
order Oor the relation to provide a true analysis oO the causation oO a certain eOOect e 
(i.e., in Mackie's terminology, the ldnntlOicatinn oO the disjunction (AX or 7), which is 
necessary and suOOicieni Oor the eOOect e) cannot be a description oO events. Let us 
take an example due to Mill and discussed by Davidson: Smith dies as a consequence 
oO a slip oO his Onnt while climbing a ladder. The conditional analysis approach 
requires that we speciOy all the conditions that made tie death oO Smith necessary, 
besides tie Oact that his Onnt slipped: this in Oact, is not a so00lclent condition, since 
slipping while climbing a ladder is not always On11nwnd by death. Another condition, 
Oor example, would be the weight oO Smith: had he been as light as a Oeatier, he 
would be still alive. All these conditions need to be speciOied in (AX or 7), although 
we do not normally bother to mention those which are too obvious. Davidson notes
that
IO it was Smith's Oall that killed him, and Smith weighed 12 stone, then Smith's
Oall was the Oall oO a man who weighed 12 stone, whether or not we know it or 
mention it. How could Smith's actual Oall, with Smith's weighing, as he did, 12 
stone, be any more eOOlcacinus in killing him than Smith's actual Oall?o
The point is that the slipping oO Smith and his weighing 12 stone at tie time oO 
the slip are one and the same event, i.e. the slipping oO Smith who weighed 12 stone. 
When, while trying to Oully speciOy (AX or 7), we add tie condition that Smith 
weighed 12 stone, we are not introducing a Ourther event into the picture, but we are
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just adding a further description of the event we had already referred to in 
introducing the condition that Smith slipped. Thus a supporter of the conditional 
analysis of causation camiot take the conditions specified in it to be events, and a 
conditional analysis clashes with the view that causes and effects are events.
A possible way out would be to suggest that causes and effects correspond to 
sentences rather than events. Possibly, they could be sentences the semantic values of 
which are events. In that way, a conditional analysis could still be supported, since 
sentences "can express conditions of truth for others."2 3 In this case, in a causal 
statement such as
(1) The short circuit caused the fire
the two expressions 'the short circuit' and 'the fire' would not be singular terms 
refemng to events, but nominalised sentences, and the logical fonn of the whole 
would be made perspicuous by the following:
(2) The fact that there was a short circuit caused it to be the case that there was
a fire
in which the italicised words constitute a new logical comective, like 'and' and
'if. ..then....'
Davidson rejected this possibility, for two reasons: first, contrary to what is 
nomially assumed, the connective in (2) would not be a conditional, neither truth-
2 Davidson I967, 76.
3 Ibid, 77.
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functional nor non-truth-functional; second, (2) would not give the logical form of 
singular causal statements. Let us consider his arguments for these conclusions.
Davidson's reasons for claiming that the connective in (2) cannot be a truth- 
functional conditional depend on the fact that (2) cannot be an instantiation of an 
universal law (in the Humean sense of an universally quantified material 
conditional). According to Davidson, on the other hand, this seems to be the only 
way in which, by maintaining the meaning of the material conditional included in the 
universal law which (2) is supposed to instantiate, the connective in (2) could be 
truth-functional. He does not explain why that should be so, but one may presume it 
is because there is no way to capture the meaning of the connective in (2) through the
relation between the truth values of the two sentences embedded in it and the truth
value of the whole; in fact, the truth-value of a sentence like (2) may change, even if 
the truth values of the two sentences which compose it remain constant. 
Consequently, the only way to determine the meaning of the causal connective in a 
way such that it turns out to be truth conditional, is to say that its meaning is parasitic
on that of another connective which is truth-functional. The relation between the
conditional contained in an universal law and the causal connective in an
instantiation of that law may offer precisely a case of that sort.
A sentence like (2), however, in Davidson's view cannot be an instantiation of 
an universal law, since - although it does entail also an instantiation of an universal 
law (e.g., ‘if there was a short circuit, then there was a fire’)- it entails the truth of the 
conjunction of the two sentences embedded in it. We can say that (2) follows from an 
universal law and an appropriate conjunction, but then it does not simply instantiate 
the universal law, and thus the meaning of the truth-functional conditional in the 
universal law is not warranted to explain the meaning of the connective in (2).
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Davidson consienrs and rejects also an attempt to interpret the conneciivn in (2) 
as a n on-tmth-Ounctional conditional. According to P ap ( 1958), in Oact, the causal 
operator is similar to the material conditional, but "tie Oalsity oO the antecedent is no 
ground Oor inOemng the truth oO tie causal implication. "4 hi this way, tie truth value 
oO the whole would be indntenninatn when ibn antecedent is Oalse, with ibn 
consequence that tie meaning oO tie operator is non-truti-Ourciiona11y determined. 
Davidson c ontends that this is wrong: when the antecedent o O ac ausal relation is 
Oalse, the whole is Oalse, not indeterminate. Thus tie truth conditions oO tie causal 
operator would be just those oO a conjunction, and it would not be clear how tie two
would be eiOOerent.
Finally, Davidson oOOnrs an argument to the eOOect tiat (2) does not give tie 
logical Oorm oO singular causal statements. First oO all, we can note that (2) is not
truth-Ounctional: iO we substitute one oO the two sentences embedded in it with
alroiier sentence having tie same iroih-va1un, tie truth-value oO (2) may change. 
However, singular terms contained in (2) may be substituted with co-extensive 
singular terms, without jeopardising tie truth value oO the whole causal statement. IO 
Smith's Oall caused his death, and Smith was tie best Oriend oO Clark, iinr the Oall oO
the best Oriend oO Clark caused iis own death. Now, iO the connective in (2) gave tie 
logical Oorm oO singular causal statements, then tie sentences emOeedne in that 
causal statement would be su0stituta01n by logically equivalent ones. Thus, we could 
substitute one oO tie sentences embedded in (2) with a logical equivalent sentence 
containing tie nominalised Oorm oO the toOtiltuine sentence. At tiat point, tie
nomina1ited Oorm oO the substituted sentence can be substituted with a co-extensive
term, since the causal operator allows substitutions oO this tori, but this leads to a 
substitution oO sentences, once we have de-nominalised the newly iniroducee
4 Pap 1958, 212, quoted in Davidson 1967, 78.
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singular tenn? Consequently, the causal operator should be tmth-functional, but this 
is inconsistent with one of the premises. Davidson's way out seems to be the proposal
to dismiss the idea
that (2) gives the logical form of (1), and with it the ideas that the "caused" of
(1) is a more or less concealed sentential connective, and that causes are fully 
expressed only by sentences?
The alternative he suggests is that there would be a variety of kinds of causal 
statements, some, like (1), expressing connections among events, others, like (2), 
referring to relations among sentences describing events. This distinction would be 
possible since, according to Davidson, it would be tme, as Hume suggested, that any 
time a singular causal statement is true there must be a true covering law; however, 
this does not mean that the knowledge of a singular causal statement presupposes the 
knowledge of the respective covering law, nor that the singular causal statement 
entails a covering law, as C.J. Ducasse (1966) rightly contended. Thus, sentences like 
(1) are not correctly analysed by highlighting their alleged logical form, like (2) tries 
to do, although when the attention is focused on the covering laws which must be 
tme when they are tme, their relations with the connectives which are included in the 
relevant covering laws become relevant. ?
Davidson's objection and the consequent proposal could be fatal for Mackie's 
analysis of causation. The latter, however, offers resources for a reply. Let us begin 
by noting that Davidson's criticism of the possibility that causal singular statements
2 This is a version of the famous and contentious slingshot argument. For a discussion of this, cf. 
Neale 2001, 49-57.
6 Davidson 1967,79.
7 Against Davidson, Anscombe (1971) suggested that if we do not need to know a covering law to 
make a causal statement and if a causal statement does not necessarily entail a covering law, there is 
no need to suppose that all causal statements are covered by some law. This point, however, does not 
jeopardise tlie argument which Davidson wants to ground on the idea that we do not need to know 
covering laws in order to make causal statements, although it entails a modally weaker conclusion: it 
remains tme tliat (1) is not correctly analysed by (2), but the difference is that the relation between the
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are about events is problematic. His reasons had to do with the fact that a full 
specification of the causes of a certain effect requires several descriptions of the 
same event, rather than a conjunction of several singular terms referring to different 
events. Thus, in the example we have considered, Smith's slip, Smith's fall, and 
Smith’s weighing 12 stone are different aspects of the one event which caused his
death.
Davidson's criticism to Mackie, however, is open to a serious objection. The 
examples used by Davidson, like that concerning Smith's fall, certainly make a good 
point: at least in some cases, when we specify the at least INUS conditions of a 
certain effect, we do not list events, but we offer different manners of describing the 
same events. This, nonetheless, is not to say that all the specifications of the at least 
INUS conditions are like that. Some of the at least INUS conditions, in fact, could 
describe different events. Let us take the example of Smith’s fall again. It is one of 
the INUS conditions of his death that the event of someone's laying a mattress at the 
feet of the ladder did not occur. Had it occurred. Smith would not have died. A 
similar case could be made also for positive events: had not someone brought the 
latter into the Garden, Smith would not have even tried to climb it; had it not rained,
the ladder would not have been slippery, and Smith would be still alive. In 
conclusion, the conjunction AX, one of the disjuncts of (AX or Y), may contain 
members which are extensionally equivalent, although they have different senses, but 
it may also contain conjuncts which refer to different events. If this is so, Davidson's
criticism to Mackie is dubious.
Davidson could reply that, necessarily, all conjuncts of AX are different ways 
of referring to the same event, since, no matter how many conjuncts we add to AX,
connective of a sentence like (1) and the connective of a relevant covering law can only be relevant in 
cases where a covering law actually exists; such a law, however, does not need to exist in all cases.
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the situation they refer to is one and the same, a certain event which occurred in the 
world. In the example, 'Smith slipped on the ladder' refers to the event which is also 
refeiTed to by 'someone brought the ladder into the garden.' A situation in which 
nobody had brought a ladder into the garden, would not be the one in which Smith 
slipped, since the event of Smith's slip is his slipping on a ladder that someone had 
brought into the garden. The fact that someone might have brought the ladder into 
the garden at a time quite anterior to Smith's slip is not relevant: in fact, they are just 
event-slices of a whole event which endured throughout the entire time separating 
the two actions, hi other words, someone bringing the ladder is a necessary part of an 
event which Smith's slip is also a necessary part of. They are necessary parts since 
the event would not be the event it is unless it had (also) both those parts.
Although Davidson did not mention this reply, I think it is a view that he would
o t
have endorsed in his essay under discussion (1967). hr fact, there he objects to
Mackie's intuition according to which a certain fire in a house could have occurred 
even though the short circuit which caused it had not occuiTed, but an oil stove had 
been overturned instead. In Davidson's opinion, "a short circuit elsewhere could not 
have caused this fire, nor could the overturning of a lighted oil stow.”9 His intuition, 
thus, seems close to those which led Kripke towards the notion of a posteriori 
necessity, hi the previous chapter we have already seen that Kripke's view is 
incompatible with Mackie's conditional analysis of causation, but what matters here 
is that Davidson could appeal to this intuition to claim that whatever the conditions 
specified in AX are, they are just different descriptions of one and the same event. In 
fact, since he believes that a fire is the fire it is because it necessarily had the origin it
2 Elsewhere, Davidson (1993) made a similar point as a defence of anomalous monism: according to a 
critique, anomalous monism purports that an event with the same physical description, but a different 
mental one, would have caused the action all the same. Against this objection, Davidson contends that 
it would not have been the same event.
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iad, he should admit tiat the origin oO an object is part oO all events in wiici that
object is involved.
It seems to me that this line oO enOence would be problematic, since it seems to 
entail that all that happens is part oO one single event. Any action or happening, in 
Oact, would be necessarily related a posteriori to all the events which happened and 
will happen. But iO having an a posteriori necessary relation is suOOicient Oor being 
part oO a single event, then possibly all happenings and actions are part oO one single 
event. In tiis way, however, any causal statement should be true, i.e. trivial and 
uninOormative, Oor any thing would be a cause oO anything else. This, however, is 
inconsistent with our basic intuitions on the meaning oO causal statements. A way out 
would be to renounce the idea tiat causal relations are among events, and Davidson 
does precisely that. The point, here, though, is that one could avoid Oollowing 
Davidson, and develop Mackie's iienry, by denying tiat a posteriori necessary 
relations among happenings and actions entail nveni-identiiy. Suci a project, 
however, requires that one can oOOer a plausible account oO the individuation oO 
events, and an explanation oO iow tie proposed account Oits in a conditional analysis 
oO causation. It seems to me iiai this is precisely what Kim (1971) irine to do. He did 
not openly admit to challenge Davidson's account, but that was probably iis 
intention, tincn, aOtnr granting Davidson the merit oO having shown some serious 
Oaults in Mackie's theory,w ie goes on to oOOnr an account oO event idnntiOicaiinn 
wiici may vindicate a conditional analysis oO causation.
In Kim's opinion,
tie logical and ontological Ooundations oO Mackie's discussion oO causal 
relations are in urgent need oO repair; in Oact, 'repair' is too mild a word, since
9 Ibid,, 77.
10 Kim 1971, 71.
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Mackie does not seem aware of the problem of the underlining logic of event 
talk for his analysis of causation.11 .....
Kim recognises several different problems concerning Mackie's talk of events. 
Before getting into his criticisms, however, it is worth pausing to consider why we 
need to be concerned with them. The point of our interest for Mackie's proposal is 
that it seems to represent the best implementation of a line of analysis of causation 
which Aquinas seems to favour: i.e., conditional analysis. All problems faced by 
Mackie's proposal, therefore, are problems which Aquinas - or at least the Aquinas 
reconstructed in the interpretation propose here - needs to overcome, especially if his 
views on causation have to be presented in contemporary debates as plausible 
contenders. Thus, Kim's objections to Mackie are relevant for our concerns with 
Aquinas's theory of causation.
But there is a further point to be considered. Although Aquinas takes causal 
relations to be conditional relations, as we have seen in chapter three, and although 
his intuition is best implemented by Mackie's proposal, we can already note that his 
views on causal relata do not seem to square with Mackie's: in chapter tliree we have 
anticipated that Aquinas's takes the hylomorphic constituents of substances to be 
causal relata, whereas, in the present chapter, we have noted that according to 
Mackie it is events which are causes and effects. Since Kim's objections to Mackie
focus on the thesis that events are causal relata, they touch on a point which is 
particularly interesting for our purposes. As we shall see, Kim's objections lead him 
to offer a revision of Mackie's proposal which makes Aquinas's views on causal 
relata intelligible and appealing. Considering Kim's points, therefore, will help us to 
implement a Thomistic proposal.
U/Z>ztf.,71.
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After these general remarks, let us turn to Kim's objections to Mackie's talk of 
events. First of all, Kim tries to make Mackie's logical apparatus more precise. Fie 
emphasises that Mackie's notation assumes that traditional sentential operators can be 
used in events talk to constmct "complex events" (for example, AX, (AX or Y), etc.) 
out of "simple events" (for example, A, X), although events-talk does not involve 
sentences and propositions, but singular terms and events. (Of course, the idea that 
causal statements are conditionally analysable for the fact that they have the logical 
form of sentences comiected by some operator is hopeless, as Davidson showed. And 
Kim wants to vindicate a conditional analysis). Kim defines negation, conjunction 
and disjimction operators for events talk along the lines of the operators of 
propositional logic. Furthermore, he highlights the equivalence condition, implicitly 
assumed, but not discussed, by Mackie: "truth-functionally equivalent event names 
and descriptions designate the same ^^^nt"12 The upshot of the equivalence 
description, is that the complexity of complex events (for example, AB) turns out to 
be a characteristic of events descriptions, not of events. This generates a confusion 
between events and descriptions of events, which was already underlined by 
Davidson, and, Kim notes, leads to tluee main problems. Let us consider them.
First, Mackie's notion of a sufficient minimal condition, assumed the given 
logic of events, is doubtful. Let us imagine that AB is a minimal sufficient condition 
for P. In this case, almost any C can be shown to be an INUS condition (and thus a 
possible cause) of P. In fact, given the meaning of events disjunction, 'A' and '(A or 
~^Q' refer to the same event, and thus AB is equivalent to (A or ~(C)B. ~C cannot 
obtain, however, otherwise AB would not be minimal sufficient, and -’-■C, that is C, 
must be the case. This entails that also C(A or (C)B is a minimal sufficient condition 
of P, i.e. C is an INUS condition of P. The only restrictions are that (A or -Q cannot
'2 Ibid, 65.
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amount to A, and that C alone or jointly with B is not suOOicient Oor P. One could 
contend that C(A or -QB is not in a discjunctive normal Oorm, but suOOicinni 
conditions can be minimal only when they are in normal disjunctive Oonn. The 
problem with this, though, is that sentences do not normally have unique disjunctive 
nonnal Onemt. (A or ~AB), {-BA or B) and {A or B), Oor example, are all logically 
equivalent and in normal Oorms, and, thus, Oor the equivalence condition, reOer to the 
same event; however, according to the Oirst -A is an INUS condition oO P, according 
to the second ~B is an INUS condition oO P, according to the third neither ~A nor —B
are INUS conditions oO P. How can it be that the same minimal suOOicient condition
turns out to be made oO diOOerent events?
Second, Kim underlines a cnnOUsinn between events and descriptions oO events,
which is built in the deOmiiinn oO a minimal tuOOicient condition. Tiat eeOnltinn
allows a condition to be minimally suOOicient only in cases in which that condition
has been represented in a certain logical Oorm, namely in a way such that all the
necessary conditions Oor the eOOect have been explicitly spelled out.
Whether or not an event is a minimal tuOO1cient condition Oor another would 
depend on the logical Oorm oO the particular description chosen Oor it; but the 
equivalence condition shows that no reliable inOerence can be made from the 
logical Oonm oO an event name to the ontological structure oO the event named 
by it.13
This is a reOnnmu1ation oO the problem already discussed by Davidson: Mackie 
supposes that events are causes and eOOects, but then he takes the names oO events to
be essential Oor the correctness oO causal statements. The dnOmitinn oO a minimal
suOOicient condition, then has to be thus reOnrmu1ated:
An event P is a minimal suOOicient condition Oor P iO and only iO it is 
representable (i.e. is named) by an expression oO the Oom "A1 .... An"
13 Ibid., 68.
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containing no redundancies such that Al .... An is sufficient for P and the 
deletion of any of the As results in a condition not sufficient for P.14
In this way, the distinction between events and expressions referring to events is 
taken into account. What a theory needs, then, is a good way of explaining the 
relationship between the complexity of events descriptions and the actual structures 
of events to which they refer. This will be Kim's intent in his proposal, as we shall
see in short.
Third, while explaining what a cause is, Mackie introduces the requirement 
that, besides being at least an INUS condition, A needs also to exist, and "must be 
present on the occasion in question"15 (see the second clause of the definition of 'A 
caused B' in section 3.2 above). Kim stresses that the qualification "on the occasion 
in question" suggests that A is not an individual event, but a generic event, so that the 
expression would be saying that in the occasion in question the generic event A must 
be exemplified, i.e. there must be an individual event falling under the generic event 
A. The 'in the occasion in question' clause does not mean just that A exists, and thus it 
is not redundant, since the last condition put forward by Mackie in the explanation of 
'A caused B' is that any minimal sufficient condition other than AN must be "absent in 
the occasion in question."16 This, according to Kim, cannot mean that those events do 
not exist at all, otherwise it would be hard to see how they could be minimal 
sufficient conditions of any event; consequently, that expression must mean that 
those events exist, but are not exemplified on the occasion in question. Thus, 'A', 'B\ 
'X, and so on, must be taken as referring to universals, and their "presence" and 
"absence" as their being exemplified and not being exemplified respectively.
14
15
16
Ibid, 68.
Mackie 1965, 37.
Ibid.
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In conclusion, Kim claims that Mackie's theory can be vindicated only if one 
propose an ontology of events which makes a clear distinction between events and 
events descriptions, and which accommodates the relationship between individual 
events and universal (generic) events. Such a theory will probably be able to cope
with Davidson's criticism.
Kim notes that Mackie's theory requires an analysis in the terms of necessary
and sufficient conditions of singular causal statements. Necessity and sufficiency,
though, are properties of generic events, rather than individual event. When we say
"oxygen is necessary for combustion", we do not mean that some particular amount
of oxygen is necessary, but that the presence of some amount of oxygen (whatever
that is) was necessary. Necessity and sufficiency of individual events must somehow
be derivative from those of generic events. Thus, Kim concludes
we need entities that possess both an element of generality and an element of 
particularity; the former is necessary for making sense of the relations of 
necessity and sufficiency, and the latter for making sense of singular causal 
statements.17
Such entities are available, according to Kim: they are substances, i.e. (individual) 
objects realising (universal) properties.18 Thus, Kim defines an event as the 
exemplifying of an empirical property by an object at a time, so that to comprehend 
both states and changes. Furthermore, he proposes to use the notation [x, P, r] to refer 
to the event of the object x exemplifying the property P at time t. (He notes that this 
is generalisable in order to include polyadic events, but he decides to overlook that 
complication). Thus all nominalised sentences, such as 'the death of Socrates', 'the 
sinking of Titanic' and so on, can be represented with this notation, when an 
appropriate date is specified.
17 Kim 1971, 71.
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Since Mackie's notation for events concerns generic events (A, B etc.), Kim 
proposes to give up his idea that minimal sufficient conditions are conjunctions of 
generic events (AX) and necessary conditions are disjunctions of compound generic 
events (AX or Y). Indeed, as we have seen, the logical machinery that Mackie needs 
to accept in order to conjunct and disjunct generic events such as A, B etc., can be 
abandoned, and its unacceptable consequences considered above can thus be 
avoided. Alternatively, Kim proposes to speak of sets of properties, instead of 
conjunctions or disjunctions of generic events. He stipulates that "a set of properties 
is realised or exemplified on a given occasion, provided each property in the set is 
exemplified on that occasion."19 Consequently, the claim that in Mackie's notation 
would have been expressed by the sentence 'ABC N CDF is a necessary and 
sufficient condition of P', can now be captured by the expression 'Whenever the set 
of properties [A, B, C] is realised or the set [C, D, F] is realised, P is realised, and 
also conversely.' Similarly, a set is minimally sufficient for P if and only if it is 
sufficient f or P, b ut n o subset o f i t i s s ufficient f or P. A11 his p oint, K im d efines 
INUS conditionality for properties and sets of properties. A is an INUS property of P 
if and only if there is some unique family SAp of sets s( of properties such that:
a) for some i, A g s,-;
b) for each i, s{ g Sap if and only if s,- is minimal sufficient for P;
c) Sap is a necessary condition for P (that is, if P is realised, some member 5, 
of Sap must also be realised).
After defining the notions of necessity and sufficiency for sets of properties, 
and that of INUS conditionality for properties, Kim can go on to define the 
fundamental notion of INUS conditionality for events: 18
18 Kim notes that one could utilise a space-time region ontology, instead of a substance ontology: he
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[x, ri, Zi] is an INUS condition of [y, P, t] if and only if
(i) A (x, t]),P (y,t)
(ii) A is an INUS property of P;
(iii) Some set s , hi Spp containing A and at least one other property is 
realised on the occasion of [x, A,ti];
(iv) Spp *conai^nst at leas t one set other than p,-.
(v) No set of pm^piirrtisr nr Spp other than Si ir reaiised onthe ocaasin to f f [y,
Pj Jl
Kim claims toat die notion of at least an INUS condition is "similarly definable. "20 
Altoougt tie does not do it, we can guess 1iow ttat can be done. A is at least an INUS 
conditions of P if and only if one and only one of toe following obtains:
I) A is an INUS condition of P;
II) Alt the fot A bemg an INUS Goudkoon of P are met wtth toe
exception of (iv) - and tous rtis a necessary condition of P;
III) Allt the requiremenss fot A bemg an NJUS 001x1111.01.1 of P are met viith tte 
exception of (iii) and (iv)t which are satisfyingly substituted by toe following: 
'some set ss in Sap containing A and no otoer property is realised on toe 
occasion of [x, A, fi]'; in tois case, A is a necessary and sufficient condition of
P.
At tois point, Kim may conclude toat '[x, A, Zj caused [y, P, t]' means also - or 
at least -, rhar [x, rt, rt] is at least an INUS condition of [/, P, ?].
Kim's proposal tas anotoer advantage, besides ttat of clarifying nte relation 
between events and descriptions of events. In fact, it offers a criterion for toe identity 
and toe identification of events wtod allows one to explain wtat makes events * 19
develops a proposal based on the latter, but the former could found a suitable alternative.
19 Kim 1971, 72.
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numerically different from each other. In particular, the proposal reduces the identity 
of events to the identity of the substances which are involved in them. Thus, 
Davidson's path, which led towards the conclusion that any specification of a cause is 
a different description of the same single event, may be blocked: the different 
conditions which have to be specified as parts of the complete cause of an event 
belong to different events (or are descriptions of different events) as far as they 
concern different objects.
Let us look at the usual example. Kim's framework allows us to settle 
Davidson's intuition according to which the slipping of Smith and the slipping of 
someone who weighed 12 stone are a numerically identical event. Thus, if S is the 
property of slipping on a ladder, 5 is the object Smith and t is the time at which Smith 
had the fatal slip, then [5, S, t] is the event of Smith slipping on ladder. Since Smith 
weighted 12 stone at t, however, we can claim that [s, S, t] is identical to the event of 
the slipping of someone who weighted 12 stone. We cannot claim, though, that [s, S, 
r] is identical to the event of someone bringing the ladder into the garden at t-n, since 
the latter event involves a different object (the person who brought the ladder) and a 
different time. Of course, as Kim recognises, this account leaves a question still 
unanswered: "how do we characterise generally the set of individual events which 
jointly cause some event? 1,22 The problem is that the presence of an event 
exemplifying a certain property may not be enough. The fact that someone brought a 
ladder into the garden, for example, could be insufficient, since Smith could have 
slipped on some other ladder. Evidently, we would need to add some constrains in
20 Ibid., 73.
21 Let us assume that it was not the case the Smith was the person who brought the ladder into the 
garden at t, and, thus, tried to climb the ladder while carrying it. In tliat case, the two events would in 
fact be numerically identical, and all problems of identifications could be avoided through a polyadic 
account of events. Such a complication, however, seems quite straightforward and can be ignored, 
since it does not seem to lead towards philosophically important considerations.
22Kim 1971,73.
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order to secure cross references among the events in each s,. However, quite 
correctly, Kim notes that this is a problem which all accounts of causation have to 
face, and thus it does not count against his proposal in particular*.
Kim considers another worry which may arise from his proposal: how can we 
be certain that [y, P, f] is the cause of [x, A, fi]? Could not it be another event of the 
appropriate type (i.e., exemplifying P at f), which did not cause [x. A, fi], but some 
other event [z, A, fi]? For example, how do we secure that my striking of a match 
causes the lighting that match, and not the lighting of Clark's match, which he lit at 
the s ame t ime? A gain, i n K im's v iew t his i s a general p roblem of all a ccounts o f 
causation which cannot be charged against his proposal.
If these defences of Kim's proposal are accepted, as it seems they should be, 
his substance-based account of events seems to meet the objections which arose from 
a close consideration of the ontology o f e vents p resupposed by Mackie's analysis. 
His account, in fact, a) clarifies the relation between events and descriptions of 
events, b) explains how events can be identified and why they differ from each other, 
and c) explains the relation of necessity and sufficiency among events. The question 
we should ask, now, is whether Kim's theory of causation grounded on his substance- 
based account of events can accommodate Aquinas's theory of substances. If it can, 
and we will suggest that it can, Aquinas's theory of causation can be taken seriously.
4.2 Causal Relata and Hylomorphism
As we have seen in chapter one, according to Aquinas, substances are
hylomophically constituted, i.e. they are the result of a substantial form structuring
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some appropriate matter; in virtue of their structure, substances may have a built in 
teleology, i.e. some of the characteristics they have in virtue of their form are 
dispositions to develop according to processes reaching towards certain ends. What 
individuates a substance, thus, is its particular individual form, the matter of which it
is constituted, and the end towards which its existence leads. We have also seen in 
section 1.4, that through the reception of its substantial form, the matter of a thing is 
actualised and that thing receives its own act of being, i.e. conies into existence. 
Fonn, thus, must be received through the action of something which has the capacity 
to actualise the potentialities contained in matter. In this sense, a fonn is an act, i.e. 
the energy to turn matter into a certain thing.
We have also seen that, in virtue of its fonn, each substance falls under a 
certain sortal concept, and under some concepts which express the exemplification of 
certain essential properties. Furthermore, substances may also receive forms which 
are not substantial, i.e. organising principles in virtue of which they may change 
some of their characteristics (accidents), without ceasing to fall under a certain sortal 
concept. The acquisition of such a form, however, will make a thing exemplify some 
accidental property. Finally, substantiality comes in degrees: we sometimes apply 
concepts which are classificatory in manners similar to those of sortal concepts, 
although the things under which they fall maintain their substantial form. The typical 
example is that of a statue: the concept statue behaves like a sortal concept even if a 
marble statue remains a piece of marble with a new shape received as an accidental
form.
Let us note that, as a consequence of all this, whenever a substance exemplifies 
a property and, thus, falls under a certain property-concept, no matter whether that 
property is essential or accidental, the manifestation of that property is due to a form
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which actualises some of the potentialities of the matter of that substance. That 
actuality may be a first actuality, and thus the fonn responsible for it is a newly 
received one, or may be a second actuality, i.e. a manifestation of a capacity that that 
substance already had in virtue of a form it already possessed.23 Thus, the human 
soul which is the substantial form of my body and in virtue of which I exemplify 
humanity and falls under the sortal man is a first actuality. Similarly, the shape of a 
stone which is an accidental form and in virtue of which that stone exemplifies 
sphericity and fall under the property-concept spherical is a first actuality: by 
possessing it, the object ipso fact manifests the relevant property. On the other hand, 
my capacity to walk is a second actuality: I have it in virtue of my substantial form 
(it is an essential property of all men), when I manifest it I exemplify the concept 
walk, it is due to the capacity of my substantial fonn to actualise its matter (i.e., my 
body) in a certain way, but the having of that form is not ipso facto a sign that I 
manifest that capacity.
The upshot of this distinction is that whenever a thing exemplifies a property, 
that is because its matter is actualised in a certain manner by a form: if that actuality 
is a first actuality, the form responsible for it is received from the outside; if that 
actuality is a second actuality, the foim responsible for it is a form (either accidental 
or substantial) which already structures that substance.
If one holds this conception of substances one may accept also Kim's 
substance-based ontology of events, but one has to harmonise that theory of events 
with the idea that the substances involved in events are hylomorphically constituted. 
Thus, the occurrence of x in the canonical description of an event [x, P, t] needs to be 
reformulated in order to introduce the information that x may exemplify the property
23 Aquinas's distinction between first and second actuality was introduced in section 1.5. It has been 
clearly explained by Lonergan 1967, 106-151.
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P because of an actuality (either first or second) due to a certain form/; furthermore, 
it may be structured by that fonn since it has a potentiality for it, i.e. because it is the 
object it is. It is the object it is, on the other hand, because some matter in is 
actualised according to a certain structure by a form f with the result that x has the 
disposition to be actualised by/. Finally, by receiving the fonn/, x may acquire a 
certain end e, which may be the purpose of its activity (in the case of natural objects) 
or the function for which it was constmcted (in the case of artefacts). An example of 
a natural object could be a man, who is a certain body (i.e., x) stmctured by a human 
soul (i.e../) with the result that that man has life, especially intellectual life (i.e., e), 
as his end. An example of an artefact could be a knife, which is the mereological sum 
of a piece of iron and a piece of wood (i.e., x), which receives a certain form (the 
shape of a knife, with a handle and a sharp blade, i.e../) and has the function to cut 
as its end (i.e., p). If the received / is a substantial form, x will undergo a sunstantial 
change and will consequently fall under a different sortal concept. Otherwise, x will 
undergo accidental change and it will exemplify a new accidental property.
I propose that all this information should be embedded in the notation used to 
refer to events. An event, given Aquinas's ontology, is the exemplification of some 
property (either accidental or substantial) by an object due to an actualisation (which 
may be first or second) of some potentiality of it tlnough the reception of a fonn 
(accidental or substantial) in virtue of which it may acquire some end or function. If 
the received fonn is substantial, the reception is a substantial change. Thus an event 
could be expressed by the notation [x,„/, a(f), P, e, f], where x,„/is the object which 
has the potentiality toreceive the actuality a by being structured according to the 
form f, P is the property which is exemplified as a result of the actuality a, e is the 
end or function which may be introduced by the actuality a.
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Let us note that f (that is the fonn of x,„y) and/' may or may not be numerically 
identical and may or may not be substantial; hence, there are eight combinatory 
possibilitic^s In all cases in which f is accidental, is not a proper substance, 
although it falls under an artefact-sortal concept or a quasi-sortal concept of some 
other kind, and can be treated like an object. A typical example, as we have seen in 
chapter one, is that of a statue: although substantially it is a piece of marble, the 
concept statue is an artefact-sortal. When both f and f are substantial forms, either 
they are identical, or the actualisation a amounts to a substantial change.
The two places form of the index mf is general, but in some cases not all the 
two parts which are supposed to fill it exist. For example, some substances may not 
need to involve the actualisation of some matter. In chapter two, the notion of a 
subsistent form was introduced. A form of that kind is characterised by that fact that 
it can exist and perform some of its activities independently and separately from 
matter. The disembodied human soul is the typical example of this sort of substance. 
In this case, then, the substance in question has a form and a purpose, but lacks 
matter. Its index will have to be shortened consequently. Thus, if x is a disembodied 
human individual, she is an x/.
Similarly, some substances may exemplify a property without a purpose. A 
stone, for example. (One cannot object that stones have puiposes on account of the 
fact that they may be used for different ends by animals: when they are used they 
acquire an accidental function-attributing form, i.e. they become artefacts, but their 
substantial form remains purposeless). In such cases, an event will take the form [xw,/, 
a(f),P, t].
24 One could claim that there are only six combinatory possibilities, and that two must be excluded, 
since when f and/ are numerically identical they cannot be one substantial and the other accidental. 
However, we cannot rule out a priori the possibility that a tiling may undergo substantial change in a 
way that the same form structures it substantially and accidentally at different stages.
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We should now consider whether and how this new characterisation of events
affects Kim's explanation of INUS conditional relation among events. I would like to 
suggest that his proposal could be left as it stands, with the only requirements that
A) its explandum takes the form "[x,H'y”, A, e", tj] is an INUS condition
of [y,„f, a(fy P, e, Z]" (or the form "[xy”, «"(// e"> M is an INUS condition
of by a(f)> e> d", if immaterial substances are involved) and
B) s ome c onstrains b e p ut o n e ach s et 5 /, t he r ealisation o f w hich m ay be a 
minimal sufficient condition for the exemplification of property P in the 
event [ymf, alf), P, e, Z] (or by a(D> P, Zj). In particular, in order for a 
certain event a(f), P, e, Z] (or by ^(Z), P> (I) 1° happen, it is 
necessary that the following conditions obtain (let us call them 'strict causal 
conditions y
1) there is some substance x,„«yr (or xy?) which, by having the act a' through a 
form/, at a time tl antecedent to Z, exemplifies the relational property A of 
jointly actualising the members of a non-empty set M of material 
substances (or immaterial potentialities), which satisfies condition 3 below, 
through the fonn/- which may be a substantial or accidental fonn of some 
substance 5 and satisfies the condition 2 below; in other words, a polyedic 
event of the form [xHI/y?, a'(f), M, sr, A(xmifl_ ai(fi)t el, z'] (or [xy?, a'(f), M, sr, 
A(xjt, ai(fi). M,f), e‘, *']) takes place;
2) there is an instantiation of the form / - which may be a substantial or 
accidental form of some substance 5 - which, at a time t1 antecedent to z', 
exemplifies the relational property S of being disposed to jointly structure 
the members of the set M, as characterised in condition 3 below, so that
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they jointly receive the actuality ai i.e., a polyedic event of the fonn [sy, S_ 
m, a), el, /] takes place;
3) there must be a non-empty set M of material substances (if the object 
involved in the effect-event has the form yinj) or immaterial potentialities (if 
the object involved in the effect-event has the form yf) which, at a time f'" 
antecedent to f, jointly exemplify the relational property D of being 
disposed to receive the fonn/, as defined in condition 2 above, through the 
act of some substance xmifi (or x/j), as defined in condition 1 above. When
ymf (or yj) must be the only member of M, and it may be the only 
member otherwise (i.e., it may be the only member when///7, but a{f) does 
not involve a substantial change, since a is a second actuality); i.e., a 
polyedic event of the form [M,/, xf D(m, xmi/j e"', f^]| (or, [M,/> xfli 
D(m. xfi,f)' em, f"]) takes place;
4) If the effect-event has the fonn \yinf, a{f), P, e, f] (or [y„,y, af P, e, ;]), as 
opposed to [yW{/, a(fj, P, f] (or [y, a(f), P, f]), one of the two must obtain:
a) xrnfi (or xf), as defined in condition 1 above, is an intentional agent and 
there is a state of affairs e which, at a time f antecedent to 
exemplifies the p roperty E ofbeing the e nd o r purpose of her or his 
action a'(f); i.e., the event [e, x„f, &(/), E{e, xmi/i, a’(/)), f*] (or [e, xy, 
a’(/), E(g, Xf,, a‘(/)), /]) must take place;
b) xmif, (or xf), as defined in condition 1 above, is not an intentional agent 
and, at a time f antecedent to fl, the form/ of s, as defined in condition 
2 above, exemplifies the property E of being disposed to structure 
teleologically towards an end e any set M', the members of which 
jointly have the same disposition to be stmctured as the members of M,
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as defined in condition 3 above; i.e. the event [e, sy, M', E(e,f, M1), /"] 
must take place.
Conditions 1 to 4 depend on Aquinas's metaphysical assumptions, but they are 
formal, in that all cases of causation among events, if Aquinas's metaphysics is 
assumed, can fit within them. It may be the case, for example, that x,,^ (or xy?)== ymf 
(or yj), and this accounts for the possibility of an event in which one causes the 
actualisation of some property in oneself. Similarly, it may the case that/=/, where/ 
is the fonn of x,„if, (or xf), when something acts on something else and stmctures it 
according to its own fonn (for example, in the process of animal generation).
So whatever event is caused, the minimal sufficient set of events which have to 
be realised (i.e., the particular s(, belonging to SAp, each property of which - 
according to Kim - must be exemplified by some substance, in order for the caused 
event to happen) must contain three or four events, satisfying the requirements 1 to 3 
(if the effect-event has not a purpose e), or 1 to 4 (if the effect-event has a purpose e). 
This is not a radical modification of Kim's proposal, but an attempt to make it more 
precise, through the employment of Aquinas's metaphysical outlook, and to offer a 
more articulated analysis of the identification of events. As we saw above, Kim was 
aware that his proposal left some questions unsolved, but he believed that this did not 
need to be a serious worry, since all theories of causation have to face problems 
analogous to his. hi particular he noted that there is a difficulty concerning how to 
"characterise generally the set of individual events which jointly cause some 
effect."25 The proposal suggested here goes some way into an answer to this 
question. If we accept Aquinas's hylomorphism, we know that that set must contain 
at least three or four events having the forms specified in conditions 1-4. Of course, 
this is not to say that a full characterisation of the desired set is offered, but the
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present proposal does seem to specify at least some of the characteristics which that 
set must have. Each set of events minimal sufficient for a certain effect-event, must
thus contain (at least the first three of) the INUS conditional events the forms of 
which are in^ti’oduced in conditions 1 to 4. Those general forms of events may be
given the following names:
- Efficient INUS condition, i.e. the event mentioned in condition 1: xmif, (or 
x/) < (/^-actualises y„f (or yj).
- Formal INUS condition, i.e. the event mentioned in condition 2: the form/ 
exemplifies the disposition to structure .y,n/-(o r yf).
- Material INUS cooddion, r.e. rhe rvent mentionen in eo ndition 3: some
matter, contained in M, is available to be structured by/7.
- Final INUS condition, i.e. the event mentioned in condition 4: the a(fj- 
actualisation ofy„f (or yj) has a teleological bearing.
Although, the proposed view was not presented by Aquinas, it is Thomistic in 
the sense that it attempts to meet contemporary wonies by starting from assumptions 
taken from Aquinas. Furthermore, it is also an attempt to present Aquinas's views 
with a language and a degree of precision propm to the requlrementr of 
contemporary debates. Consequently, the proposed view may offer some hints on 
how to answer some contemporary worries which did not receive a reply in chapter 
three. In particular, we needed to explain why Aquinas needs to introduce four 
"species" of causes, although there is only one kind of causal relation, and how 
proper causes are different from INUS conditions which are not causal, i.e. - in 
Aquinas's terms - why accidental and proper causes differ. Let us now deal with 
these problems in turn.
25 Kim 1971, 73.
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A reply to the first problem is now easily available. There is only one kind of
relation between a cause and an effect: a cause is an at least INUS condition of its
effect. However, since causes and effects are events, events are exemplifications of 
properties by substances, and substances are hylomorphically composed, each effect- 
event requires at least three (or four) INUS conditional events, making available the 
hylomoiphical components needed for the substance involved in the effect-event to 
exemplify a certain property. Each of those three (or four) INUS conditional events 
fulfils a different role in the hylomorphical constitution of the object involved in the 
effect-event, and, in consequence of this fact, they can receive different names and fit 
in different species. The species are the four event-forms referred to above.
One could object that this answer overlooks the fact that, according to Aquinas, 
causes and effects are things and hylomorphical components of things (matter, form, 
purpose), whereas the proposal presented in this section takes causes and effects to 
be events. Therefore, either the present proposal is not fully Thomistic, and, 
consequently, cannot be used to clarify Aquinas's views, or Aquinas's conception of
causes was misconceived.
It seem that the first horn has to be disregarded, since Aquinas often uses 
examples of causal relations which clearly involve events, besides the numerous 
places where he refers to objects or hylomorphic components. For example, in 
discussing accidental causes, he notes that
When a pillar hinders the movement of a stone which rests upon it, [...] one
[who] removes the pillar is said to move the stone accidently. [...] The 
discovery of the treasure is connected with digging in the soil.26
26 ME, V, 3, 789: "sicut columna impedit motum lapidis, unde removens columnam dicitur per 
accidens movere lapidem superpositum alio modo, [...] sicut inventio thesauri [habet ordinem]ad 
fossionem in terra."
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Here, Aquinas seems clearly to hold that the movement of a pillar (accidentally) 
caused the movement of a stone, and the digging in the soil (accidentally) caused the 
discovery of treasure. Since his usual examples of causes are things (he takes a 
sculptor to be the cause of a statue) or hylomorphic components (he takes the form of 
the statue in the sculptor's mind and the marble to be causes of the statue), it may 
seem that we must conclude that Aquinas's theory is misconceived.
However, I would like to suggest that the view that both events and things may 
be causes is not incoherent, if one holds a theory of events like Kim's, in which 
substances are the basic components of events. First of all, let us note that, in order to 
explain the INUS conditional relation among events, Kim had to define the notion of 
INUS conditionality among properties, on which the former rests. Thus, in his view, 
[x, A, t1 ] is an INUS condition of [y, P, (| if and only if A is an INUS condition of P. 
Since the analysis in terms of INUS conditionality is meant to be an explanation of 
the meaning of '[x, A, ?] caused [y, P, r]', it seems natural to conclude that the 
statement 'A caused P' is meaningful. And, thus, if it makes sense to say that an event
caused another event, it makes sense to say that a thing caused anther thing.
This conclusion can be extended to things other than properties, for example 
substances. One of Kim's examples of '[x, A, t1 ] caused fy, P, /]' is 'My striking of the 
match caused its lighting.' If my striking caused a certain event, however, it seems 
natural to claim that I caused it. In the example, 'I caused the lighting of the match' 
seems to make perfect sense. The occurrence of T here, on the other hand, does not 
seem to be just a shortened version of the expression 'my striking of the match', since 
'my striking of the match caused its lighting' implies 'I caused the lighting of the 
match', but the reverse is not true, since there are several actions which I could have 
performed to reach that effect. It may be suggested, then, that the reason why 'I
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caused the lighting of the match' is meaningful and correct is that when an event is a 
cause of some effect, also its component pails (a substance and a property) are causes 
of its effect. A similar case can be made for effects, at least when the form acquired 
by the relevant substance in order to exemplify a certain property is substantial (or 
artefactual), such as in 'my sculpting caused the marble to turn into a statue', which is 
paralleled by 'my sculpting caused the statue.'
If all of this is correct, it can be suggested that the hylomorphic components of
substances involved in cause-events and effect-events can be causes and effects as
well as events. Furthermore, like the INUS conditional events described in conditions
1 to 4 fit in the four Aristotelian species of causes, this can be said of their 
components and their hylomorphic constituents. x,,^ (or xji) and a ‘(f) are e fficient 
causes, like 'I' and 'a striking of a match' are parts of the event referred to by the term 
'my striking of a match', and they can be said to cause the lighting of the match, f 
and .sy are formal causes of the stmcture of the property exemplified in the effect- 
event; for example, the structure and features of the match are causes of the stmcture 
and the features the flame which resulted. A set M containing appropriate items is 
also a cause, since the reception of the form through the action of some agent 
requires an appropriate "subject" which is disposed to receive it. Thus, the match 
which I strike is the only member of M, and it ignites when the other conditions 
obtain. The purpose e, for which one acts, is a cause of the resulting effect. For 
example, the reason for which one needs some fire, is a cause of the lighting of a
match.
Let us now return to the second problem left over from chapter three,
concerning the criterion to distinguish real causes from other INUS conditions, hi 
chapter three, we saw that part of the meaning of 'A caused B' is that A is also an at
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least INUS condition of B, but there is more to it. What differentiates proper causes 
from mere at least INUS conditions? We have also seen what one of Aquinas's 
answers could be the following: only per se causes are proper causes, whereas 
accidental causes are only INUS conditions. In fact, according to Aquinas, if Mark is 
the efficient cause of a statue, and Mark happens to be white, Mark's whiteness will 
also happen to be a cause of that statue. If we think of causes as being also at least 
INUS conditions of their effects, it is easy to see why he could have thought that: if 
Mark is white, the whiteness that he exemplifies is part of an event comprehended in 
a minimal sufficient condition of the effect (the statue).
Although this explains why accidental causes can be thought of as causes, it
does not offer a criterion to distinguish them from proper per se causes. The example
/
may suggest that the fact that the accidental cause was a supervenient property of the
A
/ /
actual cause may be relevant, and it is probably so; but the fact of superveqeing on a 
cause cannot be a necessary and sufficient condition for a property to be an 
accidental cause, since there may be accidental properties which do not supervene. 
An example taken from Aquinas may be this: assuming that the sculptor Polycletus 
sculpted a certain statue, Polycletus is an accidental cause of the statue, whereas a 
sculptor (who happens to be him) is its efficient cause. In this case, the fact of being 
Polycletus does not supervene on the fact of being a sculptor, yet Polycletus is said to 
be an accidental cause in virtue of the fact that a sculptor is a per se cause.
At this point, however, a proposal on how to differentiate accidental causes 
from per se causes is available. Since Kim's conditional analysis of causation 
involves a substance-based ontology of events, and since Aquinas's hylomorphism 
leads to the idea that substances and their hylomorphic components can be causes 
and effects, it may be argued that the causes of an event e, in a strict sense, are those
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events (and their components) which are responsible for the hylomorphic 
composition of e. Thus, all the events which are INUS conditions of e and satisfy one 
of the above conditions 1 to 4, are proper causes of e. All the other INUS conditions 
which form a set of events minimally sufficient for e are not causes, or - in Aquinas's
terms - are accidental causes.
We need to note that the expression 'hylomorphic composition of <?', which was 
just used above, may seem problematic, since, one may contend, the present proposal 
is grounded on the idea that substances, not events, are hylomorpliically composed. 
To this, however, it can be replied that the hylomorphic components of substances 
are also components of the events where the substances which they constitute them 
are involved, for the reason, considered above, that causation occurs both between
events, between the substances involved in those events, and between the
components of those substances.
One final remark about accidental causation is needed. We have already noted 
in chapter three that, according to Aquinas, an accidental cause may not be an 
accident, but a substance, whereas a per se cause may be an accident. For example, 
the proper cause of a statue needs to be a sculptor, although a sculptor does not need 
to be a man, or an animal, but could be a machine (say a robot); on the other hand the 
fact that the sculptor of a certain statue is a man, or even a certain man (say
Polycletus) is an accidental cause. This possibility is granted by the present proposal, 
through the fact that, as noted above, the substances involved in events do not need 
to satisfy all the criteria for the identity of substances, put forward in chapter one. 
The objects xmy» andy,„f, involved in the events [xm"j», a',(fr), A, e", tf\ and [ymp a(f), 
P, e, /], need not be substances in a strict sense, since xm>y and y„,/may result from 
the structuring of m" and m (which could be themselves substances, or sets of
241
substances, is the strict sense specified in chapter one) through the accidental forms 
f and f respectively. For example, the two events could be the sculpting of a 
sculptor and the realisation of a certain shape in the marble involving a certain statue. 
In this case, both the objects involved in the two events are not substances in a strict 
sense. The matter of the object involved in the first event, m", could be Polycletus, 
and its form f" could be that giving Polycletus the property of being a sculptor: the 
hylomorphic composition of m" and/", then, would be an accidental object, not a 
substance in a strict sense. Similarly, the object involved in the second event, a 
statue, is not a substance in a strict sense, but it is composed of a real substance, the 
marble, and an accidental form, i.e. a certain shape, as discussed in chapter one. 
Another example could be that of the cmelty of an army causing the destmction of a 
foreign nation. The object involved in the cause-event, an army, is not a substance in 
the strict sense, although thus are the members of the set constituting its matter (i.e., 
all the individual soldiers). Similarly the object involved in the second event, a 
nation, is not a substance in the strict sense, although thus are some of the members 
of the set constituting its matter (i.e., the citizens, but not the buildings and the 
temtory).
In conclusion, the differences in the degrees of substantiality which were noted 
in the cases of substances, and their principles of organisation, i.e. forms, shows up 
also in the events in which substances are involved, and this leads to the peculiar 
fact, noted by Aquinas himself, that accidents may be proper causes, and substances 
may be accidental causes. The present proposal seems to have the resources to 
accommodate this feature of an ontology of events based on Aquinas's theory of
substances.
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4.3 Formai Causation
The theory of causation and causal relata proposed in the present and the 
previous chapters makes sense of the notion of fonnal causation. Let us recall that 
formal causation is one of our main concerns, since it is a central notion in Aquinas's 
theory of mental representation. The epistemological advantages of that theory, 
though, are normally taken to be jeopardised by the obscurity and obsolescence of 
the notion of formal causation. The reconstruction and implementation of Aquinas's 
views on causation offered above aim precisely at the elucidation of that notion in 
view of its employment in a theory of mental representation. Let us now turn, thus, to 
a closer analysis of formal causation.
Causation is a relation among events, but events are exemplifications of 
properties by substanncs.27 Smce substances exemplify properties (essential and 
accidental) in virtue of their fonns (substantial and accidental, reteectieely), 
causation involves always the reception of a form, or the astualisation of a second 
actuality which the relevant substance already has potentially. Since the actunlisatioe 
of a form camiot happen inOepeeOently from the act of an agent (efficient causation) 
and the actualisation of potentialities of some substratum (material causation), formal 
causation loses the halo of mystery which contemporary philosophers usually take to 
enfold it. Formal causes can never be inOepnnOent of efficient causes, and may be 
independent of material causes only in cases involving immaterial substances. If
27 Someone could contend that there are apparent exceptions to this claim, such as a noise, a sound, a 
flash, an odour, a breeze. I believe that these are not genuine counter-examples and that in all cases 
there is some substance manifesting a certain property, although the substance involved may not be a 
substance in the strict sense. For example a noise, a sound or an odour need to be the noise, the sound 
or the odour of some object. Also a breeze or a lightning need to involve a motion of some region of 
atmosphere, or air. This reply may assume that sounds, odours, and other traditional secondary 
properties cannot be reduced to physical events. I argue for a view to that effect in De Anna 2002.
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those cases are problematic, on the other hand, the trouble is not with the notion of 
formal causation, but with claims concerning the existence of immaterial substances.
In section 1.5, we saw that according to Aquinas, a form may exist in reality 
only as an individual, i.e. as the form of a particular substance. In the account of 
causation proposed in this chapter, on the other hand, the claim was made that an
instantiation of the form in virtue of which the effect-event occurs must contribute in
an appropriate manner to the constitution of an INUS condition of that event (cf. 
condition 2 in section 4.2 above). For example, the formal INUS condition of the 
event \ymf> a(f), P, e, z1] is the event [s/, S^ m, a}, e, t1]. The claim was that, depending 
on features of individual cases, f in the effect-event and f in the cause-event can 
either be two instantiations of the same form, or be numerically identical. They are 
numerically identical, for example, when f is a form which already structures the 
object ymf when the object xmift actualises, through a second actuality, a property 
which ymf already had potentially. The problem now is the following: when the two 
occurrences of f (i.e., that in the cause and that in the effect) are not numerically 
identical, how is it possible that / - an individual form - may have two instantiations,
one in the form and one in the effect?
An answer to this difficulties requires a better understanding of the relationship 
between individual forms and universals. In commenting Aristotle's Metaphysics, in 
particular the definition of "formal cause" put forward in book five, Aquinas writes
that
the formal cause [...] is related to a thing in two ways. In one way it stands as 
the intrinsic form of a thing, and in this respect it is called the formal principle 
of a thing. In another way it stands as something which is extrinsic to a thing 
but it is that in likeness to which it is made, and in this respect an exemplar is 
also called a thing's form. Moreover, because it is from its form that each thing 
derives its nature, whether of its genus or of its species, and the nature of its 
genus or of its species is what is signified by the definition, which expresses its
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quiddity, the form of a thing is therefore the intelligible expression of its 
quiddity, i.e. the formula by which its quiddity is known.2?
Here Aquinas seems to say that there are three things which may count as causal 
forms of a thing: a) the individual principle of organisation which structures its 
matter, b) a Platonic exemplar, universal and existing independently from all 
individual things which partake of it, and c) the content of a definition of a thing, i.e., 
the universal concept existing in a mind.
It is interesting to note that Aquinas lists three things, whereas the passage by 
Aristotle on which he is commenting overlooks Platonic forms. This does not mean, 
however, that he objected to Aristotle and held the view that all these three things are 
causal forms; the reason why he mentions all of them at this point may have to do 
only with the fact that Aristotle did not mean to discuss these views at this stage of 
his Metaphysics. In book five, Aristotle collects the definitions of all major key- 
concepts to be discussed in metaphysics. Further on, in book seven, he will discuss 
form and matter extensively. It is plausible to argue that Aquinas thought that, in 
setting up a definition of formal causes, the proposals of all major philosophers had 
to be taken into account, and that only after a proper discussion the decision to 
overlook or ignore some could be taken. Thus, probably, he mentions also the 
Platonic thesis that separate forms are the causes of things. Further on in his 
commentary, however, he seems to agree with Aristotle that the Platonic proposal 
has to be disregarded: in lecture three of book seven of ME, indeed, he considers all
M ME, V, 2, 764; "causa formalis, quae comparatur dupliciter ad rem. Uno modo sicut forma 
intrinseca rei; et haec dicitur species. Alio modo sicut extrinseca a re, ad cuius tamen similitudinem 
res fieri dicitur; et secundum hoc, exemplar rei dicitur forma. Per quern modum ponebat Plato ideas 
esse formas. Et, quia unumquodque consequitur naturam vel generis vel speciei per formam suam, 
natura autem generis vel speciei est id quod significat definitio, dicens quid est res, ideo forma est 
ratio ipsius quod quid erat esse, idest definitio per quam scitur quid est res."
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the Aristotelian arguments against the Platonic view, and rejects only one of them, 
which seems to entail that agreed with the rest of them.
We are, thus, committed to the view that, according to Aquinas, both individual 
principles of organisation which structure particulars and the conceptualisations of 
them in a mind may be causes. Although the account of event-causation proposed in 
this chapter has mentioned only individual forms (e.g., f) as causes, it may be 
suggested that it is coherent with Aquinas's views nonetheless. In fact when the 
formal INUS conditional event of a effect-event occurs, i.e. an event of the form [sy, 
S(f, m, a) 6Z, /] occurs, there must the a substance Sf which is structured by f - no 
matter whether substantially or accidentally. On the other hand, when an Sf is 
structured by/, it falls under the concept F, i.e. a concept which is the abstraction of 
f, and under which fall all the things which are structured by f in the same way in 
which Sf is structured by/, (hi fact the same form may structure different kinds of 
matter in different ways, depending on the kind of disposition that each kind of 
matter has towards that form. For example, the same form may have natural 
existence in some kinds of objects, and intentional existence in others. As a 
consequence, different kinds of things which are disposed towards the same fomr in 
different manners, may fall under different concepts when they are structured by that
form).
It follows that, at any time ? when an event of the form ^5f, Sy m, a), elf /] 
occurs, an event of the form [sy, F, tl] must also occur. In this way, though, F must be 
an INUS condition of F, i.e. the property exemplified by the effect-event [y,„y a/), F, 
r, t]. As we have seen in the previous section, this may be a reason to claim that F is 
a cause of F, or even that F is a cause of [y,„y, a(fj, F, r, /]. This, on the other hand, 
accommodates the claim - suggested by Aquinas - that concepts of things, their
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abstracted fonns, may also be causes. The reference to the concepts of things, here, 
does not imply that the thoughts of things are causes of whatever effects those things 
are causes of. This, of course, would entail that the mind has mysterious causal 
powers and that the mere fact that we think about some events may change the
structure of minimal sufficient conditions of events which would otheimise be
completely unrelated to us. Rather, the formal features in virtue of which those things 
are thinkable and, consequently, fall under certain concepts, are themselves causes.
It seems, thus, that the view proposed in this chapter is consistent with the idea 
that both individual principles of organisation and universal concepts are causes. We 
still need to explain, however, how f may have two instantiations which are not 
numerically identical. They cannot be numerically identical, otherwise they would be 
an entity independent from each individual substance structured by them, and thus 
they would be a Platonic universal; Aquinas, however, camiot accept this possibility,
as mentioned above. A solution is that we should not think of a fomi as an
individual, nor as an universal. It is not an individual, since individuals are 
individuated by matter, but forms are not actualised matter by definition. On the 
other hand - outside the mind - forms camiot exist unless they structure some matter, 
and, thus, hylomorphically constitute some individual substance.
The status of forms is probably not as mysterious as it may seem, if one thinks 
of them in analogy with isomorphic stmctures. Two things may be isomorphic, for 
example, because their parts may be in a 1-1 correspondence. We can say that they 
have the same stmcture, although that stmcture cannot exist by itself independently 
from a thing, or from any other means or medium that we may decide to use to 
capture it. At the same time, however, we camiot claim that the form is an individual, 
since what differentiates its instantiations in all the individuals is the particular stuff
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which constitutes them, and this has nothing to do with the structure itself, which 
remains identical in all cases. Because of this peculiar status, we should take forms to 
be identified by their isomorphic properties, and to be capable of being instantiated 
in several individuals. Consequently, although each form is an individual since it is 
the form of some individual, it is identical to the forms of all the individuals 
isomorphic to that. The identity involved, is not numerical identity, but formal 
identity.
The analogy with isomorphism may also help to explain another feature of 
Aquinas's conception of forms which may seem puzzlmg. As we have seen in the last 
quote from ME, Aquinas takes both the species and the genera to be forms and 
causes of a thing. Thus, the causes of an individual man would include the species 
man and the genus animal.. Why this may be so can be explained through an analogy 
with the fact that isomorphism may be partial and come at different degrees. Let us 
suppose that we want to construct isomorphisms among the following sets by putting 
in a 1-1 correspondence identical numbers: a={l, 3, 5}, 6={1, 2, 3, 5}, c={l, 3, 5, 6, 
7}, d={ 1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. We can say that the isomorphism between a and any other set 
holds also among any pair of sets, although the same cannot be said about the 
structure of the other sets. Furthermore, d has the structure of b, but the contrary is 
not true. Finally, the structure of a can be found in all the other sets, and the structure 
of b can be found in d, but cannot be found in c. We could express this by saying that 
there is a certain degree of isomorphism between a and any of the other set, but a 
higher degree of isomorphism must exist between b and d.
Similarly, we may say that the abstracted form animal is partially identical to
the abstracted fomrs man, cat, dog, etc., which are at a higher degree partially
identical to an individual man, an individual cat and an individual dog, etc.,
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respectively. On the other hand the abstracted form living thing is partially identical 
to a greater extension of objects, although the partiality of that identity would also be
greater.
In conclusion, it seems that Aquinas's metaphysical views and his intuitions on 
the nature of causation may square with some basic requirements that emerged in
contemporary debates and any satisfying account of causation must meet. In the last
two chapters I have tried to argue that Aquinas' theory of causation has the resources
to meet those requirements and, thus, it is much more plausible than one might
expect at a first glance.
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Chapter Five
Cognition and Formal Causation
5.1 Aquinas on the Cognitive Process
In the previous four chapters, I have tried to explain and defend Aquinas’s 
views on causation. This required an analysis of his metaphysical views on the 
hylomorphic constitution of reality (chapter one) and on the possibility of forms 
existing apart from matter (chapter two). The latter was focused upon the case of 
humans, who are essentially material beings, but are also capable of existing apart 
from matter. We have also seen that Aquinas took causal relations to be conditional 
relations. The best way to analyse causal relations conditionally, though, seems to be 
in the terms of Mackie’s account of causality (chapter three). Although Aquinas’s 
views on causal relations may be compatible with Mackie’s, however, they diverge 
from those of Mackie in that Aquinas takes causal relata to be ultimately the 
hylomorphic components of substances, rather than the events in which substances 
are involved. We have also seen that the possibility of purely foimal substances, such 
as God, angels, and disembodied humans, leaves open the possibility of causation 
occurring among non-material entities (chapter four). The resulting view seems to be 
a philosophically defensible position, thus capacle of being employed in a theory of 
mental representation.
In fact, the distinctive character of Aquinas’s theory of cognition depends on 
his attempt to explain mental representation as a process in which the mind becomes
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formally identical to the world, through the causal action of the world upon the
(human) cognitive p owers. This is an i dea r ecently s upported by v arious E nglish-
speaking philo^c^p^T^e^r^^s^/ which has attracted the attention and, to an extent, the favour
of the community of analytical philosophers, on account of its epistemological
merris? Its main attraction has to do with the fact that it offers an appealing way to
maintain the intuitions developed by causal theories of cognition (i.e., theories
according to which cognition consists in the mastering of representations caused by
external things), while avoiding the problems normally associated with them. In
particular, it overcomes the difficulties of causal theories which were famously
exposed by Putnam's permutation arguments. In Haldane's words:
Even if a complete representationalist account of thought must make a 
comiection between a subject's internal states and the external world [...] the 
connection can only he extrinsic, a matter of efficient causation.[...] Clearly 
input from the world is relevant and is in part at least a matter of efficient 
causation. However, if there is to be the sort of conformity of mind to thing 
which Putnam and McDowell seek [in order to avoid the problems highlighted 
by the pemiutation argument], then I can only see this being provided 
according to an account of the sort developed by Aquinas when he writes that 
the intellect in act is the intelligible in act; or less scholastically, that a thought 
will only be of a thing when it is formally identical with it; when what we think 
of and what is thought are the same:.3
The problem highlighted by the permutation argument is that no matter how 
finely the causes of representations are specified, causal theories will always fail to 
fix the references of representations, in part because there will always be clearly 
deviant causal lines which satisfy all the specified requirements, in part also because 
conceptual identification is more finely-grained than causal individuation. (For 
example, trilaterality and triangularity cannot be distinguished in terms of their 
causal powers, or those they bestow on their instances, yet they are conceptually
' Haldane 1989a, 1989b, 1992b, 1993a, 1993b, 1996, 1997b, 1998; Jacob and Zeis 1997.
2 Putnam, 1995, first part. For a reconstruction of the debates on Thomistic epistemology in analytic 
philosophy see De Anna 2001, chapters three and four.
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distinguishable). The reason ^frihis problem, according to Haldane, is that causal 
theories do not consider the relevant semantic relations which need to linlc the thinker
to the object of thought. The notion of form becomes useful at this point: it is the fact 
that a certain thought and a certain object are fonnally identical which makes that 
thought a thought of that object. Among all causal lines responsible for the 
occurrence of a certain representation, the only semantically relevant one will be that 
which accounts for the fonn of the content of the representation. That causal line, 
however, cannot be merely a case of efficient causation, it needs to be also a case
formal causation.
In the previous chapters, I have tried to explain and defend the idea of formal 
causation within Aquinas's hylomorphic metaphysics. In the present chapter I w ill 
consider how the resulting theory of formal causation may be employed to account 
for the cognitive process.
Aquinas dealt with the problem of cognition in all his main philosophical 
works, but his major and more comprehensive treatments of it are expounded in the 
commentary on Aristotle's De anima, especially in the second half of book two and 
in book three, in the Summa theologiae, questiones seventy-eight to eighty-nine, and 
in the commentary on Aristotle's De sensu et sensato. In what follows we will deal 
with the role of formal causation in perception (section two), and in thought (section 
three), but before getting into that we will have a brief view of Aquinas's account of 
the cognitive process. Our attention will be focused mainly on the commentary on 
the De anima, where the whole cognitive process receives the most extensive
treatment.
Following Aristotle, Aquinas notes that, in cognition, the mind (or whatever 
faculties we would call by that name) is in contact with a reality different from itself
3Haldane 1998, 266-7
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and, in some ways, ends up containing that reality 'in' itself. Consequently, "the soul 
is in a way all existing things. "4 Subsequently, Aristotle distinguishes two kinds of 
objects, sensible objects and intelligible objects, that is objects of perception and 
objects of thought. He contends that, consequently, the soul must have two faculties, 
each one of which is the capacity to know one of the two kinds of objects. 
Furthermore, since it seems indisputable that a large part of the objects known by the 
intellect depend in different ways upon what is perceived, the two cognitive faculties 
must be somehow connected. The major efforts of Aristotle and his commentators to 
explain cognition are carried out under these assumptions. The major task, therefore, 
will be to define the relation between the two faculties and to illustrate in what way 
the soul "is all things."
At this point, one may already suspect that Aquinas could be charged of 
inconsistency, if the interpretation of his views o n universals supported i n chapter 
two above is correct. Let us recall that in chapter two Aquinas was attributed a view 
according to which the immediate objects of thought are not universals, intelligible 
objects, since these are the media, not the objects of cognition. The objects of 
cognition would be the actual individuals (possibly) existing in the world. If this is 
true, one could object, how can Aquinas follow Aristotle in holding the view that 
there are two kinds of objects of cognition, i.e. sensible object and intellectual 
objects? To this it can be replied, however, that Aristotle's claim about two kinds of 
objects of cognition could be the result of the reflection on perception and thought, 
which results in the recognition that the former has to do with individuals (sensible 
objects) and the latter with universals (intelligible objects). The term 'objects’, then 
would not be used in a strict sense, since the sensible and intelligible objects here 
referred to would not be what {quid) one cognises, but the things through which
4 De anima, 431 b 21.
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{quo) one cognises. This does not mean that the term ‘objects’ is equivocated by 
Aquinas: at this initial stage of the De anima, Aristotle is just appealing to the 
intuition according to which there are two kinds of cognition, which appears clear if 
one realises that one can cognise both individuals and universals. Aristotle and 
Aquinas could qualify this distinction as a reflection on the process of cognition, i.e. 
on the sensible and intelligible fonns which exist intentionally in the cognisant, only 
after a full development of the theory of cognition, which has not been carried out 
yet at this stage. In a more theoretically sophisticated Aristotelian manner, the same 
point could be expressed by saying that the sensible species and the intelligible 
species are objects only of acts of second intention, i.e. objects of self-reflective 
thought.
Concerning perception, Aristotle notes that one perceives substances, such as a 
particular man, tree or book. The five senses, though, are not sensitive to humanity, 
nor to the property of being a book or to that of being a tree. The five senses are only 
sensitive to objects, which are qualities of substances, but are not substances 
themselves, like colours or shapes. The experience of a particular which has the 
property of being a certain substance, nonetheless occurs through the perception of 
its non-substantial properties, which the senses are sensitive to. Thus, Aristotle 
distinguishes between per se objects of perception, which are sensed directly, and 
incidental or per accidens objects of perception, which do not act directly on the 
senses but are perceived nonetheless.5 Let us consider an example: when we look at a 
cat, our eyes are sensitive to some colours, some shapes, some movements. These are 
per se objects of our sight. Yet, we perceive a cat, i.e. a material particular of a 
certain sort. The property of being a cat does not act on our senses directly, but it is
5 Ibid., 418 a 21-4; see also 425 a 24-9.
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cognised through the per se objects of perception. That is why it is an incidental 
sensible object.
A distinction has to be drawn also among per se sensible objects. Some of 
them can only be perceived by one of the senses, like a colour by sight, an odour by 
smell, a sound by hearing, a flavour by taste, and hardness or roughness by touch. 
Aristotle calls them proper sensible objects.6 Other sensible objects can be sensed by 
different sense modalities: the shape of an object may be perceived through sight, but 
also through touch; the motion of a body may be touched, seen, or, under some 
circumstances, even heard. These qualities which are perceivable by several 
modalities are common sensible objects. Aristotle individuates five of these: motion, 
rest, number, shape, and size.
As mentioned above, Aristotle needs to explain in what way the soul (or the 
mind) may become all cognisable things. He explains this fact by noting that in 
perception the sense receives the form of a perceived object, "as wax receives the 
imprint of the ring without the iron or gold, and it takes the imprint which is of gold 
or bronze, but not qua gold or bronze."7 In this kind of reception the sense is passive, 
namely it does not act by itself in the production of its own objects, but "in each case 
the sense is affected by that which has colour or flavour or sound. ’,8 Furthermore, 
Aristotle adds that the action of objects on the senses does not happen "in so far as 
they [a golden ring or a bronze ring] are what each of them is spoken of as being, but 
in so far as they are things of certain kinds and in accordance with their principle"/ 
This means that the per se sensible object received by a sense organ is not the 
essence of a thing, but it is one of its properties; however, that thing has that property
6 Ibid., 418 a 11.
1 Ibid., 424 a 19-20.
2 And., 424 a 20-21.
424 a 21-23.
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in virtue of being structured by a certain principle of organisation, i.e. of having a 
certain essence. This is consistent with the claim, considered above, according to 
which a per se object of sensation is a quality of a substance, since a substance, as 
such, can only be an incidental object of perception. In his commentary (CDA), 
Aquinas notes that the form of the material particular is received in the mind (or 
soul), even if it exists differently in the mind than in the external object. In the 
external object it exists naturally or materially, whereas in the mind it exists 
intentionally or spiritually. This does not entail that the intentional existence does not 
require a material substratum. Quite the contrary: sensation is an activity of a sense 
organ. All that speaking of 'spiritual existence' amounts to is the fact that fonns 
existing intentionally are not principles of the organisation of matter in the same way 
in which they are when existing naturally.10
These claims about intentional existence raise an issue concerning their 
explanatory role in a theory of cognition. It seems, in fact, that they are meant to 
explain cognition, otherwise it would be hard to see what the purpose of speaking of 
the distinction between natural and intentional existence would be. If that is the case,
intentionality would be a criterion for cognition: a cogniser would be - unlike non- 
cognisers - an object capable of containing forms of other things existing 
intentionally in it, while maintaining its own substantial form naturally. This natural 
line of reasoning has, though, as Pasnau (1997, 47-60) pointed out, to face a 
difficulty: Aquinas claims that forms exist intentionally both in the senses and in the 
media of perception (e.g., air or water in the case of sight). Consequently, were the 
claims on intentionality meant to offer a criterion for cognitivity, air and water would 
turn out to have cognitive powers, although "it is obviously not plausible to accept
CDA, III, 2, 26 ff.
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the conclusion outright.”11 According, to Pasnau, on the other hand, “the persistence 
with which Aquinas advances [his claims on intentional existence] as a criterion 
makes it hard to see how we could refuse to take it seriously.’^2
Elsewhere (De Anna 2000b) I have argued that, although it is disputable even 
that Aquinas meant to offer a criterion for cognitivity through his theses on 
intentional existence, in the main passage where he seems to do that he speaks of 
the form (forma) and the species (species) of a thing existing in the cogniser, whereas 
while mentioning intentional existence in media (air and water) he refers to the 
likeness of a thing (similitudo rei)4 or to a form of a colour (forma colons)}5 
Although this may seem a small terminological detail, I argued that it is quite 
decisive: the forms of species of things are per accidens objects of perception, i.e. 
the essences of individual things, whereas the likeness of things or the forms of 
colours (or whatever other sensible property) are per se objects of perception, i.e. 
forms of accidental properties of things. Consequently, when Aquinas claims that 
cognisers are those beings which may contain forms of other things existing 
intentionally in themselves, he does not refer to accidental forms of things, but to 
substantial forms of concrete particulars. The criterion he would be offering, then, 
would rule out air and water, which do not contain the substantial forms of things, 
but only some of their accidental forms (e.g., the forms of colour and shape). 
Cognisers, on the other hand, would be those beings, which are capable of containing 
the substantial forms of other things in themselves, that is, of grasping the essences 
of external things. In the same essay, I suggested that grasping the essences of other 
things requires capacities of meaning attribution to the contents of sensory Pa Ib ST CD
11
12
13
14
Pasnau 1997, 50.
Ibid.
ST I, q. 14, a. 1, c.
CDA, 2, 7, 18.
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experience, and this, in turn, is possible only for beings which can be aware of their 
sensory states, havepropositional a ttitudes, and are capable of selective attention 
and reflexive awareness?/
Besides these reasons of principle, however, it is clear that awareness is 
required in the first stages of the cognitive process within the Aristotelian theory of 
perception: Aristotle certainly means this with other claims about the details of his 
account, which we can now turn to. According to him, a subject's awareness of his 
own perceptual sates is a result of the fact that the sense is in act, i.e. that it is 
actualised by a certain sensible object, and no further faculty has to be introduced. If 
we see red, our awareness of redness depends on our sight being acted upon by a 
proper sensible object and we do not have to suppose that it results from some other 
sense modality perceiving our perception. In fact, had we to suppose that, we should 
introduce also a further faculty perceiving both redness and our perceiving redness, 
and we would end up in an infinite regress. On the other hand, in order to avoid that, 
we could introduce a faculty capable of perceiving its own perceiving, but then "we 
had best admit this of the first of the series.”15 16 7 This argument seems convincing: 
reasons of economy of explanation prevent us from introducing more sense faculties 
than are strictly needed for an explanation of perception. Thus, we need to admit that 
each sense modality perceives its own perceiving - i.e. is aware of perceiving - when
15 ST, I, 56, 2, ad 3.
16 Cf. De Anna 2000b. My conclusion, therefore, is contrary to Pasnau's most generous inteipretation 
of Aquinas's criterion, according to which cognisers would be characterised by the fact of having very 
complicated patterns of managing forms existing intentionally in them. According to this 
inteipretation of the criterion, computers turn out to be cognisers (Pasnau 1997, 57). In mine, 
computers would not have cognition, instead, since they lack awareness, and, therefore, are incapable 
of reflexive awareness. Haldane (1989b) proposed a strong argument to the effect that reflective 
awareness is a necessary condition for intentionality: unless one is aware of at least some mental states 
one cannot form concepts through selective attention. Selective attention requires consciousness and 
the capacity of reflexive awareness, since several concepts can only be mastered if one can refer to 
oneself.
17 De anima, 425 b 16.
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it is in act. Awareness, thus, is an immaterial property of material things which are 
suitably structured for perception by their substantial forms.
At this point, however, we must recognise that we can perceive that different 
kinds of per se proper sensible objects (colours, smells, etc.) are different. 
Consequently, we need to admit that there is a faculty of the soul which merges 
together and compares sensations coming from different sense modalities. Aristotle's 
argument is particularly clear:
Since we judge both white and sweet and each of the objects of perception by 
reference to each other, by what do we perceive also that they differ? This must 
indeed be by perception, for they are objects of perception. [...] Nor indeed is 
it possible to judge by separate means that sweet is different from white, but 
both must be evident to one thing. [...] The same thing then asserts this; hence, 
as asserts this so it both thinks and perceives. That, therefore, it is not possible
A • 1 18to judge separate things by separate means is clear.
Medieval commentators, including Aquinas, have interpreted this conclusion as 
the introduction of a common sense modality which collects and unifies data coming 
from the external senses. Let us note that the expression 'common sense' - which is 
often used to refer to this faculty - has no implication concerning the perception of 
common sensible objects - which were mentioned above.18 9 Rather, it is a faculty 
which perceives all the per se objects (both proper and common) of the five sense 
modalities and. merges them together into complex unities, which higher cognitive 
faculties may subsequently interpret as objects of certain kinds, i.e. as the substances
which are the per accident dbjects of perception. ......... .........
; /
Aquinas called phantasms (phantasmata) such perceptual unities, and 
introduced two faculties which are capable - respectively - of retrieving and 
articulating them, notwithstanding the absence of actual stimulations of the senses:
18 De anima, 426 b 11 -22.
19 Aristotle and several of his commentators explicitly deny that there is an internal sense the role of 
which is to perceive the common objects; cf. De anima, 425 a 14 - b 12.
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memory (memoria) and fantasy {phantasid). Even though phantasms contain all the 
infomiation needed to comprehend what sort of objects they represent, Aquinas 
claimed that the mere perceiving them by the common sense is not sufficient for that 
comprehension/® thus, besides the common sense, he follows Aristotle and introduce
a higher faculty, i.e. the intellect.
Aquinas had two main reasons to claim that the common sense cannot
comprehend. The first is that perception can never go wrong, whereas
comprehension may be mistaken, at least as far as judgements are involved:
Incorrect understanding [...] results in spurious science or imprudent decisions 
or foolish opinions. Sensation, on the other hand, can only be "correct", for the 
senses are infallible with respect to their proper objects.20 1
This leads to the conclusion that the faculty which receives phantasms and the 
faculty which does the thinldng are distinct. This argument is contentious for at least 
tv/o reasons, the first being purely philosophical, the second concerning the overall 
coherence of Aquinas's views.
According to the first objection, the claim that the senses are infallible is 
problematic since it seems that there are some obvious counterexamples, such as 
hallucinations and illusions. In that case, the alleged difference between the common 
sense and the intellect, which grounds the claim that they are distinct faculties, 
disappears. An obvious attempt to save Aquinas's argument would be that of 
interpreting his problematic claim as a reference to privileged access: hallucinations 
and illusions would go wrong as interfaces to the world, i.e. as perceptions, but
20 This is the point made by Aquinas in CDA, III, 4. Contrary to his view, some commentators have
argued that the common sense can by itself grasp the essences of things contained in phantasmata-. cf. 
Gaffney (1942) and Ryan (1951). Their intent seems to secure a shortcut to realism and to avoid the 
(possibly transcendentalist) complications involved in Aquinas's views on the role of the active 
intellect in abstracting universals. Schmidt (1983) showed that such interpretations are unacceptable. I 
have critically discussed this debate in De Anna (2001, 173-6).
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would offer to the hallucinated or deceived person privileged and infallible access to 
a private realm of perceptual objects, e.g. sense data. However, this line of defence 
would seem to be unavailable to Aquinas, since, as noted in chapter two, and as we 
shall see in further depth below, he took perceptions and thoughts to be the media of 
cognition, not the objects of cognition. Perception, consequently, camiot present 
sense data, or percepts of any sort, but real external things.
I would like to reply that the proposed line of defence is in fact available to 
Aquinas, since he could hold that we can be acquainted with external objects in cases 
of nomial perception, and with sense data or percepts or phantasmata, in his 
teiminology, in cases of deception. There is nothing incoherent in the thought that in 
cases of normal perception the perceived objects are not objects of the same kind as 
those perceived in hallucinations and illusions, as Austin famously contended against
sense-data theorists: one could even think of hallucinations and illusions as 
perceptual states which lack objects// This way of thinking seems particularly close 
to Aquinas's, according to whom (as we shall see in next section) in perception the 
reception of a form consists in the senses being activated according to the form 
which structures the external object of perception. This leaves space for the 
possibility that a sense organ may be activated just as if there were an external object 
with a certain form, although the real cause of its activity is imusual, i.e. is different 
from what nonnally activates it in that way/
21 Cf. CDA, III, 4, 630 : "Non recte autem contingit intelligere [...], idest secundum falsam scientiam, 
et secundum impmdentiam et secundum opinionem falsam. Sentire autem non contingit nisi i ecte, 
quia sensus circa propria sensibilia semper vems est."
22 Austin 1962, 63 ff.
23 'Normally' in this sentence has a normative meaning, not a statistical one. It may even be that 
someone's sense organs are constantly non-normally stimulated, for example since he is a brain 
envatted by an evil scientist (of course, then we need 'sense organs' to have a sense wide enough to 
include the relevant parts of the brain cortex; Aquinas himself, on the other hand, suggests that the 
common sense have their organs in the brain; cf. QDV, 18, 8, c). What normality depends on, in this 
case, is what a sense organis made for, i.e. what its role in the cognitive process is meant tobe, 
without any teleological presumption involving a design of nature rather than a mere emergence of
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The second objection to Aquinas's argument has to do with the coherence of 
his views. As we shall see, according to him the intellect is capable of two distinct 
operations, understanding and judgement. The former is the c omprehension of the 
essences or natures of things, i.e. the capacity to form concepts, the latter is the 
capacity to employ concepts to foimulate judgements, i.e. propositions. At several 
points, he claims that the understanding can never be mistaken, whereas judgements 
can be true or false. (Again, more will be said about this shortly: for the present 
purposes we can just assume his view). The problem now is that one may wonder 
why the fact that perception is always correct whereas judgement may be mistaken, 
should be the ground for a twofold distinction of faculties (i.e., between the common 
sense and the intellect), but understanding and judgement - which also are one 
necessarily correct and the other liable to falsity - may belong to the same faculty 
(i.e., the intellect). A reply may be suggested by offering a more sophisticated 
interpretation of Aquinas's argument. The common sense and the intellect - it may be 
contended - are asymmetrical since the objects of the intellect can be acquired in a 
maimer which is not open to mistakes (i.e., by the understanding), but ’ then they can 
be merged in propositions which may be tme or false (i.e., in judgements). The same 
is not the case for the objects of perception: they can be acquired in a manner which 
is n ot 0 pen to e rror (i.e., by the c ommon s ense), b ut t hey c aimot be s ubsequently
complex systems through natural selection or whatever other natural process. Pasnau (2002, 172-80) 
argued in favour of this minimal teleological assumption in Aquinas's analysis of sensation. The 
interpretation of Aquinas's thesis on the conectness of sensation which I have proposed is 
corroborated by the fact that he restricted his claim to normal cases by adding two qualifications: the 
senses are infallible if and only if they function properly (CDA, III, 6,67-70) and there is no external 
impediment to the reception of the form of the object {ST, I, 85, 6, c). Pasnau (2002, 189) claimed 
that, with these two qualifications in place, the infallibility of the senses thesis is trivial, although not 
viciously so. I think, on the contrary, that my interpretation shows that the thesis is not trivial: the 
claim that the senses are infallible is the claim that they take in external forms properly, and the two 
qualifications leave open the possibility that the senses may be activated even though they are not 
taking in any really externally existing form.
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merged by any sensory faculty in ways which parallel the functioning of judgement 
in the intellect and its openness to error.
Aquinas's second reason for claiming that the common sense camiot 
comprehend, and therefore is different from the intellect, depends on the fact that (at 
least s ome) animals m anifest the c apacity top erceive, although they also s eem t o 
lack the cognitive capacities which are associated with understanding, i.e. which 
require the deployment of concepts:
The intellect as judging is said to have wisdom, whilst as apprehending it is 
said to understand. [...] Sensation belongs to all animals, but wisdom is found 
in only a few; therefore they differ. And [Aristotle] allows wise judgement to 'a 
few animals', and not exclusively to man, because even certain brute animals 
have a sort of prudence or wisdom, in that they instinctively form correct 
judgements on what they need to do.24
Here, Aquinas defines two operations of the intellect (judgement and 
understanding), which - as he noted in many other places - require the possession of 
universals, i.e. the deployment of conceptual abilities. The argument also 
presupposes that perception (or "sensation", as Aquinas says) does not involve the 
deployment of conceptual abilities. If that is so, since most animals seem to perceive, 
but to lack wisdom, the common sense and the intellect must be two distinct 
faculties. Aquinas subsequently comments on a restriction put forward by Aristotle: 
some non-human animal are capable of some intellectual activity (wisdom), at least 
to a certain extent. For example, a zebra may start mnning at the sight of a lion and 
this entails that it recognised the lion as a danger of some sort. On the other hand, 
this seems to require "a sort of’ conceptual and discriminatory ability.
24 CDA, III, 4,629: "Intellectus enim habet iudicare, et hoc d icitur s apere et apprehendere, et hoc 
dicitur intelligere [...]. Sentire inest omnibus animalibus; sapere autem non inest omnibus, sed paucis; 
ergo sapere non est idem quod sentire. Dicit autem quod sapere inest paucis animalium, et non quod 
insit solis hominibus, quia etiam quaedam animalia participant aliquid prudentiae et aliquid sapientiae, 
scilicet quod recte iudicant de agendis per aestimationem naturalem."
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This restriction leads to a possible objection which is particularly interesting 
for our purposes, since a reply which is available to Aquinas will give us the chance 
to proceed in the explication of his theory of cognition. The problem arises from the 
fact that he seems to fail to distinguish between sensation and perception, the fonner 
being a mere awareness to the enviromnent, the latter an awareness to the 
environment which brings about informed cognitive states about the enviromnent 
itself. The point is that (probably) all animals which have sense organs react to the 
environment in manners which are best explained by granting them informed 
cognitive states about the enviromnent, and this would amount to an attribution of 
conceptual capacities. In other words, all animals capable of perception have "a sort 
of prudence or widomm25 26Only few very simple beings could be said to have plain 
sensations, but certainly all complex organisms which may be thought to have a 
common sense, should be granted conceptually informed perception”. If this is so, 
Aquinas fails to offer an example of a being which has a common sense, but lacks 
intellectual capacities, and, thus, fail” to give the expected counterexample proving 
that the common sense and the intellect are not the same faculty.
Aquinas could reply to this objection by invoking a distinction which he drew 
elsewhere between animal and human perception, hi the Summa theologiae^ he 
distinguished between two perceptual faculties, one belonging to non-human animal” 
which lack conceptual capacities, and one belonging to human”, which have those 
capacities. Animals react to perceptual experiences in ways which are determineO by 
their instinct, but which do not presuppose a conceptual understanding of the
25 The view according to which perception is conceptually informed is argued for by McDowell 
(1994). The distinction between sensation and perception in terms close to those suggested above is 
due to Hamlyn (1996, 30 ff.). According to Hamlyn perception has to be distinguished from sensation 
although it may not require the mastering of concepts, since it still requires an active and selective role 
on the side of the perceiver. As we shall see, this possibility may be suggested in Aquinas's framework 
and vindicate the argument under discussion.
26 ST, I, 78, 4.
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contents of their experiences: they have a qiiasi-conceptual faculty, the vis 
aestimativa or estimative power, which makes them recognise relevant objects and 
act consequently, without them understanding what sorts of objects they are. For 
example, zebras react in certain ways when they receive phantasms of lions, although 
they may lack the concept lion. We can deny that they have the concept lion, since, 
besides reacting properly in front of lions, they do not seem capable to entertain 
thoughts about lions, nor can they develop more sophisticated behaviours in relation 
to lions than their instinct allows them. Humans, on the other hand, seem to have a 
different, deeper comprehension of their phantasmata, and Aquinas calls 'vis 
cogitativa', or 'cogitative power', the relevant capacity. Humans, in fact, develop a 
conceptual understanding of the objects they perceive, by collecting together 
different instantiations of phantasmatas which are identical under relevant respects, 
and which they met throughout their experiential individual history. The fact that 
they may develop concepts is exhibited by the fact that they can articulate complex 
thoughts a bout t he k inds of obj ect t hey h ave encountered, and may a cquire n ovel 
attitudes toward them.27 The result is the formation of a habit to link all objects of a 
certain sort to a certain collection of past experiences of objects of that sort. The 
relevant sort will be determined by similarities and partial formal identities found in 
numerically different phantasmata. This capacity, on the other hand, is precisely a 
conceptual ability. To fomi such a collection of numerically different but formally 
similar or partially identical phantasmata (collectio intentionarum) is to form a
concept.
With this distinction in place, Aquinas could defend his argument. Indeed, 
although most animals with a sophisticated sensory apparatus may have perceptual
27 The functioning of the cogitative power and the role of experience is analysed by Stromberg (1967 
and 1968).
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abilities - in addition to sensory ones their perceptual experiences are not 
conceptually structured since their phantasmata are interpreted by the estimative 
power, but not comprehended by the cogitative power. When they respond to the 
environment, therefore, they do have a "sort of wisdom", but this is only instinctual 
(as Aquinas explicitly says in the passage of CDA under discussion, when he 
mentions the estimative power) and lacks a real judgement based on conceptual 
capacities.
The introduction of the cogitative power leads us towards the final phases of 
the cognitive process, as described by Aquinas. The cogitative power can understand 
the nature of the phantasms received by the common sense in virtue of the fact that it 
is coimected to higher cognitive faculties, i.e. the intellect. The intellect is the faculty 
capable of cognising the nature (natura) or essence (essentia) or intelligible species 
(species intelligibilis) of a thing, that is the c ollection of features which an object 
needs to have in order to be the sort of thing which it is. Essences are universal, since 
all things falling under a relevant sortal concept have the same essence. Essences, 
however, have actual existence only when they are grasped by a mind: each thing is 
structured by an individual instantiation of a certain form. The humanity of Peter, for 
example, is identical to the humanity of Paul, but they are different instantiations of 
the same form, viz. humanity. In order to understand that they both are humans, 
though, their common features need to be abstracted from individual differences, i.e. 
their formal i dentity - theu niversal - m ust b e grasped byani ntellect. T hus, t he 
intellect is the capacity to grasp universals.28
The intellect may think by receiving an intelligible species of a thing, which is 
the form of that thing abstracted from all individual features, i.e. from all features 
which make that thing an individual numerically different from other things falling
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under the same sortal concept. A” we have seen in chapter one, matter is the principle 
of individuation of material entities: thus, the intellect i” an immaterial faculty, which 
- in Aquinas's word - means that it is a faculty which is not the act of any corporeal 
organ. (A discussion of the problem of the immateriality of the intellect was already 
earned out in chapter two above).
The intelligible species received by the intellect is a representation of the
external thing. This claim, however, is not intended in the sense of saying that the
species is itself an object of awareness which depicts the external thing:
The intention [viz. the species existing intentionally in the intellect] is not in us 
the thing thought of, for it is apparent that it is one thing to know things and 
another to know the thought intention itself which the intellect does when it
90reflects on its work.
Similarly, Aquinas wrote in the commentary on De anima:
The intelligible idea by which the potential intellect is actualised are not in 
themselves the intellect's objects; for they are not that which, but that by which 
it understands; [...] what the intellect understand” is the essence existing in 
things; it is not its own intelligible idea, except in so far as the intellect reflect” 
upon itself.28 29 30
Jolm Haldane argued that Aquinas supports a sort of 'representationalism', 
which, however, does not involve the awareness of internal representation”, but the 
production of act” of mental representation.
The intellect i” certainly productive, but the representations issuing from it are
'perfoirnances' the character of which in any given case is determined by the 
species that infoim them. [...] If I perform a series of movements this may 
succeed in representing the display of a pheasant, say directly and without the 
event standing between thought and its reference. [...] I do not put myself into
28 Cf. ST, I, 79, 1.
29 SCG, IV, 11, 6: "intentio non sit in nobis res intellecta, inde apparet quod aliud est intelligere rem, 
et aliud est intelligere ipsam intentionem intellectam, quod intellectus facit dum super suum opus 
reflectitur."
30 CDA, III, 8, 718. "species intelligibiles, quibus intellectus possibilis fit in actu, non sunt obiectum 
intellectus. Non enim se habent ad intellectum sicut quod intelligituir, sed sicut quo intelligit. [..,] 
Quod intellectus intelligit est quidditas, quae est in rebus; non autem species intelligibilis, nisi 
inquantum intellectus in seipsum reflectitur."
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an 'of-a-pheasant' state of mind by first thinldng of the dance. It is not an object 
of thought, rather the movements embody my thinking.31
As Haldane himself remarks, the analogy between thinking and dancing hides some 
important difference, primarily the fact that thinking is intrinsically representational, 
whereas dancing needs to be interpreted. The important point highlighted by the 
analogy, however, is that a thought may be seen as an act of the intellect which is 
structured according to the structure of the thought object. An intelligible species, 
thus, turns out to be a habit of the intellect to act in certain ways so as to refer to the 
things which instantiate that species.
The relevant acts of the intellect involve both abstract inferential processes 
among propositions (e.g., propositions having the essences of the thought things as 
their semantic values) and a constant turning toward mental images (conversio ad 
phantasmata}. Thus, although the intellect is immaterial, in embodied life (when no 
direct furnishing of thoughts from God is available), its exercise of conceptual 
capacities constantly requires the focus of attention on some phantasms, which, being 
the objects of the internal sense, are material entities.32 An intellect, therefore, has 
acquired a certain intelligible species when it has developed the habit to act 
according to certain inferential and representational patterns so as to refer to the 
objects of the relevant kind. The identity between the intellect and the object will be 
secured by the fact that there is an isomorphism between each received intelligible 
species (i.e., the habit to perform certain mental actions) and the features of the
31 Cf. Haldane 1989a, 25-26; similar points are also made in Haldane 1992b and Haldane 1993b.
32 Aquinas puts forward his thesis of the conversio ad phantasmata in ST, I, 84, 7. There is an 
interpretative issue concerning the modality of Aquinas's claim according to which turning to inner 
images would be necessary for the intellect in embodied life. Lonergan (1967) and Kretzmann (1993) 
argued for the view that that the necessity is merely post quem, grounded on the empirical evidence 
that we (almost) always depict mental images while thinking. Pasnau (2002, 288-295), on the 
contrary, has convincingly argued in favour of the view that, according to Aquinas, the very nature of 
thought requires the functioning of inner pictorial abilities, when no thought is substantiated directly 
by God, like in angles or disembodied human souls.
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external things of a certain kind which are relevant for the fact that they all belong to
the same kind.
By acquiring the relevant habits, the intellect may become identical - in the 
sense specified - to all material objects accessible to the senses. Consequently, the 
intellect maybe all things, as Aristotle contended. Since, at birth, children do not 
have (all) concepts which they will develop throughout their lives, it is clear that the 
intellect must foim them along its history. Thus, at least one of its parts must be 
suited to receive the forms of all sorts of things to which we may have empirical 
access. Such faculty, which will have to be passive, must be formally identical to all 
empirical things, i.e. it needs to be all of them potentially. Aquinas calls it 'potential 
intellect' {intellectus potentialis), 'possible intellect' {intellectus possibilisi) or
tt
'passive intellect' {intellectus passivus).
At this point a further problem presents itself and leads Aquinas to introduce 
the final stage of the cognitive process. How can the intelligible species be acquired 
by the potential intellect? The question is problematic since the intelligible species 
are contained potentially in the phantasmatas, and the potential intellect is potential. 
According to Aquinas, though, the potentiality of a thing may be actualised only if 
another part of that thing, or some other thing may act on it to actualise the 
potentiality. Since a thing can only act in virtue of its actuality (i.e., in virtue of 
having certain powers due to the structure received by its matter through its foim) 
neither the phantasmata nor the passive intellect may be responsible for the 
actualisation of the passive intellect by some intelligible species. Consequently, 
Aquinas must introduce a further power of the intellect which makes "things actually *
33 ST, I, 79, 2, c and ad 2.
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intelligible, by abstraction of the species from material conditions"34 (i.e., from the 
phantasmatd). This is the 'active intellect' (or 'agent intellect'), which, being 
constantly in act, can abstract the intelligible species potentially present in the 
phantasmatci, by stripping them from their material conditions, and can subsequently 
"store" them in the passive intellect.
It is clear that sensation is a necessary step of the cognitive process: were the
phantasmatci unavailable, the intellect could not actualise the intelligible species, and
the potential intellect could never receive any actuality:
The sensible powers are necessary for the soul to understand, not only 
accidentally by stimulating them, as Plato had claimed, not even merely to give 
it a disposition, as Avicenna thought, but in order to represent its own object to 
the intellect.35
In conclusion, the passive intellect may contain the intelligible species, whereas the
active intellect can make them actually intelligible. This is why Aquinas
metaphorically compares the active intellect to a light: as light makes objects visible,
so the active intellect makes species intelligible.36 Anthony Kenny offered one of the
best available explanations of this metaphor for contemporary readers:
What can we say about the agent intellect apart from this metaphorical 
description? First of all, it i s an ability, or capacity, belonging to individual 
thinkers. For Aquinas, it is a natural endowment which each human being has; 
it is not - as it was for some other medieval Aristotelians - a supernatural agent 
acting on human beings from outside in some mysterious way. The agent 
intellect is the power which humans, unlike other animals, have of acquiring 
abstract information from sense experience. Animals with senses like ours 
perceive the same material objects we do, but they lack the ability to talk about 
them, to acquire scientific knowledge about them. The species-specific ability 
which they lack is the agent intellect.37
34 ST, I, 79, 3, c: "quae faceret intelligibilia in actu, per abstractionem specieruni a conditionibus 
mater ialibus."
35 QDA, 15, c: "potentiae sensitivae sunt necessariae animae ad intelligendum, non per accidens 
tamquam excitantes, ut Plato posuit; neque disponentes tantum, sicut posuit Avicenna; sed ut 
repraesentantes animae intellectivae proprium obiectum."
36 ST, I, 79, 3, ad 2.
37 Kenny (1993, 47).
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Kenny notes an analogy between Aquinas's introduction of the active intellect 
and Chomsky's claim that humans have a species-specific innate language-learning 
ability: the best way to explain why humans can learn languages as quickly as they 
do is to postulate that they have such an ability to acquire the fundamental structure 
of all languages. Even though Chomsky's ability concerns syntax and grammar, 
whereas Aquinas's concerns semantics, the agent intellect may be understood as an 
ability of that kind, i.e. the capacity to think.
These are the general lines of Aquinas's views on cognition. What is important 
for our purposes is to see how the notion of formal causation analysed in chapter four 
can warrant the identity between mind and world which is the main epistemic merit 
of the Thomistic conception of knowledge. In the next section, we will consider the 
role of formal causation in sensation; and in the section following that, we will
consider the role of formal causation in thought.
5.2 Perception and Formal Causation
As we have seen, perception consists in the senses taking on the fonns of 
external objects. This is a material reception, since the sense organs are material 
entities, and the forms existing in them structure matter in a certain manner. In the 
previous section, we have also seen that the form existing in the organ does not exist 
in the same manner in which it exists in the external object. In order to explain the 
role of fonnal causation in perception, we need to pause a bit longer on this aspect. 
While commenting on Aristotle's analogy between the senses receiving the fonns of 
things and wax receiving the print of a ring, Aquinas wrote:
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Form received in a patient from an agent sometimes has the same mode of 
existence in the recipient as in the agent; which occurs when the patient is 
disposed to the form in the same way as the agent. [...] And it is in this way 
that air receives the influence of fire, and any other passive thing in Nature the 
action which alters its natural quality. Sometimes, however, the recipient 
receives the form into a mode of existence other than that which the form has 
in the agent; when, that is, the recipient's material disposition to receive form 
does not resemble the material disposition in the agent. In this cases, the form 
is taken into the recipient "without matter", the recipient being assimilated to 
the agent in respect of fonn and not in respect of matter. And it is thus that a 
form without matter, the form having in the sense, a different mode of being 
from that which it has in the object sensed. In the latter it has a material mode 
of being, but in the sense a cognitional and spiritual mode.38
The s ame form, t herefore, m ay b e r eceived b y different p atients i n d ifferent 
ways. Objects have accidental and essential qualities in virtue of having certain 
forms, accidental and essential, respectively. When something acts on something else 
in virtue of a certain form, i.e. in virtue of a power or actuality of its, the patient is 
modified in a certain way. Such a modification is the reception of a new actuality by 
the p atient, i .e. t he r eception of a new form giving it a n ovel s tructure. S ince t he 
features and the structure acquired by the patient as a result of the action depend on 
the features and the structure of the agent, the relevant structure of the agent and the 
stmcture resulting in the patient are isomoiphic, at least to some extent, and so an at 
least partial foimal identity between the patient and the agent is induced. The 
reception of the form, by the patient, however, may or may not cause the patient to 
acquire the same quality that the agent has in virtue of having the actuality which 
gave it the power to act as it did. If such an identity of qualities occurs, the received
38 CDA, II, 24, 5 52-3: "Nam forma, quae in patiente recipitur ab agente, quandoque quidem habet 
eumdem modum essendi in patiente, quem habet in agente: et hoc quidem contingit, quando patiens 
habet eamdem dispositionem ad formam, quam habet agens [..,].Et hoc modo aer patitur ab igne, et 
quicquid patitur passione naturali. Quandoque vero forma recipitur in patiente secundum alium 
modum essendi, quam sit in agente; quia dispositio materialis patientis ad recipiendum, non est similis 
dispositioni materiali, quae est in agente. Et ideo forma recipitur in patiente sine materia, inquantum 
patiens assimilatur agenti secundum formam, et non secundum materiam. Et per hunc modum, sensus 
recipit formam sine materia, quia alterius modi esse habet forma in sensu, et in re sensibili, Nam in re 
sensibili habet esse naturale, in sensu autem habet esse intentionale et spirituale". Cf. a parallel 
passage in ST, I, 78, 3, c.
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form structures the agent and the patient in the same way and, thus, it exists 
“naturally” in the patient, i.e. in the same way in which it existed in the agent. 
Otherwise, it has a different kind of existence in the patient, i.e. spiritual or 
intentional (“cognitive”) existence. Let us consider Aquinas’s own example: air. 
When a fire heats the surrounding air, a form of the fire (i.e., the particular 
structuring of matter in virtue of which the fire is hot) gives it the power to act on air 
in a certain way and, thus, air acquires a new structure, isomorphic to that of the fire: 
the form of heat. Air thus receives a form of fire. As a result, air gets hot. The newly 
received form, consequently, exists naturally in air: by having it, air comes to have 
the same quality which fire has in virtue of that form, viz. the quality of being hot.
A form is received “intentionally” or “spiritually”, Aquinas says, when, in 
respect of that form, the recipient has a material disposition different from that of the 
agent. This seems to be Aquinas’s interpretation of Aristotle’s claim according to 
which foims are received by the senses without matter. Let us note that Aquinas’s 
interpretation does not purports that the reception does not involve matter: all it 
amounts to is the idea that the agent and the patient have a different material 
disposition towards that form, namely that in virtue of having a different 
hylomorphic structure the patient does not take on a certain quality of the agent by 
taking on the form in virtue of which the agent has that quality. Still, the reception of
the relevant fonn in the sense causes a new structure in the matter of the sense. Since
the new structure which the sense comes to have is isomorphic to the structure of the 
agent which determined it, it makes sense to say that there is an (at least partial) 
identity between agent and patient, although that identity does not manifest itself like
a qualitative similitude.
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It must be considered, however, that the fact that the reception of forms by the 
senses are material events, does not entail that they are wholly physical processes, 
which could be accepted by a modem physicalist, contrary to what Pasnau claimed 
(1997, 36). Elsewhere, I have already offered various reasons to reject Pasnau’s 
interpretation (De Anna 2000b, 53-58). We do not need to rehearse them here, but it 
may be worth recalling the main point: Aquinas’s immaterial reception of forms is a 
material process, but presupposes a metaphysical outlook in which materiality comes 
in degrees and assumes the conception of the soul as a substantial form considered 
in chapter two. It is only within that framework that one can make sense of the 
material reception of forms being a step of a cognitive process, and not merely a 
physical change: according to Aquinas, the soul is both the form of the body and an 
immaterial entity capable of thought, an activity independent from matter. It is in 
virtue of this fact that a material change occurring in the senses may become the 
object of conscious awareness and, subsequently, the content of propositional 
attitudes, i.e. that it may be available to higher cognitive capacities. Indeed, the soul 
is the substantial form of the whole body, and, ipso facto, it structures the sense 
organs. Any alteration of a sense organ, consequently, is an alteration of the soul, a 
change of structure of the form which structures that sense organO As a partly 
immaterial being, the soul may be aware of that alteration and utilise the form 
received thereby for its higher cognitive activities.
Examples of forms received intentionally are all proper per se sensible 
objeets:39 40 41 c^l^lo^^, odours, flavours, tactual qualities (warmth, roughness, etc.),
39 My points in De Anna 2000b largely depend on Paul Hoffman’s interpretation of Aquinas’s 
metaphysics as purporting a hierarchy of fonns depending on the different degrees in which different 
forms may be distant from prime matter (cf. Hoffman 1990).
40 Cf. CDA, II, lecture 24, par. 555.
41 This is not inconsistent with the claim - made in section 5.1 above - tliat only accidental objects of 
perception (substances) may have intentional existence. In De Anna 2000b I contended that the foims 
of per se objects of perception can be analogically said to exist intentionally by Aquinas (both in the
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sounds. These are foirns s tructuring external o bjects which impinge on the s enses 
and are received by the soul. The senses are acted upon by the external objects in 
manners determined by the structures of those objects and are structured 
isomorphically, so that a partial structural identity results between objects and senses. 
What now needs to be explained is how this process could be accounted for in tenus 
of fomial causation. As we have seen in section 4.2, causal relata are primarily 
events, but events are individuated by the substances which are involved in them, and 
those substances are in turn metaphysically constituted of their hylomorphic 
components, as discussed in chapter one. In section 4.2, we also saw that Mackie's 
INUS-conditional account of causation was implemented by Kim in order to offer an 
acceptable account of events. In the same section, I have suggested that Kim's 
proposal can fit in a Thomistic metaphysical outlook, if we develop the conditions 
for the individuation of events put forward by him through the specification of the 
hylomorphic components of the objects involved.
Let us recall that, according to Kim's proposal, ’[x, A, 80 caused [y, P, /]' means 
also - or at least -, that [x, A, tj is an INUS condition of [y, P, t], which is the case if 
and only if:
(i) X (x, 80, P 0,8)
(ii) A is an INUS property of P;
(iii) Some se t i , hi Spe contrlnUlg A and at least one other propert'y is 
realised on the occasion of [x, A, ^;];
(iv) Spp continn at least one set otherthm sp
(v) No set of propertier nr Sap odeer than se is realised on the occasion of [y,
P, 8].
senses and in the media), in virtue of their role in the cognitive process, i.e. in the process leading to 
the full and proper intentional existence of things in perception and understanding.
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(we do not need to reconsider all the complications involved in the fact that an at 
least INUS condition could do). Here, SAp is the set of sets of events s,- which are
minimal sufficient for the occurrence of the effect-event.
In section 4.2, considerations concerning hylomorphism led me to the 
conclusion that, within a Thomistic metaphysical outlook, it may be claimed that 
each set of events s,- must contain, among other event, also (at least the first three of) 
the events dictated by the four strict causal conditions. The second condition, 
however, is that which most concerns us at this point, since it is that which explains 
formal causation, as argued in the previous chapter. Thus, an event \ymf, a(f), P, e, t\ 
may occur only if the formal INUS condition, which is one of the four strict causal 
conditions, occurs. In other words, only if:
2) there is an instantiation of the form f - an accidental fonn of some 
substance s - which, at a time tl antecedent to tl, exemplifies the relational 
property S of being disposed to jointly structure the members of the set M, 
as characterised in condition 3 (i.e., material INUS condition, cf. Section 
4.2), so that they jointly receive the actuality a; i.e., a polyedic event of the 
fonn [sf, S(j\ m, a), el, tl] takes place.
In the case of sensation, the effect-event [y„,f, a(f), P, e, Z] is an event of 
sensation, which involves the sense organ y,„f (for example an eye) and its 
actualisation a by the sensible fonn/7 (for example an exemplification of red on the 
surface of an apple) at time t. The sense organ ymf (the living eye) is hylomorphically 
constituted, in particular m is its matter (the actual eye) and f is its fonn, namely the 
soul of the person to whom it belongs. The end e may be the role of sensation in the 
cognitive process. It is disputable that sensations may be said to have purposes, but 
for what it matters to us we could even accept that they don't (in that case the effect-
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event would take the form [yMIy aif), P, e, ?]). However, since we are dealing with a 
Thomistic proposal we may accept that sensation is teleologically oriented, as 
Aquinas suggested.^ p is the property which the sense organ exemplifies when it is 
actualised by/, namely the sensory awareness of the form/ (red in the example).
Concerning the fonnal cause-event, f is the sensible fonn in virtue of which 
the object (the apple) has the relevant quality (the colour red), which is received 
nspirituallyn by the medium (air). The medium (air), thus, is the substance s which 
contains f' accidentally and intentionally, and, in virtue of this, has the power to 
stmcture the sense organ (the eye). Indeed, when / is contained intentionally and 
accidentally in the medium, it exemplifies the relational property S of being disposed 
to j ointly s tructure the members o f s et M ( the set o f substances which are j ointly 
disposed to be structured by the fonnby actualising through the act a a disposition 
that they jointly possess. The set M contains an only member, the sense organ y»,/(the 
eye), which receives/.
At this point, we need to face an exegetical problem pointed out by Kenny 
(1993, 35-6). The topic is interesting since it also raises philosophical issues: it 
concerns the act a, which is the reception of the fomi by the sense organ. As we have 
seen, t he a ctualisationa ofthes ense o rgan isduetother eception of the fonnf, 
which is the very fomi of the external object. This seems to imply that the sensible 
object (i.e., the form, for example the colour red) exists independently of the 
reception of it by the sense organ. The property, in other words, exists independently 
of being perceived. At some point, however, Aquinas claims that .the sensible object 
in act and the sense in act are one thing."42 3
42 Cf. ST, I, 77, 3. Aquinas's views on the teleology of sensation are discussed and defended by Pasnau 
(2002, 172-80).
43 CDA, II, 9, 5: "sensibile in actu et sensus in actu sunt unum."
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Aquinas's idea of the reception of forms may seem to conflict with his thesis 
that the act of the sense and the act of the sensible object are one and the same 
reality. If the second claim is taken seriously, the external forms should be 
considered as mere dispositions to 1 ook in certain ways when perceived, but they 
could not be taken to exist externally in the same way in which they exist in 
perception. This conclusion, however, conflicts with the general point that the senses 
take on the forms of external things as they are in reality. This entails that Aquinas 
would end up assuming a distinction similar to Galileo's and Locke's primary- 
secondary qualities distinction, which jeopardises his attempt to ground a theory of 
cognition according to which we are not acquainted with ideas or representations, but
with the external world.
Elsewheree,^ I have argued that this woiTy can be avoided if one mtei'prets 
Aquinas's claim according to which the act of the sense and that of the sensible 
object are one without assuming post-lockean worries. In Aquinas's teiTninology, 
indeed, to claim that the act of the sense and the act of the object are one, amounts to 
claiming that the sensible object is sensed when some sense senses it, which is, of 
course, a truism. A strong reason in support of this interpretation may be the fact 
Aquinas distinguished first actualities (and potentialities) from second actualities 
(and potentiates).4, Let us recall that a first actuality is a structure or organisation 
that a thing has in virtue of having a certain (either accidental or substantial) form, 
which confers some power upon it. That thing may or may not then exert that power'. 
A second actuality is the act of exertion of a power which a thing has in virtue of 
some first actuality. Thus, for example, a colour is a first actuality, since an object 
which has it has the power to act on eyes. The actual acting on eyes, though, is a *
44 De Anna 2001,272-80.
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second actuality. Similarly, the eyes of a living person have a first actuality, which is
the life of the soul stimcturing the person to whom they belong. Their capacity to see,
though, is only potential, unless they receive a second actuality through the action of
some sensible forms on them. Aquinas himself writes that:
Sense-faculty and sense-object can be taken in two ways, as in potency and as 
in act. From the point of view of act, what [Aristotle's predecessors] said was 
correct: there is no sense object without sensation. But it is not true from the 
point of view of potency.45 6
Coherently with this interpretation of Aquinas, the account of formal causation 
proposed above takes the act a to be a second actuality of both the sensible object 
and the sense organ. It is an actuality of the sensible object since by realising a the 
sensible object comes to exemplify the property Sf m, a>, which is precisely the 
property of being sensed by ymf e M. Furthermore, by being a-actualised by/, is 
involved in the event [c,„/, a(f), P, e, r] in which the perceptual property P is realised, 
i.e. the colour red is perceived by ymf. This is the second actuality of the sense 
faculty.
Someone could still insist that no matter what Aquinas says about first and 
second actualities, the appearance of/ in the perceiver is the perceptual property P, 
which only exists in the soul of the perceiver, not in the external object. This, the 
objector could claim, suggests that Aquinas must be committed to the distinction 
between primary and secondary properties. To the contrary, I believe that Aquinas 
can coherently maintain that the sensible per se object is the fonn/, which is sensed 
by the subject through an instantiation of the perceptual property P, but he does not 
need to accept the thesis (entailed by the primary-secondary qualities distinction) that
45 Cf. section 1.5 above. The distinction occurs at many place, but see, for example, SCG, II, 9, 3. An 
extensive discussion of this distinction is carried out in Lonergan 1967, 106-51.
46 CDA, III, 2, 596: "de sensu et sensibili secundum actum accidit quod ipsi dicebant, quod non est 
sensibile sine sensu. Non autem hoc verum est de sensu et sensibili secundum potentiam."
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P is caused by a disposition or a power which the external object has in virtue of 
having some properties (or dispositions grounded on properties) which are not 
tracked by /-experiences. hi other words, it is coherent to maintain both the view 
that a colour looks the way it does only when it is looked at, and the view that a 
colour is a categorical property of an external thing, not a disposition or power which 
the thing has in virtue of having other categorical properties. I take it that this is 
precisely the sense of the claim that the act of the sense per se object and the act of 
the sense organ are one and the same.47 48
A f urther i ssue c oncerns t he s tatus of the p erceptual s tates w hich e xemplify
perceptual properties, like P. In the above discussion it was assumed that they are
states with a phenomenal character, but also that they are material, in the sense that
they are states of sense organs. States of this sort may seem problematic, since they
are physically realised qualia. Jolm Haldane has argued in favour of the possibility of
them with the suggestion that the metaphysical status of qualia is troublesome only
within a Cartesian picture of the mind as phenomenological in essence, a picture
which is commonly endorsed also by contemporary materialists. Against such a
view, one may advance a range of alternatives, within which one may
remain agnostic about the possibility of a naturalistic account of qualia and still 
see merit in an old suggestion of Putnam's that the 'qualitative character' of a 
sensation, say, is just the physical realisation of a state that has the function of 
signalling the presence of some feature in the body or in the surrounding 
environment^
The problem with the Cartesian picture would be that it induces one to think of
a state of awareness as a state of an immaterial substance. If one denies the
possibility of immaterial substances (as most contemporary philosophers do), but
471 believe that this supports the coherence of Aquinas's views on the matter, which is enough for my 
present purposes. In De Aima 2002 also argue in favour of their philosophical plausibility.
48 Haldane 1998, 270. The reference is to Putnam 1981, Ch. 4.
280
maintains this presumption, one is obliged to deny the possibility of states of 
awareness altogether. A Dual Aspect-theorist or a Neutral Monist, on the other hand, 
can accept that physical states may exemplify properties of which the bearers are 
aware.49 In particular, a Dual Asp ect-theorist may hold that humans are constituted 
of one kind of substances only, but that they may have both physical and mental 
aspects, that is they may exemplify both physical and non-physical properties. A 
Neutral Monist, on the other hand, may even deny that there are two kinds of 
properties, and nonetheless maintain that the particular kind of substances which 
constitute human beings can be described both in physicalist and in mentalistic 
terms. The upshot of these metaphysical frameworks, however, is that the mind is not 
the d omain m arked b y awareness: there i s n o o ne i ndependent e ntity i n w hich a 11
states of awareness inhere.
Aquinas's conception of the soul seems to be consistent with a view of this sort. 
According to him, the whole living body is pervaded by the soul, which is the form 
of the whole body, including each organ and each part. Most of the faculties of the 
soul, although not all of them, involve a part of the body undergoing material 
changes. Awareness may be a property which some of these material changes 
exemplify, and perception may be an example of this. As already mentioned above, 
there are reasons to resist a bold physicalism: the kind of Dual Aspect or Neutral 
Monist theory required by Aquinas must be of a kind which allows for the possibility 
that the awareness exemplified by a corporeal state or event can be "felt" by the soul, 
which is an ultimately immaterial entity, for the reasons already considered in 
chapter 2 and in section 5.1. What matters for our purposes, however, is that the fact 
that a phenomenal property P may be exemplified by a material event occurring in a
49 A view of this sort in contemporary debates is supported, for example, by John Heil (cf. 1998, Ch. 
6: "Minds and their Place in Nature").
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sense organ does not constitute a problem. A perceptual property P is the 
phenomenal aspect of an event occurring in a material body (the sense organ) when it 
is stimulated by things in the environment, and, thus, it is the manner in which the 
environment manifests itself to the perceiver.
This characterisation of the phenomenal property P allows us to say something 
more about a sensible object being that through which {quo} perception happens, 
rather than the object {quod} of perception, as promised in section 5.1. P, in fact, is 
not an object of awareness, but is a property manifested by the receiver when he/she 
receives a form. It is not what the subject is aware of, but it is the way in which the 
received form / manifests itself to her or him. In other words, it is the way in which 
the form of the external object appears to the perceiver. The upshot is that the fonn/7 
of the external object is directly manifested to the perceiver. This explains the sense 
of Haldane's claim according to which P "is just the physical realisation of a state 
that has the function of signalling the presence of some feature in the body or in the 
surrounding environment."
A further point about the role of fonnal causation in perception which needs to 
be dealt with concerns common sense. As we have seen in section 5.1, common 
sense unifies the sensible objects received by different sense modalities (e.g., 
colours, sounds, tastes, etc.; but also, shapes, sizes, etc.) and is consequently aware of 
phcintasmata, which are the sensible fonns of external things, viz. the fonns of the 
accidental objects of perception (i.e., everyday three dimensional objects). I propose 
that these should not be intended as mental images, coherently with the dictum that 
they are the means, not the objects of perception. Rather, they could be understood as 
simultaneous co-ordinated states of awareness of several sense modalities activated
at once. They are the awareness of the simultaneous reception of several sense per se
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objects. Thus, the common sense receives an actuality when it is structured by a form 
fa, which is a function of the simultaneous reception of several foim fl, f2, fn, by 
several external senses. In other words, fa=F(fl, f2, fn), where fa is a phantasm, 
and F is a functional operator the exact meaning of which depends on the unifying 
operations actually carried out by the external sense. Whether such operations 
depend transcendentally on an innate structure of the common sense or are stmctured 
by reality itself through the development of individual cognitive capacities is a 
matter of considerable debate among interpreters of Aquinas.44 Either way, however, 
the following account of fonnal causation is available.
Let [y„,y cff), P, e, t\ be an the event of the common sense ymf being a- 
actualised by the form f’ (which is the sensible form of an external accidental object), 
so that it exemplifies the perceptual property P (which is the awareness of the form 
f). The perceptual property is open to the same consideration already discussed for 
the external senses. The formal INUS condition will be the event [s/, Sf m, a), e\ /], 
where s/ is the living body with some sense modalities activated by the forms <ff, fH, 
... fn>,f’=¥(fl, fl, fn), M contains the only member ymf, S is the property of being 
disposed to fl-activatey’^exemplified by f at t, and c is subject to the considerations 
about teleology already discussed in the case of the external senses.
The identity between f and the form of the external accidental object of 
perception (viz. the perceived external three-dimensional object) depends on the 
suitability of function F. Let us illustrate this point with an example. I touch a 
smooth red apple. What I perceive is not a disconnected cluster of properties, but an 
individual with several qualities: redness, smoothness, a spherical shape and so on. I 
take in different qualities of the apple through different sense modalities: I see the
50 The transcendental view was supported by Lonergan (1967), the developmental one by Fabro 
(1962, 288 ff., esp. 294), This point will be discussed more below.
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shape and he colour, I feel the shape and the smoothness. The common sense unifies 
the infomiation coming in through different senses and constitutes the individual 
which I actually perceived, i.e. it is aware of the phantasm of the apple. The unity I 
perceive, though, is formally identical to the actual apple only if my common sense 
has unified the data of different senses precisely in the same manner in which they 
are conjoined in reality. In other words, only if the function F can properly 
recompose the sensible fonns of things which were 'shattered' by the external senses.
As mentioned above, the warrant of the suitability of function F may come 
either from transcendental considerations51 or from the idea that suitable functions 
akin to F were selected throughout the development of individual cognitive 
capacities or the evolution of the species. Indeed, having reliable functions akin to F 
is a fitting factor. Although the second option seems easier to support without 
appealing to demanding metaphysical assumptions, either way it may be concluded 
that the account of formal causation suggested in chapter two can explain how the 
sensible form of an external individual may be received by a perceiver by making her 
cognitive apparatus identical to it, through the actions of some of its accidental fonns
on her sense organs.
I
5.3 Hylomophism and 'Isomorphic Thoiisgths
The form f received by the common sense is a material form, viz. a form 
stmcturing, although "intentionally", a corporeal organ. As we have seen in chapter 
four, this makes it an individual fonn. It is in virtue of being an individual form, as
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we have seen in chapter two, that it may be spatio-temporally located and can thus 
track the particular which impinged it on the senses. At the end of section 5.1, we 
saw that the individual form can structure the intellect and make it fomially identical 
to external reality: the intellect groups that fonn with other formally identical fonns 
received at different times, and thus acquires a habit to act according to its structure. 
We now need to see how fonnal causation is relevant in this process and, 
consequently, how the isomorphism between mind and world can be obtained.
Before dealing with the role of fonnal causation in thought, however, it may be 
worthy to recapitulate the modes of existence of a fonn, which were espoused in 
section 4.3 and 5.1. I believe that what was said above can fit neatly in a six-fold 
distinction among kinds of entities and relations suggested by Haldane (1998, 268):
1) F-ness - the universal, or form;
2) The f-ness ofX- singular case or instance;
3) X-a particular subject;
4) X exemplifies F-ness, or a natural exemplification of F-ness;
5) X exemplifies F-ness intentionally, or is an intentional exemplification of F-
ness;
6) The f-ness of X is a natural case or instance F-ness.
Cases 1-3 concern entities. Cases 4-6 concern r elations, in particular two cases of 
exemplification (4 and 5) a case of instantiation. The F-ness referred to in 1 is an 
immaterial entity which can only have actual existence in a mind after abstraction, 
but exists potentially in its exemplifications and instantiations. The f-ness of X 
referred to in 2 is the principle of organisation which structures a particular
51 These will have to relay on a teleological outlook which may explain why the common sense is 
suited to cognise reality. Ultimately, one probably needs to call in question God's good will as a 
warrant that our cognitive powers are suited to cognise the world.
52 This is a more refined version of the seven-fold distinction presented in Haldane 1997b.
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individual, X, i.e. it is an individual form. 2 and 5 differ for the fact that the f-ness of 
an individual may be considered both as an entity and as instance of the universal F.
In section 4.3, we have introduced the notion of formal identity among 
individual fonns. Let us recall that two individuals a and b are formally identical if 
they are stmctured by two isomorphic principles of organisation, e.g. the forms fa 
and/). We can introduce the formal identity operator "=/' which means that, if g=Ni, 
g and h are t lie s ame form as the n niversai form F, and e ach o f t hem may bean 
instantiation of F, an exemplification of F, or F itself. Thus, fa=pfb, fa^fa, fa=pF, 
and F=fF are all well formed formulas.
We can now try to account for the role of formal causation in intellectual 
cognition, which was expounded in section 5.1. As we have seen, intellection 
involves the active intellect abstracting the intelligible species from phantasms, and 
actualising the potential intellect accordingly. Thus, if \y, af), F, e, t] is the event of 
the potential (immaterial) intellect y exemplifying the property F (i.e., the capacity to 
entertain F-ly structured thoughts, which, as we saw in section 5.1, involve both 
semantically determined inferential dispositions and imaginative dispositions), by 
being n-actualised by the folrn/7' both the following efficient INUS condition and the 
following formal INUS c ondition must occur in any set minimal sufficient for the
effect:
• Efficient INUS condition: the active intellect xy, which, by having the act d 
(=a) through a fonn f (=f), at a time t antecedent to t, exemplifies the 
relational property A of actualising the immaterial potentialities of the 
potential intellect y, through the fomn f- which may be a substantial or 
accidental fonn of some substance j and satisfies the formal INUS 
condition; in other words, a polyedic event of the form [xyr, d(f), y, Sf, A(Xy,
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aiffi). r. /)> e‘’ S]) takes place. (Again, for present purposes, we may just 
assume that cognition has an end).
• Formal INUS condition, there is an instantiation of the form/ - which may 
be a substantial or accidental form of some substance s - which, at a time / 
antecedent to t\ exemplifies the relational property S of being disposed to 
structure the potentialities of the intellect y, so that it receives the actuality 
a; i.e., a polyedic event of the form [sy, Sfty,a), el9 /] takes place. (The usual 
considerations on teleology apply).
This account of the mind-world relation clarifies some issues concerning 
mental representation. As mentioned in section 4.3, fonnal identity may be a matter 
of degree, since different degrees of isomorphism may hold among different things. 
This may account for two important features of thought. First of all, degrees of 
isomorphism may account for the fact that concepts are hierarchically structured. A 
man falls u nder thee oncept man and a dogu ndert he c oncept dog, b ut b oth f all 
under the concept animal. This may be explained by the fact that the fonn of 
animality is isomorphic both to that of caninity and that humanity, but the latter two 
have a greater isomorphism with actual dogs and men respectively, than the former 
does. Second, degrees in isomorphism may explain why, according to Aquinas, the 
intellect cannot go wrong in grasping concepts, as mentioned in section 2.2 above. 
Indeed, it may be claimed that whenever there is a thought, some grouping of objects 
according to stmctural isomorphisms must have occurred. Counter-examples to the 
claim that all these count as proper concept-formation may be explained with the 
idea that they still require some degree of isomorphism, although only proper 
concepts involve the highest degree of isomorphism. Let us imagine that I wrongly 
take the concept bike to be exemplified both by bicycles and by skateboards. In
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order to think about all those objects in the way I do, I still need to have selected 
some isomorphism among them, but I do not really h ave the c oncept b ike since I 
have not noted that among some of them (proper bikes) there is a higher 
isomorphism than among the set including also the rest (skateboards). Until I do not 
recognise that, I do not have the concept bike, but I do not have it wrongly: I do have 
some other concept (e.g., wheeled non-powered mobile device). In other words, I do 
not have a wrong concept.
It may be concluded that the Thomistic theory of causation developed in 
chapters tliree and four offers an analysis of the notion of formal causation which 
may account for the idea that the cognitive process involves the world as a fonnal 
cause of thoughts. As we saw in chapter one, the world is constituted of 
hylomorphically constituted substances, which may act on the s enses and p ass on 
their fonns to them. As a result, sensory events instantiate properties which are 
isomorphic to the forms of sense objects, since the foims of external objects are
constituents of the foimal INUS conditions of effect events. The data of different
senses are merged together by the internal sense. The fonns structuring sensory 
events are isomorphic to the content of the common sense to which they give rise, 
and thus phantasmatci (the forms received by the common sense) are formally 
identical to external objects. Again, the fonns of the senses are causes of phantasms 
since they constitute the fonnal INUS conditions of perceptual events. Finally, the 
phantasms (i.e., sensible fonns of external things) are consitutents of the fonnal 
INUS conditions of the events of actualisation of the intellect: as such they are fonnal 
causes of thought. Thus, the fonns of external things are formal causes of thought. 
Consequently, external objects and thoughts concerning them are formally identical.
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Conclusion
The aim of this work was that of developing a Thomistic theory of causation, 
suitable to account for the role of formal causation in the theory of mental 
representation proposed as a contender in contemporary debates by John Haldane 
and other supporters of Thomistic views within the analytic tradition. This task 
involved two main levels of work: on the one hand, it required the historiographical 
reconstruction of Aquinas's views on causation and the underlying metaphysics; on 
the other, it required the development of Aquinas's views on causation in a way 
which could make them a respectable party in current discussions. As a consequence, 
the first part of the work, notably chapters one and two, were more exegetical, and 
were centred on Aquinas actual claims, whereas the last part, chapters three to five, 
were Thomistic only in a broad sense, i.e. in the sense that they were elaborations of 
Aquinas's views beyond what he actually wrote, and were aimed at meeting the 
demands and challenges presented by analytical philosophy.
The more exegetical parts concerned metaphysics and cognition, whereas the 
most theoretical parts concerned causation. This camiot come as a surprise, since 
metaphysics and cognition where quite developed areas of philosophy in Aquinas's 
time and received a proportionally extended treatment by him. On the other hand, in 
the 13th Century, causation had not received attention comparable to that paid to it 
today. It is natural, therefore, that Aquinas has much more to say on metaphysics and 
cognition than on causation. Hence, in his texts one can find arguments closely 
related to metaphysical and cognitive issues discussed at the present, while one needs 
to speculate quite a lot to see how the few things he said about causation could
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address wonies on that topic which philosophers became aware of well after his 
death. The proposed theory of causation, nonetheless, is Thomistic, in that it attempts 
to justify all of Aquinas's claims on the matter, and, for aspects which cannot be 
found in Aquinas, it draws upon assumptions taken from his metaphysics.
Aquinas's metaphysics, at least as far as concerns aspects relevant to our 
purposes, proved to be more tenable and plausible that it might have seemed at a first 
sight. In chapter one, his views on substance priority were discussed. The priority of 
substances is the central thesis of Aristotelian descriptive metaphysics, which claims 
the world to be ultimately made of substances. Supporters of views of this kind, from 
Aristotle to Wiggins, had to struggle to find sound arguments for substance priority, 
and most attempts remained unsatisfying. However, the arguments for substance 
priority to be found in Aquinas's commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics, which were 
discussed in chapter one, seem to offer a strong case for the Aristotelian view. The 
same can be said of Aquinas's views on form and matter. If prime matter is 
intei-preted as a purely metaphysical item (i.e., as the potentiality for the realisation 
of substances which has to be introduced in order to account for substantial change) 
and it is not taken as a sort of stuff which is the ultimate physical constituent of 
reality, then it proves to be an acceptable principle. Similarly, the notion of 
substantial form (as opposed to that of accidental form) proved to be philosophically 
sustainable: the twofold criterion for substantiality proposed in chapter one, indeed, 
seems to account for most of our intuitions on how things are generated and 
corrupted, and for the difference between things which are made of other things (and 
thus fall under sortal concepts in virtue accidental forms), and things the constituents 
of which are not actual things, but only potential (and thus fall mder sortal concepts
in virtue of a substantial form). The resulting picture of reality seems to
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accommodate our intuitions about what we have common experience of, but it also 
seems compatible - at least in principle - with the results of science. As we have 
seen while discussing the objections to descriptive metaphysics presented by Simons, 
a substance-based descriptive metaphysics such as Aquinas's is in no worse position 
than contemporary alternatives in respect to the objects of science.
Another a spect of A quinas's m etaphysics w hich i s r elevant for h is t heory o f 
mental representation concerns his conception of the mind. Chapter two focused on 
this issue and, in this respect, Aquinas's views appeared reasonable. Given the 
descriptive approach to metaphysics and the account of change discussed in chapter 
one, reality can be claimed to contain living things, and life to involve various kinds 
of capacities the exercises of which require actions which can be attributed to the 
substance which manifests them: a thing is alive if and only if the origin of its own 
vital "motions" (i.e., changes of states) is within itself. We saw that cognitive 
capacities can be counted among vital activities, and thinking represents the highest 
kind of cognitive capacity. On the other hand, thinkmg involves the reception of 
intelligible forms, and intelligible forms are universal. Hence, thinkmg must be an 
immaterial faculty (i.e., a faculty independent of any corporeal organ), since 
universals camiot be in matter, which is the principle of individuation. I have argued 
that, contrary to some objections by Robert Pasnau, this is a coherent view, given the 
metaphysical premise on individuation considered in chapter one. Aquinas is thus led 
to the conclusion that in nature there are immaterial substances, i .e. human souls.
This is not an anti- or super-natural view, since this conclusion is arrived to tluough 
an analysis of change in material reality and an account of the capacities of material 
substances. Equally, however, it is not a naturalistic view in the modem, physicalist 
sense. The upshot is that cognition, the relationship between world and mind, cannot
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be a naturalistic process in that modem sense either. The subsequent account of 
fonnal causation and mental representation needed to accommodate this 
metaphysical premise.
Concerning causation, Aquinas inherited from Aristotle the distinction of four 
species of causes (fonnal, material, final, and efficient), and various other 
distinctions about the proximity of causes, about causal chains, and about causal 
combinations. He went beyond Aristotle, however, and suggested that causal 
relations could be analysed conditionally: a causal relation is a relation in which the 
effect would not have occuiTed if the cause had not occurred. In the past few 
decades, analytical philosophers have done much work to develop a satisfy analysis 
of this sort. Although, for reasons mentioned above, a sophistication comparable to 
contemporary analyses carnot be expected from Aquinas, his views on causation 
must meet the requirements that have emerged from contemporary discussions, if 
they are to be advanced in cunrent debates. The main concern of chapter three was to 
show that Aquinas's views can meet those requirements. The counterfactual analysis, 
which is a favourite development of the conditional analysis, was ruled out since it 
seems to face some fatal problems of its own and is grounded on metaphysical 
assumptions with are incompatible with Thomistic ontology anyway. I suggested 
Mackie's INUS conditional analysis of causation as a still valuable alternative, and I 
tried to show that Aquinas's views on causation (i.e., his fourfold distinction of 
species of causes, and other distinctions he proposed) are consistent with it. I also
argued that the resulting account of causation can accommodate Aquinas's claims on 
immaterial substances considered in chapter two.
A problem concerning the compatibility of Aquinas's views with Mackie's 
conditional analysis seemed to derive from the fact that according to the fonner
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causes and effects are substances, or the hylomorphic components of substances, 
whereas according to the latter causes and effects are events. However, in chapter 
four, I recalled the fact that Mackie's ontology of events is flawed, and that Kim's 
implementation of his theory proposes a substance-based account of events which is 
compatible with Aquinas's claims. I subsequently offered a further implementation of 
Kim's theory in order to accommodate his ontology of substances within Aquinas's 
hylomorphism. The resulting proposal holds that each one of the sets of events which 
are minimally sufficient for an effect must contain, among other events, a formal 
INUS conditional event, a material INUS conditional event, an efficient INUS 
conditional event, and - possibly - a final INUS conditional event. At the end of the 
chapter, I tried to explain why all this explains that forms can be causes and effects.
The fifth and final chapter attempted to apply the account of causation 
suggested in chapters three and four to the cognitive process described by Aquinas, 
on the grounds of his ontology discussed in chapters one and two. After a brief 
reconstruction of Aquinas's analysis of cognition, the role of formal causation in 
sensation, perception and thought was explained and justified. I have also argued that 
the ensuing view can account for the fact that mind-world identity may be a matter of 
degree and can explain Aquinas's dictum according to which the intellect can never 
be claimed to grasp erroneous concepts. Indeed, all thinking involves some degree of 
mind-world formal identity, although concepts can be grasped with different degrees
of accuracy.
I believe that the Thomistic account of fonnal causation and of its role in
mental representation offered in this work satisfies the needs of the proposal put 
forward by Analytical Thomists. Indeed, it explains why one may talk about formal 
causation in regard to the relation between world and mind; and it also explains some
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claims about thought and reality which were sustained by Aquinas and are appealing 
within current discussions on epistemology. Someone could object that this work 
showed that the epistemological merits of the Thomist proposal have too high a 
metaphysical cost, since they propose a radical revision of orthodox analytical 
metaphysics. The only r eply to this woiry may b e that the distinctive character of 
analytical philosophy is its openness to philosophical argument and rational scmtiny. 
There is no reason to be reluctant to accept conclusions which may be radically 
different from what one expected, and which require the reconsideration of initially 
distant traditions of thought, if they follow from sound arguments. The Thomist 
tradition may be challenged, and may even be ultimately flawed, but - I think this 
conclusion is indisputable - it is worthy of consideration.
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Appendix
'Analytical Thomism’ and Metaphysical Realism
Doctorial Thesis Presented at the 
University of Padua, Italy, December 1999
A Brief Summary
Part One: Realism, Antirealism, and Mental Representation
Chapter One: Metaphysical Realism, Semantic Realism, and Mental
Representation
1.1 The Debate on Realism
An overview of the debate: definitions and explanations. Metaphysical vs 
epistemological realism, irrealism, anti-cognitivism.
1.2 Metaphysical Realism and Epistemological Realism
Metaphysical realism: weak and strong; epistemological realism: weak and 
strong; examples from Moore, Smart, Putnam, Papineau, and neo-Kantians; 
combinatory possibilities of the different views.
1.3 Metaphysical Realism and Scientific Realism
Different versions of strong metaphysical realism, and the way they deal with 
the objects of science; instrumentalism and phenomenalism are compared.
1.4 Mental Representation: Intentionality and Naturalism
Different views on intentionality are considered and compared; the views 
compatible with naturalism are individuated.
1.5 Realism and Phenomenalism
The problems of perceptual realism within a naturalistic framework are 
considered. Phenomenalism (i.e., sense-data theory) could be a solution, were 
it not that Austin, and, more recently, Valberg offered strong reasons to reject 
it.
1.6 Semantic Realism
The semantic consequence of the conjunction between metaphysical realism 
and naturalism are considered. The resulting view is semantic realism. It is 
claimed that the position is instable, since it purports that we should have 
conceptual abilities which transcend our recognitional capacities.
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Chapter Two: Putnam, the Challenge to Realism, and the Problems of
Internalism
2.1 Putnam and his Arguments Against Metaphysical Realism
It is suggested the r easons of Putnam's interest for the mind-world identity 
theory lay in the excursus of his thought, since the late Sixties. His frequent 
changes of mind could be considered like the development of a whole 
argumentation, which led him to accept direct realism.
2.2 From Frege to Externalism
The focus is on the first stage of Putnam's excursus which concerns the issue 
under discussion. It starts with the abandonment of Frege's idea that thought 
determines meaning, and ends with the endorsement of realism and of the 
theory of direct reference. (Late Sixties to early Seventies).
2.3 The Turn from Metaphysical Realism to Internal Realism
Second phase of Putnam's excursus: mid Seventies to Eighties. Putnam 
abandons metaphysical realism under the pressure of the considerations 
caused by two arguments: the permutation argument and the brains in a vat 
argument. The resulting position is 'internalism' or 'internal realism'", a 
combination of metaphysical antirealism and epistemological realism.
2.4 Internal Realism, Relativism, and Mental Representations
Throughout the Eighties Putnam reached the conclusion that a stable notion 
of reality requires the rejection of the internalism-extemalism distinction. It is 
claimed that the need of experiential constrains o n our conceptual freedom 
emerges also within the internalist framework, opens metaphysical and 
semantic worries with a Kantian flavour and the Aristotelian notion of form 
becomes an appealing possibility.
2.5 From Epistemology) and Semantics to the Theory of Knowledge: The Re- 
emergence of Kant's Problem of Represnetation
It i s c laimed t hat P utnam's c onclusion fits i n a n ovel i nterest for a k antian 
approach to epistemology which has recently become prominent in analytical 
philosophy (for example, though McDowell). It is suggested that Kantian 
epistemology opens problems which can be tackled with Thomistic 
categories. An example taken from Nineteenth-Century neo-Thomism is 
considered: Fabro's work on cognitive psychology.
Part Two: Analytical Thomism and the Return to Realism
Chapter Three: Analytical Thomism, the Challenge to Naturalism, and
Mental Representation
3.1 Putnam, Neo-Aristotelianism, and the Renounce to Naturalism
One of the neo-Aristotelian trends which had an influence on Putnam is 
considered: Nussbaum's works on Aristotle's psychology. In the Sixties, 
Putnam offered a functionalist reading of Aristotle, but Nussbaum objections 
to that reading contributed to Putnam discontent with functionalism. Recent
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exchanges wit Nussbaum led Putnam to defend a fully Aristotelian non­
naturalist conception of the mind.
3.2 Haldane and the Thomistic Theory of Mental Representation
The second neo-Aritotelian trend which influenced Putnam was Analytical 
Thomism. Two of Haldane's contentions are critically discussed: his reasons 
against the naturalisation of intentionality, and his criticism of Putnam's 
discussion of intentionality. It is also discussed how, according to Haldane, 
Thomistic cognitive theory could overcome the problems associated with 
intentionality in contemporary debates.
3.3 Aquinas on the Abstraction of Sensible and Intelligible Forms
The focus is on Aquinas's cognitive theory, which is reconstructed. Some 
crucial points highlighted by critics are discussed: Gaffney, Ryan and 
Schmidt on the common sense, Fabro on the cogitative power, Kemiy and 
Jenkms on the intellect.
3.4 Haldane and Mind-World Formal Identity
Different kinds of representationalism are considered and compared with 
Haldane's proposal, which is based on hylomorphism (against naturalism) and 
a theory of the abstraction of intelligible forms from particular individuals 
(against causal theories of reference and representation). The resulting view is 
the mind-world identity theory.
Chapter Four: Mental Representation and Realism: a Reply to Putnam by
Analytical Thomism
4.1 Metaphysical Reaiism and Aquinas's Outlook
Putnam's reasons against realism are recapitulated and the stand of the 
Thomistic view in the debate on realism is located.
4.2 Thomistic Theory of Mental Representation and Strong Metaphysical Realism 
It is claimed that strong epistemological realism grounded on the Thomistic 
theory of intentionality entails strong metaphysical realism. Quine's 
arguments against strong metaphysical realism are discussed in connection 
with a defence of the Thomistic view suggested by Jacobs and Zeis.
4.3 Why Mental and Linguistic Reference are not Undetermined
The reasons why the Thomistic theory of intentionality avoids the problems 
of realism pointed out by Putnam are considered. The exchange between 
Haldane and Putnam on Thomistic intentionality is discussed. Explanation of 
Putnam's return to realism. Against Boulter, it is claimed that Putnam's long 
journey from realism and back was not idle: the value of direct realism and 
the importance of Aristotelian epistemology emerged from that excursus.
4.4 Mind-World Formal Identity Theory and Semantic Antirealism
The position of the Thomistic theory of intentionality about semantic realism 
is considered. Haldane suggests a sort of weak semantic realism, which is 
grounded on the idea that the form of the world acts on the mind through a
297
relation of fomial causation. Tlie notion of form allows him to claim that the 
world is in principle cognisable, although parts and aspects of it may 
transcend our recognitional capacities. In this way, the merits of semantic 
realism may be maintained, without its troubles. It is argued that Thomistic 
weak semantic realism does not face some fatal problems of antirealism 
highlighted by Ktinne.
4.5 Weak Semantic Realism, Kinds of Recognitional Capacities, and the Role of 
Analogy in Meaning.
Some objections by Boulter against the compatibility between the negation of 
semantic realism and the mind-world identity theory are considered. The 
suggested reply relies on the distinction among different kind of recognitional 
capacities and on the role of analogy in Aquinas's semantics.
Part Three: An Open Problem for Analytical Thomism: The
Representation of Sensible Qualities
Chapter Five: Aquinas on the Reception of Sensible Forms
5.1 Sensation and Materialism
Some theoretical and exegetical problems of Aqunias's theory of abstraction 
are highlighted. The need for Analytical Thomists to tackle them is 
underlined. The issue of materialism and sensation in Aquinas is particularly 
pressing, since it touches upon one of the central themes of naturalism, i.e., 
the view that Thomists attempts to challenge.
5.2 The Debate on Aquinas and the Reception of Sensible Forms
The ontological status of sensible forms in Aquinas has been at the centre of a 
philosophical and exegetical debate since the early Nineteen-Eighties. Going 
through the main views, two fundamental questions emerge: is Aquinas 
notion of intentional existence sufficient to explain cognitivity? Is the 
immaterial reception of forms mentioned by Aquinas an event occurring in 
the body or in the soul?
5.3 Pasnau and Semimaterialism
Semimaterialism, Pasnau's recent characterisation of Aquinas's view, is 
reconstructed: it holds that the immaterial reception of forms is a completely 
physical event occurring in the body and that, as a result, cognitivity is a 
capacity possessed also by non-intelligent animals, and even by beings 
lacking awareness.
5.4 Materiality and the Cognitive Role of Sensation in Aquinas
A criticism of Pasnau's semimaterialism is suggested. It requires some 
detailed analysis of Aquinas's notions of matter and form. The conclusion is 
that although according to Aquinas sensation occurs in the body, it purports 
an event of the whole human soul, which is not a material thing. It is 
contented that Aquinas's claims are incompatible with contemporary 
physicalism, but they are not incoherent or implausible for that reason.
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5.5 The Nature of Sensible Forms: Mere Representations or Real Objects of
Knowledge?
The issue of sensible forms raises a problem also about the nature of fonrns 
existing in reality: according to Aquinas, are they real properties of things, or 
are they the powers which give rise to sensations? An exegesis due to Kenny 
is discussed and some ambiguities are disentangled through the Thomistic 
distinction between first and second actualities. The conclusion is that 
sensible forms (colours, odours, and so on) are real properties of things.
Chapter Six: The Simple View of Colour and the Reference of Perceptual
Terms
6.1 The Debale on Secondary Qualities
The conclusion of the previous chapter opens the problem of the distinction 
between primary and secondary qualities, and suggests that Aquinas did not 
hold that distinction. Is that a plausible view? Some contemporary attempts to 
answer that question are expounded:.
6.2 Mackie and MacDowell on Secondary Qualities
Mackie took from Locke the idea that the distinction between primary and 
secondary qualities holds, and he explained it in the terms of subjectivity and 
objectivity of phenomenal properties. McDowell objected to Mackie's
" distinction between subjectivity and objectivity, but maintained the 
distinction between primary and secondary qualities: the former, unlike the 
latter, carnot be thought of other than like contents of some subjective state.
6.3 Campbell: A Crilictsm Againstthe Primary-Secondary Qualities Dtshcctinn 
Campbell has rejected McDowell distinction: all thinkable things can only be 
thought of as contents of subjective states, since even spatial location 
assumed by physics is only specifiable through the reference to a subject. 
Consequently, he rejects the primary-secondary qualities distinction and 
accepts the simpie view of colour: colourS' and other traditional secondary 
qualities, are real properties of things. Smith advanced several criticisms 
against this view.
6.4 The Simple View of Colour: a Defence
Some replies to Smith's objections are proposed. The replies rely on a non- 
phys^calist account of causation according to which it makes sense to claim 
that colours, odours and so on have causal powers.
6.5 The Simple View of Colour and Semantic Exiernaliem
Jim Edwards argued that the simple view of colour seems to presuppose 
semantic externalism, but is incoherent with it. In order to show the 
incoherence, he gives a counterexample in which contradictory consequences 
are derived from the conjunction of semantic externalism and the simple 
view.
6.6 Semantic Exiernaliem and Internalism about Warrant
A slightly modified version of Edwards's counterexample is applied to 
primary qualities and it has the same unpleasant consequences which it had in
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the case of colour. I consequently note that the incoherence can be given a 
different d iagnosis: t he p roblem a rises w hen wet ake thee xternal s emantic 
value of terms to warrant assertions embedding those terms. If we distinguish 
externalism of semantic value and internalism of warrant, the problem can be 
avoided and the simple view is vindicated.
Conclusion
Analytical Thomism may be a significant contender in contemporary epistemology. 
Of course, it needs to face a number of challenges, but this is true of any 
philosophical proposal. The third part has shown that some of the challenges can be 
met: others can be probably confronted in similar mamiers. The most urgent task for 
Thomists seems to be that of offering a satisfying elucidation of the notions of formal 
causation and its metaphysical presuppositions: that notion, indeed, plays a key role 
in the cognitive process which grounds the Thomist proposal, but it is difficult to 
accept or even to understand in contemporary terms.
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